Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

>
> Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true mainly
> because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting that
> deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality but
> doesn't require hidden variables (see
> https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
> work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.
>

I have had a chance now to look at the paper Jesse refers to here by
Brassard et al. As I suspected, it is nothing more than a load of nonsense.
They model the correlations in terms of what they call "non-local boxes".
This is all very well, but no such boxes are physically realizable, so
their argument rather loses its point.

The interesting part of the paper for our discussion, is section 5, in
which they give what they consider to be a local explanation of the Bell
correlations. Since their non-local boxes are not physical, I will
translate their argument into measurements by Alice and Bob on a pair of
entangled particles in the singlet state.  One can reproduce the Brassard
argument by considering only the case in which Alice and Bob use parallel
polarizers. The quantum correlation is then that if Alice measures 'up',
Bob necessarily measures 'down'. And if Alice measures 'down', Bob
necessarily measures 'up'.

I continue with a quote for page 8 of the paper (translated into spin
measurement terms).
"For example, if Alice sees 'up', she splits, and there is a 'parallel'
Alice who sees 'down'. Her system can be imagined to carry the following
rule: you are allowed to interact with Bob if he saw 'down'. Should this
Alice ever come into the presence of a Bob who had seen 'up', she would
simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
the one who had seen 'down', would be free to shake hands with that Bob."

The paper goes on to elaborate this argument in terms of what happens to
Bob after he splits on seeing either 'up' or 'down'.

In their attempt to eliminate non-locality, Brassard et al. have been
forced to resort to unvarnished magic. The split Alices and Bobs inhabit
different parallel worlds, so what happens when Alice_up meets Bob is that
she splits into two copies again: one who sees Bob_up and one who sees
Bob_down. Similarly for Alice_down. Brassard et al. are essentially
claiming that magically, the pairing of Alice_up with Bob_up can never
happen. They give no rationale for this, or any physical explanation as to
how this could happen. They simply claim that the pairings up-up and
down-down are forbidden and can't happen -- by magic it would see. Of
course this magic is local in that it happens only when Alice and Bob meet.
But that is no more a physical explanation of the Bell correlations than is
the existence of Brassard's "non-local boxes". Of course, the argument they
give cannot be generalized to the typical case of non-parallel polarizers
either.

The whole paper is a crock of shit!

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Lawrence Crowell]

 

The Born rule is not a proven result within the postulates or physical 
axioms of quantum mechanics. It is something that works well in QM, and we 
take it as almost a type of proven theorem. It is related to the Gleason 
theorem, so it might in the end be provable.

The attempt by Hossenfelder and Palmer to derive a superdeterminism may 
lead to interesting results, but maybe very differently from what she 
thinks. The formalism relies upon p-adic number theory. I think that for 
Hossenfelder and Palmer to be right it requires that Hilbert’s 10th problem 
have a solution.  Since superdeterminism is a global law it would require a 
single consistent algorithm for solving p-adic problems, which are 
equivalent to Diophantine equations.  Matiyasevich proved a variant of the 
Gödel theorem which showed global solutions do not exist.

In effect there are limits to systems and observations. In particular, 
these systems when they observe themselves are akin to Turing machines that 
encode each other. The universal Turing machine is not able to emulate all 
machines, such as itself emulating all machines including itself. There is 
then a type of measurement horizon, which does not permit the encoding of 
all possible information within the algorithm of the TMs. We may think of 
this as a sort of horizon that requires a “forcing” of the numerical 
system. This lack of a universal solution to of p-adic Hossenfelder and 
Palmer appeal to us a type of forcing that requires imaginary numbers in 
QM. Something similar occurs with spacetime as built from quantum 
entanglements. This incompleteness is translated into the occurrence of 
horizons in spacetime.
There is a lot of course I am glossing over above, but I think nature has 
these fundamental limits on the capacity for systems of encode themselves. 
This is I think one element behind QM and GR. With Hossenfelder and Palmer 
they advance something that appears mathematically false, and because of 
this they can say there are absolutely determined hidden variables. 

LC

On Sunday, December 26, 2021 at 5:15:07 AM UTC-6 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 11:04 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> *> To equate probability with self-location there must be a proportionate 
>> number of locations.  Otherwise you would have to suppose there is some 
>> "weight" of being in a certain branch.  *
>
>
> Not a weight of being, all the observers in all the branches feel equally 
> real regardless of the amplitude of the quantum wave, but you do need to 
> adjust the probability if you want unitarity, and without that 
> "probability" is meaningless. Fortunately there is an obvious way to do 
> that by way of the Born rule.
>
>
> *> Neither of these exist in the bare Schroedinger equation.  I'm not 
>> saying the MWI is wrong because it needs these supplementary hypotheses;*
>
>
> The Born Rule is not a hypothesis, it's a proven fact, or at least as 
> close to one as science ever gets. And the quantum wave is not 
> "supplementary", it's what Schrodinger's equation is all about.
>
>  > *but I am saying its superiority to simply saying one branch happens 
>> is less than obvious.*
>
>
> Every quantum interpretation (except for superdeterminism which believes 
> in ontological certitude not probability) takes the Born Rule for granted, 
> including Many Worlds.
>
> John K Clark   See what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
> 
> qwf
>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 11:04 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> To equate probability with self-location there must be a proportionate
> number of locations.  Otherwise you would have to suppose there is some
> "weight" of being in a certain branch.  *


Not a weight of being, all the observers in all the branches feel equally
real regardless of the amplitude of the quantum wave, but you do need to
adjust the probability if you want unitarity, and without that
"probability" is meaningless. Fortunately there is an obvious way to do
that by way of the Born rule.

*> Neither of these exist in the bare Schroedinger equation.  I'm not
> saying the MWI is wrong because it needs these supplementary hypotheses;*


The Born Rule is not a hypothesis, it's a proven fact, or at least as close
to one as science ever gets. And the quantum wave is not "supplementary",
it's what Schrodinger's equation is all about.

 > *but I am saying its superiority to simply saying one branch happens is
> less than obvious.*


Every quantum interpretation (except for superdeterminism which believes in
ontological certitude not probability) takes the Born Rule for granted,
including Many Worlds.

John K Clark   See what's on my new list at  Extropolis

qwf

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 6:38 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 02:57:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> > If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear
> > function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then
> > the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B
> > is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already
> > start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a
> difficulty.
> >
> >
> >
> > I don't understand what you are talking about. If a trial has two
> possible
> > outcomes, and every outcome is realized in every trial, then after N
> trials
> > there are 2^N possible sequences of outcomes. These cover all possible
> binary
> > strings of length N, independent of the probabilities for individual
> outcomes
> > on any single trial. The binomial theorem (or the law of large numbers)
> then
> > implies that as N becomes large, in the large majority of sequences you
> will
> > have approximately equal numbers of each result. If these sequences are
> used to
> > estimate the probabilities, then most sequences will give p = 0.5 for
> each
> > result. This is a well-known result.
>
> Consider a fair dice, and the two outcomes: a six, and the numbers
> 1-5. According to your argument, the probability of each outcome is
> 1/2. Clearly something has gone wrong.
>

The only thing that has gone wrong is that you are using your intuition
that there are more integers between 1 and 5 than for the single six. The
Hilbert space is still only two dimensional and can be represented by

   |psi> = a|1> + b |0>

If both outcomes are realized on each trial, then after one trial we have
branches

 0, and 1.

After 2 trials, we have 4 branches: 00, 01, 10, and 11.
After 3 trials, there are 8 branches: 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110,
and 111.

After N trials , there are 2^N branches, covering all possible binary
sequences of length N. According to the binomial theorem, the distribution
of 0s and 1s tends to peak towards equal numbers as N increases. So, for
large N, the majority of branches have proportions of 0 and 1 that tend
towards 1/2.

This is a simple and indisputable consequence of the law of large numbers.
One notes that the outcomes on the 2^N branches are independent of the
original weights (coefficients) a and b. Since both outcomes are realized
on each trial, the individual weights are of no consequence -- one cannot
get a different set of 2^N bit strings by changing the weights. Your
intuition that 1-5 and 6 have different weights has led you astray when we
are considering only two dimensional outcomes.

Since the majority of sequences for large N have approximately equal
numbers of 0s and 1s, the probability for each tends towards 0.5,
independent of the presumed weights for each possibility.


What I'm saying is that the probability must depend on both the
> anterior and posterior states. In this thought experiment, the
> anterior state is one of maximum ignorance, but the posterior states
> have uneven weights.
>


What you are claiming is that the probability should depend on the
coefficients a and b in the above general form for a vector in a
2-dimensional Hilbert space. That intuition breaks down when both
possibilities are realized on each trial. The development of the state

  |psi> = a|1> + b|0>

is given by

   |psi>|environment> = (a|1> + b|0>)|envirnment> = a|environment_1> +
b|environment_0>

and the environment itself is not affected by the coefficients (weights) a
and b.

In the 2-dimensional case, the probabilities for each outcome tend to 0.5
for any input vector.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 02:57:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> 
> If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear
> function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then
> the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B
> is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already
> start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a 
> difficulty.
> 
> 
> 
> I don't understand what you are talking about. If a trial has two possible
> outcomes, and every outcome is realized in every trial, then after N trials
> there are 2^N possible sequences of outcomes. These cover all possible binary
> strings of length N, independent of the probabilities for individual outcomes
> on any single trial. The binomial theorem (or the law of large numbers) then
> implies that as N becomes large, in the large majority of sequences you will
> have approximately equal numbers of each result. If these sequences are used 
> to
> estimate the probabilities, then most sequences will give p = 0.5 for each
> result. This is a well-known result.

Consider a fair dice, and the two outcomes: a six, and the numbers
1-5. According to your argument, the probability of each outcome is
1/2. Clearly something has gone wrong.

What I'm saying is that the probability must depend on both the
anterior and posterior states. In this thought experiment, the
anterior state is one of maximum ignorance, but the posterior states
have uneven weights.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/25/2021 7:24 AM, John Clark wrote:

Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> What in the world are you talking about.Determining the
quantum wave function is the only reason the Schrodinger
equation is of any use, and the Born Rule is the only reason
the quantum wave function is of any use.


/> The wave function is a vector in Hilbert space.The Schrodinger
equation determines the time evolution of the vector./


Right. And that's why the Born Ruleis just Pythagoras's theorem in 
action.


> >> /after the number of branches is supplemented to
be in the proportion required by the Born rule/

>> After the number of branches is amplified or reduced
*according to the amplitude of the wave function*.


/> That is essentially what I said. There must be a form of branch
counting if self-locating uncertainty is going to work to give you
the probability./


If one branch does not correspond to just one integer but instead some 
branches must be "supplemented" more than others then you're not doing 
branch counting, in fact you're not doing "counting" of any sort.


To equate probability with self-location there must be a proportionate 
number of locations.  Otherwise you would have to suppose there is some 
"weight" of being in a certain branch. Neither of these exist in the 
bare Schroedinger equation.  I'm not saying the MWI is wrong because it 
needs these supplementary hypotheses; but I am saying its superiority to 
simply saying one branch happens is less than obvious.


Brent

Actually it's even worse than that because when you're counting 
physical things and not just numbers you have to be sure that the 
units are the same, that's why 2 apples plus 2 more apples does NOT 
equal 4 oranges. A branch is not a probability, to an observer on a 
rare low amplitude branch things would seem just as real to him as an 
observer in a common high amplitude branch. And because a branch is 
not a probability you can't add up branches and expect to get a 
probability.


/> In MWI, it is assumed that in any measurement all possible
outcomes are realized, albeit in different worlds./


Yes.

> /Any vector in a Hilbert space is expanded in terms of the same
set of eigenvectors, so has the same set of possible outcomes./


I'm not talking aboutHilbert spaceand I'm not talking about 
eigenvectors, I'm talking about probabilities. And to determine 
probability if you must use a variable conversion factor that is 
proportional to the square of the magnitude of the quantum wave 
function that not only modifies the weight each branch has in 
determining the total probability but also changes the basic nature of 
the thing that you're counting, then the claim it isbranch 
"counting" is like saying if I had some cream I could have 
strawberries and cream, if I had some strawberries.


John K Clark    See what's on my new list at Extropolis 


bcn




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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 2:29 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 09:07:30AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk 
> wrote:
> >
> > Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each
> > experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and
> B=p2.
> > In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments
> the
> > end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and
> find that
> > they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each
> > observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to
> this
> > outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined
> that
> > each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily
> > invoking the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of
> > observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.
> >
> >
> > The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch
> for
> > every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then
> after N
> > trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an
> individual
> > sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for N
> trials.
> > According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative proportions
> of A
> > and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other words, the
> majority
> > of the copies at the end of this experiment will find data suggesting a
> > probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of course, be a
> number of
> > outliers with discrepant statistics, such as sequences dominated by As
> or by
> > Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion in the limit of large N.
> >
> > The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
> > regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There
> is, in
> > fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the
> actual
> > probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This is
> one of
> > main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data clearly
> > falsifies the theory.
> >
> > Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome
> this. One
> > popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that
> the
> > proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have
> > varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely
> ad hoc.
> > and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which one
> can
> > know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look to
> the Born
> > probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the raw
> Schrodinger
> > equation.
> >
> > Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome the
> basic
> > problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data.
> >
>
> The probability of an observer seeing state B given they're in state A
> must depend on both A and B. So what you say about a split into B and
> ¬B giving rise to probabilities of 1/2 cannot be the case in general,
> as there would be no dependence on either A or B.
>

Maybe that is the point when all possibilities are realized on every trial.

If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear
> function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then
> the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B
> is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already
> start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a difficulty.
>


I don't understand what you are talking about. If a trial has two possible
outcomes, and every outcome is realized in every trial, then after N trials
there are 2^N possible sequences of outcomes. These cover all possible
binary strings of length N, independent of the probabilities for individual
outcomes on any single trial. The binomial theorem (or the law of large
numbers) then implies that as N becomes large, in the large majority of
sequences you will have approximately equal numbers of each result. If
these sequences are used to estimate the probabilities, then most sequences
will give p = 0.5 for each result. This is a well-known result.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 09:07:30AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each
> experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and 
> B=p2. 
> In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the
> end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that
> they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each
> observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this
> outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that
> each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily
> invoking the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of
> observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.
> 
> 
> The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch for
> every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then after 
> N
> trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an individual
> sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for N trials.
> According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative proportions of A
> and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other words, the majority
> of the copies at the end of this experiment will find data suggesting a
> probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of course, be a number of
> outliers with discrepant statistics, such as sequences dominated by As or by
> Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion in the limit of large N.
> 
> The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
> regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There is, 
> in
> fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the actual
> probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This is one of
> main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data clearly
> falsifies the theory.
> 
> Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome this. One
> popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that the
> proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have
> varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely ad 
> hoc.
> and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which one can
> know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look to the 
> Born
> probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the raw Schrodinger
> equation.
> 
> Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome the basic
> problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data.
> 

The probability of an observer seeing state B given they're in state A
must depend on both A and B. So what you say about a split into B and
¬B giving rise to probabilities of 1/2 cannot be the case in general,
as there would be no dependence on either A or B.

If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear
function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then
the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B
is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already
start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a difficulty.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 11:43 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 12/24/2021 2:07 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each
>> experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.
>> In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the
>> end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that
>> they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each
>> observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this
>> outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that
>> each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily
>> invoking the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of
>> observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.
>>
>
> The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch
> for every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then
> after N trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an
> individual sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for
> N trials. According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative
> proportions of A and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other
> words, the majority of the copies at the end of this experiment will find
> data suggesting a probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of
> course, be a number of outliers with discrepant statistics, such as
> sequences dominated by As or by Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion
> in the limit of large N.
>
> The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
> regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There
> is, in fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the
> actual probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This
> is one of main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data
> clearly falsifies the theory.
>
> Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome this.
> One popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that
> the proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have
> varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely ad
> hoc. and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which
> one can know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look
> to the Born probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the
> raw Schrodinger equation.
>
>
> The ad hockery can be overcome by assuming there are an enormous number of
> macroscopically indistinguishable branches even before the
> experiment...which would be consistent, since their are always an enormous
> number of microscopic events being amplified enough to leave a record but
> not enough to affect our perceptions.  So an experiment for which the Born
> rule predicts a 49/51 split can split the large number of existing branches
> in this proportion.  Julian Barbour uses a metaphor like this as the state
> of the world being like river of equivalence classes, we regard as a single
> stream until it's split into different channels.  What is missing in this
> picture is some mechanism for the splittiing.  The Schroedinger equation
> that predicts the 49/51 split doesn't say anything about interacting with
> the different threads of this stream.  So the advocates claim that it's
> "just the Schroedinger equation" doesn't seem adequate.
>


Generally these approaches are just glorified fairy stories. There is no
mechanism that will do any of these wonderful things. If you are allowed to
make up stories, you can get away with anything -- such as that MWI gives a
local account of Bell correlations.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/24/2021 2:07 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk  
wrote:



Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments. 
Each experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of
A=p1 and B=p2.  In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of
these experiments the end observer in each branch now tabulates
their observations and find that they have measured outcome A p1
times and outcome B p2 times.  Each observer therefore must have
followed a branching path that lead to this outcome.  What in the
MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that each observer
would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily invoking
the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of
observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.


The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own 
branch for every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in 
your case, then after N trials there will be 2^N copies of the 
observer -- each with an individual sequence of A B results, covering 
all possible 2^N sequences for N trials. According to the binomial 
theorem, for large N the relative proportions of A and B in these 
sequences will peak around 50/50. In other words, the majority of the 
copies at the end of this experiment will find data suggesting a 
probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of course, be a 
number of outliers with discrepant statistics, such as sequences 
dominated by As or by Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion in the 
limit of large N.


The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio, 
regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. 
There is, in fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that 
reflects the actual probabilities when these differ significantly from 
p1=p2=0.5. This is one of main main objections to MWI -- direct 
confrontation with the data clearly falsifies the theory.


Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome 
this. One popular way is to simply add additional branches on each 
trial so that the proportions reflect the required probabilities. 
Zurek and Carroll have varieties of this approach. The trouble here is 
that this is completely ad hoc. and it also turns out to be circular, 
because the only way in which one can know how many additional 
branches to add to each outcome is to look to the Born probabilities 
-- probabilities that are not available in the raw Schrodinger equation.


The ad hockery can be overcome by assuming there are an enormous number 
of macroscopically indistinguishable branches even before the 
experiment...which would be consistent, since their are always an 
enormous number of microscopic events being amplified enough to leave a 
record but not enough to affect our perceptions.  So an experiment for 
which the Born rule predicts a 49/51 split can split the large number of 
existing branches in this proportion.  Julian Barbour uses a metaphor 
like this as the state of the world being like river of equivalence 
classes, we regard as a single stream until it's split into different 
channels.  What is missing in this picture is some mechanism for the 
splittiing.  The Schroedinger equation that predicts the 49/51 split 
doesn't say anything about interacting with the different threads of 
this stream.  So the advocates claim that it's "just the Schroedinger 
equation" doesn't seem adequate.


Brent



Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome 
the basic problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data.


Bruce
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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> What in the world are you talking about. Determining the quantum wave
>> function is the only reason the Schrodinger equation is of any use, and the
>> Born Rule is the only reason the quantum wave function is of any use.
>>
>
> *> The wave function is a vector in Hilbert space. The Schrodinger
> equation determines the time evolution of the vector.*
>

Right. And that's why the Born Rule is just Pythagoras's theorem in action.


> > >> *after the number of branches is supplemented to be in the
 proportion required by the Born rule*
>>>
>>>
>
> >> After the number of branches is amplified or reduced *according to the
>> amplitude of the wave function*.
>>
>
> *> That is essentially what I said. There must be a form of branch
> counting if self-locating uncertainty is going to work to give you the
> probability.*
>

If one branch does not correspond to just one integer but instead some
branches must be "supplemented" more than others then you're not doing
branch counting, in fact you're not doing "counting" of any sort. Actually
it's even worse than that because when you're counting physical things and
not just numbers you have to be sure that the units are the same, that's
why 2 apples plus 2 more apples does NOT equal 4 oranges. A branch is not a
probability, to an observer on a rare low amplitude branch things would
seem just as real to him as an observer in a common high amplitude branch.
And because a branch is not a probability you can't add up branches and
expect to get a probability.

*> In MWI, it is assumed that in any measurement all possible outcomes are
> realized, albeit in different worlds.*
>

Yes.

> *Any vector in a Hilbert space is expanded in terms of the same set of
> eigenvectors, so has the same set of possible outcomes.*
>

I'm not talking about Hilbert space and I'm not talking about eigenvectors,
I'm talking about probabilities. And to determine probability if you must
use a variable conversion factor that is proportional to the square of the
magnitude of the quantum wave function that not only modifies the weight
each branch has in determining the total probability but also changes the
basic nature of the thing that you're counting, then the claim it is branch
"counting" is like saying if I had some cream I could have strawberries and
cream, if I had some strawberries.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

bcn





>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

The amplitude of the wave function may be far broader then the worthies on this 
mailing-list have so far proposed. That what is quantum, specifically a process 
space where the Multi basically like Hugh Everett + John Wheeler evoked is like 
is something like a spaghetti chart if we postulate observables?
Bear Witness on this Hallowed Day! A couple of neighbor's from master Clark's 
Texas A produced this ARXIV publication that tries to lighten these issues of 
Born + Heisenberg + Schrodinger  and I am bit non-plus'd to not see Wigner's' 
Friend astride the head of Mr. S's Cat? https://arxiv.org/pdf/2110.00580.pdf

"Introducing the ‘process dimension’One way to develop a more thorough 
understanding of a situation is to build a model. Modelscan be physical (like 
an architect’s scale model of a building), or they can be visual or conceptual, 
like a diagram (which requires more imagination to appreciate). Model-building 
alwaysinvolves making some simplifications, in order to reduce unnecessary 
complications and bringout essential details of the situation being modeled.Now 
we’re trying to model a situation where events that occur outside of space and 
time“collide” with our universe. But it’s difficult enough to visualize 
four-dimensional spacetime, letalone events that occur somewhere outside! To 
get a hold of this idea to begin with, we shouldtry to simplify as much as 
possible, without excluding the essential details. In doing this, wemay once 
again cite the example of Einstein, who is often quoted as saying “Everything 
shouldbe made as simple as possible, but no simpler.” 1"
To wit, Make The Jump to Process Space...


-Original Message-
From: Bruce Kellett 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Fri, Dec 24, 2021 11:57 pm
Subject: Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 2:18 PM John Clark  wrote:

On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 8:20 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:



>> You're completely ignoring the amplitude of the quantum wave function, in 
>> other words you're completely ignoring Schrodinger's equation.

> If you check carefully, you will find that Schrodinger's equation is 
> insensitive to the amplitude of the wave function.

What in the world are you talking about. Determining the quantum wave function 
is the only reason the Schrodinger equation is of any use, and the Born Rule is 
the only reason the quantum wave function is of any use. 

The wave function is a vector in Hilbert space. The Schrodinger equation 
determines the time evolution of the vector. An observable quantity is 
represented by a Hermitian operator in this Hilbert space. The space is spanned 
by a set of basis vectors that are conveniently taken to be the eigenvectors of 
the related measurement operator. Any wave function can be expanded in terms of 
this set of basis vectors. There are as many of them as there are distinct 
possible outcomes from a measurement of the corresponding operator (the 
dimension of the Hilbert space).
In MWI, it is assumed that in any measurement all possible outcomes are 
realized, albeit in different worlds. Any vector in a Hilbert space is expanded 
in terms of the same set of eigenvectors, so has the same set of possible 
outcomes. This set is independent of the coefficients determining different 
vectors in the base space. In other words, the set of possible results for any 
measurement involving a particular operator and base space is independent of 
the amplitude of any particular basis vector in the wave function.
In the spin measurement case, there are two possible outcomes, |up> or |down>, 
so the Hilbert space is two dimensional. Any vector in this space can be 
expanded in terms of these basis vectors:
        |psi> = a|up>  + b|down>
and the possible results are up or down, independent of the coefficients (or 
amplitudes) a and b.



> That is one of the reasons that the Born rule is not derivable from the 
> Schrodinger equation or the wave function.

As I keep saying, the Born rule does not need to be derived from anything nor 
does it need to be assumed  because we already know from a huge number of 
experiments that it is correct; if it wasn't the computer I'm typing this on 
wouldn't work, the modern world economy wouldn't work either.

The Born rule works. But that does not mean that it does not need to be derived 
or postulated.

 
If you look at Carroll and Sebens, they acknowledge that their prescription 
boils down to simple branch counting

Nope. From page 143 of Sean Carroll's  book "Something Deeply Hidden"
"It's easy to show that this idea known as branch counting can't possibly work"

That refers to naive branch counting. When the number of branches is increased 
so that all the amplitudes are equal -- equal probability for each branch -- 
then the probability of a particular result is proportional to the number of 
branches giving this result. This is effectively branch counti

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 2:18 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 8:20 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> You're completely ignoring the amplitude of the quantum wave function,
>>> in other words you're completely ignoring Schrodinger's equation.
>>>
>>
>> *> If you check carefully, you will find that Schrodinger's equation is
>> insensitive to the amplitude of the wave function.*
>>
>
> What in the world are you talking about. Determining the quantum wave
> function is the only reason the Schrodinger equation is of any use, and the
> Born Rule is the only reason the quantum wave function is of any use.
>

The wave function is a vector in Hilbert space. The Schrodinger equation
determines the time evolution of the vector. An observable quantity is
represented by a Hermitian operator in this Hilbert space. The space is
spanned by a set of basis vectors that are conveniently taken to be the
eigenvectors of the related measurement operator. Any wave function can be
expanded in terms of this set of basis vectors. There are as many of them
as there are distinct possible outcomes from a measurement of the
corresponding operator (the dimension of the Hilbert space).

In MWI, it is assumed that in any measurement all possible outcomes are
realized, albeit in different worlds. Any vector in a Hilbert space is
expanded in terms of the same set of eigenvectors, so has the same set of
possible outcomes. This set is independent of the coefficients determining
different vectors in the base space. In other words, the set of possible
results for any measurement involving a particular operator and base space
is independent of the amplitude of any particular basis vector in the wave
function.

In the spin measurement case, there are two possible outcomes, |up> or
|down>, so the Hilbert space is two dimensional. Any vector in this space
can be expanded in terms of these basis vectors:

|psi> = a|up>  + b|down>

and the possible results are up or down, independent of the coefficients
(or amplitudes) a and b.


*> That is one of the reasons that the Born rule is not derivable from the
>> Schrodinger equation or the wave function.*
>>
>
> As I keep saying, the Born rule does not need to be derived from anything
> nor does it need to be assumed  because we already know from a huge number
> of experiments that it is correct; if it wasn't the computer I'm typing
> this on wouldn't work, the modern world economy wouldn't work either.
>

The Born rule works. But that does not mean that it does not need to be
derived or postulated.


>
>> *If you look at Carroll and Sebens, they acknowledge that their
>> prescription boils down to simple branch counting*
>>
>
> Nope. From page 143 of Sean Carroll's book "Something Deeply Hidden"
>
> "It's easy to show that this idea known as *branch counting can't
> possibly work"*
>

That refers to naive branch counting. When the number of branches is
increased so that all the amplitudes are equal -- equal probability for
each branch -- then the probability of a particular result is proportional
to the number of branches giving this result. This is effectively branch
counting, and Carrol admits as much in one of his later papers with Sebens.


> after the number of branches is supplemented to be in the proportion
>> required by the Born rule
>
>
> After the number of branches is amplified or reduced *according to the
> amplitude of the wave function*.
>

That is essentially what I said. There must be a form of branch counting if
self-locating uncertainty is going to work to give you the probability.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 8:20 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> You're completely ignoring the amplitude of the quantum wave function,
>> in other words you're completely ignoring Schrodinger's equation.
>>
>
> *> If you check carefully, you will find that Schrodinger's equation is
> insensitive to the amplitude of the wave function.*
>

What in the world are you talking about. Determining the quantum wave
function is the only reason the Schrodinger equation is of any use, and the
Born Rule is the only reason the quantum wave function is of any use.

*> That is one of the reasons that the Born rule is not derivable from the
> Schrodinger equation or the wave function.*
>

As I keep saying, the Born rule does not need to be derived from anything
nor does it need to be assumed  because we already know from a huge number
of experiments that it is correct; if it wasn't the computer I'm typing
this on wouldn't work, the modern world economy wouldn't work either.


> *If you look at Carroll and Sebens, they acknowledge that their
> prescription boils down to simple branch counting*
>

Nope. From page 143 of Sean Carroll's book "Something Deeply Hidden"

"It's easy to show that this idea known as *branch counting can't possibly
work" *

> after the number of branches is supplemented to be in the proportion
> required by the Born rule


After the number of branches is amplified or reduced *according to the
amplitude of the wave function*.

 John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

bcq

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 10:15 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 5:40 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> I suggest you look up a standard reference on the binomial
>> distribution. The 50/50 ratio is a consequence of the fact that there are
>> just two possibilities on each trial.*
>
>
> You're completely ignoring the amplitude of the quantum wave function, in
> other words you're completely ignoring Schrodinger's equation.
>

If you check carefully, you will find that Schrodinger's equation is
insensitive to the amplitude of the wave function. The wave function
splits according to the eigenfunctions for the allowed values (The number
of components of the wave function is given by the dimension of the
relevant Hilbert space.). But the wave function splits only according to
the number of eigenvalues, ignoring the actual coefficients of these
components of the wave function.


And no Many World's advocate, and no physicist alive for that matter,
> believes you can figure out probabilities from branch counting. You are
> allowed to assign equal probabilities to branches ONLY when they have
> identical amplitudes; that's why we must use amplitude squared when we want
> to figure out probabilities.
>

That is one of the reasons that the Born rule is not derivable from the
Schrodinger equation or the wave function. If you look at Carroll and
Sebens, they acknowledge that their prescription boils down to simple
branch counting -- after the number of branches is supplemented to be in
the proportion required by the Born rule, with each branch having the same
amplitude. If you use self-locating uncertainty as your measure of
probability, you have to resort to branch counting in the final analysis.
Just think about it for a while

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 5:40 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*> I suggest you look up a standard reference on the binomial distribution.
> The 50/50 ratio is a consequence of the fact that there are just two
> possibilities on each trial.*


You're completely ignoring the amplitude of the quantum wave function, in
other words you're completely ignoring Schrodinger's equation. And no Many
World's advocate, and no physicist alive for that matter, believes you can
figure out probabilities from branch counting. You are allowed to assign
equal probabilities to branches ONLY when they have identical amplitudes;
that's why we must use amplitude squared when we want to figure out
probabilities.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

bcx



>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 9:24 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 5:07 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
>> regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.*
>
>
> I don't know how you figure that!
>

I suggest you look up a standard reference on the binomial distribution.
The 50/50 ratio is a consequence of the fact that there are just two
possibilities on each trial.



> Some human beings are over 8 feet tall but not many, if you picked a
> population of 100 people at random you might eventually find a population
> in which 50% were over 8 feet tall, but I think the sun would've turned
> into a red giant before you found it. And by the way, the Many Worlds
> advocates calculate probabilities exactly the same way Many Worlds
> opponents do, if they have been doing it wrong all these years then so has
> everybody else.
>

You can estimate probabilities from relative proportions, but that is not a
good definition of probability.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 5:07 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*> The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
> regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.*


I don't know how you figure that! Some human beings are over 8 feet tall
but not many, if you picked a population of 100 people at random you might
eventually find a population in which 50% were over 8 feet tall, but I
think the sun would've turned into a red giant before you found it. And by
the way, the Many Worlds advocates calculate probabilities exactly the same
way Many Worlds opponents do, if they have been doing it wrong all these
years then so has everybody else.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ddu








>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Fri, Dec 24, 2021 at 3:53 PM Dirk Van Niekerk  wrote:

>> All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental
>> laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably
>> wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a
>> half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most
>> common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium
>> decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're
>> talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will
>> not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only
>> one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5
>> million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay
>> after only 5 nanoseconds. You may ask, how different can "you" be before
>> it no longer deserves the right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is
>> somewhat arbitrary, but the important point is that whatever limit you
>> choose, as long as it's consistent, it makes no difference if high
>> precision is demanded for something to be called "you" or if extreame
>> sloppiness can be tolerated, either way it will still remain true that
>> there will be more "yous" near the center of the Bell Curve than at the
>> trailing edges.
>>
>
> *> Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each
> experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.
> In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the
> end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that
> they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each
> observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this
> outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that
> each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily
> invoking the Born rule). *
>

First of all nobody arbitrarily invokes the Born Rule, thanks to experiment
we know for a fact that it works, we also know it is the only way to get
probabilities out of the Schrodinger equation in which all the
probabilities are positive and they all add up to 1, after all that part is
not even controversial because the Born Rule is really just Pythagoras's
Theorem on steroids. And classical physics is a very good approximation of
the Schrodinger equation when things get large, so If you want to calculate
the odds of a coin flip you can forget quantum mechanics entirely and just
use classical physics, it says that if you flip a fair coin there's no
reason to expect one side of the coin to be favored over another, so the
odds must be 50-50.

>
> *> What in MWI prevents that a large number of observers will report a
> probability for either A or B as 100%.*
>

Suppose there was a being with a godlike intellect and knew the quantum
wave function of the entire multiverse, since the Schrodinger equation is
entirely deterministic couldn't he just forget about probabilities entirely
and predict with 100% confidence which branch of the multiverse he will be
on and thus predict with 100% certainty if he will see an atom of Neptunium
240 decay in the next hour or not? No he could not, and the reason he
couldn't is because he would know everything there is to know about the
multiverse except for which branch he is on. Even with infinite
intelligence he couldn't say "I will now answer the question  "which ONE
and only ONE branch will I end up being on after I change from 1 to 2?".
And the reason he couldn't do that is because even infinite intelligence is
not good enough to  provide an answer to gibberish, and despite the
existence of a question mark at the end "which ONE and only ONE branch
 will I end up being on after I change from 1 to 2?"  is not a question, it
is self contradictory gibberish.


John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis


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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk  wrote:

>
> Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each
> experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.
> In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the
> end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that
> they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each
> observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this
> outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that
> each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily
> invoking the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of
> observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.
>

The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch
for every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then
after N trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an
individual sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for
N trials. According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative
proportions of A and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other
words, the majority of the copies at the end of this experiment will find
data suggesting a probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of
course, be a number of outliers with discrepant statistics, such as
sequences dominated by As or by Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion
in the limit of large N.

The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio,
regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There
is, in fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the
actual probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This
is one of main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data
clearly falsifies the theory.

Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome this.
One popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that
the proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have
varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely ad
hoc. and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which
one can know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look
to the Born probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the
raw Schrodinger equation.

Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome the
basic problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Dirk Van Niekerk]

On Tuesday, December 21, 2021 at 9:01:30 AM UTC-8 johnk...@gmail.com wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou  
> wrote:
>
> >*but** there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life 
>> period that one version of you will see and another version of you will 
>> see, which is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom 
>> decay, if you have a normal human brain without telepathic communication 
>> with other copies.*
>
>  
> All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental 
> laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably 
> wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a 
> half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most 
> common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium 
> decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're 
> talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will 
> not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only 
> one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5 
> million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay 
> after only 5 nanoseconds.
>
> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the 
> right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the 
> important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's 
> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for 
> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated, 
> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near 
> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>
>
> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis 
> 
>
Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments.  Each 
experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2.  
In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the 
end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that 
they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times.  Each 
observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this 
outcome.  What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that 
each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily 
invoking the Born rule).  What in MWI prevents that a large number of 
observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%.

Dirk 

>
> emc
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Dec 23, 2021 at 10:00 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 22-12-2021 23:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> > At least the collapse hypothesis is subject to experimental test.
> > Whereas the many-worlds hypothesis is beyond any conceivable
> > experimental test. Decoherence is not unique to MWI -- it happens in
> > any quantum model.
>
> The relevant prediction of the MWI is simply that systems evolve
> according to unitary time evolution. No information gets created out of
> thin air. If you have collapse, then the random element of the collapse
> amounts to information added to the system.
>

Of course, information is added in MWI as well. Every time you get a
definite result from an experiment you learn something new. Physics is
based on the gathering of new information from experiments. Obtaining a
definite result is characteristic of both many-worlds and collapse models.
But again, this is irrelevant to the optic under discussion.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Dec 23, 2021 at 9:55 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 22-12-2021 22:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:
> >
> >> On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>>
> >>> In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their
> >>> polarizers randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact that
> >>> Alice might get |up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at some
> >>> randomly different polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck with
> >>> thinking in terms of parallel polarizer orientations.
> >>
> >> It's not true only when the polarizers are orthogonal. Whenever the
> >> polarizers are not orthogonal, Alice will gain some amount of
> >> information about what Bob will find given the result of her
> >> measurement. For Bob, the probability of finding up or down are always
> >> 1/2, but after Alice makes her measurement, the conditional probability
> >> of what Bob will find, given her measurement result will not be equal to
> >> 1/2 for both outcomes if her polarizer was not orthogonal to that of
> >> Bob, so Alice will have gained information about Bob's
> measurement result.
> >
> > The conditional probability you refer to is defined only non-locally.
> >
>
> There are no nontrivial nonlocal effects in the MWI.


That is what remains to be proved.

Once you specify
> how Alice and Bob decide to choose their polarizers, you can analyze the
> flow of information


As I understand it, Deutsch and Hayden attempted this in
arXiv:quant-ph/9906007. This idea has proved to be unsuccessful. One of the
problems being that their construction bears little relationship to what
happens in the laboratory. One can make up toy models to demonstrate almost
anything. However, in order to be useful, such models must be closely tied
to laboratory experience.


If you do that within the MWI framework there won't
> by any nonlocal effects apart from common cause effects where
> information created at one spacetime point ended up travelling in two
> directions via local processes and ended up creating correlations in
> spacelike separated systems.
>
>  In the MWI
>  there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the correlation
>  being caused by common cause when the entangled pair is created
> >>>
> >>> Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to depend
> >>> on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at the
> >>> time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with some
> >>> non-local influence (or retro-causation).
> >>
> >> The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
> >> process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in the
> >> analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in an
> >> MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other than
> >> trivial common cause effects.
>

As I have said. That is your contention, but it has yet to be proved. The
method of setting the polarizers can be included if you must, but this is
ultimately irrelevant to the main issues here. It seems that you introduce
it only as a distraction.


> I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape.
> > MWI is not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of
> > entangled particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual
> > experiment, the analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse
> > models. The additional worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation.
> > They are, therefore, otiose, and MWI can be discarded.
>
>
> As Jesse Mazer pints out this has nothing to do with superdeterminism.
> You can e.g. let Bon And Alice do additional spin measurements on other
> (non-entangled) electrons and use the random results of those to
> determine the orientation of their polarizers. Thing is that you need to
> choose some physical process for this. There is then no appeal to the
> setting of the polarizer having been pre-determined in a way to explain
> the correlations, so this is not an appeal to superdeterminism.
>

I am not arguing for superdeterminism. It just seemed that insistence on
including the method for setting polarizer angles was akin to the arguments
made be advocates of superdeterminism.


Collapse models invoke new, as of yet unobserved physics, at scales
> where our present theories of physics are very solid. While such
> collapse theories could be correct, they are not motivated by an attempt
> to solve a problem, like e.g. tensions with experimental results. The
> MWI, in contrast, is motivated with problems of standard QM, namely the
> unphysical collapse of the wavefunction.
>

This discussion has nothing to do with one's philosophical preference for
non-collapse over collapse models. The issue is whether or not MWI can give
a local account of the Bell correlations. A simple analysis based on actual
laboratory experience shows that many-worlds cannot accomplish this.
Concocting artificial models 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 23, 2021 at 2:01 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

*> As I see it, the only problem MWI solves is to maintain determinism*


And solves the measurement problem. And gets rid of the ridiculous Heisenberg
cut.

Heisenberg cut 
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

whc





>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/23/2021 3:00 AM, smitra wrote:

On 22-12-2021 23:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:


On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:



The problem is with
comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is

no

difference.


If there is no difference, where is the problem?


One needs to invoke a new physical mechanism to explain the
collapse.
Since this is then not motivated by experimental results showing
that
e.g. systems decohere faster than standard QM would predict, one is
then
invoking new physics purely because of a philosophical dislike of a
theory that doesn't need that new physics.


That is a purely philosophical objection!

At least the collapse hypothesis is subject to experimental test.
Whereas the many-worlds hypothesis is beyond any conceivable
experimental test. Decoherence is not unique to MWI -- it happens in
any quantum model.


The relevant prediction of the MWI is simply that systems evolve 
according to unitary time evolution. No information gets created out 
of thin air. If you have collapse, then the random element of the 
collapse amounts to information added to the system.


So does your self-locating uncertainty becoming certain.

Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/23/2021 2:55 AM, smitra wrote:

On 22-12-2021 22:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:


On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:


In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their
polarizers randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact

that

Alice might get |up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at

some

randomly different polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck

with

thinking in terms of parallel polarizer orientations.


It's not true only when the polarizers are orthogonal. Whenever the
polarizers are not orthogonal, Alice will gain some amount of
information about what Bob will find given the result of her
measurement. For Bob, the probability of finding up or down are
always
1/2, but after Alice makes her measurement, the conditional
probability
of what Bob will find, given her measurement result will not be
equal to
1/2 for both outcomes if her polarizer was not orthogonal to that of

Bob, so Alice will have gained information about Bob's measurement
result.


The conditional probability you refer to is defined only non-locally.



There are no nontrivial nonlocal effects in the MWI. Once you specify 
how Alice and Bob decide to choose their polarizers, you can analyze 
the flow of information. If you do that within the MWI framework there 
won't by any nonlocal effects apart from common cause effects where 
information created at one spacetime point ended up travelling in two 
directions via local processes and ended up creating correlations in 
spacelike separated systems.



In the MWI
there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the

correlation

being caused by common cause when the entangled pair is created


Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to

depend

on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at

the

time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with

some

non-local influence (or retro-causation).


The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in
the
analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in
an
MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other
than
trivial common cause effects.


I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape.
MWI is not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of
entangled particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual
experiment, the analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse
models. The additional worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation.
They are, therefore, otiose, and MWI can be discarded.



As Jesse Mazer pints out this has nothing to do with superdeterminism. 
You can e.g. let Bon And Alice do additional spin measurements on 
other (non-entangled) electrons and use the random results of those to 
determine the orientation of their polarizers. Thing is that you need 
to choose some physical process for this. There is then no appeal to 
the setting of the polarizer having been pre-determined in a way to 
explain the correlations, so this is not an appeal to superdeterminism.


Collapse models invoke new, as of yet unobserved physics, at scales 
where our present theories of physics are very solid. While such 
collapse theories could be correct, they are not motivated by an 
attempt to solve a problem, like e.g. tensions with experimental 
results. The MWI, in contrast, is motivated with problems of standard 
QM, namely the unphysical collapse of the wavefunction.


Arguing for collapse models today is like what would have happened if 
not Einstein but Maxwell had invited the theory of special relativity. 
Some physicists might then have pushed back against that by inventing 
the ether to restore the old familiar notion of absolute time.


Also, collapse models may not even get rid of the parallel Worlds. If 
the universe is infinite or is infinite in the temporal direction, 
then identical copies of us will exist in an infinite number of 
different but similar environments. Collapse will then happen, leading 
to a definite outcomes in each sector, but you'll be split among all 
the different outcomes in different sectors. The only difference with 
the MWI is then that according to the MWI the split must happen, while 
according to collapse interpretations, a split may happen depending on 
the large scale structure of the universe.


As I see it, the only problem MWI solves is to maintain determinism 
contrary to all experience by saying, everything happens but not where 
anyone can see it.  Which is as if Einstein had discovered QM instead of 
Heisenberg.


Brent





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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 22-12-2021 23:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:


On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:



The problem is with
comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is

no

difference.


If there is no difference, where is the problem?


One needs to invoke a new physical mechanism to explain the
collapse.
Since this is then not motivated by experimental results showing
that
e.g. systems decohere faster than standard QM would predict, one is
then
invoking new physics purely because of a philosophical dislike of a
theory that doesn't need that new physics.


That is a purely philosophical objection!

At least the collapse hypothesis is subject to experimental test.
Whereas the many-worlds hypothesis is beyond any conceivable
experimental test. Decoherence is not unique to MWI -- it happens in
any quantum model.


The relevant prediction of the MWI is simply that systems evolve 
according to unitary time evolution. No information gets created out of 
thin air. If you have collapse, then the random element of the collapse 
amounts to information added to the system.


Saibal



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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 22-12-2021 22:54, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:


On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:


In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their
polarizers randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact

that

Alice might get |up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at

some

randomly different polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck

with

thinking in terms of parallel polarizer orientations.


It's not true only when the polarizers are orthogonal. Whenever the
polarizers are not orthogonal, Alice will gain some amount of
information about what Bob will find given the result of her
measurement. For Bob, the probability of finding up or down are
always
1/2, but after Alice makes her measurement, the conditional
probability
of what Bob will find, given her measurement result will not be
equal to
1/2 for both outcomes if her polarizer was not orthogonal to that of

Bob, so Alice will have gained information about Bob's measurement
result.


The conditional probability you refer to is defined only non-locally.



There are no nontrivial nonlocal effects in the MWI. Once you specify 
how Alice and Bob decide to choose their polarizers, you can analyze the 
flow of information. If you do that within the MWI framework there won't 
by any nonlocal effects apart from common cause effects where 
information created at one spacetime point ended up travelling in two 
directions via local processes and ended up creating correlations in 
spacelike separated systems.



In the MWI
there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the

correlation

being caused by common cause when the entangled pair is created


Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to

depend

on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at

the

time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with

some

non-local influence (or retro-causation).


The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in
the
analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in
an
MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other
than
trivial common cause effects.


I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape.
MWI is not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of
entangled particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual
experiment, the analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse
models. The additional worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation.
They are, therefore, otiose, and MWI can be discarded.



As Jesse Mazer pints out this has nothing to do with superdeterminism. 
You can e.g. let Bon And Alice do additional spin measurements on other 
(non-entangled) electrons and use the random results of those to 
determine the orientation of their polarizers. Thing is that you need to 
choose some physical process for this. There is then no appeal to the 
setting of the polarizer having been pre-determined in a way to explain 
the correlations, so this is not an appeal to superdeterminism.


Collapse models invoke new, as of yet unobserved physics, at scales 
where our present theories of physics are very solid. While such 
collapse theories could be correct, they are not motivated by an attempt 
to solve a problem, like e.g. tensions with experimental results. The 
MWI, in contrast, is motivated with problems of standard QM, namely the 
unphysical collapse of the wavefunction.


Arguing for collapse models today is like what would have happened if 
not Einstein but Maxwell had invited the theory of special relativity. 
Some physicists might then have pushed back against that by inventing 
the ether to restore the old familiar notion of absolute time.


Also, collapse models may not even get rid of the parallel Worlds. If 
the universe is infinite or is infinite in the temporal direction, then 
identical copies of us will exist in an infinite number of different but 
similar environments. Collapse will then happen, leading to a definite 
outcomes in each sector, but you'll be split among all the different 
outcomes in different sectors. The only difference with the MWI is then 
that according to the MWI the split must happen, while according to 
collapse interpretations, a split may happen depending on the large 
scale structure of the universe.


Saibal





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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, Dec 23, 2021 at 10:01 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 4:54 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:
>>
>>> On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> >
>>>
>> > Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to depend
>>> > on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at the
>>> > time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with some
>>> > non-local influence (or retro-causation).
>>>
>>> The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
>>> process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in the
>>> analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in an
>>> MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other than
>>> trivial common cause effects.
>>>
>>
>> I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape.
>>
>
> I don't think Saibal was referring to superdeterminism? Or are you
> suggesting the MWI version of locality involves superdeterminism? If so
> that's wrong, superdeterminism involves some special constraint on initial
> conditions such that variables associated with the entangled particles
> (hidden or non-hidden) at the moment they are sent out in opposite
> directions are correlated in advance with the future choices of detector
> settings by the experimenters.
>
> MWI is not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of
>> entangled particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual experiment,
>> the analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse models. The
>> additional worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation.
>>
>
> They allow it to be local without superdeterminism, because the "matching"
> of local worlds can be done at a point in spacetime that has both
> experimenter's measurements in its past light cone, I gave you a toy model
> demonstrating how this can work in my post at
> https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg91022.html
>
>
> One way to think about local vs. non-local explanations is to imagine
> running a *simulation* of a Bell type experiment, using three or more
> separate computers that are each responsible for simulating what's going on
> in a localized region of space, say the location of experimenter A
> ('Alice'), the location of experimenter B ('Bob'), and the location of the
> emitter midway between them. The computer simulating the location of the
> emitter has to run some algorithm that assigns states to the two emitted
> particles
>

The whole point of the entanglement is that there are no separately
assigned states to the two particles. They are in an entangled,
non-separable, state. So that the particle that goes to A is non-locally
linked to the particle that goes to B.
There is a simple rule here. If the particles interact only locally, then
the joint state is separable. If the state is non-separable, the
interactions are non-local. All local states are separable. Non-separable
states are non-local. Modus tollens.


(the algorithm is allowed to involve something like a random number
> generator, it need not be deterministic), and then it can transmit some or
> all of that information to the computers simulating the locations of Alice
> and Bob. Then once the computer simulating Alice's location receives that
> information about the state of the simulated particle arriving there, it
> runs some algorithm to decide what detector setting Alice selects, and what
> happens in that local region when she measures the particle with that
> detector setting (again we are allowed to use a random number generator),
> and the computer simulating Bob's location does the same. If we want to
> simulate a model of physics that obeys locality, then computers simulating
> events with a spacelike separation, like Alice performing her measurement
> and Bob performing his, cannot be in communication at the moment they each
> compute the local outcome at their own location. And if we want to avoid
> superdeterminism, the computer simulating the emitter cannot have any way
> to predict in advance what measurement setting Alice and Bob are going to
> use at their own locations--over many trials, the states it assigns to the
> particles on each trial cannot be statistically correlated with the future
> choices of detector settings by Alice and Bob on that trial.
>
> A simulation based on a MWI style toy model could respect both of these
> conditions, locality (no communication between computers when they are
> determining the results of events that are supposed to be at a spacelike
> separation, like Alice's measurement and Bob's measurement) and non
> superdeterminism (the computer simulating the emitter generates the states
> to send to Alice and Bob with no advanced knowledge of what detector
> setting they are going to choose in the future). The twist with the MWI is
> that the computers simulating Alice and Bob's locations don't generate
> unique 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 6:21 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:


*> In MWI, one person saw the atom decay and the other did not. They are
> not observable to each other, but they observe themselves, obviously.*
>

Obviously.

John K Clark



>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 23 Dec 2021 at 09:57, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 5:25 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:\
>
>> *> It's a thought experiment. You are duplicated in two separate places,
>> A and B, and the two copies can never meet, what is your expectation of
>> finding yourself in A or B?*
>>
>
> No. It's not a thought experiment, it's not an experiment of any sort
> because even after it's all completed nobody has learned anything because
> nobody has any idea who saw city A and who saw city B;  "you" has been
> duplicated and thus "you" saw A and "you" saw B, and the question asked is
> "what one and only one city will "you" end up seeing after "you" is
> duplicated and becomes two?" has no answer because it is nonsensical .
>
> > This is equivalent to what happens when the world split according to
>> MWI.
>>
>
> No it is not equivalent. In the Many Worlds case the two people are
> clearly labeled, one of them is observable and the other is not.  In the
> people duplicating machine case the only difference between the two people
> is one saw A and one saw B, so the only possible answer to the question
> "which one saw A" is "the one that saw A" because that's the only label
> there is to differentiate the two people.
>

In MWI, one person saw the atom decay and the other did not. They are not
observable to each other, but they observe themselves, obviously.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Jesse Mazer]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 4:54 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:
>
>> On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> >
>> > In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their
>> > polarizers randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact that
>> > Alice might get |up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at some
>> > randomly different polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck with
>> > thinking in terms of parallel polarizer orientations.
>>
>> It's not true only when the polarizers are orthogonal. Whenever the
>> polarizers are not orthogonal, Alice will gain some amount of
>> information about what Bob will find given the result of her
>> measurement. For Bob, the probability of finding up or down are always
>> 1/2, but after Alice makes her measurement, the conditional probability
>> of what Bob will find, given her measurement result will not be equal to
>> 1/2 for both outcomes if her polarizer was not orthogonal to that of
>> Bob, so Alice will have gained information about Bob's measurement
>> result.
>>
>
> The conditional probability you refer to is defined only non-locally.
>
> >> In the MWI
>> >> there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the correlation
>> >> being caused by common cause when the entangled pair is created
>> >
>> > Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to depend
>> > on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at the
>> > time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with some
>> > non-local influence (or retro-causation).
>>
>> The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
>> process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in the
>> analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in an
>> MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other than
>> trivial common cause effects.
>>
>
> I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape.
>

I don't think Saibal was referring to superdeterminism? Or are you
suggesting the MWI version of locality involves superdeterminism? If so
that's wrong, superdeterminism involves some special constraint on initial
conditions such that variables associated with the entangled particles
(hidden or non-hidden) at the moment they are sent out in opposite
directions are correlated in advance with the future choices of detector
settings by the experimenters.

MWI is not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of entangled
> particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual experiment, the
> analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse models. The additional
> worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation.
>

They allow it to be local without superdeterminism, because the "matching"
of local worlds can be done at a point in spacetime that has both
experimenter's measurements in its past light cone, I gave you a toy model
demonstrating how this can work in my post at
https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg91022.html

One way to think about local vs. non-local explanations is to imagine
running a *simulation* of a Bell type experiment, using three or more
separate computers that are each responsible for simulating what's going on
in a localized region of space, say the location of experimenter A
('Alice'), the location of experimenter B ('Bob'), and the location of the
emitter midway between them. The computer simulating the location of the
emitter has to run some algorithm that assigns states to the two emitted
particles (the algorithm is allowed to involve something like a random
number generator, it need not be deterministic), and then it can transmit
some or all of that information to the computers simulating the locations
of Alice and Bob. Then once the computer simulating Alice's location
receives that information about the state of the simulated particle
arriving there, it runs some algorithm to decide what detector setting
Alice selects, and what happens in that local region when she measures the
particle with that detector setting (again we are allowed to use a random
number generator), and the computer simulating Bob's location does the
same. If we want to simulate a model of physics that obeys locality, then
computers simulating events with a spacelike separation, like Alice
performing her measurement and Bob performing his, cannot be in
communication at the moment they each compute the local outcome at their
own location. And if we want to avoid superdeterminism, the computer
simulating the emitter cannot have any way to predict in advance what
measurement setting Alice and Bob are going to use at their own
locations--over many trials, the states it assigns to the particles on each
trial cannot be statistically correlated with the future choices of
detector settings by Alice and Bob on that trial.

A simulation based on a MWI style toy model could respect both of these
conditions, 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 5:25 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:\

> *> It's a thought experiment. You are duplicated in two separate places, A
> and B, and the two copies can never meet, what is your expectation of
> finding yourself in A or B?*
>

No. It's not a thought experiment, it's not an experiment of any sort
because even after it's all completed nobody has learned anything because
nobody has any idea who saw city A and who saw city B;  "you" has been
duplicated and thus "you" saw A and "you" saw B, and the question asked is
"what one and only one city will "you" end up seeing after "you" is
duplicated and becomes two?" has no answer because it is nonsensical .

> This is equivalent to what happens when the world split according to MWI.
>

No it is not equivalent. In the Many Worlds case the two people are clearly
labeled, one of them is observable and the other is not.  In the people
duplicating machine case the only difference between the two people is one
saw A and one saw B, so the only possible answer to the question "which one
saw A" is "the one that saw A" because that's the only label there is to
differentiate the two people.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

q96




>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:
>
> >> The problem is with
> >> comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is no
> >> difference.
> >
> > If there is no difference, where is the problem?
>
> One needs to invoke a new physical mechanism to explain the collapse.
> Since this is then not motivated by experimental results showing that
> e.g. systems decohere faster than standard QM would predict, one is then
> invoking new physics purely because of a philosophical dislike of a
> theory that doesn't need that new physics.
>

That is a purely philosophical objection!

At least the collapse hypothesis is subject to experimental test. Whereas
the many-worlds hypothesis is beyond any conceivable experimental test.
Decoherence is not unique to MWI -- it happens in any quantum model.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 23 Dec 2021 at 09:12, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 4:46 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> In the matter duplicating machine thought experiment it is meaningless to
>>> ask "what is the probability that you will see city X" because the meaning
>>> of the personal pronoun "you" is ambiguous; after the experiment is
>>> concluded 2 people in the same world who can talk to each other and to the
>>> experimenter both claim to be "you" and one claims he saw city X and the
>>> other claims he saw city Y. So the question "what city did you end up
>>> seeing?" has no answer because the personal pronoun is ambiguous. By
>>> contrast there is no ambiguity at all in the Many Worlds case, "you" is the
>>> only person named Stathis Papaioannou that is observable, and I will
>>> believe the only Stathis Papaioannou that I can see when he tells me what
>>> city he ended up in. But when that same question is asked in the matter
>>> duplicating case 2 people with an equally strong claim to be Stathis
>>> Papaioannou give contradictory answers to my question, so in the matter
>>> duplicating machine case "what is the probability that you will see city X
>>> ?" is not a question at all, it's just a string of ASCII characters
>>> with a question mark at the end.
>>>
>>
>> > *It's logically possible that we might find a way to meet our copies
>> in other worlds, or that duplication experiments could be set up so that
>> the copies in the same world could never meet.*
>>
>
> If that ever becomes possible and common (like something out of Rick and
> Morty) then English and all other human languages are going to need radical
> revisions, especially in the way they use personal pronouns.
>
> > *or that duplication experiments could be set up so that the copies in
>> the same world could never meet.*
>
>
> After the experiment is completed the experimenter will HAVE TO  communicate
> with BOTH of them, otherwise it's not an experiment at all and would
> return zero results.
>

It's a thought experiment. You are duplicated in two separate places, A and
B, and the two copies can never meet, what is your expectation of finding
yourself in A or B? This is equivalent to what happens when the world split
according to MWI.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 4:46 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

In the matter duplicating machine thought experiment it is meaningless to
>> ask "what is the probability that you will see city X" because the meaning
>> of the personal pronoun "you" is ambiguous; after the experiment is
>> concluded 2 people in the same world who can talk to each other and to the
>> experimenter both claim to be "you" and one claims he saw city X and the
>> other claims he saw city Y. So the question "what city did you end up
>> seeing?" has no answer because the personal pronoun is ambiguous. By
>> contrast there is no ambiguity at all in the Many Worlds case, "you" is the
>> only person named Stathis Papaioannou that is observable, and I will
>> believe the only Stathis Papaioannou that I can see when he tells me what
>> city he ended up in. But when that same question is asked in the matter
>> duplicating case 2 people with an equally strong claim to be Stathis
>> Papaioannou give contradictory answers to my question, so in the matter
>> duplicating machine case "what is the probability that you will see city X
>> ?" is not a question at all, it's just a string of ASCII characters with
>> a question mark at the end.
>>
>
> > *It's logically possible that we might find a way to meet our copies in
> other worlds, or that duplication experiments could be set up so that the
> copies in the same world could never meet.*
>

If that ever becomes possible and common (like something out of Rick and
Morty) then English and all other human languages are going to need radical
revisions, especially in the way they use personal pronouns.

> *or that duplication experiments could be set up so that the copies in
> the same world could never meet.*


After the experiment is completed the experimenter will HAVE TO  communicate
with BOTH of them, otherwise it's not an experiment at all and would return
zero results.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ram

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 10:12 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> > In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their
> > polarizers randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact that
> > Alice might get |up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at some
> > randomly different polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck with
> > thinking in terms of parallel polarizer orientations.
>
> It's not true only when the polarizers are orthogonal. Whenever the
> polarizers are not orthogonal, Alice will gain some amount of
> information about what Bob will find given the result of her
> measurement. For Bob, the probability of finding up or down are always
> 1/2, but after Alice makes her measurement, the conditional probability
> of what Bob will find, given her measurement result will not be equal to
> 1/2 for both outcomes if her polarizer was not orthogonal to that of
> Bob, so Alice will have gained information about Bob's measurement
> result.
>

The conditional probability you refer to is defined only non-locally.

>> In the MWI
> >> there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the correlation
> >> being caused by common cause when the entangled pair is created
> >
> > Rubbish. If there were a common cause, then that would have to depend
> > on the final polarizer orientations. And those are not known at the
> > time of creation of the entangled pair. You are, then, back with some
> > non-local influence (or retro-causation).
>
> The setting of the polarizers will be the result of some physical
> process. Whatever you specify for that process should be included in the
> analysis of the problem. But when you do so, it's inevitable that in an
> MWI analysis, there is not going to be any nonlocal effect other than
> trivial common cause effects.
>

I see. So in desperation you resort to the superdeterminism escape. MWI is
not necessary for the understanding of the correlations of entangled
particles, as my simple example shows. In an actual experiment, the
analysis is identical in many-worlds and collapse models. The additional
worlds in MWI add nothing to the explanation. They are, therefore, otiose,
and MWI can be discarded.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 23 Dec 2021 at 08:15, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 2:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 09:48, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>

>>> *>>> So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the
 next hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the
 atom will decay in the next hour under MWI?*

>>>
>>> >> By utilizing a complex set of observations it is actually possible
>>> to delay the radioactive decay of an atom indefinitely, for practical
>>> reasons when this experiment is actually performed the delay is small but
>>> statistically significant. This is how Many Worlds would explain that.
>>> Suppose an atom has a halflife of one second, the universe splits and so do
>>> I after one second.  In one universe the atom decays and in the other it
>>> doesn't. In the universe where it didn't decay after another second the
>>> universe splits again, and again in one universe it decays but in the other
>>> it has not, it survived for 2 full seconds. So there will be a version of
>>> me that observes this atom with a one second half life surviving for 3
>>> seconds, and 4 seconds, and 5 years, and 6 centuries, and you name it. By
>>> utilizing a series of increasingly complex and difficult procedures in the
>>> lab it is possible for the lab to be in the tiny minority of universes
>>> that contains observers that see the atom surviving for an arbitrary length
>>> of time. But the longer the time and the more atoms involved the more
>>> difficult the procedures become and soon becomes ridiculously
>>> impractical.
>>>
>>
>> *> I understand that, but you have previously claimed about thought
>> experiments involving duplication that there is no sense in saying that the
>> subject can expect to see a particular outcome with a particular
>> probability, because he will certainly see all outcomes.*
>>
>
> In the matter duplicating machine thought experiment it is meaningless to
> ask "what is the probability that you will see city X" because the meaning
> of the personal pronoun "you" is ambiguous; after the experiment is
> concluded 2 people in the same world who can talk to each other and to the
> experimenter both claim to be "you" and one claims he saw city X and the
> other claims he saw city Y. So the question "what city did you end up
> seeing?" has no answer because the personal pronoun is ambiguous. By
> contrast there is no ambiguity at all in the Many Worlds case, "you" is the
> only person named Stathis Papaioannou that is observable, and I will
> believe the only Stathis Papaioannou that I can see when he tells me what
> city he ended up in. But when that same question is asked in the matter
> duplicating case 2 people with an equally strong claim to be Stathis
> Papaioannou give contradictory answers to my question, so in the matter
> duplicating machine case "what is the probability that you will see city X
> ?" is not a question at all, it's just a string of ASCII characters with
> a question mark at the end.
>

It's logically possible that we might find a way to meet our copies in
other worlds, or that duplication experiments could be set up so that the
copies in the same world could never meet.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 2:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 09:48, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>> *>>> So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the
>>> next hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the
>>> atom will decay in the next hour under MWI?*
>>>
>>
>> >> By utilizing a complex set of observations it is actually possible to
>> delay the radioactive decay of an atom indefinitely, for practical reasons
>> when this experiment is actually performed the delay is small but
>> statistically significant. This is how Many Worlds would explain that.
>> Suppose an atom has a halflife of one second, the universe splits and so do
>> I after one second.  In one universe the atom decays and in the other it
>> doesn't. In the universe where it didn't decay after another second the
>> universe splits again, and again in one universe it decays but in the other
>> it has not, it survived for 2 full seconds. So there will be a version of
>> me that observes this atom with a one second half life surviving for 3
>> seconds, and 4 seconds, and 5 years, and 6 centuries, and you name it. By
>> utilizing a series of increasingly complex and difficult procedures in the
>> lab it is possible for the lab to be in the tiny minority of universes
>> that contains observers that see the atom surviving for an arbitrary length
>> of time. But the longer the time and the more atoms involved the more
>> difficult the procedures become and soon becomes ridiculously
>> impractical.
>>
>
> *> I understand that, but you have previously claimed about thought
> experiments involving duplication that there is no sense in saying that the
> subject can expect to see a particular outcome with a particular
> probability, because he will certainly see all outcomes.*
>

In the matter duplicating machine thought experiment it is meaningless to
ask "what is the probability that you will see city X" because the meaning
of the personal pronoun "you" is ambiguous; after the experiment is
concluded 2 people in the same world who can talk to each other and to the
experimenter both claim to be "you" and one claims he saw city X and the
other claims he saw city Y. So the question "what city did you end up
seeing?" has no answer because the personal pronoun is ambiguous. By
contrast there is no ambiguity at all in the Many Worlds case, "you" is the
only person named Stathis Papaioannou that is observable, and I will
believe the only Stathis Papaioannou that I can see when he tells me what
city he ended up in. But when that same question is asked in the matter
duplicating case 2 people with an equally strong claim to be Stathis
Papaioannou give contradictory answers to my question, so in the matter
duplicating machine case "what is the probability that you will see city X ?"
is not a question at all, it's just a string of ASCII characters with a
question mark at the end.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

am0

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 1:40 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> >> Even if there are an infinite, and not just an astronomically large,
>> number of other worlds it would still not be difficult to introduce the
>> idea of probability.
>
>

* > An actual countable infinity creates problems like Hilbert's Hotel.*
>

Hilbert's Hotel is strange but it creates no logical paradoxes, and there's
nothing even strange about dividing up a continuum into a finite number of
finite pieces, you do it every time you cut a piece of string.

>> Each "you" in the Multiverse will live in a world that is different, and
>> thus each "you" will be different, sometimes that difference will be very
>> slight and sometimes it will be very large. The determination of how
>> different "you" can be and still be considered "you" is arbitrary, but as
>> long as consistency is maintained in your choice and the amount of
>> difference allowed is greater than zero then there will always be more
>> versions of "you" near the center of the Bell Curve than at the outer
>> edges. So if I have a lottery ticket I can predict that tomorrow when the
>> drawing is held I am far more likely to find myself in the losers center of
>> the Bell Curve than at the millionaire trailing edge, although a small
>> minority of "yous" will beat the odds and become rich. And I should add
>> that if you demand perfection with zero slop then you'd have to conclude
>> that you become a different person every time you take a sip of coffee, or
>> even water.
>
>
> *> Hmm.  When I brought this up earlier you thought it was no problem that
> the same you would be living in innumerably many worlds simply because
> cosmic rays and radioactive decays were leaving macroscopic records that
> split the world.  So innumerably many yous shouldn't be a problem either.
> But why not look at it the other way around and define "world" with some
> slop? *
>

Call it whatever you like, but I don't see your point.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

hhh

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 09:48, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>>
> *> So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the
>> next hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the
>> atom will decay in the next hour under MWI?*
>>
>
> By utilizing a complex set of observations it is actually possible to
> delay the radioactive decay of an atom indefinitely, for practical reasons
> when this experiment is actually performed the delay is small but
> statistically significant. This is how Many Worlds would explain that.
> Suppose an atom has a halflife of one second, the universe splits and so do
> I after one second.  In one universe the atom decays and in the other it
> doesn't. In the universe where it didn't decay after another second the
> universe splits again, and again in one universe it decays but in the other
> it has not, it survived for 2 full seconds. So there will be a version of
> me that observes this atom with a one second half life surviving for 3
> seconds, and 4 seconds, and 5 years, and 6 centuries, and you name it. By
> utilizing a series of increasingly complex and difficult procedures in the
> lab it is possible for the lab to be in the tiny minority of universes
> that contains observers that see the atom surviving for an arbitrary length
> of time. But the longer the time and the more atoms involved the more
> difficult the procedures become and soon becomes ridiculously impractical.
>

I understand that, but you have previously claimed about thought
experiments involving duplication that there is no sense in saying that the
subject can expect to see a particular outcome with a particular
probability, because he will certainly see all outcomes.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/22/2021 3:32 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 2:12 AM Bruce Kellett  
wrote:


/> You still need to introduce an independent notion of
probability because each member must consider himself to be a
random selection from the ensemble. The notion of a random
selection cannot be defined without reference to some prior notion
of probability./


Even if there are an infinite, and not just an astronomically large, 
number of other worlds it would still not be difficult to introduce 
the idea of probability.


An actual countable infinity creates problems like Hilbert's Hotel.

Each "you" in the Multiverse will live in a world that is different, 
and thus each "you" will be different, sometimes that difference will 
be very slight and sometimes it will be very large. The determination 
of how different "you" can be and still be considered "you" is 
arbitrary, but as long as consistency is maintained in your choice and 
the amount of difference allowed is greater than zero then there will 
always be more versions of "you" near the center of the Bell Curve 
than at the outer edges. So if I have a lottery ticket I can predict 
that tomorrow when the drawing is held I am far more likely to find 
myself in the losers center of the Bell Curve than at the millionaire 
trailing edge, although a small minority of "yous" will beat the odds 
and become rich


And I should add that if you demand perfection with zero slop then 
you'd have to conclude that you become a different person every time 
you take a sip of coffee, or even water.


Hmm.  When I brought this up earlier you thought it was no problem that 
the same you would be living in innumerably many worlds simply because 
cosmic rays and radioactive decays were leaving macroscopic records that 
split the world.  So innumerably many yous shouldn't be a problem 
either.  But why not look at it the other way around and define "world" 
with some slop?  There's an essay by Vaidman that takes this approach 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19979/1/PreprintWFR.pdf


Brent

Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:04 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

 > *But can a macroscopic observer really be approximated by a simple
> algorithm?*


Certainly not, if the algorithm was simple we would have found it by now,
but a macroscopic observer can be created by a complex algorithm, after all
we know that Darwinian Evolution managed to do it, and I have no doubt that
in the near future intelligent humans will be able to do it too. After all,
if random mutation and natural selection can do something then intelligent
design can do it too, and do it faster and better.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

cde


>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 2:12 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
> each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
> reference to some prior notion of probability.*
>

Even if there are an infinite, and not just an astronomically large, number
of other worlds it would still not be difficult to introduce the idea of
probability. Each "you" in the Multiverse will live in a world that is
different, and thus each "you" will be different, sometimes that difference
will be very slight and sometimes it will be very large. The determination
of how different "you" can be and still be considered "you" is arbitrary,
but as long as consistency is maintained in your choice and the amount of
difference allowed is greater than zero then there will always be more
versions of "you" near the center of the Bell Curve than at the outer
edges. So if I have a lottery ticket I can predict that tomorrow when the
drawing is held I am far more likely to find myself in the losers center of
the Bell Curve than at the millionaire trailing edge, although a small
minority of "yous" will beat the odds and become rich

And I should add that if you demand perfection with zero slop then you'd
have to conclude that you become a different person every time you take a
sip of coffee, or even water.

   John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

dpx

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 21-12-2021 22:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:


On 21-12-2021 07:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer 
wrote:

I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics

(there

doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism'

distinct

from local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for

the

toy model they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being
duplicated when they try to measure the entangled particle. The

point

is that Alice is locally duplicated when she measures her

particle,

and Bob is locally duplicated when he measures his, but there is

no

need for the universe to decide which copy of Bob inhabits the

same

"world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice versa, until there's

been

time for signals limited by the speed of light to pass between

them

(or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local realist"
theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit

assumptions

in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces exactly

one

of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting can

be

perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly

select

one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various
outcomes can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell
inequalities.

This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually

argued.

I was asking for something a little more concrete.

There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds

ideas

can have no role to play in the violation of the Bell

inequalities. In

other words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that

MWI

makes these experiments completely local.

The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin

states

on members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to

be

distant from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a
sequence of particles at random polarizer orientations,

randomizing

the polarizer angle between measurements. She records her results

(up

or down) in a lab book. After N such pairs have been measured, her

lab

book contains a sequence of N 0s or 1s (for up/down), with a

record of

the relevant polarizer angle for each measurement. If MWI is

correct,

there are 2^N copies of Alice, each with a lab book containing a
similar binary sequence. Over the 2^N copies of Alice, all

possible

binary sequences are covered. Bob does the same, so he has a lab

book

with some binary sequence of 0s and 1s (and 2^N copies with

different

lab books). For each copy of Bob, and each lab book, all N
measurements were necessarily made in the same world (because
individuals cannot move between worlds).

After all measurements are complete, Alice and Bob meet and

compare

their lab books in order to calculate the correlations between

results

for different relative measurement angles. Once Alice and Bob

meet,

they are necessarily in the same world. And since they carry their

lab

books with them, the measurements made in each lab book must all

have

been made in that same, single, world. The correlations that Alice

and

Bob calculate are shown to violate the Bell inequality. (That is
experimentally verified). But this violation of the inequality

takes

place in just one world, as has been seen by the above

construction.

The alternative copies of Alice and Bob also meet to compare

results.

As before, all these meetings take place in the same worlds as all

the

relevant measurements were made. Consequently, the many-worlds
analysis for each Alice-Bob pair is exactly the same as the single
world analysis obtained if collapse is assumed. Many-worlds adds
nothing to the analysis, so MWI cannot give any alternative
explanation of the correlations. In particular, MWI cannot give a
local account.

Bruce


It is the violation of the Bell inequality in each world that is the

evidence of the existence of the other worlds.


Huh?


Violation of Bell's inequalities rules out local hidden variables. This 
means that in some arbitrary quantum experiment where there is more than 
one outcome, the information about the measurement result was not 
already present locally before the measurement was carried out. So, when 
measuring the z-component of a spin 1/2 particle polarized in the 
x-direction, the measurement outcome will produce new information out of 
thin air, unless, of course, one assumes that the true physical state 
contains both outcomes.





The problem is with
comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is no
difference.


If there is no difference, where is the problem?


One needs to invoke a new physical mechanism to explain the collapse. 
Since this is then not motivated by experimental results showing that 
e.g. systems decohere faster than standard QM would predict, one is 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 1:50 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of the
> original even though they know that they are not,*


They are a true continuation of the original, they're just not the "one" true
continuation of the original.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

889


>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 21-12-2021 22:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/21/2021 5:27 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 


wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have 
one.

A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because 
it

is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it 
has

to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as 
many

assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework 
for a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck 
with a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you 
are not allowed to describe observers and observations within the 
collapse frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between 
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case 
textbooks were to insist that you are only allowed to consider 
certain types of heat engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.


Yes, but it is decoherence theory that extends the theory of
measurement beyond just phenomenological projectors.  And it doesn't
reach to explaining the probabilistic nature of QM.  ISTM that the
steps in Everett's account of measurement where instrument variables
become correlated with quantum system variables and cross terms form
superpositions are set to zero are almost has "hand wavy" as the CI
projection operators.   They seem to be just motivated by "This must
be the way the Schroedinger equation works for macroscopic 
instruments

in order that we get the same answer as the CI projector after we
assume Born's rule."

Brent


I agree that this is a problem. But as as I explained just now to 
Jesse Mazer, one should be able to make progress by including an 
observer defined as an algorithm. This should amount to the same thing 
as is done by Everett, but it's then motivated by the actual physics.


That would be better than just hand waving.  But can a macroscopic
observer really be approximated by a simple algorithm?  One of the
things that makes an "observer" is that it interacts with an
environment and has an effectively infinite degrees of freedom.

Brent



What we called an "observer moment" (OM) in this list, should be 
considered to be an algorithm that the universe is running using some 
fraction of the physical degrees of freedom located in he brain and 
perhaps also some other body parts. So, while the algorithm is not going 
to be located at exactly one point, it's not infinite in extent either. 
The physical state of the brain will, of course, be entangled with the 
environment. But there exists a local description of how the brain 
works, and there are good reasons foe believing that whatever we 
experience (including the notion we have about our personal identity) is 
due to running a particular algorithm.


Saibal














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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:15 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
*> So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the next
> hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the atom
> will decay in the next hour under MWI?*
>

By utilizing a complex set of observations it is actually possible to delay
the radioactive decay of an atom indefinitely, for practical reasons when
this experiment is actually performed the delay is small but statistically
significant. This is how Many Worlds would explain that. Suppose an atom
has a halflife of one second, the universe splits and so do I after one
second.  In one universe the atom decays and in the other it doesn't. In
the universe where it didn't decay after another second the universe splits
again, and again in one universe it decays but in the other it has not, it
survived for 2 full seconds. So there will be a version of me that observes
this atom with a one second half life surviving for 3 seconds, and 4
seconds, and 5 years, and 6 centuries, and you name it. By utilizing a
series of increasingly complex and difficult procedures in the lab it is
possible for the lab to be in the tiny minority of universes that contains
observers that see the atom surviving for an arbitrary length of time. But
the longer the time and the more atoms involved the more difficult the
procedures become and soon becomes ridiculously impractical.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

ww3

umu









>
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
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> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 09:02, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:47 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
 that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
 outcomes.*

>>>
>>> >> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it
>>> because all the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John
>>> Clark that is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have
>>> observed rare events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>>>
>>
>> *> So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each
>> outcome, to whom do the other probabilities apply?*
>>
>
> This may or may not be the answer because I'm not sure I understand your
> question, but John Clark will either see event X or see event Y, so there
> is a 100% chance John Clark will see event X and only event X,  and a 100%
> chance John Clark will see event Y and only event Y. And the same would
> be true for people with other names.
>

So if you say that there is a 50% chance the atom will decay in the next
hour what does that mean, given that there is also a 100% chance the atom
will decay in the next hour under MWI?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:47 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*>>> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
>>> that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
>>> outcomes.*
>>>
>>
>> >> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because
>> all the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark
>> that is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
>> events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>>
>
> *> So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each outcome,
> to whom do the other probabilities apply?*
>

This may or may not be the answer because I'm not sure I understand your
question, but John Clark will either see event X or see event Y, so there
is a 100% chance John Clark will see event X and only event X,  and a 100%
chance John Clark will see event Y and only event Y. And the same would be
true for people with other names.
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

umu

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 12:53 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 21-12-2021 07:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer 
> > wrote:
> >
> > I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
> > doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct
> > from local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the
> > toy model they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being
> > duplicated when they try to measure the entangled particle. The point
> > is that Alice is locally duplicated when she measures her particle,
> > and Bob is locally duplicated when he measures his, but there is no
> > need for the universe to decide which copy of Bob inhabits the same
> > "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice versa, until there's been
> > time for signals limited by the speed of light to pass between them
> > (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local realist"
> > theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit assumptions
> > in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces exactly one
> > of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting can be
> > perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly select
> > one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
> > probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various
> > outcomes can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell
> > inequalities.
> >
> > This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued.
> > I was asking for something a little more concrete.
> >
> > There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas
> > can have no role to play in the violation of the Bell inequalities. In
> > other words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that MWI
> > makes these experiments completely local.
> >
> > The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin states
> > on members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to be
> > distant from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a
> > sequence of particles at random polarizer orientations, randomizing
> > the polarizer angle between measurements. She records her results (up
> > or down) in a lab book. After N such pairs have been measured, her lab
> > book contains a sequence of N 0s or 1s (for up/down), with a record of
> > the relevant polarizer angle for each measurement. If MWI is correct,
> > there are 2^N copies of Alice, each with a lab book containing a
> > similar binary sequence. Over the 2^N copies of Alice, all possible
> > binary sequences are covered. Bob does the same, so he has a lab book
> > with some binary sequence of 0s and 1s (and 2^N copies with different
> > lab books). For each copy of Bob, and each lab book, all N
> > measurements were necessarily made in the same world (because
> > individuals cannot move between worlds).
> >
> >  After all measurements are complete, Alice and Bob meet and compare
> > their lab books in order to calculate the correlations between results
> > for different relative measurement angles. Once Alice and Bob meet,
> > they are necessarily in the same world. And since they carry their lab
> > books with them, the measurements made in each lab book must all have
> > been made in that same, single, world. The correlations that Alice and
> > Bob calculate are shown to violate the Bell inequality. (That is
> > experimentally verified). But this violation of the inequality takes
> > place in just one world, as has been seen by the above construction.
> > The alternative copies of Alice and Bob also meet to compare results.
> > As before, all these meetings take place in the same worlds as all the
> > relevant measurements were made. Consequently, the many-worlds
> > analysis for each Alice-Bob pair is exactly the same as the single
> > world analysis obtained if collapse is assumed. Many-worlds adds
> > nothing to the analysis, so MWI cannot give any alternative
> > explanation of the correlations. In particular, MWI cannot give a
> > local account.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> It is the violation of the Bell inequality in each world that is the
> evidence of the existence of the other worlds.


Huh?

The problem is with
> comparing with collapse hypothesis and then saying that there is no
> difference.


If there is no difference, where is the problem?

But the whole problem is that when Alice makes her
> measurement that she gains some amount of information about what Bob is
> going to find, even though they are spacelike separated.


In general, that is not true. When both Alice and Bob set their polarizers
randomly while the particles are in flight, the fact that Alice might get
|up> tells her nothing about what Bob will get at some randomly different
polarizer orientation. You seem to be stuck with thinking in terms of
parallel polarizer orientations.


In the MWI
> there is no such mysterious gain of information due to the 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 07:50, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 3:34 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> >> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves
>>> the right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but
>>> the important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
>>> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
>>> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
>>> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
>>> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>>>
>>
>> *> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments,
>> that there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both
>> outcomes.*
>>
>
> Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because all
> the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark that
> is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
> events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
>

So given that John Clark has a 100% probability of seeing each outcome, to
whom do the other probabilities apply?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2021 5:27 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework 
for a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck 
with a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you 
are not allowed to describe observers and observations within the 
collapse frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between 
statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case 
textbooks were to insist that you are only allowed to consider 
certain types of heat engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.


Yes, but it is decoherence theory that extends the theory of
measurement beyond just phenomenological projectors.  And it doesn't
reach to explaining the probabilistic nature of QM.  ISTM that the
steps in Everett's account of measurement where instrument variables
become correlated with quantum system variables and cross terms form
superpositions are set to zero are almost has "hand wavy" as the CI
projection operators.   They seem to be just motivated by "This must
be the way the Schroedinger equation works for macroscopic instruments
in order that we get the same answer as the CI projector after we
assume Born's rule."

Brent


I agree that this is a problem. But as as I explained just now to 
Jesse Mazer, one should be able to make progress by including an 
observer defined as an algorithm. This should amount to the same thing 
as is done by Everett, but it's then motivated by the actual physics.


That would be better than just hand waving.  But can a macroscopic 
observer really be approximated by a simple algorithm?  One of the 
things that makes an "observer" is that it interacts with an environment 
and has an effectively infinite degrees of freedom.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 3:34 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
>> right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
>> important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
>> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
>> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
>> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
>> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>>
>
> *> But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments, that
> there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both outcomes.*
>

Yes, John Clark did say that and sees no reason to retract it because all
the John Clark's have as equal a right to that name as the John Clark that
is writing this email, even those John Clark's that have observed rare
events at the outer edges of the Bell Curve.
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

bew

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2021 2:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis
Papaioannou  wrote:

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker
 wrote:

On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:

The probabilities come from the fact that
observers consider themselves unique
individuals persisting through time.


But that doesn't imply any kind of
probability unless they regard themselves
as the one member of an ensemble that is
unique, e.g. the one that really exists or
the one that's really me.  Otherwise they
are just like the duplicate Captain Kirks.


Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the
one true continuation of the original even
though they know that they are not, because
that is the nature of first person experience.


You still need to introduce an independent notion
of probability because each member must consider
himself to be a random selection from the
ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot
be defined without reference to some prior notion
of probability.


Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how
your identity moves from one body into the next.



You just need some credible evidence that such a notion
even begins to make sense.


It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual
persisting through time, because everyone understands what it
means. Some people try to come up with theories based on this
feeling, such as the existence of an immaterial soul, but that
doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique individual
persisting through time stands independently of whatever
entity or gives rise to this feeling.


I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation
of  personal identity through time was not what we were talking
about. Persistence through time does not involve self-locating
uncertainty from an ensemble at a point in time.


If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of 
me will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see 
the atom decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I 
feel myself to be a unique individual persisting through time, even 
though I might know the objective details of what is occurring.


Yes, but symmetric examples are deceptive.  What do you fell when the 
probability of decay is 1/100 and non-decay 99/100.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 22 Dec 2021 at 04:01, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> >*but** there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life
>> period that one version of you will see and another version of you will
>> see, which is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom
>> decay, if you have a normal human brain without telepathic communication
>> with other copies.*
>
>
> All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental
> laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably
> wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a
> half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most
> common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium
> decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're
> talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will
> not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only
> one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5
> million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay
> after only 5 nanoseconds.
>
> You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
> right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
> important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
> consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
> something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
> either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
> the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.
>

But you have said in the past, with regard to copying experiments, that
there is a 100% chance that you (i.e. John Clark) will see both outcomes.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Jesse Mazer]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 1:12 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
 objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
 role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.

>>>
>>> At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
>>> Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
>>> theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
>>> not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
>>> example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
>>> objective.
>>>
>>> fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
>>> Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
>>> anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
>>> has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
>>> anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
>>> define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
>>> a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
>>> self-locating uncertainty.
>>>
>>
>> What does fGRW stand for?
>>
>
> It is short for Flash-GRW, in which the random collapse interactions of
> GRW are replaced by "flashes". The point here is that this formulation is
> Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic.
>

I assume the flashes are collapses to eigenstates, with probabilities given
by the Born rule, even if these collapses are not necessarily caused by
interactions? If so, what factors affect the probability a collapse happens
at any given moment? Does it depend on the mass of the entangled system
(thus becoming more likely as the system becomes entangled with its
environment), as in Penrose's suggestion?


>
> If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those theories that involves
>> stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are usually in principle
>> experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be true of this theory
>> as well?
>>
>
> In principle this collapse model is distinguishable from no-collapse
> models. The experiments to detect this might be outside current
> capabilities.
>
> If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
 measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
 a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
 we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
 to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
 over the Copenhagen interpretation.

 Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true
 mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting
 that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality

>>>
>>> No you can't.
>>>
 but doesn't require hidden variables (see
 https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
 work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.

>>>
>>> They set up a contrast between realism and locality.
>>>
>>
>> I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
>> doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct from
>> local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the toy model
>> they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being duplicated when they
>> try to measure the entangled particle. The point is that Alice is locally
>> duplicated when she measures her particle, and Bob is locally duplicated
>> when he measures his, but there is no need for the universe to decide which
>> copy of Bob inhabits the same "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice
>> versa, until there's been time for signals limited by the speed of light to
>> pass between them (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local
>> realist" theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit
>> assumptions in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces
>> exactly one of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting
>> can be perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly
>> select one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
>> probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various outcomes
>> can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell inequalities.
>>
>
> This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued. I
> was asking for something a little more concrete.
>
> There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas can
> have no role to play in the violation of the 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>*but** there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life
> period that one version of you will see and another version of you will
> see, which is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom
> decay, if you have a normal human brain without telepathic communication
> with other copies.*


All versions of "you" that live in worlds that have the same fundamental
laws of physics (and those that don't would be so different they probably
wouldn't deserve to be called "you") would agree that Neptunium 240 has a
half-life of one hour, in other words that mode of decay would be the most
common and most of "you" in the multi-verse would see an atom of Neptunium
decay at around the one hour mark. But most does not mean all and if we're
talking about one particular Neptunium 240 atom a minority of "you" will
not see it decay after 5 hours even though you know it's half life is only
one hour, and a very tiny minority will not see it decay even after 5
million years, and another very tiny minority of "you" will see it decay
after only 5 nanoseconds.

You may ask, how different can "you" be before it no longer deserves the
right to be called "you"? I admit that limit is somewhat arbitrary, but the
important point is that whatever limit you choose, as long as it's
consistent, it makes no difference if high precision is demanded for
something to be called "you" or if extreame sloppiness can be tolerated,
either way it will still remain true that there will be more "yous" near
the center of the Bell Curve than at the trailing edges.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

emc

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 21-12-2021 07:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer 
wrote:


On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer 
wrote:

But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no
distinguished role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of
quantum interactions.

At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI
over Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern
collapse theories do not have to distinguish particular
"measurement" events, and do not have to assume a classical
superstructure . In modern fGRW, for example, everything can be
treated as quantum, and the theory is completely objective.

fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic
theory. Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not
based on anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of
probability, and while it has to reject a frequentist basis for
probability, it cannot really supply anything else. Self-locating
uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to define probability. You
have to have some notion of a random selection from a set, and that
is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
self-locating uncertainty.


What does fGRW stand for?

It is short for Flash-GRW, in which the random collapse interactions
of GRW are replaced by "flashes". The point here is that this
formulation is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic.


If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those theories that
involves stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are usually
in principle experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be
true of this theory as well?


In principle this collapse model is distinguishable from no-collapse
models. The experiments to detect this might be outside current
capabilities.


If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what
qualifies as a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements'
are just something we feed into the theory on a
know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim to objectivity is lost
and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has over the
Copenhagen interpretation.

Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true
mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style
splitting that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that
preserves locality

No you can't.

but doesn't require hidden variables (see
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort
of work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.

They set up a contrast between realism and locality.


I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct
from local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the
toy model they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being
duplicated when they try to measure the entangled particle. The point
is that Alice is locally duplicated when she measures her particle,
and Bob is locally duplicated when he measures his, but there is no
need for the universe to decide which copy of Bob inhabits the same
"world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice versa, until there's been
time for signals limited by the speed of light to pass between them
(or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local realist"
theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit assumptions
in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces exactly one
of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting can be
perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly select
one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various
outcomes can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell
inequalities.

This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued.
I was asking for something a little more concrete.

There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas
can have no role to play in the violation of the Bell inequalities. In
other words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that MWI
makes these experiments completely local.

The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin states
on members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to be
distant from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a
sequence of particles at random polarizer orientations, randomizing
the polarizer angle between measurements. She records her results (up
or down) in a lab book. After N such pairs have been measured, her lab
book contains a sequence of N 0s or 1s (for up/down), with a record of
the relevant polarizer angle for each measurement. If MWI is correct,
there are 2^N copies of Alice, each 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 20-12-2021 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for 
a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with 
a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not 
allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse 
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical 
mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to 
insist that you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat 
engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.


Yes, but it is decoherence theory that extends the theory of
measurement beyond just phenomenological projectors.  And it doesn't
reach to explaining the probabilistic nature of QM.  ISTM that the
steps in Everett's account of measurement where instrument variables
become correlated with quantum system variables and cross terms form
superpositions are set to zero are almost has "hand wavy" as the CI
projection operators.   They seem to be just motivated by "This must
be the way the Schroedinger equation works for macroscopic instruments
in order that we get the same answer as the CI projector after we
assume Born's rule."

Brent


I agree that this is a problem. But as as I explained just now to Jesse 
Mazer, one should be able to make progress by including an observer 
defined as an algorithm. This should amount to the same thing as is done 
by Everett, but it's then motivated by the actual physics.


Saibal

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

One needs to define the observer + measurement apparatus. In 
conventional QM one associates to a measurement device made ready to 
measure some property of a system a Hermitian operator. But if we pursue 
the MWI rigorously, then one should associate a set of commuting 
operators to a conscious experience of an observer. And this should then 
follow from a description of consciousness as the computational state of 
some algorithm.


So, at this very moment my experience while I'm typing these words must 
be the result of a particular algorithm that is processing a particular 
set of data. I cannot in principle see the difference of that exact 
algorithm being implemented in different parts of the multiverse. At 
least not at that very moment when that particular set of data is 
processed.


An algorithm can be described by a time evolution operator U that acts 
on an input state and maps it to the state one computational step later. 
The preferred basis then arises from selecting the sectors where the 
algorithm representing the observer exists. The algorithm will have some 
valid input states |input> and corresponding output states |output(in)> 
= U|input>, we can then write:


U = sum over all |input>, |output> of |output>sum over all |input> of |output(input)>



Suppose that we seek the observer represented by the operator U who has 
some definite experience. Whatever the observer is experiencing will be 
some course grained description of the precise inputs the actual data 
that U could be processing. So, we then consider limiting the summation 
above to only those input states that correspond to the specified coarse 
grained description. So, one can say that we need to narrow down U to 
some definite experience, but we then still end up summing over a very 
large set of states, because a particular conscious experience does not 
correspond to a definite physical state.


A simple example is to consider simulating a spin measurement using a 
quantum computer. The spin is then represent by a qbuit and the 
"observer" measuring the spin would then be the CNOT operator that takes 
the qubit representing the spin as the control qubit while the other 
qubit that it acts on is initialized to be |0>. So, one can then say 
that there exists a "CNOT observer". This definition is then well 
defined w.r.t. changing the basis.


Saibal



On 20-12-2021 18:01, Jesse Mazer wrote:

When you say the MWI + Born rule "yields an unambiguous framework for
a fundamental theory" are you assuming the idea of probability being
equal to amplitude squared only applies to "measurements", or that it
would somehow apply at all times in the MWI? If the former there would
seem to be some ambiguity about what a "measurement" is; if the
latter, I believe MWI advocates still don't have an agreed-upon answer
to the "preferred basis problem" discussed at
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/65177/is-the-preferred-basis-problem-solved

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 4:03 AM smitra  wrote:


On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker



wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have

one.

A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such

as

the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because

it

is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it

has

to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as

many

assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework
for a
fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with
a
phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not

allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical
mechanics
and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to insist
that
you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat engines that
operate in the quasistatic limit.

Saibal




If it were not true Schrodinger's Wave would be completely

useless

and there would be no reason any physicist would bother to

calculate

it.


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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 20-12-2021 11:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:03 PM smitra  wrote:


On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:


The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it

has

to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as

many

assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework
for a
fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with
a
phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not

allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
frameworks.


I think you are stuck on a very old-fashioned view of collapse
theories -- perhaps you are thinking only in terms of theories
dominated by Bohr's idea of a separation between the quantum and the
classical -- with the classical world necessary to give quantum
results meaning. In other words, a fundamental separation between the
observer and the observed. This, of course, is problematic in that you
cannot describe the observer in quantum terms.

But modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this
limitation. There is no observer/observed distinction in such
theories, and they can easily accommodate the idea that everything,
including the observer, is quantum.

Besides, MWI is far from unambiguous. For instance, the notion of
probability is decidedly problematic in Everettian theory.

Bruce


Yes, I agree, I've read about such theories some time ago. I don't 
remember the details, but I think they do predict new physics, so they 
can be tested and falsified.


The notion of probability in Everettian theory is indeed problematic, 
but you'll have similar problems in a Bruno-type copying experiment 
where I make 99 copies of you that will observe one thing and 1 copy 
will observe something else. Then all 100 observations will exist, but 
you can still say that you'll expect to observe the first outcome with 
99% probability.


Saibal

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 21:51, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:31 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>
>
> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the 
> one
> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are 
> just
> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>

 Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
 of the original even though they know that they are not, because that 
 is
 the nature of first person experience.

>>>
>>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
>>> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
>>> the
>>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
>> moves from one body into the next.
>>
>
>
> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
> make sense.
>

 It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
 through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
 to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
 immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
 individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
 or gives rise to this feeling.

>>>
>>> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>>>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
>>> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
>>> ensemble at a point in time.
>>>
>>
>> If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
>> will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
>> decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
>> to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
>> the objective details of what is occurring.
>>
>
> I don't see how persistence through time has any bearing on the
> probability. If there is a split, then the probability that you will see
> one or the other result depends on the magnitudes of the wave function for
> the branches. That is the Born rule, and it is an independent assumption,
> as is the fact that there is a probability interpretation at all.
> Self-locating uncertainty only gives you a measure of the probability if
> the number of branches with each outcome matches the Born probabilities.
>

Under MWI every outcome happens, so the probability of each outcome is 1.
How do you justify calculating probabilities for outcomes that are less
than 1?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:11 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete
>> rewrite, and the prospects are not looking good:
>>
>> Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to
>> relativistic particles
>> 
>>
>
>
> *> Flash-GRW is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic*
>

You should submit a paper to Physical Review to compete with the one they
just published.


> *> Getting rid of the determinism of the Schrodinger equation is a good
> thing if you want a theory that is going to predict probabilities.*
>

That doesn't follow because there is a difference between ontology and
epistemology.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

xx2


>
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:52 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 5:28 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >*modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this
>> limitation. There is no observer/observed distinction in such theories, and
>> they can easily accommodate the idea that everything, including the
>> observer, is quantum.*
>>
>
> One thing GRW can't accommodate is Special Relativity, so it's
> inconsistent with observation, so it's not yet a quantum interpretation at
> all, but Many Worlds had no difficulty in accommodating Special Relativity
> from day one. Unlike Many Worlds GRW is not deterministic, it adds a random
> term to Schrodinger's equation that only does 4 things:
>
> 1) It makes the new equation inconsistent with special relativity and thus
> observation.
> 2) It makes an equation that was already very difficult to solve even more
> difficult.
> 3) It makes Schrodinger's equation become nondeterministic.
> 4) It gets rid of those Many Worlds that so many people hate and fear.
>
> Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete
> rewrite, and the prospects are not looking good:
>
> Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to relativistic
> particles
> 
>


Flash-GRW is Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic because it is
based on light cone physics. Getting rid of the determinism of the
Schrodinger equation is a good thing if you want a theory that is going to
predict probabilities.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 5:28 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>*modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this limitation.
> There is no observer/observed distinction in such theories, and they can
> easily accommodate the idea that everything, including the observer, is
> quantum.*
>

One thing GRW can't accommodate is Special Relativity, so it's inconsistent
with observation, so it's not yet a quantum interpretation at all, but Many
Worlds had no difficulty in accommodating Special Relativity from day one.
Unlike Many Worlds GRW is not deterministic, it adds a random term to
Schrodinger's equation that only does 4 things:

1) It makes the new equation inconsistent with special relativity and thus
observation.
2) It makes an equation that was already very difficult to solve even more
difficult.
3) It makes Schrodinger's equation become nondeterministic.
4) It gets rid of those Many Worlds that so many people hate and fear.

Maybe someday GRW Will do better but that would require a complete rewrite,
and the prospects are not looking good:

Impossibility of extending the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model to relativistic
particles


John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

wrd

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:31 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
 themselves unique individuals persisting through time.


 But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
 themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the 
 one
 that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are 
 just
 like the duplicate Captain Kirks.

>>>
>>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
>>> of the original even though they know that they are not, because that is
>>> the nature of first person experience.
>>>
>>
>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
>> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
>> the
>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>
>
> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
> moves from one body into the next.
>


 You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
 make sense.

>>>
>>> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
>>> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
>>> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
>>> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
>>> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
>>> or gives rise to this feeling.
>>>
>>
>> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
>> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
>> ensemble at a point in time.
>>
>
> If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
> will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
> decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
> to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
> the objective details of what is occurring.
>

I don't see how persistence through time has any bearing on the
probability. If there is a split, then the probability that you will see
one or the other result depends on the magnitudes of the wave function for
the branches. That is the Born rule, and it is an independent assumption,
as is the fact that there is a probability interpretation at all.
Self-locating uncertainty only gives you a measure of the probability if
the number of branches with each outcome matches the Born probabilities.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
>>> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>>>
>>>
>>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>>
>>
>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
>> of the original even though they know that they are not, because that is
>> the nature of first person experience.
>>
>
> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
> the
> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>

 Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
 moves from one body into the next.

>>>
>>>
>>> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
>>> make sense.
>>>
>>
>> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
>> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
>> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
>> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
>> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
>> or gives rise to this feeling.
>>
>
> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
> ensemble at a point in time.
>

If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
the objective details of what is occurring.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 12:32 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> that is the one assumption you have to make in the MWI, you have to
>> assume that the Schrodinger wave equation means what it says, and in words
>> it says  "*The rate of change of a wave function is proportional to the
>> energy of the quantum system and the high energy parts of the wave function
>> evolve rapidly while the low energy parts evolve slowly*". It would be
>> expected that more things happen in the rapidly evolving parts then the 
>> slowly
>> evolving parts.
>
>
>
> *> Whether the Geiger counter detects five alpha particles in a second or
> four doesn't depend on some atoms evolving slowly or quickly.*
>

Yes, but that is in no way inconsistent with what I said in the above, in
fact that's the reason that all versions of "you" agree on what the half
life of a radioactive element is, although they may disagree on whether a
particular atom has decayed or not.

*> MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all possible outcomes...but
>>> in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> >> That depends on the meaning of the pronoun "you". In the fast
>> evolving part of the wave function more things are happening but there are
>> also more versions of "you" to see them, and some parts contain no energy
>> at all and thus nothing happens there at all. It is physically impossible
>> for some things to happen so no version of "you" sees it.
>
>
> > *That's a strange thing to say.*
>

Yes it's a very strange thing to say no doubt about it, but there is
absolutely positively no way any quantum interpretation that is compatible
with observation will EVER be able to make the quantum world not seem
strange. When you get down into the quantum realm things just seem weird,
but they never become logically paradoxical. The reason things seem so
strange to us is that there would've been no Evolutionarily advantage to
our hominid ancestors on the African savanna if our minds were constructed
in such a way that such things seemed intuitively obvious, so instead
evolution made our brains good at other things, like avoiding predators and
detecting prey.


>   > In the last few seconds thousands of cosmic rays shot thru you and
> you didn't see or detect them in any way.
>

Yes.


> > *Yet according Everett they split the world into as many copies because
> they left traces that could be observed where they passed thru solid
> objects. *
>

Yes. Is there supposed to be a problem with that?

>> And if the Born rule had been proven to be inconsistent with Hilbert
>> space physicist would not have gotten rid of the Born rule, instead they
>> would've gotten rid of Hilbert space, because the Born rule would have
>> continued to work regardless of what Hilbert space's opinion of it is.
>
>
> > *Without Hilbert space they'd have no state vector to apply the Born
> rule.*
>

And that would be a pity, but physicists would still have the ability to
multiply numbers and find their square roots, they were doing such
numerical manipulation long before anybody knew anything about Hilbert space
, so they could still use the Born rule. Regardless of what a mathematician
might say physicists will never abandon the Born rule as long as it retains
its ability to make successful predictions.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

q92

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
>> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>>
>>
>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>
>
> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
> the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
> nature of first person experience.
>

 You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
 because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
 ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
 reference to some prior notion of probability.

>>>
>>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
>>> moves from one body into the next.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
>> make sense.
>>
>
> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
> or gives rise to this feeling.
>

I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
 personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
ensemble at a point in time.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:

> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>
>
> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>

 Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
 the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
 nature of first person experience.

>>>
>>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
>>> each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
>>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity moves
>> from one body into the next.
>>
>
>
> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
> make sense.
>

It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
or gives rise to this feeling.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider themselves
 unique individuals persisting through time.


 But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
 themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
 that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
 like the duplicate Captain Kirks.

>>>
>>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
>>> the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
>>> nature of first person experience.
>>>
>>
>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
>> each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>
>
> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity moves
> from one body into the next.
>


You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to make
sense.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider themselves
>>> unique individuals persisting through time.
>>>
>>>
>>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>>
>>
>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of
>> the original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
>> nature of first person experience.
>>
>
> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
> each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>

Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity moves
from one body into the next.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider themselves
>> unique individuals persisting through time.
>>
>>
>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>
>
> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of the
> original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
> nature of first person experience.
>

You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability because
each member must consider himself to be a random selection from the
ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
reference to some prior notion of probability.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 12:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2021 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 09:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 *> >> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
>> measurement are realized probabilistically.*
>
>
 >> What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have
> one. A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such
> as the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
> interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the square
> of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it is observed
> to be true.

 > *A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very well
 return 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. *

>>>
>>> A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is not a
>>> temperature operator, and a measurement is not a probability, although
>>> the square of the absolute value of a wave function might tell you the
>>> probability of you getting that temperature measurement at that time and
>>> place.
>>>
>>> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.
 But it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in
 the equation itself. *
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know what you mean by that.
>>>
>>> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
>>> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
>>> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
>>> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.
>>>
>> Self-locating uncertainty is not dependent on any particular theory. It’s
>> the same whether it’s the Many Worlds, the Star Trek teleporter or God that
>> does the duplicating.
>>
>>
>> Not exactly.  In those other theories you mention you can put all the
>> duplicates side by side and there's no sense to the question, which one
>> happened?  They all did and there's no probability to assign to them;
>> because probability only makes sense when something happens and other
>> things don't.
>>
>
> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider themselves
> unique individuals persisting through time.
>
>
> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one
> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just
> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>

Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation of the
original even though they know that they are not, because that is the
nature of first person experience.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 4:40 PM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
>>> objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
>>> role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.
>>>
>>
>> At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
>> Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
>> theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
>> not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
>> example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
>> objective.
>>
>> fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
>> Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
>> anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
>> has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
>> anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
>> define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
>> a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
>> self-locating uncertainty.
>>
>
> What does fGRW stand for?
>

It is short for Flash-GRW, in which the random collapse interactions of GRW
are replaced by "flashes". The point here is that this formulation is
Lorentz invariant and completely relativistic.

If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those theories that involves
> stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are usually in principle
> experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be true of this theory
> as well?
>

In principle this collapse model is distinguishable from no-collapse
models. The experiments to detect this might be outside current
capabilities.

If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
>>> measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
>>> a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
>>> we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
>>> to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
>>> over the Copenhagen interpretation.
>>>
>>> Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true
>>> mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting
>>> that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality
>>>
>>
>> No you can't.
>>
>>> but doesn't require hidden variables (see
>>> https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
>>> work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.
>>>
>>
>> They set up a contrast between realism and locality.
>>
>
> I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
> doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct from
> local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the toy model
> they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being duplicated when they
> try to measure the entangled particle. The point is that Alice is locally
> duplicated when she measures her particle, and Bob is locally duplicated
> when he measures his, but there is no need for the universe to decide which
> copy of Bob inhabits the same "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice
> versa, until there's been time for signals limited by the speed of light to
> pass between them (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local
> realist" theory that Bell was trying to refute (one of the implicit
> assumptions in his derivation was that each spin measurement produces
> exactly one of two possible outcomes), but the dynamics of such splitting
> can be perfectly local, and it can still be true that if you randomly
> select one of the copies of an observer in a Bell type experiment, the
> probabilities that your randomly selected copy will see various outcomes
> can be made to match the QM predictions that violate Bell inequalities.
>

This seems to be the hand-waving way in which this is usually argued. I was
asking for something a little more concrete.

There is a fairly simple argument that shows that many worlds ideas can
have no role to play in the violation of the Bell inequalities. In other
words, there is an indirect no-go theorem for the idea that MWI makes these
experiments completely local.

The argument goes like this. Take Alice and Bob measuring spin states on
members of entangled pairs of particles -- they are presumed to be distant
from each other, and independent. Alice, say, measures a sequence of
particles at random polarizer orientations, randomizing the polarizer angle
between measurements. She records her results (up or down) in a lab book.
After N such pairs have been measured, her lab book contains a sequence 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Jesse Mazer]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:10 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> Brent Meeker  Wrote:
>>>
>>> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.
 But it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in
 the equation itself. *
>>>
>>>
>>> > I don't know what you mean by that.
>>>
>>> *> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
 applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
 self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
 those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.*
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven that
>>> the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of Schrodinger's
>>> equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1. And Schrodinger says
>>> an electron wave can be in any location, and in a camera/electron wave a
>>> camera will observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
>>> Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for every camera
>>> that sees an electron in every location.
>>>
>>> *> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less)
 than you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid
>>> and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because
>>> the Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests
>>> , so it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
>>> true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
>>> convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
>>> outranks theory.
>>>
>>
>> But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
>> objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
>> role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.
>>
>
> At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
> Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
> theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
> not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
> example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
> objective.
>
> fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
> Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
> anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
> has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
> anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
> define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
> a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
> self-locating uncertainty.
>

What does fGRW stand for? If it's stochastic, do you mean it's one of those
theories that involves stochastic spontaneous collapse? Such theories are
usually in principle experimentally distinguishable from QM, would that be
true of this theory as well?



>
>
> If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
>> measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
>> a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
>> we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
>> to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
>> over the Copenhagen interpretation.
>>
>> Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true mainly
>> because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting that
>> deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality
>>
>
> No you can't.
>
>> but doesn't require hidden variables (see
>> https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
>> work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.
>>
>
> They set up a contrast between realism and locality.
>

I wasn't linking to the paper for the argument about semantics (there
doesn't seem to be any agreed-upon definition of 'realism' distinct from
local realism in physics, from what I've seen) but rather for the toy model
they provide in section 5 with the experimenters being duplicated when they
try to measure the entangled particle. The point is that Alice is locally
duplicated when she measures her particle, and Bob is locally duplicated
when he measures his, but there is no need for the universe to decide which
copy of Bob inhabits the same "world" as a given copy of Alice, or vice
versa, until there's been time for signals limited by the speed of light to
pass between them (or to a third observer). This is not the sort of "local
realist" theory that Bell was trying to refute 

Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 7:32 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:50 PM Brent Meeker  
wrote:


> MWI is completely deterministic, including the prediction that all
possibilities occur.


True.

/> So you have to have some assumption to get probabilities, such
that one thing happens and others don't. /


Yes, that is the one assumption you have to make in the MWI, you have 
to assume that the Schrodinger wave equation means what it says, and 
in words it says  "/The rate of change of a wave function is 
proportional to the energy of the quantum system and the high energy 
parts of the wave function evolve rapidly while the low energy parts 
evolve slowly/". It would be expected that more things happen in the 
rapidly evolving parts then the slowly evolving parts.


Whether the Geiger counter detects five alpha particles in a second or 
four doesn't depend on some atoms evolving slowly or quickly.



/> MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all possible
outcomes...but in other worlds. /


That depends on the meaning of the pronoun"you". In the fast evolving 
part of the wave function more things are happening but there are also 
more versions of "you" to see them, and some parts contain no energy 
at all and thus nothing happens there at all. It is physically 
impossible for some things to happen so no version of "you" sees it.


That's a strange thing to say.  In the last few seconds thousands of 
cosmic rays shot thru you and you didn't see or detect them in any way.  
Yet according Everett they split the world into as many copies because 
they left traces that could be observed where they passed thru solid 
objects.




/> But the mechanism of this splitting, when and where it happens,
is as just as hand wavy as Copenhagen's projection postulate./


No, it's right there in the equation, the thing is that people forget 
that they are a quantum system too and thus are also part of the 
Schrodinger wave equation. The equation says nothing about a 
separation between the observer and the thing that is being observed, 
that is just pasted  on by every quantum interpretation except for  
Many Worlds. MWI is strip down bare bones no nonsense Quantum 
Mechanics with none of the silly gimmicks tacked on just to make those 
who dislike the idea that they are not unique feel good.


>> And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in any location,
and in a camera/electron wave a camera will observe the
electron being in every location, and in a Brent
Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for
every camera that sees an electron in every location.


/> That's like saying every horse in the gate is a possible winner
of the Kentucy derby. But that doesn't get you to
probabilitieswithout an assumption that one an only one will win. 
Everett wants to avoid that assumption...which then takes
self-locating uncertainty to make it consistent with probabilistic
observations./


Schrodinger equation says high energy partsof the wave evolve swiftly, 
so there would be more versions of you in those parts than in the low 
energy parts, so it's more likely that "you" will end up in a higher 
energy part than a low energy part.


>> Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid
and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident
is because the Born rule has always conform with observations
and all empirical tests , so it doesn't need a seal of
approval  from a theory for us to think it's true, but a
theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation
always outranks theory. 



/> But observation is always finite, while theories claim infinite
applicability.  Newton's mechanics is also used everyday, with
confidence.  I didn't say theory made it true.  Theory only shows
the Born rule is consistent with Hilbert space. /


And if the Born rule had been proven to be inconsistent with Hilbert 
space physicist would not have gotten rid of the Born rule, instead 
they would've gotten rid of Hilbert space, because the Born rule would 
have continued to work regardless of what Hilbert space's opinion of 
it is.


Without Hilbert space they'd have no state vector to apply the Born rule.

Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 12:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 12/20/2021 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 09:56, Brent Meeker
 wrote:


On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker
 wrote:


/> >> It also makes the assumption that the
eigenvalues of a measurement are realized
probabilistically./


>> What is the eigenvalueof a temperature of 72°F? It
doesn't have one. A measurement doesn't have an
eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as the one that
describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a
relationship between the square of the absolute
value of that wave and probability because it is
observed to be true. 


>///A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might
very well return 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state
eigenvector. /


A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and
place is not a temperature operator, and a measurement is
not a probability, although the square of the absolute value
of a wave function might tell you the probability of you
getting that temperature measurement at that time and place.

/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the
Schroedinger equation.  But it's part of the application
of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the equation
itself. /


I don't know what you mean by that.


It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen
interpretation that applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the
Born rule plus some kind of self-locating uncertainty to
allow for the probabilistic observations.  So those are
things not in the Schroedinger equation.

Self-locating uncertainty is not dependent on any particular
theory. It’s the same whether it’s the Many Worlds, the Star Trek
teleporter or God that does the duplicating.


Not exactly.  In those other theories you mention you can put all
the duplicates side by side and there's no sense to the question,
which one happened?  They all did and there's no probability to
assign to them; because probability only makes sense when
something happens and other things don't.


The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider 
themselves unique individuals persisting through time.


But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard 
themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the one 
that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are just 
like the duplicate Captain Kirks.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 14:32, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:50 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
> > MWI is completely deterministic, including the prediction that all
>> possibilities occur.
>>
>
> True.
>
>
>> *> So you have to have some assumption to get probabilities, such that
>> one thing happens and others don't. *
>>
>
> Yes, that is the one assumption you have to make in the MWI, you have to
> assume that the Schrodinger wave equation means what it says, and in words
> it says  "*The rate of change of a wave function is proportional to the
> energy of the quantum system and the high energy parts of the wave function
> evolve rapidly while the low energy parts evolve slowly*". It would be
> expected that more things happen in the rapidly evolving parts then the slowly
> evolving parts.
>
>
>> * > MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all possible
>> outcomes...but in other worlds. *
>>
>
> That depends on the meaning of the pronoun "you". In the fast evolving
> part of the wave function more things are happening but there are also more
> versions of "you" to see them, and some parts contain no energy at all and
> thus nothing happens there at all. It is physically impossible for some
> things to happen so no version of "you" sees it.
>

But there are events such as the decay of an atom within a half life period
that one version of you will see and another version of you will see, which
is interpreted as a 1/2 probability of you seeing the atom decay, if you
have a normal human brain without telepathic communication with other
copies.

* > But the mechanism of this splitting, when and where it happens, is as
>> just as hand wavy as Copenhagen's projection postulate.*
>>
>
> No, it's right there in the equation, the thing is that people forget
> that they are a quantum system too and thus are also part of the
> Schrodinger wave equation. The equation says nothing about a separation
> between the observer and the thing that is being observed, that is just
> pasted  on by every quantum interpretation except for  Many Worlds. MWI is
> strip down bare bones no nonsense Quantum Mechanics with none of the silly
> gimmicks tacked on just to make those who dislike the idea that they are
> not unique feel good.
>
> >> And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in any location, and in a
>>> camera/electron wave a camera will observe the electron being in every
>>> location, and in a Brent Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent
>>> Meeker for every camera that sees an electron in every location.
>>
>>
>> * > That's like saying every horse in the gate is a possible winner of
>> the Kentucy derby. But that doesn't get you to probabilities without an
>> assumption that one an only one will win.  Everett wants to avoid that
>> assumption...which then takes self-locating uncertainty to make it
>> consistent with probabilistic observations.*
>>
>
> Schrodinger equation says high energy parts of the wave evolve swiftly,
> so there would be more versions of you in those parts than in the low
> energy parts, so it's more likely that "you" will end up in a higher energy
> part than a low energy part.
>
>  >> Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid and
>>> they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because the
>>> Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests , so
>>> it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
>>> true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
>>> convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
>>> outranks theory.
>>
>>
>>
>
> * > But observation is always finite, while theories claim infinite
>> applicability.  Newton's mechanics is also used everyday, with confidence.
>> I didn't say theory made it true.  Theory only shows the Born rule is
>> consistent with Hilbert space. *
>>
>
> And if the Born rule had been proven to be inconsistent with Hilbert space
> physicist would not have gotten rid of the Born rule, instead they would've
> gotten rid of Hilbert space, because the Born rule would have continued to
> work regardless of what Hilbert space's opinion of it is.
>
> John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> 
> hsx
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> 
> .
>
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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:50 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> MWI is completely deterministic, including the prediction that all
> possibilities occur.
>

True.


> *> So you have to have some assumption to get probabilities, such that one
> thing happens and others don't. *
>

Yes, that is the one assumption you have to make in the MWI, you have to
assume that the Schrodinger wave equation means what it says, and in words
it says  "*The rate of change of a wave function is proportional to the
energy of the quantum system and the high energy parts of the wave function
evolve rapidly while the low energy parts evolve slowly*". It would be
expected that more things happen in the rapidly evolving parts then the slowly
evolving parts.


> * > MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all possible
> outcomes...but in other worlds. *
>

That depends on the meaning of the pronoun "you". In the fast evolving part
of the wave function more things are happening but there are also more
versions of "you" to see them, and some parts contain no energy at all and
thus nothing happens there at all. It is physically impossible for some
things to happen so no version of "you" sees it.

* > But the mechanism of this splitting, when and where it happens, is as
> just as hand wavy as Copenhagen's projection postulate.*
>

No, it's right there in the equation, the thing is that people forget that
they are a quantum system too and thus are also part of the Schrodinger
wave equation. The equation says nothing about a separation between the
observer and the thing that is being observed, that is just pasted  on by
every quantum interpretation except for  Many Worlds. MWI is strip down
bare bones no nonsense Quantum Mechanics with none of the silly gimmicks
tacked on just to make those who dislike the idea that they are not unique
feel good.

>> And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in any location, and in a
>> camera/electron wave a camera will observe the electron being in every
>> location, and in a Brent Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent
>> Meeker for every camera that sees an electron in every location.
>
>
> * > That's like saying every horse in the gate is a possible winner of the
> Kentucy derby. But that doesn't get you to probabilities without an
> assumption that one an only one will win.  Everett wants to avoid that
> assumption...which then takes self-locating uncertainty to make it
> consistent with probabilistic observations.*
>

Schrodinger equation says high energy parts of the wave evolve swiftly, so
there would be more versions of you in those parts than in the low energy
parts, so it's more likely that "you" will end up in a higher energy part
than a low energy part.

 >> Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid and they
>> use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because the Born
>> rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests , so it
>> doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's true,
>> but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to convince us
>> that a theory is true. That's because observation always outranks theory.
>
>
>

* > But observation is always finite, while theories claim infinite
> applicability.  Newton's mechanics is also used everyday, with confidence.
> I didn't say theory made it true.  Theory only shows the Born rule is
> consistent with Hilbert space. *
>

And if the Born rule had been proven to be inconsistent with Hilbert space
physicist would not have gotten rid of the Born rule, instead they would've
gotten rid of Hilbert space, because the Born rule would have continued to
work regardless of what Hilbert space's opinion of it is.

John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

hsx

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 12:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2021 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 09:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> *> >> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a measurement
> are realized probabilistically.*


>>> >> What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have
 one. A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such
 as the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
 interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the square
 of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it is observed
 to be true.
>>>
>>> > *A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very well
>>> return 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. *
>>>
>>
>> A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is not a
>> temperature operator, and a measurement is not a probability, although
>> the square of the absolute value of a wave function might tell you the
>> probability of you getting that temperature measurement at that time and
>> place.
>>
>> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
>>> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
>>> equation itself. *
>>
>>
>> I don't know what you mean by that.
>>
>> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
>> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
>> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
>> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.
>>
> Self-locating uncertainty is not dependent on any particular theory. It’s
> the same whether it’s the Many Worlds, the Star Trek teleporter or God that
> does the duplicating.
>
>
> Not exactly.  In those other theories you mention you can put all the
> duplicates side by side and there's no sense to the question, which one
> happened?  They all did and there's no probability to assign to them;
> because probability only makes sense when something happens and other
> things don't.
>

The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider themselves
unique individuals persisting through time.

> --
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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 12:36 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 12/20/2021 5:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> Brent Meeker  Wrote:
>>>
>>> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.
 But it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in
 the equation itself. *
>>>
>>>
>>> > I don't know what you mean by that.
>>>
>>> *> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
 applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
 self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
 those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.*
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven that
>>> the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of Schrodinger's
>>> equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1. And Schrodinger says
>>> an electron wave can be in any location, and in a camera/electron wave a
>>> camera will observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
>>> Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for every camera
>>> that sees an electron in every location.
>>>
>>> *> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less)
 than you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid
>>> and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because
>>> the Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests
>>> , so it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
>>> true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
>>> convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
>>> outranks theory.
>>>
>>
>> But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
>> objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
>> role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.
>>
>
> At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
> Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
> theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
> not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
> example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
> objective.
>
> fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
> Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
> anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
> has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
> anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
> define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
> a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
> self-locating uncertainty.
>
>
> In principle one should be able to empirically distinguish between wave
> function "collapse" due to GRW or due to decoherence.  It would take
> extreme isolation to suppress decoherence though.
>


Sure. GRW collapse is experimentally testable, at least in principle. But
MWI is not susceptible to any empirical test.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 5:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark 
wrote:


  Brent Meeker Wrote:


/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the
Schroedinger equation.  But it's part of the application
of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the equation
itself. /


> I don't know what you mean by that.


/> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen
interpretation that applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's
the Born rule plus some kind of self-locating uncertainty
to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So those are
things not in the Schroedinger equation./


I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically
proven that the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities
out of Schrodinger's equation such that all the probabilities
add up to 1. And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in
any location, and in a camera/electron wave a camera will
observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for
every camera that sees an electron in every location.

/> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more
(or less) than you can observe Schroedinger's equation to
be true./


Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule
is valid and they use it every day, and the reason they're so
confident is because the Born rule has always conform with
observations and all empirical tests , so it doesn't need a
seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's true, but
a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation
always outranks theory.


But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort
of objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no
distinguished role, but are simply treated using the usual rules
of quantum interactions.


At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over 
Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse 
theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, 
and do not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, 
for example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is 
completely objective.


fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic 
theory. Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based 
on anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and 
while it has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot 
really supply anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in 
itself, serve to define probability. You have to have some notion of a 
random selection from a set, and that is not available in either the 
Schrodinger equation or in self-locating uncertainty.


In principle one should be able to empirically distinguish between wave 
function "collapse" due to GRW or due to decoherence.  It would take 
extreme isolation to suppress decoherence though.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 4:52 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:



On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark  wrote:


  Brent Meeker Wrote:


/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger
equation.  But it's part of the application of the
Schroedinger equation. It's not in the equation itself. /


> I don't know what you mean by that.


/> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen
interpretation that applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the
Born rule plus some kind of self-locating uncertainty to allow
for the probabilistic observations.  So those are things not
in the Schroedinger equation./


I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically
proven that the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out
of Schrodinger's equation such that all the probabilities add up
to 1. And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in any
location, and in a camera/electron wave a camera will observe the
electron being in every location, and in a Brent
Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for
every camera that sees an electron in every location.

/> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or
less) than you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true./


Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is
valid and they use it every day, and the reason they're so
confident is because the Born rule has always conform with
observations and all empirical tests , so it doesn't need a seal
of approval  from a theory for us to think it's true, but a theory
may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to convince us that
a theory is true. That's because observation always outranks theory.


But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of 
objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no 
distinguished role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of 
quantum interactions. If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI 
plus Born rule for measurements" with there being no dynamical 
definition of what qualifies as a measurement, where the moments we 
call 'measurements' are just something we feed into the theory on a 
know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim to objectivity is lost 
and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has over the Copenhagen 
interpretation.


Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true 
mainly because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style 
splitting that deals with Bell style experiments in a way that 
preserves locality but doesn't require hidden variables (see 
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of 
work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.


I agree.  MWI is useful because it motivated the research into 
decoherence theory.  But if you just take MWI+probability+basis you can 
pretty much force the Born rule.  But what does probability or basis 
mean for the 1e50 interactions taking place all around you that are not 
"measurements"...or are they?  MWI's whole point is to avoid any 
distinction between measurement and other interactions.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 11:53 AM Jesse Mazer  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> Brent Meeker  Wrote:
>>
>> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
>>> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
>>> equation itself. *
>>
>>
>> > I don't know what you mean by that.
>>
>> *> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
>>> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
>>> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
>>> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.*
>>
>>
>> I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven that
>> the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of Schrodinger's
>> equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1. And Schrodinger says
>> an electron wave can be in any location, and in a camera/electron wave a
>> camera will observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
>> Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for every camera
>> that sees an electron in every location.
>>
>> *> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less) than
>>> you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.*
>>
>>
>> Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid
>> and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because
>> the Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests
>> , so it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
>> true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
>> convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
>> outranks theory.
>>
>
> But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
> objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
> role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.
>

At one time, that might have been a point on which to prefer MWI over
Bohr's version of the CI, but that is no longer true. Modern collapse
theories do not have to distinguish particular "measurement" events, and do
not have to assume a classical superstructure . In modern fGRW, for
example, everything can be treated as quantum, and the theory is completely
objective.

fGRW has the added advantage that it is an inherently stochastic theory.
Probability is treated as a primitive notion that is not based on
anything else. MWI struggles with the concept of probability, and while it
has to reject a frequentist basis for probability, it cannot really supply
anything else. Self-locating uncertainty does not, in itself, serve to
define probability. You have to have some notion of a random selection from
a set, and that is not available in either the Schrodinger equation or in
self-locating uncertainty.


If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
> measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
> a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
> we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
> to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
> over the Copenhagen interpretation.
>
> Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true mainly
> because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting that
> deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality
>

No you can't.

> but doesn't require hidden variables (see
> https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of
> work in progress rather than a complete interpretation.
>

They set up a contrast between realism and locality. This is a false
contrast, since Bell's theorem has nothing to do with any concept of
realism. Bell's concern was to show that the results of quantum mechanics
violate the assumption of locality -- there is no other escape. So called
"Einsteinian realism" has no role in Bell's argument.

If you think that MWI provides a simple local explanation of the violation
of Bell inequalities, then give the argument here -- and not in terms of
endless links to nonsense papers.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 09:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker
 wrote:


/> >> It also makes the assumption that the
eigenvalues of a measurement are realized
probabilistically./


>> What is the eigenvalueof a temperature of 72°F? It
doesn't have one. A measurement doesn't have an
eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as the one that
describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship
between the square of the absolute value of that wave
and probability because it is observed to be true. 


>///A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very
well return 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. /


A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is
not a temperature operator, and a measurement is not a
probability, although the square of the absolute value of a wave
function might tell you the probability of you getting that
temperature measurement at that time and place.

/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger
equation.  But it's part of the application of the
Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the equation itself. /


I don't know what you mean by that.


It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation
that applies the Born rule. In MWI it's the Born rule plus some
kind of self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic
observations.  So those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.

Self-locating uncertainty is not dependent on any particular theory. 
It’s the same whether it’s the Many Worlds, the Star Trek teleporter 
or God that does the duplicating.


Not exactly.  In those other theories you mention you can put all the 
duplicates side by side and there's no sense to the question, which one 
happened?  They all did and there's no probability to assign to them; 
because probability only makes sense when something happens and other 
things don't.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Jesse Mazer]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:01 PM John Clark  wrote:

> Brent Meeker  Wrote:
>
> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
>> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
>> equation itself. *
>
>
> > I don't know what you mean by that.
>
> *> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
>> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
>> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
>> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.*
>
>
> I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven that
> the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of Schrodinger's
> equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1. And Schrodinger says
> an electron wave can be in any location, and in a camera/electron wave a
> camera will observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
> Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for every camera
> that sees an electron in every location.
>
> *> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less) than
>> you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.*
>
>
> Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid
> and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because
> the Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests
> , so it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
> true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
> convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
> outranks theory.
>

But one of the big selling points of the MWI is to give some sort of
objective picture of reality in which "measurements" have no distinguished
role, but are simply treated using the usual rules of quantum interactions.
If you have to say "OK, I believe in the MWI plus Born rule for
measurements" with there being no dynamical definition of what qualifies as
a measurement, where the moments we call 'measurements' are just something
we feed into the theory on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, then this claim
to objectivity is lost and it's not clear what theoretical appeal it has
over the Copenhagen interpretation.

Personally I still lean towards some version of the MWI being true mainly
because you can come up with a toy model with MWI-style splitting that
deals with Bell style experiments in a way that preserves locality but
doesn't require hidden variables (see
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm ) but I see it as a sort of work
in progress rather than a complete interpretation.




>
>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 4:00 PM, John Clark wrote:



  Brent Meeker Wrote:


/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger
equation.  But it's part of the application of the Schroedinger
equation.  It's not in the equation itself. /


> I don't know what you mean by that.


/> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation
that applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some
kind of self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic
observations.  So those are things not in the Schroedinger equation./


I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven 
that the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of 
Schrodinger's equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1.


I'm well aware of that, and that's why I phrased it as "/to allow for 
the probabilistic observations". / MWI is completely deterministic, 
including the prediction that all possibilities occur.  So you have to 
have some assumption to get probabilities, such that one thing happens 
and others don't.  MWI finesses this by saying that you observe all 
possible outcomes...but in other worlds.  But the mechanism of this 
splitting, when and where it happens, is as just as hand wavy as 
Copenhagen's projection postulate.  It's of the form: This must be how 
it works because that will give the right answer.  That's not 
wrong...but neither is it an improvement.


And Schrodinger says an electron wave can be in any location, and in a 
camera/electron wave a camera will observe the electron being in every 
location, and in a Brent Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a 
 Brent Meeker for every camera that sees an electron in every location.


That's like saying every horse in the gate is a possible winner of the 
Kentucy derby.  But that doesn't get you to probabilities without an 
assumption that one an only one will win.  Everett wants to avoid that 
assumption...which then takes self-locating uncertainty to make it 
consistent with probabilistic observations.




/> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or
less) than you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true./


Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is 
valid and they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident 
is because the Born rule has always conform with observations and all 
empirical tests , so it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory 
for us to think it's true, but a theory may need a seal of approval 
from the Born Rule to convince us that a theory is true. That's 
because observation always outranks theory.


But observation is always finite, while theories claim infinite 
applicability.  Newton's mechanics is also used everyday, with 
confidence.  I didn't say theory made it true.  Theory only shows the 
Born rule is consistent with Hilbert space.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 09:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
> On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> *> >> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a measurement
 are realized probabilistically.*
>>>
>>>
>> >> What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one. A
>>> measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as the one
>>> that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum interpretation needs to
>>> assume there is a relationship between the square of the absolute value of
>>> that wave and probability because it is observed to be true.
>>
>> > *A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very well return
>> 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. *
>>
>
> A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is not a
> temperature operator, and a measurement is not a probability, although
> the square of the absolute value of a wave function might tell you the
> probability of you getting that temperature measurement at that time and
> place.
>
> *>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
>> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
>> equation itself. *
>
>
> I don't know what you mean by that.
>
> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.
>
Self-locating uncertainty is not dependent on any particular theory. It’s
the same whether it’s the Many Worlds, the Star Trek teleporter or God that
does the duplicating.

> >> No quantum interpretation needs to derive the Schrodinger Equation nor
>>> does it need to be assumed because it can be experimentally verified to
>>> be true. And no quantum interpretation is inconsistent with
>>> observation, at least not so far.
>>>
>>
>> *>It can't be experimentally verified that the other world branches exist
>> *
>
>
> But an astronomical number, or even an infinite number, of other world
> branches is not inconsistent with experiment or observation, and if you
> want to hypothesize about what's really going on at the deepest level of
> reality while making the fewest possible assumptions then Many Worlds is
> your best bet. At least it's the best bet anyone has come up with so far.
>
>
>> *> and the Schrodinger equation cannot be verified except statistically
>> by assuming the Born rule.  *
>
>
> I must insist yet again that the Born Rule is *NOT *assumed to be true
> nor is it required to be derived to be true because we can do far better
> than either one of those two things. We can observe the Born Rule to be
> true.
>
> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less) than you
> can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.  They are theories that
> predict a result in every time and place, past and future.  If they fail,
> even on a set of measure zero, in this infinitude they are invalidated.
> Every theory must go beyond what has been observed to be useful...that's
> the whole point of having theories instead of just catalogues of
> observations.
>
> Brent
>
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Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

Brent Meeker  Wrote:

*>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
> equation itself. *


> I don't know what you mean by that.

*> It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that
> applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of
> self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  So
> those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.*


I don't know how you figure that. It has been mathematically proven that
the Born rule is the only way to get probabilities out of Schrodinger's
equation such that all the probabilities add up to 1. And Schrodinger says
an electron wave can be in any location, and in a camera/electron wave a
camera will observe the electron being in every location, and in a Brent
Meeker/camera/electron wave there will be a  Brent Meeker for every camera
that sees an electron in every location.

*> No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less) than
> you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.*


Nonsense! Every quantum physicist alive believes the Born rule is valid and
they use it every day, and the reason they're so confident is because the
Born rule has always conform with observations and all empirical tests , so
it doesn't need a seal of approval  from a theory for us to think it's
true, but a theory may need a seal of approval from the Born Rule to
convince us that a theory is true. That's because observation always
outranks theory.

John K Clark

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker  
wrote:



/> >> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues
of a measurement are realized probabilistically./


>> What is the eigenvalueof a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't
have one. A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a
matrix does, such as the one that describes the Schrodinger
Wave. And no quantum interpretation needs to assume there is
a relationship between the square of the absolute value of
that wave and probability because it is observed to be true. 


>///A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very well
return 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. /


A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is not 
a temperature operator, and a measurement is not a probability, 
although the square of the absolute value of a wave function might 
tell you the probability of you getting that temperature measurement 
at that time and place.


/>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger
equation.  But it's part of the application of the Schroedinger
equation.  It's not in the equation itself. /


I don't know what you mean by that.


It's the projection postulate in the Copenhagen interpretation that 
applies the Born rule.  In MWI it's the Born rule plus some kind of 
self-locating uncertainty to allow for the probabilistic observations.  
So those are things not in the Schroedinger equation.





>> No quantum interpretation needs to derive the Schrodinger
Equation nor does it need to be assumed because it can be
experimentally verified to be true. And no quantum
interpretation is inconsistent with observation, at least not
so far.


/>It can't be experimentally verified that the other world
branches exist /


But an astronomical number, or even an infinite number, of other world 
branches is not inconsistent with experiment or observation, and if 
you want to hypothesize about what's really going on at the deepest 
level of reality while making the fewest possible assumptions then 
Many Worlds is your best bet. At least it's the best bet anyone has 
come up with so far.


/> and the Schrodinger equation cannot be verified except
statistically by assuming the Born rule. /


I must insist yet again that theBorn Ruleis *NOT *assumed to be true 
nor is it required to be derived to be true because we can do far 
better than either one of those two things. We can observe the Born 
Rule to be true.


No, you can't observe the Born rule to be true any more (or less) than 
you can observe Schroedinger's equation to be true.  They are theories 
that predict a result in every time and place, past and future.  If they 
fail, even on a set of measure zero, in this infinitude they are 
invalidated.  Every theory must go beyond what has been observed to be 
useful...that's the whole point of having theories instead of just 
catalogues of observations.


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

The Born rule, understood as probabilities are predicted by state vector 
amplitudes squared, is not a problem.  Gleason's theorem shows that this 
is the only mathematically consistent probability measure on a Hilbert 
space.  The other part of the Born rule, that QM results/are 
probabilistic and depend only on the state vector/, does /not/ follow 
from Schroedinger's equation, although they are natural and well tested 
hypotheses.


Where I have doubts about Everett and many-worlds is (1) the many-worlds 
are NOT observable and have no empirical content and (2) the 
diagonalization of the density matrix seems to beg the question of how 
the Schroedinger equation defines a measurement just as much as the 
projection postulate.  Nobody writes down the Hamiltonian of the 
instrument and the interaction explicitly and applies the Schroedinger 
equation; they just assume the Hamiltonian of the instrument and the 
interaction are such as to act like a projection operator.  Dieter Zeh 
has suggested that there is a kind quantum Darwinism that produces this 
result, but I've not seen an explicit calculation showing it.


Brent

On 12/20/2021 3:54 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:04 PM Bruce Kellett  
wrote:


/>>> The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger
equation; it has to be added as a further independent
assumption. So it is not true that Many Worlds makes only
one assumption./


>> No quantum interpretation needs to derive the Schrodinger
Equation nor does it need to be assumedbecause it can be
experimentally verified to be true. And no quantum
interpretationis inconsistent with observation, at least not
so far.


/> Why do we need any theory at all then? We just have to observe
the experimental results and they are true. Perhaps science is
about understanding the experimental results, not just accepting
them as the truth./


Some productive scientists are satisfied with the Shut Up And 
Calculate quantum "interpretation" and that's fine, there is no 
disputing matters of taste, but some who don't dislike philosophy 
would like a bit more. The point I was trying to make was that nobody 
"assumes" the Born Rule anymore than somebody assumes that a body at 
rest or moving at a constant speed in a straight line will remain at 
rest or keep moving in a straight line at constant speed unless it is 
acted upon by a force. Neither the Born Rule or Newton's first law of 
motion were "assumed" to be true, they were OBSERVED to be true , and 
in science observation always outranks theory. If a theory concludes 
that a certain observation can't occur but it is observed to occur 
then the theory is wrong. A theory needs to be confirmed by 
observation, but an observation doesn't need to be confirmed by a theory.


Unfortunately none of the quantum interpretations conflicts with 
observation so to decide on a favorite one should pick the one that 
makes the fewest assumptions (*NOT* the one that produces the simplest 
outcome). And that's why I like Many Worlds, it only makes one 
assumption. And that's why I think superdeterminism is the very worst 
quantum interpretation possible, it needs, quite literally, an 
infinite number of assumptions to work. If that was the best anybody 
could come up with I'd stick with Shut Up And Calculate, but 
fortunately we can do better.


Of courseI can't denyit would be great if a quantum 
interpretationcould lead us straight to the Born Rule. It may be 
premature to claim victory but I think Many Worlds has made much more 
progress towards accomplishing that goal than any other:


Many Worlds, the Born Rule, and Self-Locating Uncertainty 



John K Clark    See what's on my new list at Extropolis 


mwc



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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2021 1:03 AM, smitra wrote:

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for 
a fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with 
a phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not 
allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse 
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical 
mechanics and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to 
insist that you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat 
engines that operate in the quasistatic limit.


Yes, but it is decoherence theory that extends the theory of measurement 
beyond just phenomenological projectors.  And it doesn't reach to 
explaining the probabilistic nature of QM.  ISTM that the steps in 
Everett's account of measurement where instrument variables become 
correlated with quantum system variables and cross terms form 
superpositions are set to zero are almost has "hand wavy" as the CI 
projection operators.   They seem to be just motivated by "This must be 
the way the Schroedinger equation works for macroscopic instruments in 
order that we get the same answer as the CI projector after we assume 
Born's rule."


Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Jesse Mazer]

When you say the MWI + Born rule "yields an unambiguous framework for
a fundamental
theory" are you assuming the idea of probability being equal to amplitude
squared only applies to "measurements", or that it would somehow apply at
all times in the MWI? If the former there would seem to be some ambiguity
about what a "measurement" is; if the latter, I believe MWI advocates still
don't have an agreed-upon answer to the "preferred basis problem" discussed
at
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/65177/is-the-preferred-basis-problem-solved

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 4:03 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
> > wrote:
> >
> >> On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
> >> By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
> >> Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.
> >>
> >> _> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
> >> measurement are realized probabilistically._
> >
> > What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
> > A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
> > the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
> > interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
> > square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
> > is observed to be true.
> >
> > The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
> > to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
> > that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
> > assumptions as collapse theories.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for a
> fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with a
> phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not
> allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
> frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical mechanics
> and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to insist that
> you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat engines that
> operate in the quasistatic limit.
>
> Saibal
>
> >
> >> If it were not true Schrodinger's Wave would be completely useless
> >> and there would be no reason any physicist would bother to calculate
> >> it.
> >
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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:38 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> *> >> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a measurement
>>> are realized probabilistically.*
>>
>>
> >> What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one. A
>> measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as the one
>> that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum interpretation needs to
>> assume there is a relationship between the square of the absolute value of
>> that wave and probability because it is observed to be true.
>
> > *A temperature operator, which would be matrix, might very well return
> 72degF as the eigenvalue of a state eigenvector. *
>

A temperature measurement taken at a particular time and place is not a
temperature operator, and a measurement is not a probability, although the
square of the absolute value of a wave function might tell you the
probability of you getting that temperature measurement at that time and
place.

*>  Yes, it's empirically supported; So's the Schroedinger equation.  But
> it's part of the application of the Schroedinger equation.  It's not in the
> equation itself. *


I don't know what you mean by that.

>> No quantum interpretation needs to derive the Schrodinger Equation nor
>> does it need to be assumed because it can be experimentally verified to
>> be true. And no quantum interpretation is inconsistent with observation,
>> at least not so far.
>>
>
> *>It can't be experimentally verified that the other world branches exist *


But an astronomical number, or even an infinite number, of other world
branches is not inconsistent with experiment or observation, and if you
want to hypothesize about what's really going on at the deepest level of
reality while making the fewest possible assumptions then Many Worlds is
your best bet. At least it's the best bet anyone has come up with so far.


> *> and the Schrodinger equation cannot be verified except statistically by
> assuming the Born rule.  *


I must insist yet again that the Born Rule is *NOT *assumed to be true nor
is it required to be derived to be true because we can do far better than
either one of those two things. We can observe the Born Rule to be true.

*> Without the Born rule the Schroedinger equation* [...]


Without the Born rule the Schrodinger Wave Equation would be a silly
worthless equation of no interest to anyone, but thanks to observation we
know for a fact that the Born Rule is true, and that makes Schrodinger's
Equation very important indeed.
John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

swq


>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[John Clark]

On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 10:04 PM Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

*>>> The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
>>> to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true that
>>> Many Worlds makes only one assumption.*
>>>
>>
>> >> No quantum interpretation needs to derive the Schrodinger Equation
>> nor does it need to be assumed because it can be experimentally verified
>> to be true. And no quantum interpretation is inconsistent with
>> observation, at least not so far.
>>
>
> *> Why do we need any theory at all then? We just have to observe the
> experimental results and they are true. Perhaps science is about
> understanding the experimental results, not just accepting them as the
> truth.*
>

Some productive scientists are satisfied with the Shut Up And Calculate
quantum "interpretation" and that's fine, there is no disputing matters of
taste, but some who don't dislike philosophy would like a bit more. The
point I was trying to make was that nobody "assumes" the Born Rule anymore
than somebody assumes that a body at rest or moving at a constant speed in
a straight line will remain at rest or keep moving in a straight line at
constant speed unless it is acted upon by a force. Neither the Born Rule or
Newton's first law of motion were "assumed" to be true, they were OBSERVED
to be true , and in science observation always outranks theory. If a theory
concludes that a certain observation can't occur but it is observed to
occur then the theory is wrong. A theory needs to be confirmed by
observation, but an observation doesn't need to be confirmed by a theory.

Unfortunately none of the quantum interpretations conflicts with
observation so to decide on a favorite one should pick the one that makes
the fewest assumptions (*NOT* the one that produces the simplest outcome).
And that's why I like Many Worlds, it only makes one assumption. And that's
why I think superdeterminism is the very worst quantum interpretation
possible, it needs, quite literally, an infinite number of assumptions to
work. If that was the best anybody could come up with I'd stick with Shut
Up And Calculate, but fortunately we can do better.

Of course I can't deny it would be great if a quantum interpretation could
lead us straight to the Born Rule. It may be premature to claim victory but I
think Many Worlds has made much more progress towards accomplishing that
goal than any other:

Many Worlds, the Born Rule, and Self-Locating Uncertainty


John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at  Extropolis

mwc

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 7:29 PM spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Without invoking MWI which I adore, let us focus upon the less grandiose
> and ask can one entangle a tardigrade or can't one?
>
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/physicists-claim-they-ve-entangled-a-tardigrade-with-qubits-but-did-they
>

It seems that they did not.

https://www.cnet.com/news/no-tardigrades-have-not-been-quantum-entangled-with-a-qubit/

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 8:03 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
> > to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
> > that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
> > assumptions as collapse theories.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for a
> fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with a
> phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not
> allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse
> frameworks.



I think you are stuck on a very old-fashioned view of collapse theories --
perhaps you are thinking only in terms of theories dominated by Bohr's idea
of a separation between the quantum and the classical -- with the classical
world necessary to give quantum results meaning. In other words, a
fundamental separation between the observer and the observed. This, of
course, is problematic in that you cannot describe the observer in quantum
terms.

But modern collapse theories, such as Flash-GRW, do not have this
limitation. There is no observer/observed distinction in such theories, and
they can easily accommodate the idea that everything, including the
observer, is quantum.

Besides, MWI is far from unambiguous. For instance, the notion of
probability is decidedly problematic in Everettian theory.

Bruce


It's a bit like the difference between statistical mechanics
> and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to insist that
> you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat engines that
> operate in the quasistatic limit.
>
> Saibal
>

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Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder

[smitra]

On 20-12-2021 03:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 12:23 PM John Clark 
wrote:


On Sun, Dec 19, 2021 at 7:59 PM Brent Meeker 
wrote:

On 12/19/2021 5:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
By contrast the Many Worlds Theory only makes one assumption,
Schrodinger's Equation means what it says. So Many Worlds wins.

_> It also makes the assumption that the eigenvalues of a
measurement are realized probabilistically._


What is the eigenvalue of a temperature of 72°F? It doesn't have one.
A measurement doesn't have an eigenvalue but a matrix does, such as
the one that describes the Schrodinger Wave. And no quantum
interpretation needs to assume there is a relationship between the
square of the absolute value of that wave and probability because it
is observed to be true.

The Born Rule cannot be derived from the Schrodinger equation; it has
to be added as a further independent assumption. So it is not true
that Many Worlds makes only one assumption. It requires just as many
assumptions as collapse theories.

Bruce


Yes, but with those assumptions it yields an unambiguous framework for a 
fundamental theory. In case of collapse theories, you're stuck with a 
phenomenological theory that cannot be improved, because you are not 
allowed to describe observers and observations within the collapse 
frameworks. It's a bit like the difference between statistical mechanics 
and thermodynamics, if in the latter case textbooks were to insist that 
you are only allowed to consider certain types of heat engines that 
operate in the quasistatic limit.


Saibal




If it were not true Schrodinger's Wave would be completely useless
and there would be no reason any physicist would bother to calculate
it.


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