Re: [Fis] Is Dataism the end of classical hypothesis-driven research and the beginning of data-correlation-driven research?

[Alex Hankey]

s? Will computers
> > became fundamentalists of Dataism?
> >
> > Best regards,
> >
> > AJ
> >
> >
> >
> > ---
> > Alberto J. Schuhmacher, PhD.
> > Head, Molecular Oncology Group
> >
> > Aragon Health Research Institute (IIS Aragón)
> > Biomedical Research Center of Aragon (CIBA)
> > Avda. Juan Bosco 13, 50009 Zaragoza (Spain)
> > email: ajime...@iisaragon.es
> > Phone:(+34) 637939901
> >
> > ___
> > Fis mailing list
> > Fis@listas.unizar.es
> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Dr. Mark William Johnson
> Institute of Learning and Teaching
> Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
> University of Liverpool
>
> Phone: 07786 064505
> Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
> Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] Meta-observer?

[Alex Hankey]

 issue must be how something looking like a chain of command
>> could happen to emerge without presuming such a chain in the beginning.
>> Prerequisite to its emergence would be the well-being of each participant
>> taken care of locally, as a replenishable inevitable. That is an issue of
>> the origins of life. The impending agenda is on something general universal
>> as an object, and yet concrete particular enough in process. The richness
>> resides within the concreteness down to the bottom.
>>
>>
>>
>>Apropos, the communications among the local participants differ from
>> computation despite the seemingly concrete outlook of the latter.
>> Computation upon the notion of time as the linear sequence of the now
>> points is not available to the local participants because of the lack of
>> the physical means for guaranteeing the sharing of the same now-point among
>> themselves.
>>
>>
>>
>>Koichiro Matsuno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ___
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
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Re: [Fis] A Paradox

[Alex Hankey]

Current Information Science, particularly that purveyed by Fis,
is far too poverty stricken to tackle this problem Xueshan.

Metaphor is a rich purveyor of meaning utlised by human consciousness,
even in the earliest epics written by mankind, like the Valmiki Ramayana,
simply because human awareness adopts 'forms' as its mode of information
content, and not digits.

The way that forms are encoded in experience is now well understood.
A proof has even been given that 'ideas' and not 'digits' are the primary
content of human awareness.

Best wishes to all,

Alex Hankey




On 4 March 2018 at 06:47, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote:

> Dear Dai, Søren, Karl, Sung, Syed, Stan, Terry, and Loet,
>
> I am sorry to reply you late, but I have thoroughly read every post about
> the paradox and they have brought me many inspirations, thank you. Now I
> offer my responses as follows:
>
> Dai, metaphor research is an ancient topic in linguistics, which reveals
> the relationship between tenor and vehicle, ground and figure, target and
> source based on rhetoric. But where is our information? It looks like Syed
> given the answer: "Information is the container of meaning." If I
> understand it right, we may have this conclusion from it: Information is
> the carrier of meaning. Since we all acknowledge that sign is the carrier
> of information, the task of our Information Science will immediately become
> something like an intermediator between Semiotics (study of sign) and
> Semantics (study of meaning), this is what we absolutely want not to see.
> For a long time, we have been hoping that the goal of Information Science
> is so basic that it can explain all information phenomenon in the
> information age, it just like what Sung expects, which was consisted of
> axioms, or theorems or principles, so it can end all the debates on
> information, meaning, data, etc., but according to this view, it is very
> difficult to complete the missions. Syed, my statement is "A grammatically
> correct sentence CONTAINS information rather than the sentence itself IS
> information."
>
> Søren believes that the solution to this paradox is to establish a new
> discipline which level is more higher than the level of Information Science
> as well as Linguistics, such as his Cybersemiotics. I have no right to
> review your opinion, because I haven't seen your book Cybersemiotics, I
> don't know its content, same as I don't know what the content of
> Biosemiotics is, but my view is that Peirce's Semiotics can't dissolve this
> paradox.
>
> Karl thought: "Information and meaning appear to be like key and lock."
> which are two different things. Without one, the existence of another will
> lose its value, this is a bit like the paradox about hen and egg. I don't
> know how to answer this point. However, for your "The text may be an
> information for B, while it has no information value for A. The difference
> between the subjective." "‘Information’ is synonymous with ‘new’." these
> claims are the classic debates in Information Science, a typical example is
> given by Mark Burgin in his book: "A good mathematics textbook contains a
> lot of information for a mathematics student but no information for a
> professional mathematician." For this view, Terry given his good answer:
> One should firstly label what context and paradigm they are using to define
> their use of the term "information." I think this is effective and first
> step toward to construct a general theory about information, if possible.
>
> For Stan's "Information is the interpretation of meaning, so transmitted
> information has no meaning without interpretation." I can only disagree
> with it kindly. The most simple example from genetics is: an egg cell
> accepts a sperm cell, a fertilized egg contains a set of effective genetic
> information from paternal and maternal cell, here information transmission
> has taken place, but is there any "meaning" and "explanation"? We should be
> aware that meaning only is a human or animal phenomena and it does not be
> used in any other context like plant or molecule or cell etc., this is the
> key we dissolve the paradox.
>
> In general, I have not seen any effective explanation of this paradox so
> far.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* Syed Ali [mailto:doctorsyedal...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, February 27, 2018 8:10 PM
> *To:* Sungchul Ji <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>
> *Cc:* Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>; Xueshan Yan <
> y...@pku.edu.cn>; FIS Group <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] A Paradox
>
>
>
> Dear All:
>
> If a non Engl

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Alex Hankey]

h type of medium produces information
> of its
> >> own kind.
> >>According to this point of view, information cannot be
> transmitted.
> >> It can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference
> >> that a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from
> it. A
> >> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
> >> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a
> synergetic
> >> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity
> reductions.
> >> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into
> information.
> >> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing
> to
> >> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let
> us
> >> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking
> >> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social
> >> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the
> introduction
> >> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message
> >> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not
> the
> >> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face
> to
> >> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if
> the
> >> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and
> what
> >> that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is
> being
> >> sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place,
> so he
> >> planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable
> >> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You
> >> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone
> in her
> >> room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And  imagination
> >> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral
> >> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk
> and
> >> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by
> >> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see
> what
> >> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
> >> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the
> intuition
> >> that it could also work for natural sciences.
> >>
> >>Best,
> >>
> >>JJ
> >>
> >>El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu
> >
> >> escribió:
> >>
> >>  Hi  FISers,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our
> >> discussions and recognize that the term information applies in diverse
> ways
> >> to many different contexts. And because of this it is important to
> indicate
> >> the framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological,
> >> linguistic, etc.
> >>
> >>  . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction
> >> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect,
> though it
> >> too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be
> >> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less
> >> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the
> >> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative
> >> analyses/properties of information."
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused
> linguistic
> >> metaphor in defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor
> has
> >> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique
> >> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of
> functions
> >> (see the last column in Table 1.)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied
> >> theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as
> belonging to
> >> the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically
> >> represented as the 3-node closed network in t

Re: [Fis] one can learn a lot from numbering every word

[Alex Hankey]

But the problem with this is that it does not apply to the way that
humans and animals communicate information
when they do it directly from Mind-to-Mind.
Very common with lots of examples.

This is accomplished through direct communication of ideas,
for which a sophisticated and well-defined theory now exists.

How do you number ideas? Maybe you can do it by numbering 'idea-grams-
by taking the Chinese symbols. But then how do you give every new molecule
that is identified, or synthesized an idea-gram?

This seems to me a thorny problem. BUT it is Essential to Tackle it,
because Ideas are the foundation of Human Cognition.

Alex Hankey


On 11 February 2018 at 19:26, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Dear Krassimir,
>
>
>
> Improvements are done if there is a need to do so, innovations come about
> as a result of creativity, not as answers to an existing need, but as
> voluntary exertions that satisfy curiosity.
>
> Taking your example of having enumerated all signals (phonemes, letters,
> words), the non-necessary innovation would be to create a parallel
> enumeration of all signals (say, in Hungarian, alongside your existing
> Bulgarian catalogue) and observe the priority (linear position) of the
> signal in the respective repertoire. (Say: {water, air, sun, mother, eat,
> …} are enumerated in (BG, HU) on positions {(3,6), (2,5), (7,7), (1,8),…}.)
>
> These ((3,6),(2,5),…) are x,y coordinates on a plane of which the axes
> are: Table: “Priorities of concepts in Bulgarian and Hungarian”, Axe x: BG,
> Axe y: HU. If one would play a few minutes with his or her computer, one
> would see the points of the plane.
>
> Finding that some of the pairs are members of a cycle (that is a polygon
> of which the corners are the (x,y) coordinates of those elements that
> change places with each other in a general enumeration of concepts (BGHU or
> HUBG)) one would connect the corners of the polygons with lines,
> differently coloured lines for each cycle, and maybe find pleasure in
> discovering the concepts of consistent enumerations.
>
> Seduction happens when the person to be seduced sees *no need* to do that
> what the seducer wants him to do. The seducer must necessarily paint
> charming pictures about the future of the seducee, if only that would do
> that what the seducer invites him to do.
>
> My sweet honey learned and respected friends, you will all be very much
> entertained and gain many rewards and gratulations if you take the trouble
> and think this through, and get familiar with talking in terms of logical
> compromises (from tautology to instability) and discontinuities. This
> because it is actually so that the arithmetic rules of reordering impose
> threads and filaments in space, as simple implicit corollaries of *a+b=c*.
> If a collection can be ordered in different ways, it is reasonable to speak
> about the most probable intermediate state that collection is in. There is
> no need to do so, but ….
>
> Best
>
> Karl
>
>
> _______
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
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Re: [Fis] I salute to Sungchul

[Alex Hankey]

36513708497810284=bMlZ324OoEHA5XMQibKiEFsm75NhcpkfIcSRUJbQZNg%3D=0>
>   [2] Petoukhov, S. (2017).  Genetic coding and united-hypercomplex
> systems in the models of algebraic biology. *BioSystems* *158*: 31-46.
>
>
>   [3] Petoukhov, S. (2016).  The system-resonance approach in modeling
> genetic
> structures. *BiosySystems* *139*:1-11.
>
>[4] Ji, S. (2017).*Neo-Semiotics*: Introducing Zeroness into Peircean
> Semiotics May Bridge the Knowable and the Unknowable. *Prog. Biophys.
> Mol. Biol*.  *131*:387-401. PDF at http://www.sciencedirect.
> com/science/article/pii/S0079610717300858?via%3Dihub
>[5] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages:
> molecualr biological, bioinformatic and linguistic implications.
> <http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Isomorphism1.pdf>
> *BioSystems* 44:17-39.  PDF at http://www.conformon.net/
> wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Isomorphism1.pdf
>
> [6] Ji, S. (2017).  The Cell Language Theory: Connecting Mind and
> Matter.  World Scientific, New Jersey.  Chapter 5*. *
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> on behalf of Emanuel Diamant <
> emanl@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Friday, January 12, 2018 11:20 AM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* [Fis] I salute to Sungchul
>
>
> Dear FISers,
>
>
>
> I would like to express my pleasure with the current state of our
> discourse – an evident attempt to reach a more common understanding about
> information issues and to enrich preliminary given assessments.
>
> In this regard, I would like to add my comment to Sungchul’s post of
> January 12, 2018.
>
>
>
> Sungchul proposes “to recognize two distinct types of information which,
> for the lack of better terms, may be referred to as the "meaningless
> information" or I(-)  and "meaningful information" or I(+)”.
>
> That is exactly what I am trying to put forward for years, albeit under
> more historically rooted names: Physical and Semantic information [1].
> Never mind, what is crucially important here is that the duality of
> information becomes publicly recognized and accepted by FIS community.
>
>
>
> I salute to Sungchul’s suggestion!
>
>
>
> Best regards, Emanuel.
>
>
>
> [1] Emanuel Diamant, *The brain is processing information, not data. Does
> anybody care?, *ISIS Summit Vienna 2015, Extended Abstract.
> http://sciforum.net/conference/isis-summit-vienna-2015/paper/2842
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsciforum.net%2Fconference%2Fisis-summit-vienna-2015%2Fpaper%2F2842=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7C89f81861ee684f05e46b08d559d86fe1%7Cb92d2b234d35447093ff69aca6632ffe%7C1%7C1%7C636513708497810284=bMlZ324OoEHA5XMQibKiEFsm75NhcpkfIcSRUJbQZNg%3D=0>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
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Re: [Fis] About 10 Principles

[Alex Hankey]

 believe that the scientific works represent proved facts
> (maybe by authors). However, who knows? We trust in authorities.
>
> Sometimes we have to doubt!
>
> That is why the background to modern science is in the wisdom of St.
> Augustin (354-430):  "Intelligo ut credam, credo ut intelligam!" [St.
> Agustin], i.e. it is in the harmony and dialectical unity of the
> scientific and beliefs’ approaches [K.Markov, 2008].
>
> Materialism or Idealism
> ---
> Very important theme, raised from letter of Logan Streondj, is about
> Idealism and Materialism.
> Let note that both are religious approaches but not scientific. The first,
> Idealism, is based on belief about existence of God, Free Information
> without material base, Intelligent Creation of the World, Information Cube
> which is transferred from one body to another, and etc. The second,
> Materialism, is based on the opposite belief - all phenomena pointed above
> do not exist. But both interconnect their reasoning to these phenomena.
>
> The scientific approach is absolutely different. Scientists do not assume
> anything in advance and try to make reasoning based only on repeatable and
> controlled experiments.
>
> I hope, the FIS List is a scientific forum and all posts nave to be based
> on repeatable and controlled experiments!
>
> About 10 principles of Informatics
> --
> Dear Pedro,
> I highly appreciate your proposition of principles!
>
> I have no remarks about principles 6-10.
> But the principles 1-5 are not clear for me.
> My interpretation is given below marked by letter M (M1, M2, etc.).
> These of Pedro are marked by letter P (P1, P2, etc.).
>
> In my practice these principles had been used many times to solve and
> explain practical problems.
> The primary concept I used is the concept of “entity” – there are many
> examples of real entities.
> Entities interact permanently and after each interaction some internal
> changes in the entities may appear.
> Such changes are called “reflections”. In Computer science the
> corresponded concept is “Data”.
> Further reasoning is given below:
>
> P1. Information is information, neither matter nor energy.
>
> M1. Information is a class of reflections in material entities. Not every
> reflection is information. Only subjectively comprehended reflections are
> information.
>
>
> P2. Information is comprehended into structures, patterns, messages, or
> flows.
>
> M2. Reflections may be comprehended as structures, patterns, messages,
> flows, etc.
>
>
> P3. Information can be recognized, can be measured, and can be processed
> (either computationally or non-computationally).
>
> M3. Reflections can be recognized, can be measured, and can be processed
> (either computationally or non-computationally).
>
>
> P4. Information flows are essential organizers of life's self-production
> processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the accompanying
> energy flows.
>
> M4. Reflection flows are essential organizers of life's self-production
> processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the accompanying
> energy flows.
>
>
> P5. Communication/information exchanges among adaptive life-cycles
> underlie the complexity of biological organizations at all scales.
>
> M5. Communication is based on special kind of reflections created by one
> entity and reflected by a second one. This way, the reflections
> comprehended as information by the first entity may be secondary
> (transitively) reflected by the second one. Such exchanges among adaptive
> life-cycles underlie the complexity of biological organizations at all
> scales.
>
>
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
> Bibliography
> [St.Anselm] http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/middleages.html ,
> http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/hop30.htm
> [Muentzer]  http://www.thomas-muentzer.de/,
> [St.Agustín]http://www.conoze.com/doc.php?doc=157
> [K.Markov, 2008]K. Markov, S. Poryazov, K. Ivanova, I. Mitov, V.
> Markova. Culture Aspects of Inforaction. International Journal INFORMATION
> TECHNOLOGIES & KNOWLEDGE, Volume 2, 2008, Number 4, pp. 335-342.
> http://www.foibg.com/ijitk/ijitk-vol02/ijitk02-4-p06.pdf
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

[Alex Hankey]

Dear All,

I particularly approve of theJose's comment that:

" following D. Hofstadter, H. von Foerster, N. Luhmann and others we
could think of a agent/observer as a self-referential loop."

That is because I show that such loops occur at the locus of control of
biological systems where the mind is situated. In complexity biology, the
condition is known as 'criticality'.

Maybe the idea of a 'perfectly self-observing loop', as a suitable
self-referential structure could be inserted in the paper. I will suggest a
suitable place,

May I also draw your attention to the fact that Karen Barad has written
extensively on the reality of the Agent. Her book, Agential Realism .
is published by Routledge.  No less a scientist than Brian Josephson at the
Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge is deeply interested in her work and
regards it as of fundamental importance.

All best wishes to you all,

Alex Hankey


On 16 October 2017 at 05:04, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero <
javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Krassimir, dear all,
>
> I have noticed that some descriptions of information make use of
> anthropocentric metaphors and that might be misguiding (for instance,
> subjective and objective information (Sung)). Agent is a concept that
> retains some sort of action-theoretic background but at the same time
> assumes the existence of nonhuman agents. Agency would be then a causal
> relation wherein the agent "causes" some sort of effects.
>
> I don`t feel confortable with this concept. I prefer the the concept of
> observer. But this one is problematic too, for the same reason: it is
> supposed that a human is there watching, feeling, measuring, etc.
>
> I think we have to get rid of these humanistic assumptions in order to
> gain insight into the issues we want to explore.
>
> Definitely I don`t think I have the answer, but following D. Hofstadter,
> H. von Foerster, N. Luhmann and others we could think of a agent/observer
> as a self-referential loop. Most of information processing devices consist
> of a design of some sort of feedback loop.  I don`t know if we could
> translate this idea to all the kinds of systems we all deal with. But it
> would be worth finding out.
>
> An operative loop enables the differentiation of system and environment.
> The system acquires the capacity to control its own behavior. At some point
> its internal states are so many that it biffucartes and grow complex.
> Subsystems can differentiate by the same mechanism. So, that`s my point:
> one have to look for self-referential loops in order to find the
> observer/agent.
>
> An intelligent agent would be some kind of loop (strange loop, maybe).
> It`s just a hypothesis anyway...
>
> Best regards,
> El oct 15, 2017 6:29 PM, "Krassimir Markov" <mar...@foibg.com> escribió:
>
>> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>>
>> After nice collaboration last weeks, a paper Called “Data versus
>> Information” is prepared in very beginning draft variant and already is
>> sent to authors for refining.
>> Many thanks for fruitful work!
>>
>> What we have till now is the understanding that the information is some
>> more than data.
>> In other words:
>>  d = r
>>  i = r + e
>> where:
>>  d => data;
>>  i => information;
>>  r => reflection;
>>  e => something Else, internal for the Agent (subject, interpreter,
>> etc.).
>>
>> Simple question: What is “Agent”?
>>
>> When an entity became an Agent? What is important to qualify the entity as
>> Agent or as an Intelligent Agent? What kind of agent is the cell? At the
>> end - does information exist for Agents or only for Intelligent Agents?
>>
>> Thesis: Information exists only for the Intelligent Agents.
>>
>> Antithesis: Information exists at all levels of Agents.
>>
>> Friendly greetings
>> Krassimir
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ___
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>
> ___
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>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] Heretic

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Professor Tozzi,

Might I suggest that you graciously retire from the list,
as you evidently do not wish to participate in what
the rest of us find fascinating topics of discussion.

As a physicist, I have no difficulty in relating to the concept of
'information',
and I am aware of no less than five conceptually totally different
mathematical structures, all of which merit the name, 'information'.

With all good wishes,

Alex Hankey


On 4 October 2017 at 02:30, <tozziart...@libero.it> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
> After the provided long list of completely different definitions of the
> term "information", one conclusion is clear: there is not a scientific,
> unique definition of information.
>
> Nobody of us is able to provide an operative framework and a single (just
> one!) empirical  testable prevision able to assess "information".
> For example, what does "semantics" and "meaning" mean, in empirical terms?
> Therefore, to talk about information is meaningless, in the carnapian
> sense.
>
> Judging from your answers, the most of you are foremost scientists.
> Therefore, my proposal is to forget about information, and to use your
> otherwise very valuable skills and efforts in other fields.
> It is a waste of your  precious time to focus yourself in something that
> is so vague.  It is, retrospectively, a mistake to state that the world is
> information, if nobody knows what does it mean.
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>
> ___
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> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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Re: [Fis] non-living objects COULD NOT “exchange information”

[Alex Hankey]

BUT, in common parlance, computers and mobile phones 'exchange information'
(in the abstract, digital sense) all the time. Including this email.

If you wish to cleanly restrict yourself to semantic content, the the form
of information that I presented to FiS a year ago offers the only
scientifically based,mathematical physics form of 'information' that I have
personally seen in the scientific literature.

Best wishes,

Alex Hankey


On 24 March 2017 at 15:25, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com> wrote:

> Dear Arturo and FIS Colleagues,
> Let me remember that:
> The basic misunderstanding that non-living objects could “exchange
> information” leads to many principal theoretical as well as psychological
> faults.
> For instance, photon could exchange only energy and/or reflections !
> *Sorry for this n-th my remark ... *
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
> *From:* tozziart...@libero.it
> *Sent:* Friday, March 24, 2017 4:52 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* [Fis] I: Re: Is information truly important?
>
>
>
>
> Dear  Lars-Göran,
> I prefer to use asap my second FIS bullet, therefore it will be my last
> FIS mail for the next days.
>
> First of all, in special relativity, an observer is NOT by definition a
> material object that can receive and store incoming energy from other
> objects.
> In special relativity, an observer is a frame of reference from which a
> set of objects or events are being measured.  Speaking of an observer is
> not specifically hypothesizing an individual person who is experiencing
> events, but rather it is a particular mathematical context which objects
> and events are to be evaluated from. The effects of special relativity
> occur whether or not there is a "material object that can recieve and store
> incoming energy from other objects" within the inertial reference frame to
> witness them.
>
> Furthermore, take a photon (traveling at speed light) that crosses a
> cosmic zone close to the sun.  The photon "detects" (and therefore can
> interact with) a huge sun surface (because of its high speed), while we
> humans on the Earth "detect" (and can interact with) a much smaller sun
> surface.
> Therefore, the photon may exchange more information with the sun than the
> humans on the Earth: both the photon and the humans interact with the same
> sun, but they "detect" different surfaces, and therefore they may exchange
> with the sun a different information content.
> If we also take into account that the photon detects an almost infinite,
> fixed time, this means once again that it can exchange much more
> information with the sun than we humans can.
>
> In sum, once again, information does not seem to be a physical quantity,
> rather just a very subjective measure, depending on the speed and of the
> time of the "observer".
>
>
>
> *Arturo Tozzi*
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
> Messaggio originale
> Da: "Lars-Göran Johansson" <lars-goran.johans...@filosofi.uu.se>
> Data: 24/03/2017 14.50
> A: "tozziart...@libero.it"<tozziart...@libero.it>
> Ogg: Re: [Fis] Is information truly important?
>
>
> 24 mars 2017 kl. 13:15 skrev tozziart...@libero.it:
>
> Dear Fisers,
> a big doubt...
>
> We know that the information of a 3D black hole is proportional to its 2D
> horizon, according to the Bekenstein-Hawking equations.
>
> However, an hypotetical observer traveling at light speed (who watches a
> black hole at rest) detects a very large black hole horizon, due to
> Einstein's equations.
> Therefore, he detects more information from the black hole than an
> observer at rest, who sees a smaller horizon…
>
> An observer is by definition a material object that can recieve and store
> incoming energy from other objects. Since it requires infinite energy  to
> accelerate even a slighest object to the velocity of light, no observer can
> travel at the speed of light. That means that your thought experiment is
> based in inconsistent assumptions and no vaild conclusions from them can be
> drawn.
> Lars-Göran Johansson
>
>
> In sum, information does not seem to be a physical quantity, rather just a
> very subjective measure...
>
> *Arturo Tozzi*
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
> ___
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> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> 

Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning

[Alex Hankey]

t without using the word 'information'. We could discuss
>> redundancy, variety, constraint, meaning, structural coupling,
>> coordination, expectation, language, etc.
>>
>> In what ways would our explanations be weakened?
>>
>> In what ways might we gain in clarity?
>>
>> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our
>> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human
>> experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday
>> human experience.
>>
>> Dai
>>
>> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>>
>>
>> Dear colleagues,
>>
>> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of
>> bits of information.
>>
>> Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a probability
>> distribution is .
>>
>> /H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb?s
>> formulation of the entropy .
>>
>> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my
>> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the
>> question of ?what is information?? As the discussion on this list
>> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one
>> can answer the question ?how is information defined?? Information is
>> not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise than as our construct.
>>
>> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move
>> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman?s and Bob Logan?s (2007)
>> definition of information ?as natural selection assembling the very
>> constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and
>> the propagation of organization.? I asked several times what this
>> means and how one can measure this information. Hitherto, I only
>> obtained the answer that colleagues who disagree with me will be
>> cited. JAnother answer was that ?counting? may lead to populism. J
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Loet
>>
>> 
>>
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>>
>> Professor, University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>>
>> l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
>> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>> Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
>> Sussex;
>>
>> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
>> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
>> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>>
>> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
>> London;
>>
>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en
>>
>> *From:*Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM
>> *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
>> *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?
>>
>> List,
>>
>> Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information
>> stated below.
>>
>> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive
>> ("bizarre"); (p. 27)
>>
>> I agree.  I struggled with this definition for a long time before
>> realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information"
>> or the number of bits needed to convey a message.  He was looking for
>> a formula that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of
>> bits needed to convey a message and realised that the amount of
>> information (number of bits) needed to convey a message was dependent
>> on the "amount" of uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he
>> equated these.
>>
>> It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of
>> information" and "information".  For example, we can measure amount of
>> water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise
>> the measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what
>> information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed
>> to fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should
>> not think that water is therefore identical to an empty volume.
>> Similarly we should not think that information is identical to
>> uncertainty.
>>
>> By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the
>> "amount of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shann

Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning

[Alex Hankey]

on
>> does  a name have meaning.
>>
>> Finally, with regards to the problems about information, I would add that
>> Alfred Korzybski (and later Marshall McLuhan) once wrote that “the map is
>> not the territory.” The map is merely a picture of something that it
>> represents. Increasing the amount of information may reduce the
>> granularity
>> of the picture, but it remains a picture. This means that accumulation
>> greater and greater amounts of information can never completely replace
>> or
>> represent the infinite complexity of any real-lilfe situation — and this
>> is
>> an insight that Wittgenstein realized only in his later philosophical
>> work.
>>
>> Steve Bindeman
>>
>>
>> On Dec 22, 2016, at 7:37 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:
>>
>> Send Fis mailing list submissions to
>> fis@listas.unizar.es
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>> fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>> fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..."
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>   1. Re: What is information? and What is life? (Dai Griffiths)
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:44:59 +
>> From: Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com>
>> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?
>> Message-ID: <dbbfa511-b4e1-79b5-f800-bad1c231b...@gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>>
>> Information is not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise
>>
>> than as our construct.
>>
>> I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in
>> discussing information come from our desire to shoe-horn many different
>> phenomena into the same construct. It would be possible to disaggregate
>> the construct. It be possible to discuss the topics which we address on
>> this list without using the word 'information'. We could discuss
>> redundancy, variety, constraint, meaning, structural coupling,
>> coordination, expectation, language, etc.
>>
>> In what ways would our explanations be weakened?
>>
>> In what ways might we gain in clarity?
>>
>> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our
>> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human
>> experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday
>> human experience.
>>
>> Dai
>>
>> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>>
>>
>> Dear colleagues,
>>
>> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of
>> bits of information.
>>
>> Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a probability
>> distribution is .
>>
>> /H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb?s
>> formulation of the entropy .
>>
>> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my
>> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the
>> question of ?what is information?? As the discussion on this list
>> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one
>> can answer the question ?how is information defined?? Information is
>> not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise than as our construct.
>>
>> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move
>> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman?s and Bob Logan?s (2007)
>> definition of information ?as natural selection assembling the very
>> constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and
>> the propagation of organization.? I asked several times what this
>> means and how one can measure this information. Hitherto, I only
>> obtained the answer that colleagues who disagree with me will be
>> cited. JAnother answer was that ?counting? may lead to populism. J
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Loet
>>
>> 
>>
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>>
>> Professor, University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>>
>> l...@leydesdorff.net &

[Fis] Fwd: What is life?

[Alex Hankey]

The problem below is with the definition of the word, 'information'.
On an abstract level, a measurable quantity of what Shannon
called digital information has been transmitted.
Whether the receiver is then 'informed' by it is a question of
his ability to interpret it, which depends on semantics.
(I can understand the English emails far easier than the
occasional Spanish ones - the Shannon information will be
the same in both, but not what I get out of it.
I thought this distinction between these had long ago
been agreed upon in Fis discussions.
Where do you stand on it Krassimir?
Best wishes,
Alex Hankey


On 18 December 2016 at 02:53, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com> wrote:

> Dear Arturo,
> Your mobile is NOT able to transmit and utilize INFORMATION but some
> signals!!!
> As well as the artificial limb walk with its owner but it is not a living
> mater.
> Firstly, we have to understand what is information!
> After that ...
> Friendly regards
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
> From: tozziart...@libero.it
> Sent: Saturday, December 17, 2016 8:11 PM
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] What is life?
>
>
> Dear
>
>
> You write: "For living beings, we know that "Life is a tramission and
> utilistion of information (not only by ADN, but by all the information
> which is used by them, at all scales for survival)".
> However, to make an example, also my mobile is able to transmit and
> utilize information.
>
> I found (and I did not look very well, to be honest) at least EIGHT
> different definitions of life in literature.
>
> Therefore, if I ask: "What is life?" I have, apart from yours, other SEVEN
> different definitions of life.
>
> What does it mean? This means that we have no idea at all about what is
> life.
>
> It is the same as if I asked: "What is love?": who knows?
>
>
>
> Arturo Tozzi
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
> 
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>
>
> ___
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>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
____

2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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Re: [Fis] Who may prove that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ???

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Colleagues,

The nature of the 'space of consciousness' was made implicitly clear in my
presentation in April.
But you have not defined whether you are talking of the space of
'consciousnesses' or only
the space of their contents.

Nor whether the contents are limited to facts, ideas, or understandings.
None of these are digital and you need to specify in detail.
I am happy to supply specific answers from my model on request.

All good wishes,

Alex


On 27 November 2016 at 01:35, Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> At the risk of attracting the anger of all the mathematicians in the
> group, I will agree with Arturo, *contra *Krassimir. For a
> non-mathematician like me, a description of complex dynamic processes such
> as consciousness and information can be partly mathematical but need not
> involve proofs and their reduced logic.
>
> The question I have is whether the field description is itself necessary
> and sufficient and if incomplete, what is missing. Perhaps it is my
> intuition that consciousness is both continuous and discontinuous, and so
> is its opposite, unconsciousness, which still involves high-level nervous
> functions. In my picture, antipodal points are of little relevance compared
> to the non-Euclidean multi-dimensionality of this dynamic opposition, moving
> between identity and diversity, presence and absence, clarity and
> vagueness, symmetry and dissymetry, within the same high overall energy
> level. In any case, perhaps we can agree that everything that is moving
> here is information!
>
> Thank you and best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* tozziart...@libero.it
> *To:* fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 26, 2016 7:06 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Who may prove that consciousness is an Euclidean
> n-space ???
>
> Dear Krassimir,
> Thanks a lot for your question, now the discussion will become hotter!
>
> First of all, we never stated that consciousness lies either on a n-sphere
> or on an Euclidean n-space.
> Indeed, in our framework, consciousness IS the continuous function.
> Such function stands for a gauge field that restores the brain symmetries,
> broken by sensations.
> Concerning brain and gauge fields, see my PLOS biology paper:
> http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.
> 1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1002400
>
> When consciousness lacks, the inter-dimensional projections are broken,
> and the nervous higher functions temporarily disappear.
>
> Concerning the question about which are the manifolds where brain
> functions lie, it does not matter whether they are spheres, or circles, or
> concave, or flat structures: we demonstrated that the BUT is valid not just
> for convex manifolds, but for all the kinds of manifolds.
> See our:
> http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jnr.23720/
> abstract?userIsAuthenticated=false=
>
> Therefore, even if you think that brain and biological functions are
> trajectories moving on concave structures towards lesser energetic levels,
> as suggested by, e.g., Fokker-Planck equations, it does not matter: you may
> always find the antipodal points with matching description predicted by
> BUT.
>
> Ciao!
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> sabato, 26 novembre 2016, 06:23PM +01:00 da Krassimir Markov
> mar...@foibg.com:
>
> Dear FIS colleagues,
>
> I think, it is needed to put discussion on mathematical foundation. Let me
> remember that:
>
>
>
> The *Borsuk–Ulam theorem* (BUT), states that every *continuous function*
> from an *n*-sphere into *Euclidean n-space* maps some pair of antipodal
> points to the same point.
>
> Here, two points on a sphere are called antipodal if they are in exactly
> opposite directions from the sphere's center.
>
> Formally: *if* f : *S n → R* n  *is* *continuous* then there exists an x
> ∈ S n  such that: f ( − x ) = f ( x ).
>
> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borsuk%E2%80%93Ulam_theorem ]
>
>
>
> Who may proof that consciousness is a  *continuous function* from
> reflected reality ???
>
> Who may proof that consciousness is an *Euclidean n-space* ???
>
> After proving these statements we may think further.
>
>
>
> Yes, discussion is interesting but, I am afraid, it is not so scientific.
>
>
>
> Friendly regards
>
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
> --
>
> ___
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Re: [Fis] Is quantum information the basis of spacetime?

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Loet and Fis Colleagues,

Are you aware of Roy Frieden's
'Physics from Fisher Information'.
His book was published in the 1990s.
I consider it a very powerful statement.

Ultimately everything we can detect at
both macroscopic and microscopic levels
depends on information production from
a quantum level that forms Fisher Information.

Frieden's points apply to quantum physics
as well as classical physics.

Best wishes,

Alex Hankey


On 12 November 2016 at 18:56, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> wrote:

> Dear Marcus,
>
>
>
> When considering things in terms of "functional significance" one must
> confront the need to address "meaning" in terms of both the living and the
> physical . . . and their necessarily entangled nature.
>
>
>
> “Meaning” is first a linguistic construct; its construction requires
> interhuman communication. However, its use in terms of the living and/or
> the physical is metaphorical. Instead of a discourse, one can this consider
> (with Maturana) as a “second-order consensual domain” that functions AS a
> semantic domain without being one; Maturana (1978, p. 50):
>
>
>
> “In still other words, if an organism is observed in its operation within
> a second-order consensual domain, it appears to the observer *as if* its
> nervous system interacted with internal representations of the
> circumstances of its interactions, and as if the changes of state of the
> organism were determined by the semantic value of these representations.
> Yet all that takes place in the operation of the nervous system is the
> structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of relative neuronal
> activity proper to a closed neuronal network.”
>
>
>
> Failing to "make that connection" simply leaves one with an explanatory
> gap. And then, once connected, a further link to "space-time" is also
> easily located . . .
>
>
>
> Yes, indeed: limiting the discussion to the metaphors instead of going to
> the phore (that is, language and codification in language) leaves one with
> an explanatory gap. Quantum physics, for example, is a highly specialized
> language in which “mass” and “information” are provided with meanings
> different from classical physics.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
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>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] Essential Core?

[Alex Hankey]

French which gives a demonstration of the convergence
>> between  that information and thermodynamical neguentropy. Since twenty
>> years, I did not find an english review which was interested by this
>> problem, because I am biologist and the biological reviews were not
>> interested.
>>
>> *[John Collier] I agree. I have read only an English translation of
>> Science and Information Theory. I read it as an undergrad, and it has
>> strongly influenced my views. It is unfortunate, I think, that it hasn’t
>> influenced English speaking scientists much. I have also seen some bad
>> misreadings of what he was saying.*
>>
>>
>>
>> ___
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing 
> listFis@listas.unizar.eshttp://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
> --
> Prof.em. Dr. Rafael Capurro
> Hochschule der Medien (HdM), Stuttgart, Germany
> Capurro Fiek Foundation for Information Ethics 
> (http://www.capurro-fiek-foundation.org)
> Distinguished Researcher at the African Centre of Excellence for Information 
> Ethics (ACEIE), Department of Information Science, University of Pretoria, 
> South Africa.
> Chair, International Center for Information Ethics (ICIE) (http://icie.zkm.de)
> Editor in Chief, International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE) 
> (http://www.i-r-i-e.net)
> Postal Address: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
> E-Mail: raf...@capurro.de
> Voice: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
> Homepage: www.capurro.de
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] Essential Core?

[Alex Hankey]

John, I read the English translation of Science and Information theory in
1976 and was profoundly influenced by it. I started doing so because I was
trying to understand conscious awareness at that time, and it struck me
that information theory was the closest thing to it in science at the time.
(not being impressed much by S's cat etc.)
So you see it took 40 years thought for me to get to where I am now. Even
in 2008 when I had 90% of my present theory worked out, I was not
formulating it as a new theory of information.
Reading and re-rereading (!) Shear and Chalmers was central to that. And
the fluid Reynolds number analogy which led me to see that I did indeed
have a genuine 'Double Aspect' information theory of just the right kind.
Alex

On 8 July 2016 at 20:37, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> Comment inserted below yours.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>
> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Michel
> Godron
> *Sent:* Friday, 08 July 2016 4:52 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es; l...@leydesdorff.net
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Essential Core?
>
>
>
> My responses are in red
>
> Bien reçu votre message. MERCI. Cordialement. M. Godron
>
> Le 08/07/2016 à 14:42, Pedro C. Marijuan a écrit :
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Some brief responses to the different parties:
>
> Marcus: there were several sessions dealing with info physics, where I
> remember some historical connotations with mechanics emerged. Mostly 1998
> and 2002 chaired by Koichiro Matsuno and 2004 by Michel Petitjean.
> Afterwards the theme has surfaced relatively often. About the present
> possibilities for a UTI, my opinion is that strictly remaining within
> Shannon's and anthropocentric discourse boundaries there is no way out.
>
> Yes, but it is not the same  with  Brillouin's information : I could send
> to you a text in French which gives a demonstration of the convergence
> between  that information and thermodynamical neguentropy. Since twenty
> years, I did not find an english review which was interested by this
> problem, because I am biologist and the biological reviews were not
> interested.
>
> *[John Collier] I agree. I have read only an English translation of
> Science and Information Theory. I read it as an undergrad, and it has
> strongly influenced my views. It is unfortunate, I think, that it hasn’t
> influenced English speaking scientists much. I have also seen some bad
> misreadings of what he was saying.*
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
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[Fis] Fwd: Re: Shannonian Mechanics?

[Alex Hankey]

Pedro suggested that I send these comments to the whole group, so here they
are
-- Forwarded message --
From: "Alex Hankey" <alexhan...@gmail.com>
Date: 29 Jun 2016 21:20
Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?
To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
Cc:

Dear Pedro,

Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC is completely at variance
with the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE that I presented in my 3 week session that the
minds of different animal species have used the same encoding of gestalt
forms for the past 400 million years since the evolution of the amniotes.

Study of response of plants to human intentions has simlar implications
related to Rupert Sheldrake's 'Sense of being stared at'. These WELL
authenticated phenomena have hugely important implications for our
understanding of information in Experience - the topic of my presentation.
Best wishes,
Alex Hankey
On 29 Jun 2016 4:24 pm, "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
wrote:

> Dear Marcus, Loet, Bob... and All,
>
> Again very briefly, your exchanges make clear the limits of the received
> Shannonian approach and the (narrow?) corridors left for advancement. I
> find this situation highly reminiscent of what happened with Mechanics long
> ago: an excellent theory (but of limited scope) was overstretched and used
> as a paradigm of what All science should be... it contributed well to
> technology and to some other natural science disciplines, but was far from
> useful --nefarious?-- for humanities and for the future of psychological
> and social science studies.
>
> The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects
> outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects
> of the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have
> streamlined the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly
> successful theory, in the technological and in many other realms
> (linguistics, artif. intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol.
> networks, applied soc. metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it
> enough? Shouldn't we try to go beyond?
>
> I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed
> (reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of
> our own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is
> successful we could find for instance that:
>
> 1. There are UNIVERSALS of information. Not only in the transmission or in
> the encoding used, well captured by the present theory, but also in the
> generation, in the "purpose", the "meaning", the targeted subject/s, in the
> duration, the cost, the value, the fitness or adaptive "intelligence", etc.
>
> 2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.
>
> 3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE.
> It would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and
> communication (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the
> human special case, it is the whole advancement of our own lives what
> propels us to engage in endless communication --about the universals of our
> own species-- but with the terrific advantage of an open-ended
> communication system, language.
>
> 4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and
> taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of
> disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of
> Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those
> domains.
>
> Best regards to all,
> (and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
> --Pedro
>
>
> El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:
>
>
> Dear Loet,
>
> I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I
> often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have
> difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.
>
> >[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
> > is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
> > to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
> > information". <
> • Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or
> meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.
>
> > Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
> > of a system of reference; for example, an observer.<
> • It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that
> you suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not
> require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately
> below.
>

[Fis] Fis Documents - Invitation to view

[Alex Hankey (via Google Drive)]

I've shared an item with you:

Fis Documents
https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B93Ht8r0miELZlFwczBhazhzZEU=sharing=COvZlLsI=572f63fe

It's not an attachment -- it's stored online. To open this item, just click  
the link above.


This link is for FIS Webinar members to look at new ideas about complexity  
in medicine, biology and consciousness studies in more detail. I specially  
recommend the short paper concerning biology and medicine.
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[Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

[Alex Hankey]

By the way, the argument below
was sent to me by Lou Kauffman.

On 4 May 2016 at 20:11, Alex Hankey <alexhan...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Fis Colleagues,
>
> I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
> sweet,
> so I am posting it for our general edification.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Alex
>
> -- Forwarded message --
>
> “Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
> view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!
>
> But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
> that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.
>
> But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
> consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
> Theorem.)
>
> If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I put
> out on the table here in front of me.
>
> And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
> cannot prove, but that I can prove.
>
> But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
> We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
> Therefore I am not a CTM.
>
> I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
> If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
> Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.
>
> The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I
> am not a Turing machine.
>
> I believe that I am consistent.
> I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
> And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.
>
> Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.
>
> (P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his
> books
> “The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
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[Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Fis Colleagues,

I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
sweet,
so I am posting it for our general edification.

Best wishes,

Alex

-- Forwarded message --

“Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!

But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.

But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
Theorem.)

If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I put
out on the table here in front of me.

And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
cannot prove, but that I can prove.

But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
Therefore I am not a CTM.

I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.

The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I am
not a Turing machine.

I believe that I am consistent.
I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.

Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.

(P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his books
“The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

[Alex Hankey]

alse, it must be true. Something has to be amiss
>>> here. In fact, what is wrong is the statement in question is not a
>>> statement at all; it is a pseudo-statement, something that looks like a
>>> statement but is incomplete or vacuous. Like the pseudo-statement that
>>> merely says of itself that it is true, it says nothing. Since such
>>> self-referential truth-evaluations say nothing, they are neither true nor
>>> false. Indeed, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ can only be meaningfully
>>> applied to what is already a meaningful whole, one that already says
>>> something. The so-called Strengthened Liar Paradox features a
>>> pseudo-statement that says of itself that it is neither true nor false. It
>>> is paradoxical in that it apparently says something that is true while
>>> saying that what it says it is not true. However, the paradox dissolves
>>> when one realizes that it says something that is apparently true only
>>> because it is neither true nor false. However, if it is neither true nor
>>> false, it is consequently not a statement, and hence it says nothing. Since
>>> it says nothing, it cannot say something that is true. The reason why it
>>> appears to say something true is that one and the same string of words may
>>> be used to make either of two declarations, one a pseudo-statement, the
>>> other a true statement, depending on how the words refer. Consider the
>>> following example. Suppose we give the name ‘Joe’ to what I am saying, and
>>> what I am saying is that Joe is neither true nor false. When I say it, it
>>> is a pseudo-statement that is neither true nor false; when you say it, it
>>> is a statement that is true. The sentence leads a double life, as it were,
>>> in that it may be used to make two different statements depending on who
>>> says it. A similar situation can also arise with a Liar sentence: if the
>>> liar says that what he says is false, then he is saying nothing; if I say
>>> that what he says is false, then I am making a false statement about his
>>> pseudo-statement. This may look like a silly peculiarity of spoken
>>> language, one best ignored in formal logic, but it is ultimately what is
>>> wrong with the Gödel sentence that plays a key role in Gödel’s
>>> Incompleteness Theorem. That sentence is a string of symbols deemed
>>> well-formed according to the formation rules of the system used by Gödel,
>>> but which, on the intended interpretation of the system, is ambiguous: the
>>> sentence has two different interpretations, a self-referential
>>> truth-evaluation that is neither true nor false or a true statement about
>>> that self-referential statement. In such a system, Gödel’s conclusion
>>> holds. However, it is a mistake to conclude that no possible formalization
>>> of Arithmetic can be complete. In a formal system that distinguishes
>>> between the two possible readings of the Gödel sentence (an operation that
>>> would considerably complicate the system), such would no longer be the case.
>>>  Cheers, Maxine ___
>>> Fis mailing listFis@listas.unizar.eshttp://listas.unizar.es/cgi-
>>> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
>>> bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <Fis@listas.unizar.es>
>>> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>> University of California, Berkeley
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-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

Dear Bruno,

You have brought up a vitally important question.
Thank you so very much.
Best wishes

Alex

RE Bruno: How could the quantum correlations existence be definite if
nothing is objective?

ME: It does not really matter what the nature of the reality is, either
strongly objective (denied by quantum theory), or D'Espagnat's 'Veiled
Reality', the title of his book in which he discusses a
not-strongly-objective reality. Quantum correlations will have the same
level of existence as the wave function and everything built out of
mixtures of wave-functions, wave-packets, and / or quantum fields.

Quantum correlations exist as 'definitely' (or indefinitely) as everything
else.
(See the discussion(s) under Steve Bindeman's response(s) earlier today.)

ALSO: The problem with 'Interpreting Quantum Theory' is that if your basic
assumption about the nature of reality is not consistent with the
implications of quantum theory, then quantum theory will inevitably be
impossible to interpret, because its implications will deny your underlying
assumptions. (I REGARD THIS AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE)

Quantum theory popularizer, Heinz Pagels (late husband of Elaine Pagels),
posed the question: "What is quantum theory trying to tell us about
existence / our universe?"
I fell that D'Espagnat's theorem says it all - or at least a great deal of
it.

My Proposed Resolution of the problem is to make sure that the macroscopic
reality you choose as the context for your interpretation of quantum theory
is not inconsistent with the theory. Then quantum theory turns out to be
relatively (sic!) easy to interpret.

But such realities are not popular as an underlying metaphysics in western
thought, though they do occur in South Asian schools of thought, and in
Whitehead's Process Philosophy.

That is why I promote a 'Vedic' interpretation of quantum theory which
starts with the idea of information and information generation as being
primary, and matter and energy as being secondary. The *processes* of
information generation (wave packet reduction), information transmission
(free states of wave functions), and information storage (bound states)
then become fundamental, along with the non-quantum states at critical
instabilities, where phenomenal experience becomes possible via <*O*
.

The primary source of information in the universe is then the symmetry
breaking process at the origin of the inflationary process in quantum
cosmology, a singularity in which I can locate information states of the
kind that I am proposing in this webinar as the foundation for
phenomenology / experience, since their <*O* structure can support
both the sense of self', in *O*, and integrated information supporting
gestalt cognition in <.

Interestingly and as I have already emphasized, this makes both the 'self'
a process, <*O*, and objects of perception, weakly objective entities
supported / manifested by sequences of information production processes.

I confess that I am a slightly unwilling Whiteheadian! (There is much to
learn!)

On 2 May 2016 at 09:55, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Hi Alex,
>
> On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:
>
> RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
> something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
> something material.
>
> ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
> one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a
> real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.
>
> I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he
> received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is
> 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence
> of quantum correlations destroys all that.
>
>
> Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations existence
> be definite if nothing is objective?
> With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the
> universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of
> elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain why
> machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that beliefs can
> last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with the quanta, and
> why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet undoubtable, like the
> qualia.
>
> (*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not withdrawing
> your kids from school when they learn the table of addition and
> multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not correct.
>
>
> Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to
> accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense
> of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a
> sati

Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

RE Bruno Marchal: Gödel's theorem implies that machines which are looking
at themselves (in a precise technical sense) develop a series of distinct
phenomenologies (arguably corresponding to justifiable, knowable,
observable, sensible).

ME: I find this a fascinating observation in that you are making a
phenomenological association with a self-referential kind of machine.

However, from the perspective of my proposal, surely your classes of
machine are not operating from a critical instability where the information
states themselves have the self-referential property embedded within them.
Or are they? Or some of them?

The question then arises whether such a machine could exhibit a capacity to
"reason about" a problem, which it had been posed, and so tackle the
problem as one of a member of.a class of similar problems?

It is certainly true in mathematics that the human mind possesses such
abilities to an outstanding extent: not only the ability to comprehend a
problem, and secondly the ability to see the problem as a member of (in the
context of) a class of similar problems, but also the ability to *generalize
*a problem, and so *create* a class of similar problems as a context within
which more general reasoning processes can be applied to solve the problem
in question.

An example of such an approach is given by the Taniyama-Shimura
conjecture, "Each
Elliptical Function is equivalent to a particular Modular Form", one step
of the path followed by Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last theorem between
1986 and 1994.

Does this not also illustrate aspects of the discussion of Godel's theorem,
where Maxine has extensively quoted semantic objections to Godel's
statement on the grounds (as I understand her) that it could not be
construed as a direct product of phenomenological experience.

May I say that I would not regard my paraphrase of Maxine's reason as a
valid objection because I do not expect statements in mathematics to
conform to requirements for statements to be considered phenomenological.
The sentential calculus is constructed within the category of sets, and
Frege and Russell and Whitehead were operating within that framework, as
was Godel.

I personally do not regard the category of sets as a valid framework for
phenomenology.
My construction of a new information theory appropriate to describe
phenomenological experience specifically denies it. The sentential calculus
of Frege & co has no bite - it is superficial and not the enamel required
to start up the mind's intellectual digestion and absorption processes.


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] _ Re: : Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Alex Hankey]

e reality. But on the other hand, they
> are all necessary steps in a process. This perspective, voiced in the 2nd
> century by Nagarjuna, closely anticipates Wittgenstein’s propositions at
> the close of his *Tractatus*:
>
> 6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone
> who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has
> used them — as steps — to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw
> away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
>
> 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
>
>
> I find Nagarjuna’s reasoning to be reductive because he demonstrates how,
> whether you begin with a belief in the truth of either identity or
> difference, in either case you are led by implication to an untenable
> position. Since both notions are thus "empty of self-essence;”  they can
> exist only together and not separately.
>
> Steve Bindeman
>
> On May 2, 2016, at 4:34 AM, Alex Hankey <alexhan...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> It is good to note that Reductionism is not appropriate,
> not in this particular context, maybe not in any context.
>
> Most of the oriental philosophers were not aware of any
> reductionist approach, since their teachers were purely
> concerned with integrated and holistic approaches to
> understanding and solving any problem.
>
> Hence their attitudes to understanding experience"
> the question of reductionism does not enter.
> Thank you.
>
> On 30 April 2016 at 22:15, Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Search Alex e Stan, Search Tutti,
>> I fully share the epistemological philosophical-scientific approach of
>> Alex and logical-mathematical set theory and / or the "hierarchy of
>> subsumption evolving" Stan. However, reductionism does not satisfy
>> neither pays.
>> A collective embrace the FIS network.
>> Francesco
>>
>> 2016-05-01 0:38 GMT+02:00 Alex Hankey <alexhan...@gmail.com>:
>>
>>> It is good to see the discussion developing into deep considerations of
>>> the history (histories?) of the metaphysical understanding of the nature of
>>> the self, the soul, and the world(s) of experience, including the material
>>> universe in which it finds itself.
>>>
>>> I do not claim to have any great expertise in understanding Nagarjuna's
>>> approach, but we have to realise that both he and the great exponent of
>>> Vedanta, Adishankara, also known as Shankaracharya (meaning teacher of
>>> liberation), are said to have used almost identical formulations, albeit
>>> with a different emphasis. While Nagarjuna used the concept of emptiness as
>>> the foundation, Adishankara stayed within the traditional Vedic scheme
>>> where 'fullness' or completeness / wholeness is regarded as fundamental.
>>>
>>> While it is certainly true that to experience the 'self' clearly, all
>>> mental content has to allowed to settle down and fade away (one aspect of
>>> 'Chitta Vritti Nirodha', a definition of Yoga) the condition for
>>> maintaining that stably is that the subtle energy, prana (life-breath),
>>> should be enlivened fully, which is why the enlivenment (ayama) of prana
>>> i.e. pranaayama (normal spelling pranayama, in which the long 'a' is not
>>> explicitly emphasised) is a fundamental Yoga exercise, usually practised
>>> before meditation (Dhyana) practices in which the mind moves to its empty
>>> state (samadhi). As can be seen, increasing the prana (life-energy) to a
>>> state of fullness is thus an integral part of attaining a stable state of
>>> pure consciousness (samadhi).
>>>
>>> It is the fullness of the state of prana that stabilizes the mind from
>>> influences that might bring it out of samadhi. In particular, various
>>> emotions can block the flows of subtle energies (several websites explain
>>> this in detail e.g. Google on acupuncture meridians - emotions). Fullness
>>> of prana is thus considered equivalent to emotional stability, which
>>> requires balanced positive emotions and feelings.
>>>
>>> Both Nagarjuna and Adishankara are then concerned with how it is that
>>> all-that-exists emerges from the original absolute. Nagarjuna evidently
>>> shows that all things including all sentient beings have a 'dependent'
>>> existence - they do not exist in and of themselves. Adishankara on the
>>> other hand uses Vedic physics and metaphysics to trace how they emerge at
>>> various levels of perception. The essence of his argument is to show how
>>> the 

[Fis] _ Re:: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Alex Hankey]

It is good to note that Reductionism is not appropriate,
not in this particular context, maybe not in any context.

Most of the oriental philosophers were not aware of any
reductionist approach, since their teachers were purely
concerned with integrated and holistic approaches to
understanding and solving any problem.

Hence their attitudes to understanding experience"
the question of reductionism does not enter.
Thank you.

On 30 April 2016 at 22:15, Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Search Alex e Stan, Search Tutti,
> I fully share the epistemological philosophical-scientific approach of
> Alex and logical-mathematical set theory and / or the "hierarchy of
> subsumption evolving" Stan. However, reductionism does not satisfy
> neither pays.
> A collective embrace the FIS network.
> Francesco
>
> 2016-05-01 0:38 GMT+02:00 Alex Hankey <alexhan...@gmail.com>:
>
>> It is good to see the discussion developing into deep considerations of
>> the history (histories?) of the metaphysical understanding of the nature of
>> the self, the soul, and the world(s) of experience, including the material
>> universe in which it finds itself.
>>
>> I do not claim to have any great expertise in understanding Nagarjuna's
>> approach, but we have to realise that both he and the great exponent of
>> Vedanta, Adishankara, also known as Shankaracharya (meaning teacher of
>> liberation), are said to have used almost identical formulations, albeit
>> with a different emphasis. While Nagarjuna used the concept of emptiness as
>> the foundation, Adishankara stayed within the traditional Vedic scheme
>> where 'fullness' or completeness / wholeness is regarded as fundamental.
>>
>> While it is certainly true that to experience the 'self' clearly, all
>> mental content has to allowed to settle down and fade away (one aspect of
>> 'Chitta Vritti Nirodha', a definition of Yoga) the condition for
>> maintaining that stably is that the subtle energy, prana (life-breath),
>> should be enlivened fully, which is why the enlivenment (ayama) of prana
>> i.e. pranaayama (normal spelling pranayama, in which the long 'a' is not
>> explicitly emphasised) is a fundamental Yoga exercise, usually practised
>> before meditation (Dhyana) practices in which the mind moves to its empty
>> state (samadhi). As can be seen, increasing the prana (life-energy) to a
>> state of fullness is thus an integral part of attaining a stable state of
>> pure consciousness (samadhi).
>>
>> It is the fullness of the state of prana that stabilizes the mind from
>> influences that might bring it out of samadhi. In particular, various
>> emotions can block the flows of subtle energies (several websites explain
>> this in detail e.g. Google on acupuncture meridians - emotions). Fullness
>> of prana is thus considered equivalent to emotional stability, which
>> requires balanced positive emotions and feelings.
>>
>> Both Nagarjuna and Adishankara are then concerned with how it is that
>> all-that-exists emerges from the original absolute. Nagarjuna evidently
>> shows that all things including all sentient beings have a 'dependent'
>> existence - they do not exist in and of themselves. Adishankara on the
>> other hand uses Vedic physics and metaphysics to trace how they emerge at
>> various levels of perception. The essence of his argument is to show how
>> the mental sensory apparatus came from the original source / Absolute, and
>> thus how all objects of sensation can be traced back there.
>>
>> In modern terms, all things we have ever experientially encountered are
>> quantum fields, and all quantum fields seem to have emerged from the Big
>> Bang via the process of symmetry breaking at its source - the inflationary
>> process. But symmetry breaking is an instability, and when one inspects the
>> information states that that instability supports, they turn out to have a
>> similar structure to O===>, the one proposed in the material that was
>> distributed.
>>
>> I feel that the role and significance of instabilities in the physical
>> world, particularly life processes, has not been adequately expounded and
>> that we may only be beginning to understand them.
>>
>> I hope this helps.
>>
>> Alex
>>
>> On 30 April 2016 at 08:18, steven bindeman <bindem...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>> I hope the following passage I’ve written on Nagarjuna will be of use
>>> for this discussion on the nature of self. The passage is from a manuscript
>>> I’ve just completed on silence and postmodernism.
>>>
>

[Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

[Alex Hankey]

RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
something material.

ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a
real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.

I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he
received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is
'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence
of quantum correlations destroys all that.

Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to
accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense
of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a
satisfactory alternative. The process of information flow creates the
observer-observed relationship and (the illusion of??) their separation.

Sequences of information production made possible by lack of equilibrium,
both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of particle tracks at
the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at the macroscopic level.
Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum correlations in
mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the Many Worlds
interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the mathematics, but do
not concur with the interpretation).

In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects among
its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp two days ago
at the conference after his talk, and checked that he still approves of
this approach.

My best to all,

Alex

P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting discussion.

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] _ Re: _ FIS discusion

[Alex Hankey]

en,
> finely detailed descriptions of those observations. Just such untethered
> observations and
> meticulous descriptions are the cornerstone of any life science. One is
> not out there trying to
> make others as you want them to be, but attempting to know them as they
> are. The task is precisely
> a challenge since it is a matter of achieving knowledge about living
> bodies that are different from,
> yet evolutionarily connected to, your living body. Jane Goodall's years of
> dedicated study set
> the original gold standard, so to speak, for such research, the
> foundations of "good life science."
> As I earlier wrote (and documented by way of a publication), descriptive
> foundations undergird
> phenomenological analyses, studies in evolutionary biology, and ecological
> literature.
>
> Cheers,
> Maxine
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] _ Re: _ Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Alex Hankey]

ea nor the concrete thing as having a
> separate reality — both instead are characterized as “‘thought
> constructions’ founded on experience.’ As such, they are not absolutely
> real or absolutely unreal. …This middle path could thus be adopted in
> understanding all forms of experience, whether they be linguistic, social,
> political, moral, or religious.”
>
> Another way of approaching an understanding of the middle way has to do
> with recognizing it as constituting a resolution of the identity/difference
> problem.  According to standard Buddhist doctrine the most dangerous false
> view possible is the belief in a permanent, independent self (also commonly
> referred to as the concept of identity). This notion of self is symptomatic
> of our deepest fears, concerning things like death and the possibility of
> our personal nonexistence. The concept of difference, which is the other
> side of the problem, is the belief that nothing is real; it also asserts
> the absence of all identities. This position would lead to the most mundane
> things becoming unintelligible. Nagarjuna’s solution to this problem is his
> assertion that neither identity nor difference is real. Both notions, when
> seen properly, are “empty” of self-essence. They can exist only together
> and not separately. Nagarjuna’s way of resolving this problem, by
> pointing to the interdependency of identity and difference, is remarkably
> similar to the one proposed by Merleau-Ponty many years later.
>
> Steve Bindeman
>
>
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>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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Re: [Fis] The phenomenology of life

[Alex Hankey]

e ratio is in
> between 3 and 4. It means that you and me are ordered by upper levels in
> around 80 % of our exchanges, while what we send upwards becomes a meager
> 20 %. It is from a statistics on business communication metrics. The
> generalization is far from direct, but maybe it would occur in the cells
> too--amazingly there is very little literature on cellular "signal
> emission".
>
> Anyhow, how the whole ascending and descending info flows give raise to
> all the varieties of organizational complexity is a fascinating problem,
>
> All the  best--Pedro
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Figure 6: Prototypical signaling pathways of multicellularity.* From
> left to right, a stimulus in the intercellular space binds to a
> transmembrane receptor (sensor) on its extracellular domain. Upon binding,
> the receptor undergoes a transient modification of its cytoplasmic domain;
> this effect triggers a transient modification of a series of proteins in
> the cell, each one acting as an intermediate in the signal transduction
> pathway (signal processing), with characteristic hierarchies of protein
> kinases and second messengers. The last components are actuators or
> effectors that activate or inhibit proteins and channels that control
> several cellular functions, notably gene expression by means of
> transcriptional switches that may interact with several coactivator
> partners. The whole biochemical changes produced in the cell represent the
> response to the received signal —its *molecular meaning*.
>
>
>
>  El 26/04/2016 a las 10:10, Alex Hankey escribió:
>
> Dear Pedro,
>
> Thank you for the comments on my presentation, and particularly for
> reminding us all that life transmits information of many different kinds by
> very specific and selective processes in chemical signally molecules.
>
> I must confess that I had assumed that such kinds of signals could be
> considered special cases of digital information analogous to the codes
> transmitted by a digital signalling tower in a mobile telephone network,
> where the initial code has to name the device that the rest of that message
> section is meant to receive.
>
> In mobile phone systems, individual devices are sent information by
> identifiers. If we have a nervous system working with several
> neurotransmitters, or a cell signalling system working with a number of
> cytokines, each with a specific regulatory influence / purpose, are these
> individual items not performing in ways that are covered by the usual
> combination of Wiener and Shannon, and therefore in principle understood,
> and AS YOU SPECIFICALLY POINT OUT, with no particular "experience"
> component.
>
> I wonder whether the material I transmitted made the following point
> succinctly / precisely enough:
> David Chalmers specifically hypothesized that 'experience information' (my
> terminology) mst have a double aspect, and that the 'loop' arising from
> criticality specifically fulfils his hypothesis in a new and potent way.
> (The material contains so many points that this, to my mind, really
> significant one may have got buried.)
>
> Thank you also for appreciating the amplification of Tononi's contribution
> (Tononi, I personally regard as of real significance). The internal loop
> creates
> the internal coherence that is required to form the 'integrated
> information'.
>
> I have a suspicion that the following propositions are probably correct:
> a. any information structure that is truly 'non-reductive'
> (Chalmers requirement 3) must possess long range coherence.
> b. any information structure with long-range coherence will be a form of
> integrated information.
> c. Hence Chalmers requirement 3 in fact specifies integrative information.
> This sequence a, b, c simplifies what those writing in the 1990's were
> saying:
> they were in fact setting equivalent requirements on the form of
> 'experience information'
> (though Tononi undoubtedly thought he was saying something different, as
> did those who followed up on his work, and Chalmers did not realize that
> Tononi's proposal was equivaent to the point that he had proposed.
>
> Anyone's thoughts on this would be very much appreciated,
> All best wishes,
>
> Alex
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 
> 6818)pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
&g

[Fis] Fis 25 / 9

[Alex Hankey]

RE: The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at
another level than the integration of cognition in the body of an
individual. One cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion.
Which research program of these two has priority? How do they relate ?
potentially differently ? to information?

ME: My Cambridge colleague, Madan Thangavelu, holds that the structure of
knowledge in both human brains (and human organizations), and in' bodies of
knowledge' in the sciences, is fractal.

It is certainly true that the structure of creative ideas and new projects
emerging from individuals and corporations has a fractal kind of
distribution, and as a consequence, has to be assessed using a Herfyndahl
index rather that the mean and standard deviation of a normal distribution,
or their analogues for experimentally encountered non-normal data
distributions. (Better the square root of the Herfyndaho index, since this
can be additive when combining distributions.)

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] Ulanowicz

[Alex Hankey]

RE: How can a concept of information help us to
think in tune with nature, rather than against it?"

ME: Possibly by being the kind of information that
we ourselves use, and can use to communicate
with directly to other minds, as my presentation
will show for both humans and animals.

It also appears to be the kind of information used
in 'intuition' and may therefore be more widely
considered some kind of 'language of nature'.

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


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[Fis] Fis: 25/7

[Alex Hankey]

RE: I am not sure that QT is the ultimate theory of all things, but I think
the effort is worth doing it, since we hardly have anything else to step on
now.I invite all those interested in this endeavor to join hands!

ME: Speaking as a theoretical physicist with 45 years experience and deep
interests in the foundations of physics and the origins of quantum theory,
I should like to comment that to really understand quantum theory so as to
see how to patch up its faults is not easy, and requires many years study
in many different subfields.

It requires deep knowledge and understanding of all of the following
subfields;
1. The Copenhagen interpretation as fully expressed by Henry Stapp.
2. John Von Neumann's formulation, together with its limitations.
3. The Many Worlds (Princeton) interpretation as most recently promoted by
Tegmark.
4. Einstein's objections as expressed  in the EPR paradox, and
5. David Bohm's program of hidden variables to support Einstein, and
6. Bell's Theorem to experimentally distinguish Bohr;s and Bohm's
approaches.
7. Aspect's experiments (and Clauser's preceding it) showing that Bohr was
right.
8. Bernard D'Espagnat's important contributions, especially the Theorem for
which he received the Templeton prize - physical reality is not 'strongly
objective' on either macroscopic or microscopic levels.
9. All the debate initiated by Gell-Man and others on how wave-functions
collapse. and what happens to quantum correlations that are generated.
10. David Deutsch's theory of quantum information.
11. Anton Zeilinger's use of quantum fluctuations for 'quantum
teleportation'
12. The quantum theory of open systems by ECG (George) Sudarshan and
others, the inherent limitations of their approach and its possible
resolution.
13. The debates on the relationship between quantum theory and classical
physics, the shortcomings of Bohr's Correspondence Principle and how to
overcome them.

I should hate to say that this is a field for specialists, because I truly
believe that non-experts can often cut through the Gordian knot in the
middle of a field, simply because they have not adopted the world view of
the experts in following the debates for decades up to that point, and are
therefore not indoctrinated with a paradigm that in fact needs updating -
often not obvious to those in the field itself.

But like most advanced scientific fields there is a lot to digest!
(And my own views are radical, and almost as violent as the
victor's approach to the Gordian Knot itself!)

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
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[Fis] _ Re: Fis Digest, Vol 24, Issue 39

[Alex Hankey]

RE: Fis Digest Vol 24, Issue 39.
Kauffman: Every idea is real and alive. Platonism asserts this directly in
the belief in the existence of form and this form is a living form that we
interact with and we are. How these notions are related to QM probably does
await the emergence of a deeper QM.

ME: The information states that I have discovered, and am proposing for a
theory of information-in-experience seem to shed some nice light on the
idea of 'the emergence of a deeper QM', which can support, 'a living form
that we can interact with, and (which) we are.'

The information states, represented by <==*O*, include a singular,
irreducible set of information vectors <===, which contain a
potentially rich and complex catastrophe singularity, i.e. a form, which we
can use to cognize information in the outside world, AND

WHICH, amazingly for this discussion, does seem to act as a potential
source of analytic, non-singular quantum wave functions, in the
(mathematical) 'space' surrounding surrounding the form, in the same way
that in complex analysis, analytic functions may be seen to originate in
the singularities (poles and cuts) at specific locations in the complex
plane.

In this sense, every human mind becomes, 'a living form that we interact
with and (which) we are.'

Best wishes,

Alex



On 30 March 2016 at 04:37,  wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
>
>1. _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: On mathematical theories and models
>   in biology (Robert E. Ulanowicz)
>2. Re: _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: On mathematical theories and models in
>   biology (Guy A Hoelzer)
>3. _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: On mathematical theories and models
>   in biology (Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov)
>
>
> --
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 18:39:24 -0400
> From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
> To: "Guy A Hoelzer" 
> Cc: Foundations of Information Science Information Science
> 
> Subject: [Fis] _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: On mathematical theories and
> models in biology
> Message-ID:
> <9f98669e818d7b5b66b4d9acb5f0.squir...@mail.cbl.umces.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Dear Guy,
>
> Please allow me to respond to your invitation to Terry with my two cents.
>
> My triad for supporting the dynamics of life is a bit different. I see the
> three essential fundamentals as:
>
> 1. Aleatoricism
>
> 2. Feedback
>
> 3. Memory
>
> Just to briefly elaborate on each:
>
> 1. I use aleatoricism to avoid the baggage associated with the term
> "chance", which most immediately associate with "blind" chance. The
> aleatoric spans the spectrum from unique events to blind chance to
> conditional chance to propensities to just short of determinism.
>
> 2. More specifically (and in parallel with autopoesis) I focus on
> autocatalytic feedback, which exhibits the property of "centripetality".
> Centripetality appears on almost no one's list of properties of life,
> despite its ubiquity in association with living systems.
>
> 3. Memory (and information) likely inhered in stable configurations of
> processes (metabolism) well before the advent of molecular encoding. Terry
> speaks to this point in Biological Theory 1(2):136-49.
>
> My fundamentals do not include reproduction, because I see reproduction as
> corollary to 2 & 3.
>
> I propose a full metaphysics for life predicated on these three
> assumptions.
> 
>
> Looking forward to what others see as fundamental.
>
> Peace,
> Bob
>
>
> > I personally consider metabolism to be at the core of what constitutes
> > ???life???, so the notion of autopoeisis is very attractive to me.  It is
> > also possible that the richness of life as we know it depends on having
> > metabolisms (activity), genomes (memory), and reproduction combined.  The
> > reductionistic approach to singling out one of these three pillars of
> life
> > as its essence may be futile.  However, I want to point out that the most
> > reduced version of ???life??? I have seen was proposed by Terry Deacon in
> > the concept he calls ???autocells???.  Terry has made great contributions
> > to FIS dealing with related topics, and I hope he will chime in here to
> > describe his minimalist form of life, which is not cellular, does not
> have
> > any metabolism or genetically encoded memory.  Autocells 

Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 24, Issue 20

[Alex Hankey]

 take time and I am not sure if such
> artists like Pivar would be ready to participate a scientific-humanitarian
> discourse, because we know that most of these talents as extremely
> egocentric and ignorant and we cannot change this. Wh!
>  at do you think?
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Plamen
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 8:09 AM, Louis H Kauffman <lou...@gmail.com
> <mailto:lou...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > Dear Plamen,
> > I do not know why Gel-Mann supported this. It is interesting to me
> anyway. It is primarily an artistic endeavor but is based on some ideas of
> visual development of complex forms from simpler forms.
> > Some of these stories may have a grain of truth. The sort of thing I do
> and others do is much more conservative (even what D?Arcy Thompson did is
> much more conservative). We look for simple patterns that definitely seem
> to occur in complex situations and we abstract them and work with them on
> their own grounds, and with regard to how these patterns work in a complex
> system. An artistic approach can be very fruitful.
> > Best,
> > Lou
> >
> >> On Mar 16, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov <
> plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com <mailto:plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear Lou, Pedro and Colleagues,
> >>
> >> I have another somewhat provoking question about the "constructive"
> role of topology in morphogenesis. What do you think about the somewhat
> artistic, but scientifically VERY controversial theory about the origin and
> development of life forms based on physical forces from classical mechanics
> and topology only, thus ignoring all of genetics, Darwinism and Creationism:
> >>
> >> http://www.ilasol.org.il/ILASOL/uploads/files/Pivar_ILASOL-2010.pdf <
> http://www.ilasol.org.il/ILASOL/uploads/files/Pivar_ILASOL-2010.pdf>
> >>
> >> What part of this can be regarded as science at all, and If there is
> something missing what is it? Why did a person like Murray Gel-Mann support
> this?
> >>
> >>
> >> Best
> >>
> >> Plamen
> >>
> >> 
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Mar 15, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>> wrote:
> >> Louis, a very simple question: in your model of self-replication, when
> you enter the environment, could it mean something else than just providing
> the raw stuff for reproduction? It would be great if related to successive
> cycles one could include emergent topological (say geometrical-mechanical)
> properties. For instance, once you have divided three times the initial
> egg-cell, you would encounter three symmetry axes that would co-define the
> future axes of animal development--dorsal/ventral, anterior/posterior,
> lateral/medial. Another matter would be about the timing of complexity,
> whether mere repetition of cycles could generate or not sufficient
> functional diversity such as Plamen was inquiring in the case of molecular
> clocks (nope in my opinion).  best--Pedro
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> -
> >> Pedro C. Mariju?n
> >> Grupo de Bioinformaci?n / Bioinformation Group
> >> Instituto Aragon?s de Ciencias de la Salud
> >> Centro de Investigaci?n Biom?dica de Arag?n (CIBA)
> >> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> >> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> >> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 <tel:%2B34%20976%2071%203526> (& 6818)
> >> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
> >> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ <
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/>
> >> -
> >>
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-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
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Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 24, Issue 2

[Alex Hankey]

first step! <
> Yes, this makes perfect sense and (I think) falls in line with the *a
> priori* notion that Loet alludes to in his post. I would term this as "a
> beginners mind" needed to discern a pure (uncolored) and detailed view of
> the topic. Further, an *a prior* vista seems critical to developing an
> essential three-fold model pointed to by Mark.
>
> > In short, in turning ?to the things themselves,? we distinguish noesis
> and noema: consciousness and the object as meant. <
> This of course echoes "das ding an sich" and noumena . . . but then this is
> not what you mean, no? This leaves me wondering: exactly "how far does the
> penny fall" in the phenomenological approach you advocate?
>
> > Each of these aspects of [Husserlian] meaning warrants study. <
> The whole matter of "meaning" seems to be a recurrently open, HOT and
> unresolved matter within this group. Loet's post points to a social aspect,
> others (Collier?) will point to a material aspect, and I stand somewhere
> in-between. In any case, all can convey meaning but of quite different
> types. Do you have a specific view you are advocating here, beyond your
> general allusion to Husserlian meaning?
>
> > What is wanted in a phenomenological analysis of information . . .
> full-blown uncovering of the nature . . .<
> As Mark's post suggests, there are many in this group likely to agree with
> this, I certainly do! Still, it feels like you are more advocating for a
> particular approach (phenomenological) rather than presenting a actual
> phenomenological analysis. I apologize if I sound a bit dense here, but I
> wish to be clear and make sure I do not overlook something.
>
> Thanks for your thoughts!
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> **
>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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