Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On Sep 13, 2014 1:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. Brent, Can you elaborate on why qm depends on a continuum? Thanks, Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 9/13/2014 6:12 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Sep 13, 2014 1:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. Brent, Can you elaborate on why qm depends on a continuum? It assumes linearity, continuous complex valued linear combinations of states and corresponding continuous values of probabilities. Notice I said as we've formulated it. I don't have a proof that it would be impossible to formulate a different, but quantum like, theory avoiding a continuum. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
Well, me neither, but it includes infinities - atoms would probably collapse - etc. But just a guess hence the provisos. Personally I would imagine most mathematical universes wouldn't support life though. On 13 September 2014 17:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 10:25 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 September 2014 08:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 2:20 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. I don't think it's equal. If MUH is true then all those other mathematical theories must be realized in some other universes where they are not just approximations. Then it's no longer the case that mathematics is unreasonably effective in picking out our universe; it could pick out any one of them. Either it would just be chance that we're in THIS mathematical universe, or there's an anthropic selection that prevents intelligent beings in universes with different mathematical bases. It seems obvious to me that there would be an anthropic selection effect. Organisms (probably) couldn't exist in a universe made from, for example, Newtonian physics - you (probably) need quantum physics for fidelity of reproduction, and maybe for making brains. Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. I would expect that most continuum based theories could support intelligent life simply because they permit lots of information. But it's very speculative. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 9/13/2014 1:10 PM, LizR wrote: Well, me neither, but it includes infinities - atoms would probably collapse - etc. The Hilbert space for an atom, even a hydrogen atom, is infinite dimensional. But just a guess hence the provisos. Personally I would imagine most mathematical universes wouldn't support life though. Sure, but you'd guess that about physical universes too just from observing how rare life seems to be in our universe. It's hard to say anything useful though because there's no canonical measure to apply. I've had this discussion with proponents of fine-tuning arguments too. They pick on some variable and say it's fine tuned, but with respect to what measure. The notional variable range is infinite, so whether it's fine tuned or coarse tuned depends on how you slip in some intuitive measure. Brent On 13 September 2014 17:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 10:25 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 September 2014 08:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 2:20 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. I don't think it's equal. If MUH is true then all those other mathematical theories must be realized in some other universes where they are not just approximations. Then it's no longer the case that mathematics is unreasonably effective in picking out our universe; it could pick out any one of them. Either it would just be chance that we're in THIS mathematical universe, or there's an anthropic selection that prevents intelligent beings in universes with different mathematical bases. It seems obvious to me that there would be an anthropic selection effect. Organisms (probably) couldn't exist in a universe made from, for example, Newtonian physics - you (probably) need quantum physics for fidelity of reproduction, and maybe for making brains. Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. I would expect that most continuum based theories could support intelligent life simply because they permit lots of information. But it's very speculative. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 13 Sep 2014, at 4:57 am, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 7:48 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Zero, even though they were all superstars and doing quite well for themselves. Sure, there are examples of great selflessness in the name of stepping forward together too, but this is rather exceptional. PGC One example that proves me wrong nicely and shows we can do without conveniently ignoring each other, even if we share similar lines of work: Little excursion: The relation between Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schönberg. In short brute form: Mahler championed the classical world, while Schönberg started to experiment with 12 tone music of 20th century. On many levels, one could think this is a parallel to the encounter of Einstein and Bohr, classicism versus quantum simultaneity, ancient Hellenic forms versus brave new world of incomprehensible peculiarities, God vs. a game of chance playing for truth. After a disastrous first dinner (the kind where Schönberg terminated the evening meal he was invited to at the Mahler House by storming out into the Vienna streets, after talking shop had become a bit too serious after some glasses of wine), Mahler would not only reverse his view on Schönberg's character, but in exemplary form simply acknowledge: I don't really understand what he does, but my ears are growing old. He put everything where his mouth and songs were: Mahler would give Schönberg references as Musikdireketor in Vienna, help Schönberg's music get played/published, even insist with public verbal reprimand that the snobby Vienna elite stop screeching their chairs on the floor during a Schönberg performance, get physically involved in throwing out a rabble-rouser at another performance, and even financially support the young Schönberg. Mahler didn't get Schönberg's music, but he gave the provocateur that questioned the entire musical legacy he stood for and represented, benefit of the doubt. Imagine Einstein doing this for Bohr. In music however, Schönberg spearheading the new paradigm and school of thought would not stop him from becoming one of Mahler's most adoring fans which is evident from letters or his reaction to Mahler's 8th Symphony. There are countless other examples in which people rectify mistakes and get over violent/competitive histories. In the end Mahler's heart shines through the histories, the technical quagmires, and differing musical theologies and theories between the two. No need for this competitive posing around. It can be done. And where there are strong women and men, it is. PGC It's not really that profound methinks, though I enjoy greatly your detailing of the fascinating love/hate between Gus and Arnie. Actually they were a couple of Jewish intellectuals competing with each other in the way that Jewish intellectuals always have and always will. Competitiveness amongst Jewish intellectuals is a lot of what drives science and art. Bohr was not Jewish so Niels and Albert simply weren't on the same wavelength. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
Thanks Brent. If you could prove it would be impossible to formulate a quantum theory without continuous values and probabilities, that would be ironic. Terren On Sep 13, 2014 12:05 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/13/2014 6:12 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Sep 13, 2014 1:49 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. Brent, Can you elaborate on why qm depends on a continuum? It assumes linearity, continuous complex valued linear combinations of states and corresponding continuous values of probabilities. Notice I said as we've formulated it. I don't have a proof that it would be impossible to formulate a different, but quantum like, theory avoiding a continuum. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 1:46 AM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: It's not really that profound methinks, though I enjoy greatly your detailing of the fascinating love/hate between Gus and Arnie. Actually they were a couple of Jewish intellectuals competing with each other in the way that Jewish intellectuals always have and always will. Competitiveness amongst Jewish intellectuals is a lot of what drives science and art. Bohr was not Jewish so Niels and Albert simply weren't on the same wavelength. Apologies. Up until this moment, I had only been aware of the non Jewish kind of competitiveness and saw parallels also between Bohr and Everett, to take another example of these difficult kinds of relations. My point being that what seem like huge gulfs technically, can turn out to be Einstein spooking Bohr, or Mahler respecting Schönberg, or Bohr having none of Everett. In all cases you can have fruitful continuations in longer run, therefore the subject is trickier and as profound as it gets imho; not least because it's also bears on theological question. Maybe one for machines. But I'm too lazy to defend the idea or get competitive about it... PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 14 September 2014 10:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/13/2014 1:10 PM, LizR wrote: Well, me neither, but it includes infinities - atoms would probably collapse - etc. The Hilbert space for an atom, even a hydrogen atom, is infinite dimensional. Of course, but Newtonian physics makes *everything* infinitely fine-grained, while quantum physics places limits on what can do what. For example it seems unlikely to me that you can have life without some digital information storage mechanism that is based on some version of quantum physics (like DNA)but who knows for sure? But just a guess hence the provisos. Personally I would imagine most mathematical universes wouldn't support life though. Sure, but you'd guess that about physical universes too just from observing how rare life seems to be in our universe. I might, but if I was looking for life-bearing universes in (say) the string landscape, I wouldn't actually try to do it by physical examination, even if granted the godlike powers required to do so. I would more likely start with whether the laws of physics in each universe allow the formation of a range of elements, whether they make the formation of large scale structures likely, what complexity of chemical compounds they make available, etc. I wouldn't look for life in the level 2 multiverse with a telescope! It's hard to say anything useful though because there's no canonical measure to apply. I've had this discussion with proponents of fine-tuning arguments too. They pick on some variable and say it's fine tuned, but with respect to what measure. The notional variable range is infinite, so whether it's fine tuned or coarse tuned depends on how you slip in some intuitive measure. Yes, I agree, this is the problem with this sort of discussion. The question is whether we can actually reach any meaningful conclusions based on the information we have available, or whether we might as well be writing technobabble for Star Trek and Doctor Who. I don't know the answer. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 September 2014 17:31, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, As far as I know, Max does not have a theory. He just has a hypothesis with nothing theoretical to back it up. I'm not sure about that. He does go on about properties we'd expect the universe to have (I think that runs into a measure problem, however?) One aspect of his hypothesis is that the creation of matter requires math that is both consistent and complete. If that is so... Whereas Godel has seemingly to me proven that such math does not exist. Is that true? ...then this disproves it, I believe. I don't know if that is so, however. Also it seems to me that if his hypothesis has this aspect, that is indeed something theoretical to back it up (and indeed falsifiable, as you've just shown). PS Mind you Bruno only requires some very simple arithmetic for comp, I'm told, so is it possible Max's MUH is similar? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 Sep 2014, at 03:09, ColinHales wrote: Hi Liz (Your post is below), Seriously dropped the ball on email on this. Apologies. Deeply impoverished? How on earth can the preamble indicate richness? I wish! J My sole purpose all along is to build hardware that replicates brain physics to make real AGI. I became a scientist to do this. No salary for over a decade. Takes that long to become a scientist. Brain electromagnetism is my specialisation. Then to work as a scientist, because you have no decent track record, you get minimal/no grants. You work as an honorary. You never get told you're right. You never get told you're wrong. Mostly you get ignorance/shallow dismissive shoot from hip or silence. You get a book published because the reviewers can't say it's wrong intelligently. You do seminars, everyone claps and asks questions that seem to indicate you communicated well enough. And then you sit, in poverty, waiting for something to happen. Waiting for that penny to drop. I am starting to conclude that I may be one of those unfortunate people born just a bit too early. Don't know. It's as if I am Galileo that skipped the meeting with the church and went straight into virtual 'as-if' house arrest as a result of the silence. A bit melodramatic but... erm illustrative of how it feels some days. Kuhn, revolutions, etc. If you read the book (attached 1st of 2 sections) you'll find the Kuhnian idea of revolutions is, in ch 13 properly contextualised (Extracts below). If ever there was a revolution, this one _we are in_ now is equal to that of the 1st, which is the enlightenment (rise of empiricism) and caused the industrial revolution. The rest of the story of change is that of a power-law (quoted below from the book). Yes, i agree with you . the 'amount' of change is a hard thing to define and Kuhn's take was an outlier... Had he been aware of power law physics history may have been different. Godel. While there is a Godellian take on the 'structure aspect science '/'appearance-aspect science' relationship, it is not a key insight into the implementation of the observer. Just because Godel put self-reference into maths does not entail this is literally speaking to the process of subjective experience (scientific observation) implemented by an actual real world made of some real structural primitive - that being explained by the proposed new science framework, Dual Aspect Science. Am preparing a paper on the Godellian interpretation of cellular automata. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to 'be' the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science (1) The actual unseen invisible underlying natural world of which we are all made and inside (2) describing the structure of (1) that accounts for an observer and (3) describing how (1) appears to the (2) observer. For 350 years we do(3) only. I expand it to (1)/(2)/(3). As a self consistent, and as-complete-as-it-gets framework for scientific knowledge. 1 half of book attached. 2nd half in second email. Please read it. I mention Godel p254 in relation to formal systems. Zero philosophy. This is an empirical proposition. Philosophy is discarded as irrelevant early in the book. The choice of assumption is always philosophical, even theological if there is an ontological commitment. And you do assumes (explicitly?) nature. This makes your approach non computationalist. What is non computational in nature. Also, you are right that math describes nature and nature is not made of math (which is meaningless), but this does not entail the existence of a nature which would not be describable as an aspect of the mathematical reality. (1)(2)(3) is what the antic greeks were doing. Bruno Regards, Colin P285/286 That said, the way paradigms were viewed after Kuhn's Structure has been largely re-engineered by subsequent reviews, including some by Kuhn. Post 1962, there was a large discourse (it still continues! E.g. [Weinert, 2013]) that disagreed that the evidence Kuhn presented supported the idea of 'sudden shift' to an incommensurable paradigm. All manner of re-characterisation of scientific change has subsequently added nothing particularly clarifying. Even if it did clarify, like everything else in this area of philosophy, it is practically irrelevant to scientists, who remain unaware of it and even if they were aware it would change nothing. The answer to this, from a dynamical systems perspective, is that changes in the statements made by scientists have what would be called, by scientists, a 'power law' seismology
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 Sep 2014, at 03:36, LizR wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to 'be' the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply claiming that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. Max ignores the FPI. he seems to (re)discover it in his book, (but he knew my work so that is a bit weird, to remain polite), but he still does not (like many) take it into account. In fact he has a less wrong ontology (with respect to computationalism) but ignore the computationalist mind-body problem. It makes both mind and body having non mathematical appearance from inside a little clear mathematical structure. He gives the correct fundamental role to math, but he is still doing physics, and not the math needed to recover physics from math. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 Sep 2014, at 04:19, meekerdb wrote: On 9/11/2014 6:36 PM, LizR wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to 'be' the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply claiming that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. I'd say mathematics is just a matter of being very precise about axioms and what you infer from them so that you find lots of interesting consequences but don't fall into contradiction. ? Basically all mathematiciens having serach for a mathematical unification of mathematics, like Church with lambda calculus, or Frege with sets, or Curry with combinators have been driven toward inconsistent theories. Each time the mathematical reality kicked back and called for more modesty. Your view is called conventionalism, and in my opinion made unsustainable by Gödel and Co. Even Einstein, a big conventionalist in math, get some doubt after discussing with Gödel. Then with comp, the existence of a physical universe dopes not make more sense than a creationist god. It simply does not work. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 12 Sep 2014, at 07:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, As far as I know, Max does not have a theory. He just has a hypothesis with nothing theoretical to back it up. One aspect of his hypothesis is that the creation of matter requires math that is both consistent and complete. Whereas Godel has seemingly to me proven that such math does not exist. Is that true? Gödel showed that you cannot have an effective (checkable theory) which is both consistent and complete. But you can have a theory consistent and complete. It will just be non effective. The theorems will not be recursively enumerable, and you will be unable to check mechanically if a proof is valid, or if a true proposition is provable. A simple example is just the set of all true arithmetical propositions. Only a logician can call that a theory. usually the theories have to be effective to be considered as genuine theory. usually, the non effective structure related to truth is called a model in logic (but the set of sentences true in that model is also called theory by logicians, but those are most of the time non effective (non Recursively enumerable). Bruno Rich On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/11/2014 6:36 PM, LizR wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to 'be' the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply claiming that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. I'd say mathematics is just a matter of being very precise about axioms and what you infer from them so that you find lots of interesting consequences but don't fall into contradiction. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 11:23 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 September 2014 17:31, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, As far as I know, Max does not have a theory. He just has a hypothesis with nothing theoretical to back it up. I'm not sure about that. He does go on about properties we'd expect the universe to have (I think that runs into a measure problem, however?) One aspect of his hypothesis is that the creation of matter requires math that is both consistent and complete. If that is so... Whereas Godel has seemingly to me proven that such math does not exist. Is that true? ...then this disproves it, I believe. I don't know if that is so, however. Also it seems to me that if his hypothesis has this aspect, that is indeed something theoretical to back it up (and indeed falsifiable, as you've just shown). PS Mind you Bruno only requires some very simple arithmetic for comp, I'm told, so is it possible Max's MUH is similar? I've read both and I don't think Max is/has pursued the rabbit hole of implications of possible comp as far or as thorough as Bruno. Then it's a matter of reasoning the few possible reasons why he doesn't cite or engage Bruno. Sure, there are some Einstein's, but in many cases the guy with popularity is always worse at the thing itself, precisely because he is better at popularity. This holds often not only in name polishing of science/reputation but also in music we are not free from this: which opera composers that got Bach's gigs, knowing full well of his work and existence, would fork over their deals/connections just to disseminate another composer's (Bach's) work, that we clearly see today as more complete and mature? Zero, even though they were all superstars and doing quite well for themselves. Sure, there are examples of great selflessness in the name of stepping forward together too, but this is rather exceptional. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 7:48 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Zero, even though they were all superstars and doing quite well for themselves. Sure, there are examples of great selflessness in the name of stepping forward together too, but this is rather exceptional. PGC One example that proves me wrong nicely and shows we can do without conveniently ignoring each other, even if we share similar lines of work: Little excursion: The relation between Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schönberg. In short brute form: Mahler championed the classical world, while Schönberg started to experiment with 12 tone music of 20th century. On many levels, one could think this is a parallel to the encounter of Einstein and Bohr, classicism versus quantum simultaneity, ancient Hellenic forms versus brave new world of incomprehensible peculiarities, God vs. a game of chance playing for truth. After a disastrous first dinner (the kind where Schönberg terminated the evening meal he was invited to at the Mahler House by storming out into the Vienna streets, after talking shop had become a bit too serious after some glasses of wine), Mahler would not only reverse his view on Schönberg's character, but in exemplary form simply acknowledge: I don't really understand what he does, but my ears are growing old. He put everything where his mouth and songs were: Mahler would give Schönberg references as Musikdireketor in Vienna, help Schönberg's music get played/published, even insist with public verbal reprimand that the snobby Vienna elite stop screeching their chairs on the floor during a Schönberg performance, get physically involved in throwing out a rabble-rouser at another performance, and even financially support the young Schönberg. Mahler didn't get Schönberg's music, but he gave the provocateur that questioned the entire musical legacy he stood for and represented, benefit of the doubt. Imagine Einstein doing this for Bohr. In music however, Schönberg spearheading the new paradigm and school of thought would not stop him from becoming one of Mahler's most adoring fans which is evident from letters or his reaction to Mahler's 8th Symphony. There are countless other examples in which people rectify mistakes and get over violent/competitive histories. In the end Mahler's heart shines through the histories, the technical quagmires, and differing musical theologies and theories between the two. No need for this competitive posing around. It can be done. And where there are strong women and men, it is. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 9/12/2014 2:20 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. I don't think it's equal. If MUH is true then all those other mathematical theories must be realized in some other universes where they are not just approximations. Then it's no longer the case that mathematics is unreasonably effective in picking out our universe; it could pick out any one of them. Either it would just be chance that we're in THIS mathematical universe, or there's an anthropic selection that prevents intelligent beings in universes with different mathematical bases. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 13 September 2014 05:48, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: I've read both and I don't think Max is/has pursued the rabbit hole of implications of possible comp as far or as thorough as Bruno. I agree. I just stuck with Max because his version is more straightforward to argue. Then it's a matter of reasoning the few possible reasons why he doesn't cite or engage Bruno. Sure, there are some Einstein's, but in many cases the guy with popularity is always worse at the thing itself, precisely because he is better at popularity. Yes, well, I write novels and make up cryptic crosswords, but the thought of trying to sell the damn things (not necessarily for money, just to publicise them) gives me a panic attack. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 13 September 2014 08:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 2:20 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. I don't think it's equal. If MUH is true then all those other mathematical theories must be realized in some other universes where they are not just approximations. Then it's no longer the case that mathematics is unreasonably effective in picking out our universe; it could pick out any one of them. Either it would just be chance that we're in THIS mathematical universe, or there's an anthropic selection that prevents intelligent beings in universes with different mathematical bases. It seems obvious to me that there would be an anthropic selection effect. Organisms (probably) couldn't exist in a universe made from, for example, Newtonian physics - you (probably) need quantum physics for fidelity of reproduction, and maybe for making brains. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 9/12/2014 10:25 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 September 2014 08:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/12/2014 2:20 AM, LizR wrote: On 12 September 2014 14:19, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Or equally consistent, at least. Assuming that maths is broader than what is required to describe (or generate) our universe, this is equally consistent with the MUH. I don't think it's equal. If MUH is true then all those other mathematical theories must be realized in some other universes where they are not just approximations. Then it's no longer the case that mathematics is unreasonably effective in picking out our universe; it could pick out any one of them. Either it would just be chance that we're in THIS mathematical universe, or there's an anthropic selection that prevents intelligent beings in universes with different mathematical bases. It seems obvious to me that there would be an anthropic selection effect. Organisms (probably) couldn't exist in a universe made from, for example, Newtonian physics - you (probably) need quantum physics for fidelity of reproduction, and maybe for making brains. Yes, I agree that there's bound to be some anthropic selection, although I'm not sure why a Newtonian universe is ruled out by that. Quantum physics, as we've formulated it depends on a continuum. I would expect that most continuum based theories could support intelligent life simply because they permit lots of information. But it's very speculative. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to ‘be’ the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply *claiming* that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
Or chs 9-14 of course! (In fact I hadn't even opened your 2nd email when I wrote that...) I will do my best to have a look at the book, and if I have any sensible comments I'll get back with them. On 12 September 2014 13:36, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to ‘be’ the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply *claiming* that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
On 9/11/2014 6:36 PM, LizR wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to ‘be’ the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply /claiming/that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. I'd say mathematics is just a matter of being very precise about axioms and what you infer from them so that you find lots of interesting consequences but don't fall into contradiction. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Book: Revolutions of Scientific Structure (book section 1/2)
Liz, As far as I know, Max does not have a theory. He just has a hypothesis with nothing theoretical to back it up. One aspect of his hypothesis is that the creation of matter requires math that is both consistent and complete. Whereas Godel has seemingly to me proven that such math does not exist. Is that true? Rich On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/11/2014 6:36 PM, LizR wrote: Obviously I haven't read the PDF file with Chs 1-8, which may take me a while - but I do (mildly) take issue with this assertion. Mathematics is merely a description of nature. Nature can operate mathematically (adverb), but cannot be claimed to ‘be’ the mathematics. Being predictive with/using mathematics does not prove nature is made of it. I deal with nature itself. Not maths. When you realise this you end up with dual aspect science. A 3 tiered epistemic framework practical for science This is of course the position that science has taken for the past few centuries without realising that there was any alternative. However, now that Max Tegmark (and of course Bruno) have argued that there is an alternative, simply *claiming* that nature cannot be made of maths no longer cuts the mustard. It's true that maths being predictive doesn't prove that nature is made of maths because as we know, science doesn't set out to prove anything, especially not sweeping ontological claims. But it still seems quite possible to me, at least, that Max may be onto something, because as he points out his theory explains the unreasonable effectiveness of maths in physics - so I will be interested to hear some counter arguments that explain this effectiveness on a non universe-is-maths basis. So far I've seen a bit of handwavium, but generally I've been underwhelmed by the alternatives presented to explain this, which leaves Max's theory out in front in terms of explanatory power, as far as this particular issue is concerned. Not that there aren't problems with Max's theory, of course. (It's mind boggling for a bear of little brain like me to attempt to grasp how it could possibly actually work) But it does seem plausible enough to deserve decent counter-arguments. One counter argument is to note that math has been unreasonably effective in Ptolemaic astronomy, Newtonian physics, fluid dynamics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and other theories which we now think were mere approximations. This seems much more consistent with mathematics being descriptive rather than prescriptive. I'd say mathematics is just a matter of being very precise about axioms and what you infer from them so that you find lots of interesting consequences but don't fall into contradiction. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
