First Person Indeterminacy (new attempt) (was Theology or not theology)
John, Let me try again, with a slightly different thought experiment. In this case I invite Arthur to make some experience. I think it is indifferent if Arthur knows or not the protocol (except that it would violate the comp ethics to not tell him the protocol, gievn that he will be, as you can guess, duplicated). I define 3-Arthur(s) by the body(ies) or Arthurs. I define a 1-Arthur-story by the content of the diary of Arthur when he looks in its diary. Arthur's initial goal, which by comp will be preserved through the duplication, consists in trying to predict the future of his personal story, as he described in his diary. The experience consists in being duplicated each day, for ten days in a row. He is duplicated in two similar rooms, except for a big 1 painted in the wall of one of these rooms, and a big 0 painted on the corresponding wall in the other rooms/ We manage that the copies never met and never exchanges diaries. We also put a cup of tea before each reconstitution, by gentleness but also to illustrate a point. The question which is asked to Arthur, specifically, is to predict if he will see a 0, or a 1 on the wall, and if he will get a cup of tea. Please, do the experience with Arthur not knowing the protocol and knowing the protocol, I think there will be no difference. By gentleness, but also for making plausible his ignorance of the protocole, I assume the duplication is done under anesthesia. So he arrive in my office, I give him a pill, he fall asleep, I duplicate him in the two rooms, and then I wake up and interview them, but separately, and this each day, reiterating the duplication for all the resulting copies. Obviously I will have a lot of work the tenth day, because I will have to interview 1024 copies, or more simply to review 1024 diaries, each corresponding, by definition, to the 1-stories, and which includes the attempts of prediction. Here are the interview, or observation done in the diaries. Day one. The 1-view are the content of each diary. There are two Arthurs to interview, and two diaries to look in. I will refer to them by A followed by the story, and excerp of Arthurs thoughts. I assume he is fond of zero, and its initial theory is I will always seen 0, and I will always get a cup of tea. A-0 I expected 0, I win, and I expected a cup of tea, my theory seems correct, but let us see if my theory will work next day A-1 Shit, I expected 0, so I loss. My theory is refuted. But I was correct about the cup of tea. Day two. A-00 it works A-01 oops, it did not work, I have to change my theory, what the hell could it be? I still got the cup of tea, though A-10 Hmm... 0 now, how could I have been able to predicted that?!? A-11 A pattern appear, could it be that I will always see 1? Day three. A-000 I knew I got the right theory A-001 What? A-010 Hmm... perhaps 010101...? A-011 No idea what the hell is going on A-100 Should I come back to my early theory? A-101 Hmm... perhaps 101010...? A-110 Hmm... perhaps 010101? A-111 No idea what the hell is going on Etc. This just to help you understand the definition. Arthur try to predict his 1-stories, that means the content of its diary at the place where he sum it up by a sequence of 1 and 0. Each of the resulting Arthur has a personal unique story. Note that you don't even need to attribute consciousness to Arthur. An inference inductive machine would do perfectly. It is an exercise in combinatorial analysis to understand, that all theories produced in such sequence, assuming we continue the iteration, is refuted in the n further days for the 2^n descendants of the Arthur. For example, Here, at step ten you have the following 1-stories (among the 1024 one): A-0 0 (ha! I was wrong, my theory is perfect) A-0 1 (what?? How unexpected!) A-01010 10101 (OK, my second theory is correct) A-01010 10100 (oh no! that's last experience refute my theory!!!) A-10001 10110 (Hmm... ) A-1 1(OK, my initial theory was correct, just with 1 instead of 0!) The point is that it is provable that when the number of iteration grows, the numbers of theories, compressing the information lived by the Arthurs, become sparse and negligible compared to the stories looking like white noise. That white noise corresponds to the randomness of the lived experience of most Arthur. By definition this is what is called the first person indeterminacy. The correct comp reasoner might infer that even after a row of nine 0, there is still only a probability of P(0) = 1/2, if he knows a bit of probability calculus. Again, its 2^n -1 descendants will agree, and only one might be skeptical for reasonable psychological reason, getting always his prediction fulfilled, but he is wrong, from the comp view. I can't say it more easily and clearly: the 1-person indeterminacy is the inability to predict the content of
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 16 March 2012 21:04, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Would it be not wrong to think of ordinary motion of an object through space as a form of repetitive cut and paste operation? You mean on the basis of the same assumptions as the UDA, I assume? Well, insofar as movement through space encompasses the stepwise evolution of discrete computational states, I suppose that this would necessarily be the case. I'm not sure why you say this conclusion would be not wrong, unless it was a slip of the finger. In Bruno's thought experiment, in effect the two copies ARE the original after it has been moved through space, albeit by exotic technology. It is interesting to recall that Bruno's interest in these ideas was sparked by consideration of amoebas, which are naturally able to split themselves into two identical copies. If human beings were able to perform a similar trick, cell-by-cell, and then wander off in different directions, the divergence of personal identity from a common source would in fact be seen as commonplace, not the stuff of obscure logical thought experiments. David On 3/16/2012 3:09 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 16 March 2012 17:28, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: since by assumption each successor must be restricted to a single, localised experience That's the whole point of this step in the UDA reasoning. I know, and that's exactly the problem. OK, now we may be getting somewhere. If that's exactly the problem can I take it that you have some reason to dispute that the experience of each successor would be individually localised in the ordinary way? Do you have an alternative account? Make no mistake, I'm not asking you to provide an enumeration of the different successors considered as a group. If you don't believe, in the thought experiment as described, that the experience of each successor, considered separately, would be individually localised, what DO you believe it would be like, and on what alternative assumptions do you base this belief? David Dear David, Would it be not wrong to think of ordinary motion of an object through space as a form of repetitive cut and paste operation? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 1:20 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: There are many possible enormous changes that could happen without you being aware of them. Show me. Show me a example of a change being made between 2 conscious beings that resulted in a enormous difference between them, and yet the individual themselves could detect no subjective change and still saw themselves as so similar that even they themselves could not tell themselves apart, and a third party objective observer could not detect a difference between them either, not even theoretically. Those are the conditions in my symmetrical room thought experiment, I showed there was no subjective difference between them and no objective difference between them, if you can show me that despite that there is still a enormous difference between them then you have won the argument. Good luck, you'll need it. In the hypothetical duplicator/transporter the two persons would not see or otherwise perceive each other, so they would not be aware that a new individual was created. So what, in my symmetrical room they would. They would only have memories of entering the transporter in Helsinki and of opening the door and seeing either Moscow or Washington - which would certainly change their consciousness. Certainly, so they would no longer be each other although both would still be the Helsinki man, he'd just be in new positions. You change positions all the time and it doesn't seem to destroy your identity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:34 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: so according to you, we should throw pronouns in the toilet Most of the time pronouns work just fine, but if you're discussing personal identity and duplication chambers you've got to be very stingy with their use, otherwise you end up asking questions that can not be answered, not because they are deep but because they are incomplete questions, like how long is a piece of string?. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:34 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: so according to you, we should throw pronouns in the toilet Most of the time pronouns work just fine No they are fine or not... If MWI is true What will *I* do in one second ? is fine or it is not. No language game, no what about we're discussing change that. , but if you're discussing personal identity and duplication chambers you've got to be very stingy with their use, otherwise you end up asking questions that can not be answered, not because they are deep but because they are incomplete questions, like how long is a piece of string?. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:34 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: so according to you, we should throw pronouns in the toilet Most of the time pronouns work just fine, but if you're discussing personal identity and duplication chambers you've got to be very stingy with their use, otherwise you end up asking questions that can not be answered, not because they are deep but because they are incomplete questions, like how long is a piece of string?. John K Clark Your (?) world is simple, in case MW or Comp is true, there cannot be a measure problem... because your (?) next moment is not you (?) (because you (?) 're so careful not to ask incomplete questions or stupid ones)... Hence you (?) die at every moments... so no measure problem no, everything is either 0% or 100%. Stubbornness at its highest level. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First Person Indeterminacy (new attempt) (was Theology or not theology)
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The experience consists in being duplicated each day, for ten days in a row. Oh dear, Is this really necessary? He is duplicated in two similar rooms, except for a big 1 painted in the wall of one of these rooms, and a big 0 painted on the corresponding wall in the other rooms I hope you do realize that if one copy sees a 0 and another copy sees a 1 then the identical copies are no longer identical and they differentiate into different people. If that's the point you're trying to make there is no need for things to be so elaborate. The question which is asked to Arthur, specifically, is to predict if he will see a 0, or a 1 on the wall, and if he will get a cup of tea. I haven't even finished reading this post but already I see a potential pronoun land mine, the dreaded he, a word that threatens to render the entire exercise useless. I duplicate him in the two rooms, and then I wake up and interview them, but separately, and this each day, reiterating the duplication for all the resulting copies. Obviously I will have a lot of work the tenth day, because I will have to interview 1024 copies, or more simply to review 1024 diaries, I can't help but think that adding this ridiculous complication was done to hide, perhaps even from yourself, that all that is going on here is that there is no way for poor old Arthur to make a prediction if he will see a 0 or a 1 that is better than the laws of probability. In other words ALL the different Arthurs (and they are all different because they all saw different things) can only guess if they will see a 0 or a 1. What is new here? A-110 Hmm... perhaps 010101? A-111 No idea what the hell is going on I'll tell you exactly what the hell is going on, different people see different things. Is this really a revolutionary discovery? Arthur try to predict his 1-stories, And in general Turing Machines like Arthur can not predict their 1-stories, they don't know if they will stop until they do. I ask again what is new here? Note that you don't even need to attribute consciousness to Arthur. Obviously, no experiment can directly observe consciousness. I can't say it more easily and clearly: the 1-person indeterminacy is the inability to predict the content of the personal diary Well I can say it more easily and clearly, 1-person indeterminacy is indeterminacy period. And actually, the inability to predict the content of the personal diary is not only a trait we share with Turing Machines it is the only definition of free will (other than a sound made by the mouth) that is not circular gibberish. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/17/2012 8:18 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 16 March 2012 21:04, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Would it be not wrong to think of ordinary motion of an object through space as a form of repetitive cut and paste operation? You mean on the basis of the same assumptions as the UDA, I assume? Hi David, No, I was not thinking of the UD. I was just trying to understand how we can obtain a model of motions that is invariant with respect to Lorentz transformations from the constitutionalists ideas. Well, insofar as movement through space encompasses the stepwise evolution of discrete computational states, I suppose that this would necessarily be the case. I'm not sure why you say this conclusion would be not wrong, unless it was a slip of the finger. In Bruno's thought experiment, in effect the two copies ARE the original after it has been moved through space, albeit by exotic technology. But why make copies of some original object when the program can just generate many by paralleling running one subroutine or simultaneously running multiple programs ala UD? My intuition is that we need something the many client model of MMORPGs to get anything like Lorentz invariant physical laws. I bring this up because it has always bothered me that the concept of physical laws as often discussed in our considerations of COMP seems to never consider Special or General Relativistic considerations. I think that this is neglected because the discussions seem to always revolve around considerations of a single point of view and the views of many observers are relagated to some ambiguous plural shared 1p term that is never exactly defined. It is my contention that while considering only one observer is very simplifying for our toy models and back of the envelope calculations but at a price of ignoring many important and, IMHO, relevant concepts in physics such as the problem of concurrency. It is interesting to recall that Bruno's interest in these ideas was sparked by consideration of amoebas, which are naturally able to split themselves into two identical copies. If human beings were able to perform a similar trick, cell-by-cell, and then wander off in different directions, the divergence of personal identity from a common source would in fact be seen as commonplace, not the stuff of obscure logical thought experiments. Yes, Bruno's ideas seemed to start with actual physical systems and thoughts about how their first person views can be represented in logic. That his reasoning lead to a sound argument against material monism is not a surprise to me. I just disagree with the interpretation in term of ideal monism as such ontological theories render impossible any explanations of the physical world as something other than causally ineffective illusions. I have been driven, kicking and screaming, to consider some form of dualism. The failure of the dualism of Descartes has almost completely poisoned that well, but I have found a very clever way of rehabilitating dualism that was found by Vaughan Pratt and explained in this paper: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First Person Indeterminacy (new attempt) (was Theology or not theology)
2012/3/17 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The experience consists in being duplicated each day, for ten days in a row. Oh dear, Is this really necessary? He is duplicated in two similar rooms, except for a big 1 painted in the wall of one of these rooms, and a big 0 painted on the corresponding wall in the other rooms I hope you do realize that if one copy sees a 0 and another copy sees a 1 then the identical copies are no longer identical and they differentiate into different people. If that's the point you're trying to make there is no need for things to be so elaborate. The question which is asked to Arthur, specifically, is to predict if he will see a 0, or a 1 on the wall, and if he will get a cup of tea. I haven't even finished reading this post but already I see a potential pronoun land mine, the dreaded he, a word that threatens to render the entire exercise useless. I duplicate him in the two rooms, and then I wake up and interview them, but separately, and this each day, reiterating the duplication for all the resulting copies. Obviously I will have a lot of work the tenth day, because I will have to interview 1024 copies, or more simply to review 1024 diaries, I can't help but think that adding this ridiculous complication was done to hide, perhaps even from yourself, that all that is going on here is that there is no way for poor old Arthur to make a prediction if he will see a 0 or a 1 that is better than the laws of probability. In other words ALL the different Arthurs (and they are all different because they all saw different things) can only guess if they will see a 0 or a 1. What is new here? A-110 Hmm... perhaps 010101? A-111 No idea what the hell is going on I'll tell you exactly what the hell is going on, different people see different things. Is this really a revolutionary discovery? Arthur try to predict his 1-stories, And in general Turing Machines like Arthur can not predict their 1-stories, they don't know if they will stop until they do. I ask again what is new here? Note that you don't even need to attribute consciousness to Arthur. Obviously, no experiment can directly observe consciousness. I can't say it more easily and clearly: the 1-person indeterminacy is the inability to predict the content of the personal diary Well I can say it more easily and clearly, 1-person indeterminacy is indeterminacy period. No... don't you see that in MWI (or comp) context, the SWE is determinist and indeterminacy is on the observer ? 3 POV determinist (SWE) 1 POV indeterminate (=== measure problem). Quentin And actually, the inability to predict the content of the personal diary is not only a trait we share with Turing Machines it is the only definition of free will (other than a sound made by the mouth) that is not circular gibberish. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 17 March 2012 17:48, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: But why make copies of some original object when the program can just generate many by paralleling running one subroutine or simultaneously running multiple programs ala UD? But surely (still arguing from comp assumptions, that is) we must guard against mixing logical levels in this way when trying to conceptualise what might be going on? Sure, for comp to be true, everything that could happen to us, or that we could witness, would have to be founded, at some level, on the intersection of computation and consciousness, filtered through some complex measure. But this wouldn't make our experience of, or ability to interact with, physical objects any the less real, it would mean only that it couldn't ultimately be based on their independent, primitive existence. I bring this up because it has always bothered me that the concept of physical laws as often discussed in our considerations of COMP seems to never consider Special or General Relativistic considerations. I think that this is neglected because the discussions seem to always revolve around considerations of a single point of view and the views of many observers are relagated to some ambiguous plural shared 1p term that is never exactly defined. I agree that this is under-defined in discussions of comp, but I'm not qualified to say whether it counts as an argument against it. Again, it seems to me that considerations of logical levels of description are crucial here. Certainly, if all the appropriate physical principles couldn't eventually be extracted from comp assumptions, that would be an effective disproof of the theory. But whether the extremely general level at which we tend to discuss it is the appropriate one to look for the detailed emergence of such principles, I can't say. I have a feeling - no more than this - that the single point of view is in fact a non-negotiable feature of comp - hence the heuristic I suggested in an attempt to resolve the dispute about identity and localisation. The single point of view seems to play the indispensable and irreducible role of symmetry-breaker of the computational everything. Only when that symmetry is broken can any finite relation between knower and known emerge from what is otherwise mere noise. This relation may be, in a sense, the duality of which you speak. Also, the symmetry is broken not in one place, but in infinitely many. If comp is true, it is to this infinity of mutually-exclusive perspectival instances that we must look for the antidote to solipsism, and for the ultimate reconciliation of all consistent points of view. David On 3/17/2012 8:18 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 16 March 2012 21:04, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Would it be not wrong to think of ordinary motion of an object through space as a form of repetitive cut and paste operation? You mean on the basis of the same assumptions as the UDA, I assume? Hi David, No, I was not thinking of the UD. I was just trying to understand how we can obtain a model of motions that is invariant with respect to Lorentz transformations from the constitutionalists ideas. Well, insofar as movement through space encompasses the stepwise evolution of discrete computational states, I suppose that this would necessarily be the case. I'm not sure why you say this conclusion would be not wrong, unless it was a slip of the finger. In Bruno's thought experiment, in effect the two copies ARE the original after it has been moved through space, albeit by exotic technology. But why make copies of some original object when the program can just generate many by paralleling running one subroutine or simultaneously running multiple programs ala UD? My intuition is that we need something the many client model of MMORPGs to get anything like Lorentz invariant physical laws. I bring this up because it has always bothered me that the concept of physical laws as often discussed in our considerations of COMP seems to never consider Special or General Relativistic considerations. I think that this is neglected because the discussions seem to always revolve around considerations of a single point of view and the views of many observers are relagated to some ambiguous plural shared 1p term that is never exactly defined. It is my contention that while considering only one observer is very simplifying for our toy models and back of the envelope calculations but at a price of ignoring many important and, IMHO, relevant concepts in physics such as the problem of concurrency. It is interesting to recall that Bruno's interest in these ideas was sparked by consideration of amoebas, which are naturally able to split themselves into two identical copies. If human beings were able to perform a similar trick, cell-by-cell, and then wander off in different directions, the divergence of personal identity from a
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 17 Mar 2012, at 05:05, John Clark wrote: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't neither would. The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any personal observation, So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does not change their consciousness, and so far I agree with you completely; but then in the next breath you say it DOES change their consciousness and the change is about as dramatic as a change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new individual is created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication or do you not? They can perceive the difference, not the duplication. You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the split ever after the differentiation occurred. Everett said they would not feel the split but they would certainly feel other things, Sure, me too. and there would not even be a differentiation unless there was something different about them to differentiate. Everett would also say that talking about 2 absolutely identical points of view is silly, if there is no difference between them then there is only one point of view. Me too. Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the notion of probability does not apply because the guy looking at the dice is not the same that the guy who threw it, which is straw man. I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate probabilities, or anything else for that matter, it is not a straw man to ask just what you want me to calculate; the probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice will see 12 is 100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on the dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K Clark will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36. So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what you will feel with certainty the result of your future self-localization. But I have already explain why it does not work. I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I don't see the need of the word localization) will be certain the dice gave him a 12, and the algorithm to calculate this has been well known for centuries. I was illustrating a point. If the dices are medelt long enough the quantum uncertainties adds up and generates the 36 (* a continuum) possibilities, in which case quantum indeterminacy, which is different from the classical statistical one, and different from the comp 1- indeterminacy. The indeterminacies looks alike, but have different explanations, and different consequences. *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one city*. Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both cities*. But he feels he is in only one city. He used your trick to predict that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in Washington. Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in Washington AND in Moscow. But how could he *know* that? He can only *verifie* that. The presence, or not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some confirmation. He can give a call to Moscow, to say hello to himself, but bad luck, he just learned that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow. This illustrates that each copies can know where they are, but can only believe the other copy is or not in the other city. They personal perspective are different, they knew this in advance, they perceive the difference, but they can only bet on the duplication, not experience them. The experiences they (can) get are only I wake up in Moscow, OR I wake up in Washington, and never I wake up in washington and I wake in Moscow. The probability here on those future personal experiences. But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having survived in both cities. Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing Moscow and he will answer yes to both questions. Ask the Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing Washington and he will answer yes to both questions. Therefore it doesn't take rocket science to conclude that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow AND Washington. Then, given that you and me are already the result of the many duplication since the first amoeba, we have all the life at once. I love the idea, and I think we might have a very deep common first person indeed, but this is not relevant for the question of predicting, for example the movie you will feel to see in the multiplication-movie thought experience. Here the answer is white noise, because it will be lived by the vast majority of the copies. Both
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/17/2012 8:01 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 1:20 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: There are many possible enormous changes that could happen without you being aware of them. Show me. You are placed in a closed room and anesthesized. While you are unconscious you are moved to an identical room in Moscow. You wake up. There has been an enormous change in your position but you are not aware of it. Show me a example of a change being made between 2 conscious beings that resulted in a enormous difference between them, They are both anethesitized and ... and yet the individual themselves could detect no subjective change and still saw themselves as so similar that even they themselves could not tell themselves apart, and a third party objective observer could not detect a difference between them either, not even theoretically. The third party could tell the difference between them because as classical objects they have definite spacetime histories. Otherwise there would not be two bodies - only one, per Leibniz's principle. Those are the conditions in my symmetrical room thought experiment, I showed there was no subjective difference between them and no objective difference between them, if you can show me that despite that there is still a enormous difference between them then you have won the argument. Good luck, you'll need it. Keep it for yourself. In the hypothetical duplicator/transporter the two persons would not see or otherwise perceive each other, so they would not be aware that a new individual was created. So what, in my symmetrical room they would. They would only have memories of entering the transporter in Helsinki and of opening the door and seeing either Moscow or Washington - which would certainly change their consciousness. Certainly, so they would no longer be each other although both would still be the Helsinki man, he'd just be in new positions. What do you mean he'd?? Since they are no longer each other, they can no longer be (in the sense of identity) the Helsinki man. You change positions all the time and it doesn't seem to destroy your identity. But it destroys my being identical. I'm not identical with who I was a minute ago. You seem to have trouble noticing that the same English word has different meanings. Try googling Bill Clinton and is. Brent The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First Person Indeterminacy (new attempt) (was Theology or not theology)
Oh my god, I'm going to scream. Do you think it's possible John and Craig are actually *one and the same person*, some kind of evil mastermind über-troll intent on driving us all over the brink of sanity? What's clear now is that John has painted himself into a corner from which he can never retreat, however absurd his position becomes. He will argue black is white until he's blue in the face in order to avoid ever having to say, Oh, I get it now! I misunderstood your point. One wise thing Craig said: I suggest you stop reading my posts. That was excellent advice, my mental health rapidly improved. Now that I realise that John = Craig (perhaps duplicates of the same wicked mind in Helsinki and Moscow), I think I'm going to apply the same policy to John too. On Mar 18, 3:07 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The experience consists in being duplicated each day, for ten days in a row. Oh dear, Is this really necessary? He is duplicated in two similar rooms, except for a big 1 painted in the wall of one of these rooms, and a big 0 painted on the corresponding wall in the other rooms I hope you do realize that if one copy sees a 0 and another copy sees a 1 then the identical copies are no longer identical and they differentiate into different people. If that's the point you're trying to make there is no need for things to be so elaborate. The question which is asked to Arthur, specifically, is to predict if he will see a 0, or a 1 on the wall, and if he will get a cup of tea. I haven't even finished reading this post but already I see a potential pronoun land mine, the dreaded he, a word that threatens to render the entire exercise useless. I duplicate him in the two rooms, and then I wake up and interview them, but separately, and this each day, reiterating the duplication for all the resulting copies. Obviously I will have a lot of work the tenth day, because I will have to interview 1024 copies, or more simply to review 1024 diaries, I can't help but think that adding this ridiculous complication was done to hide, perhaps even from yourself, that all that is going on here is that there is no way for poor old Arthur to make a prediction if he will see a 0 or a 1 that is better than the laws of probability. In other words ALL the different Arthurs (and they are all different because they all saw different things) can only guess if they will see a 0 or a 1. What is new here? A-110 Hmm... perhaps 010101? A-111 No idea what the hell is going on I'll tell you exactly what the hell is going on, different people see different things. Is this really a revolutionary discovery? Arthur try to predict his 1-stories, And in general Turing Machines like Arthur can not predict their 1-stories, they don't know if they will stop until they do. I ask again what is new here? Note that you don't even need to attribute consciousness to Arthur. Obviously, no experiment can directly observe consciousness. I can't say it more easily and clearly: the 1-person indeterminacy is the inability to predict the content of the personal diary Well I can say it more easily and clearly, 1-person indeterminacy is indeterminacy period. And actually, the inability to predict the content of the personal diary is not only a trait we share with Turing Machines it is the only definition of free will (other than a sound made by the mouth) that is not circular gibberish. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You are placed in a closed room and anesthesized. While you are unconscious you are moved to an identical room in Moscow. You wake up. There has been an enormous change in your position but you are not aware of it. And in your example there is a zero change in your consciousness, absolutely ZERO. How can I be so certain of that? You answered that question yourself, because you are not aware of it. Show me a example of a change being made between 2 conscious beings that resulted in a enormous difference between them, They are both anethesitized and ... Position is irrelevant because there is no unique position to consciousness, good thing too otherwise we'd loose our identity every time we moved. and yet the individual themselves could detect no subjective change and still saw themselves as so similar that even they themselves could not tell themselves apart, and a third party objective observer could not detect a difference between them either, not even theoretically. The third party could tell the difference between them because as classical objects they have definite spacetime histories. But there is no way you can know the original and his identical copy can have a unique position (definite spacetime histories is too pompous for my taste) because for all you know, and for all they know, and for all the universe knows, those 2 identical objects, the copy and the original, could be exchanging position 10^44 times a second. And definite spacetime histories of what? You are always recycling your atoms, do you loose part of your identity every time you take a piss? Do you need to make a separate spacetime diagram for every atom that was once part of your body when you were in the third grade? he'd just be in new positions. What do you mean he'd?? Since they are no longer each other, they can no longer be (in the sense of identity) the Helsinki man. Why on Earth not??? You people can't seem to get it through your head that the Helsinki man HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, as a result the Helsinki man has no difficulty whatsoever being in 2 places at the same time, that is what duplicated means for god's sake! And once a identical copy has been made environmental forces can cause those 2 identical things to differentiate and evolve differently. I'm not identical with who I was a minute ago. So is the one minute ago you dead? If so then the Helsinki man is dead in the same way, in other words not very dead. You seem to have trouble noticing that the same English word has different meanings. And you can't grasp that pronouns can be ambiguous. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/17/2012 9:45 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You are placed in a closed room and anesthesized. While you are unconscious you are moved to an identical room in Moscow. You wake up. There has been an enormous change in your position but you are not aware of it. And in your example there is a zero change in your consciousness, absolutely ZERO. How can I be so certain of that? You answered that question yourself, because you are not aware of it. So what? I wrote There are many possible enormous changes that could happen without you being aware of them. Where did I say there was a change in your consciousness that you were not aware of? Please do not attribute to me things I didn't write. Show me a example of a change being made between 2 conscious beings that resulted in a enormous difference between them, They are both anethesitized and ... Position is irrelevant because there is no unique position to consciousness, good thing too otherwise we'd loose our identity every time we moved. Where did I say otherwise? and yet the individual themselves could detect no subjective change and still saw themselves as so similar that even they themselves could not tell themselves apart, and a third party objective observer could not detect a difference between them either, not even theoretically. The third party could tell the difference between them because as classical objects they have definite spacetime histories. But there is no way you can know the original and his identical copy can have a unique position (definite spacetime histories is too pompous for my taste) because for all you know, and for all they know, and for all the universe knows, those 2 identical objects, the copy and the original, could be exchanging position 10^44 times a second. And how would they do that? By magic? Of course if you invoke magic all bets are off. And definite spacetime histories of what? You are always recycling your atoms, do you loose part of your identity every time you take a piss? Definite in the sense of preserving continuity of structure and memory. Does your brain remain the same no matter what information you receive? Do you differentiate from who you were - as you suppose the man in Moscow does from the man in Washington. Can you manage to reconcile your inconsistent accounts? Do you need to make a separate spacetime diagram for every atom that was once part of your body when you were in the third grade? he'd just be in new positions. What do you mean he'd?? Since they are no longer each other, they can no longer be (in the sense of identity) the Helsinki man. Why on Earth not??? You people can't seem to get it through your head that the Helsinki man HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, as a result the Helsinki man has no difficulty whatsoever being in 2 places at the same time, that is what duplicated means for god's sake! And once a identical copy has been made environmental forces can cause those 2 identical things to differentiate and evolve differently. And once they are differentiated they are not equal to each other. Can't you get it through your head that things different from one another cannot be equal to a third thing. http://www.cs.odu.edu/~toida/nerzic/level-a/relation/eq_relation/eq_relation.html I'm not identical with who I was a minute ago. So is the one minute ago you dead? If so then the Helsinki man is dead in the same way, in other words not very dead. Being different is not the same as being dead. You seem to have trouble noticing that the same English word has different meanings. And you can't grasp that pronouns can be ambiguous. You're the one that used he'd for two different people. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
