Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate).

Best, Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 


Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
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On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa" wrote:
 

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often
quote from Peirce,

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world" 4.551.

That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense
what I feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism! 

Edwina
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 On Sat 08/04/17  7:03 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
sent:
Dear Edwina, 

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should
be “reasonableness energizing in the world.” 

Not “universe.”  

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to
say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a
“religious atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I
find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in
creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache ritual:  

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all
is godly. There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the
mystery of creation, the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers
in every leaf and stone, in every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the
rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the fawn. Things utterly
opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of the mountain
lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God looking
on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic
wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in
creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
God” 

Gene 
 On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was
trying to say and I didn't express it very well  - you've said it
perfectly. 

Edwina
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 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Sat 08/04/17  6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
[3] sent:
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by
abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an
abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling,
imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring
rewards.” 
The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative
mind of the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational
process rather than inaugurates it through observation. We are born
to be wild intersocial, communicative abductors! The dialogue
continues over time as the infant’s upper brain starts to come
online, becoming more vocally-gesturally engaged, eventuating in both
the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the toddler as a
symbolizer.  
Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant
by "God's purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to
be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth
of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).”  
Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere
growth of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of
creation. Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced
itself from the living spontaneity, as though true living would have
as its ultimate goal to become a know-it-all. True living involves
participation in creation through the primacy of affirmative mind, in
bodying forth and learning, to which knowing is at best secondary.
That is how I take Peirce’s statements that “the continual
increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum
bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.” 
Gene Halton  


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Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Edwina,

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”

Not “universe.”

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence
gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924
description of attending an Apache ritual:

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly.
There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation,
the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in
every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes
of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the
yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is
no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the
dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were,
in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
God”

Gene


On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:

Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was trying to
say and I didn't express it very well  - you've said it perfectly.

Edwina

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On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent:

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the summum bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Eugene Halton]

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”


This is very helpful.  My mistake has been thinking of the Sign-Object
relation as conventional for a Symbol, rather than more broadly habitual.

CSP:  Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in
the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate,
is a Deity relatively to us.


So, just as ideas or resolutions in a human mind result in actions by a
human body, likewise the laws of nature have existential effects within the
universe.

GF:  But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in
His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and
since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is
either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at
all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no
consciousness” (CP6.489).


I think that there is some equivocation on "consciousness" between the two
passages.  In the earlier one, it seems to me that Peirce may have chosen
that word mainly to avoid repeating "mind."  In the later one, he clearly
associated consciousness with bodily sensation and therefore 2ns or
existence, which (as I just mentioned in another post) he did not consider
to be applicable to God.

GF:  I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible
that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens
necessarium/Creator* God you believe in may not be the same as the *agency *God
that Edwina disbelieves in.


That is an interesting suggestion, although I have a hard time seeing how
God could be the Creator *without *possessing agency.  I am reminded of
these remarks by Peirce.

CSP:  "God" is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than
almost any, is *vague*. No words are so well understood as vernacular
words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is
true that, let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents
in their places, still the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness,
answer the principal purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very
vague word "God," which is not made less vague by saying that it imports
"infinity," etc., since those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494;
c. 1906)


Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 4:17 PM,  wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
>
>
> The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
> *Baldwin’s
> Dictionary,* Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is
> constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and
> understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
> without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”
>
>
>
> Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here
> (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):
>
> “That thoughts act on the physical world and *conversely*, is one of the
> most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories
> are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible
> for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very
> promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be
> made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of
> ultimate solution.
>
>
>
> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature
> influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or
> symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not
> merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The
> general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But
> it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not
> in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the
> thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation*
> which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible
> analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.
> Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the
> mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a
> Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and
> Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the
> advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that
> beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific
> 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:

JFS:  Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.


Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies it--right?

JFS:  The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.


I agree, except that I would substitute "reality" for "existence," since
the law itself is 3ns while its instantiations are 2ns.

HR:  ... I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work ...So law is all type, there are no tokens of it
in inanimate world of efficient causation.


Given my agreement with John S. above, it seems to me that a type
(3ns) can *only
*be experienced through its tokens (2ns).  We then use
reason--retroduction, deduction, induction--to formulate, explicate, and
evaluate the hypothesis that what we are observing is the manifestation of
a real law.

ET:  A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.


Yes, the law as a *type *governs an inexhaustible continuum of
*potential *cases;
its instantiation as a *token *is any *actual *case that it governs.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that
> law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a
> general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure
> of your point.
>
> I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the
> inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the
> physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a
> hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the
> type/law.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> John, List,
> Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws
> existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed
> by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there
> are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not
> interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are
> no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
> type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation.
> Is my guess.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
> "John F Sowa" wrote:
> Jon and Edwina,
>
> Jon
> > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
>
> Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
> could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
>
> Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
> or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
> tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
> "A cat on a red mat".
>
> All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
> monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
> to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
>
> The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
> which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
> observations.
>
> Edwina
> > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> > own [or both sets of] laws.
>
> I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
> Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
> An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
> babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Helmut, List:

Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence
*of God.  He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected
Argument."

CSP:  Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to
brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed
in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a
Spirit, or Mind. (R 843; 1908)


He also addressed this a couple of years earlier.

CSP:  ... I myself always use *exist *in its strict philosophical sense of
"react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that
sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." (CP 6.495; c. 1906)


As for "the *logos *is God," consistent with the possible connection
between the beginning as an indeterminate symbol (EP 2:322) and John 1:1, I
think that this is 3ns (reality) rather than 2ns (existence)--at least,
until "the *logos *became flesh and dwelt among us."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:05 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> John, List,
> I think so, after your proof!
> Best, Helmut
> 08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
>  "John F Sowa" 
>
> On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> > I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> > but the law itself at work.
>
> I agree.
>
> > So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
> > of efficient causation. Is my guess.
>
> For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
> be a token.
>
> For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.
>
> But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean
> for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the
> Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist?
>
> John
>

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Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.


I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason."  CP 1.615 (1903) continues
beyond what you quoted.

CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
as must develope knowledge the most speedily.


So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such
that the growth of one *is *the growth of other.  I would also suggest that
this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our
*purpose with *God's *purpose.  In other words, we have the opportunity to
participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity.

I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP
5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its
higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through
self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for
making the rational purport to be general."  We contribute to evolution,
the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control.  In fact, right
after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to
explain what he meant.

CSP:  It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the
proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those
special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design,
but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every
situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in
future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to
self-control.


Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides
*our future self-controlled conduct.  And since God (or Mind, as you
prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is
neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal.

ET:  I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and
therefore, not really debatable.


I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List.
However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely
devoid of evidentiary support.  Many people adopt one or the other for
various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on
what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated.

ET:  I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical and
biological semiosis within it.


I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside
our differences to discuss it.

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
>
> Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
> bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create
> (CP 1.615; 1903)."
>
> I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a
> theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue.
>
> Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never
> have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason,
> is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's actually
> governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in
> its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such
> that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be
> in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason
> requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can
> ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is
> going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".
>
> Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is
> the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write
> that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by
> ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same 

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Jon Alan,

 

The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is 
constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood 
as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to 
the motives which originally governed its selection.”

 

Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here 
(EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

“That thoughts act on the physical world and conversely, is one of the most 
familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories are 
stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible for us, in 
the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very promising 
guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be made which 
suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of ultimate solution.

 

All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing 
thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but 
even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically 
determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature 
general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any 
participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great 
problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a 
century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite 
incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or 
resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or 
subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up 
Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the 
advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond 
that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

 

But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His 
essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since 
there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely 
the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some 
visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet 
he had earlier referred to God as a “vast consciousness.” I don’t want to get 
into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary 
vagueness of its terminology, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in 
may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

Gary F., List:

 

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a 
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" 
(CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the 
universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since 
that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As 
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the 
same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as 
the universe itself.  Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a 
non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not 
just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce 
meant by "God's purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be 
the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge 
about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development 
of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in 
nature to which the human reason is analogous."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 


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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that
there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they
have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa"  wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.
 I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
 Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
 An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
 babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
 John
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Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list: And here is a key difference.

Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)."

I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you,
Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a
contentious issue.

Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can
never have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General,
of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's
actually governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason,
consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of
Reason is such that its being never can have been completely
perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that
is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".

Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES
write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning
universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the
same thing.

My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God
does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which
is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter
- by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function
according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of
that same matter. 

Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous
nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a
"vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities.The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem" 5.119 which can be
even compared with a painting..

But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God],
then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter
function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433

And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in
the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori
purpose [i.e., God's purpose]. 

---

I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary
support and therefore, not really debatable. 

I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical
and biological semiosis within it.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., List:
 There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the
universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to
me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and
"living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what
the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would
presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the 
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in
some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the
very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human
reason 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.


I agree.


So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.


For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
be a token.

For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.

But does that mean no token can exist?  What would existence mean
for such a thing?  Perhaps you could call it logos.  As John the
Evangelist said, "The logos is God."  Does God exist?

John

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Jon and Edwina,

Jon

I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.


Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark.  Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat.  Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads.   As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication.  Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina

the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
with another external organism, to informationally connect with
the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
own [or both sets of] laws.


I agree.  But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is
the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its
Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP
2.95; 1902).  As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature
would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense *represent *the
development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them
"something in nature to which the human reason is analogous."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM,  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S.,
>
>
>
> As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I
> supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason
> is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge
> is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous
> to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs we are now using to
> describe them. If we agree that those objects are themselves signs, that
> the real Universe is a vast representamen, “precisely an argument,” any
> knowledge we can have of them must be both *in* signs and *of* signs
> which are real. It follows that the real signs we are talking about are
> analogous to the signs we are using to talk about them, which are
> propositions (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns).
>
>
>
> But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply
> acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can
> we know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of
> nature.” If you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless
> unless you call upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the
> dynamic object of the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience
> consists of having done the sort of thing we are doing right now,
> participating in an ongoing argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of
> nature” are symbols participating in an argument is empty of content unless
> those laws, those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought
> about them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it
> deploys that analogy.
>
>
>
> In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural
> laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of
> *symbols* and of *propositions* is our own use of them to participate in
> arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol” differs from the
> conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our acquaintance with its
> dynamic object can only be drawn from the *commens*, and only by analogy
> with that can we mean something definite by asking whether the laws of
> nature are symbols.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, List,

Edwina wrote:

Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very beginning
of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore, as primordial,
because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior to the
existential emergence of the Universe. That includes Mind; I consider Mind
to be made up of all three categories.

So- that remains a key difference. Nothing wrong with that - just - it's
'there'.

Somehow I think that you're quite right about this Edwina. Some people
imagine an early cosmology prior to the Big Bang (I use that expression
just for the sake of convenience ind order to mark "the existential
emergence of the Universe"), while others see the (our) Universe as
commencing at that singularity with *nothing* preceding it.

Indeed, Peirce (who seems to be in the first camp) sometimes--although not
always--remarked that his early (pre-Big Bang) cosmological musings were
"prescientific." And so they may be.

In truth, they tend toward a religious view of our Universe *as created*.
Last year Jon S explored this pre-scientific thinking in some detail in a
thread (or two) on this list, and for those of us who find it difficult to
accept an *un-created singularity* (the Big Bang), seeing it as implying*
something arising out of nothing*, his further explication of the
blackboard example--including his positing a kind of whiteboard dimension
in consideration of what, well, God, inscribed on the blackboard, was quite
a tour de force, and a convincing one for at least some of us imaging a
Reality prior to the Big Bang.

But, again, I find that I agree with your conclusion, Edwina:

"So- that remains a key difference. Nothing wrong with that - just - it's
'there'."


Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> And here we still have a sticking point. Jon wrote:
>
> "So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall, but I
> think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were
> present from the very beginning of our existing universe."
>
> Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very beginning
> of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore, as
> primordial, because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior to the
> existential emergence of the Universe. That includes Mind; I consider Mind
> to be made up of all three categories.
>
> So- that remains a key difference. Nothing wrong with that - just - it's
> 'there'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 08/04/17 12:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
>
> Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
> determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
> or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has
> its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect actualization on
> account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP 2:478-479; 1908).  I found this
> distinction very helpful in sorting out Peirce's cosmology when we were
> discussing it on the List last fall.
>
> As I said back then, I believe that we should interpret Peirce's earlier
> writings on the subject, including "A Guess at the Riddle" (1887-8) and the
> Monist metaphysical series (1891-3), in light of his later writings,
> including the RLT lectures (1898) and "A Neglected Argument" (1908).  So I
> agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall, but I think
> that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were present
> from the very beginning of our existing universe.  On that basis, the
> three of us also seem to agree that while chance as 1ns can break up
> habits, it does not create new ones, since that is a matter of 3ns.
>
> Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two] categories
> of chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is continuous. This ends
> up being important in various ways."  However, I do not recall seeing that
> statement in any of Clark's messages, and it also does not show up in the
> List archive.  More importantly, where does this notion arise in Peirce's
> writings?
>
> Clark's earlier observation that "chance is the outward aspect of that
> which within itself is feeling" (CP 6.265; 1892) points the way to one
> possible translation of the three modes of Interpretants in human semeiosis
> (feeling/action/thought) to the physico-chemical and biological realms.
>
>- 1ns could be chance, spontaneity, freedom, indeterminism,
>"sporting"; the question then becomes how this can be a
>possible/actual/habitual  effect 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Gary F., List:

GF:  Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws
of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out
its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols,
though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form
of propositions.


This makes sense to me, although I still need some assistance sorting out
in my own mind what it means to be a non-conventional Symbol.  I anticipate
that Stjernfelt's book will be helpful in this regard, although my
impression is that it does not address laws of nature--at least, not
directly.

CSP:  I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is
a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is
analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its
applications to human convenience are witnesses.


I wonder if what I am seeking in the other thread--the
physico-chemical/biological equivalent of thought in the 3ns-mode
Interpretants of human semeiosis--is precisely this "something in nature to
which the human reason is analogous."

ET:   I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws.
Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a
secondary step.


I agree--we *experience *the instantiations of natural laws (2ns), and *reason
*to the laws themselves as *generalizations *of that experience (3ns).

ET:  My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in themselves, and how
they operate.


This is what I am still trying to figure out--the semeiotic details of what
is going on in nature before and apart from *human *representation of it as
natural laws.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 11:03 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those
> pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection.
>
> No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't real. I
> am sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which was to
> question first, the nature of these natural laws, which are symbolic but
> not in the human sense of symbolic. And second, to question that our
> primary experience of these natural laws is metaphorical.
>
>  I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical,
> in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws.
> Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a
> secondary step. As Peirce said - "every scientific explanation of a natural
> phenomenon". I'm talking about prior to the scientific explanation which,
> since it suggests Reason functioning within the natural world - can be
> 'anthropomorphic' [if we define Reason as particularly human]. But I
> consider our analysis of these laws irrelevant. My focus is on the natural
> laws themselves, in themselves, and how they operate.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign
> cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.
>
>
>
> For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from
> Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and
> this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here:
>
>
>
> [[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic
> conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural
> phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the
> human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of
> science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They
> proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the
> light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness
> in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking
> away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe.
>
> Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of
> the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a
> great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
> realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its
> Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these
> reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course,
> play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the
> little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our
> perceptual 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 And here we still have a sticking point. Jon wrote:

"So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall,
but I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three
Categories were present from the very beginning of our  existing
universe."

Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very
beginning of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore,
as primordial, because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior
to the existential emergence of the Universe. That includes Mind; I
consider Mind to be made up of all three categories.

So- that remains a key difference. Nothing wrong with that - just -
it's 'there'.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17 12:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
 Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that
"Ideas, or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns,
"whatever has its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect
actualization on account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP
2:478-479; 1908).  I found this distinction very helpful in sorting
out Peirce's cosmology when we were discussing it on the List last
fall. 
 As I said back then, I believe that we should interpret Peirce's
earlier writings on the subject, including "A Guess at the Riddle"
(1887-8) and the Monist metaphysical series (1891-3), in light of his
later writings, including the RLT lectures (1898) and "A Neglected
Argument" (1908).  So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is
primordial overall, but I think that both of us agree with Edwina
that all three Categories were present from the very beginning of our
 existing universe.  On that basis, the three of us also seem to agree
that while chance as 1ns can break up habits, it does not create new
ones, since that is a matter of 3ns.
 Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two]
categories of chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is
continuous. This ends up being important in various ways."  However,
I do not recall seeing that statement in any of Clark's messages, and
it also does not show up in the List archive.  More importantly, where
does this notion arise in Peirce's writings? 
 Clark's earlier observation that "chance is the outward aspect of
that which within itself is feeling" (CP 6.265; 1892) points the way
to one possible translation of the three modes of Interpretants in
human semeiosis (feeling/action/thought) to the physico-chemical and
biological realms.
*1ns could be chance, spontaneity, freedom, indeterminism,
"sporting"; the question then becomes how this can be a
possible/actual/habitual  effect produced by a Sign, since we usually
associate such concepts with the absence of a (sufficient) cause.
*2ns was always the clearest, as there are obviously
physical/existential actions and reactions in nature, and we can also
recognize Peirce's use of "law" as brute determinism here.
*3ns could be habit-taking or what Clark called "the statistical
tendency," although my working hypothesis is that all (and only)
Final Interpretants are habits.  I guess that we would then have the
Immediate Interpretant as a range of  possible habit-takings, the
Dynamic Interpretant as any actual habit-taking, and the Final
Interpretant as a habit of habit-taking; but is this sufficiently
analogous to possible/actual/habitual thoughts in human semeiosis?
I see that Clark also commented yesterday, "If law were primordial it
wouldn’t need to be explained whereas Peirce is explicit that it
must be explained."  This suggests that if continuity is indeed
primordial, then it does not need to be explained--and it seems to me
that this is basically what Peirce was arguing in CP 6.490 (1908),
although there he referred instead to "super-order" and "super-habit"
as "any general state of things whatsoever."  I understand his claim
to be that the Reality of God--or Mind, as Edwina prefers to say--as 
Ens necessarium is the only postulate or premise that can account for
the reality of the three Universes of Experience, without already
assuming it.  On the other hand, if we take all three Categories to
be primordial overall, then none of them needs to be explained--and I
suspect that Peirce would reject this as blocking the way of inquiry.
 Regards,
 Jon S.  
 On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:40 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, List,
 What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the
original continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as
"a generalizing tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") 
reminded me that Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like
Peirce's 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic
Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness.
This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another
external organism, to informationally connect with the external
organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their own [or both sets
of] laws.
 -- 

Edwina
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17 12:58 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, John S., List:
 JFS:  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that
makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it
isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
 I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that
real aspect/regularity as a Sign  itself, if in fact it is legitimate
to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 ET:  I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour;
i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.
 I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law
of nature is the continuum of its potential  instantiations (3ns),
not the (discrete) collection of its actual instantiations (2ns).
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
John, list: 

I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.

That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of
chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via
eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of
flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year
in particular form after form.

A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.


Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [4] 
 On Fri 07/04/17  9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net [5] sent:
 On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: 
 > JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is 
 > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. 
 > 
 > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not
our 
  > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of
Signs 
 > are they? 
  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes 
 reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. 
 That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity.  But 
 it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. 
 For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his 
 neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time 
 he went out for his daily walk.  That is an example of law-like 
 behavior.  But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law 
 embodied in Kant's nature.  That's just the way he behaved. 
 > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general 
 > laws of nature are real, 
  If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be 
 something real that makes it true.  But that something may be 
 as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. 
 Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that 
 we don't understand in detail. 
 For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, 
 Newton, and Einstein.  Then think of the thousands or millions 
 of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws.  Then 
 imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. 
 An interesting joke:  "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." 
 For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is 
 as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. 
 John 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://www.primus.ca
[5]
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John S., List:

JFS:  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real
aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a
law until somebody states it as such.


I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real
aspect/regularity as a Sign *itself*, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting *entirely *of Signs.

ET:  I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.


I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law of
nature is the *continuum *of its *potential *instantiations (3ns), not the
(discrete) *collection *of its *actual *instantiations (2ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list:
>
> I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among
> a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation.
>
> That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens,
> which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It
> would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability
> to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form.
>
> A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
> particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
> > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
> >
> > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our
> > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs
> > are they?
>
> Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
> reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
> That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But
> it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
>
> For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his
> neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time
> he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like
> behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law
> embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved.
>
> > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
> > laws of nature are real,
>
> If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be
> something real that makes it true. But that something may be
> as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior.
> Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that
> we don't understand in detail.
>
> For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler,
> Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions
> of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then
> imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium.
>
> An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks."
>
> For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is
> as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries.
>
> John
>
>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:

Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has
its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect actualization on
account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP 2:478-479; 1908).  I found this
distinction very helpful in sorting out Peirce's cosmology when we were
discussing it on the List last fall.

As I said back then, I believe that we should interpret Peirce's earlier
writings on the subject, including "A Guess at the Riddle" (1887-8) and the
Monist metaphysical series (1891-3), in light of his later writings,
including the RLT lectures (1898) and "A Neglected Argument" (1908).  So I
agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial *overall*, but I think
that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were present
from the very beginning of our *existing *universe.  On that basis, the
three of us also seem to agree that while chance as 1ns can *break up*
habits, it does not *create *new ones, since that is a matter of 3ns.

Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two] categories
of chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is continuous. This ends
up being important in various ways."  However, I do not recall seeing that
statement in any of Clark's messages, and it also does not show up in the
List archive.  More importantly, where does this notion arise in Peirce's
writings?

Clark's earlier observation that "chance is the outward aspect of that
which within itself is feeling" (CP 6.265; 1892) points the way to one
possible translation of the three modes of Interpretants in human semeiosis
(feeling/action/thought) to the physico-chemical and biological realms.

   - 1ns could be chance, spontaneity, freedom, indeterminism, "sporting";
   the question then becomes how this can be a possible/actual/habitual *effect
   *produced by a Sign, since we usually associate such concepts with
the *absence
   *of a (sufficient) cause.
   - 2ns was always the clearest, as there are obviously
   physical/existential actions and reactions in nature, and we can also
   recognize Peirce's use of "law" as brute determinism here.
   - 3ns could be habit-taking or what Clark called "the statistical
   tendency," although my working hypothesis is that all (and only)
*Final *Interpretants
   are habits.  I guess that we would then have the Immediate Interpretant as
   a range of *possible *habit-takings, the Dynamic Interpretant as any *actual
   *habit-taking, and the Final Interpretant as a *habit *of habit-taking;
   but is this sufficiently analogous to possible/actual/habitual *thoughts
   *in human semeiosis?

I see that Clark also commented yesterday, "If law were primordial it
wouldn’t need to be explained whereas Peirce is explicit that it must be
explained."  This suggests that if *continuity *is indeed primordial, then
it does not need to be explained--and it seems to me that this is basically
what Peirce was arguing in CP 6.490 (1908), although there he referred
instead to "super-order" and "super-habit" as "any general state of things
whatsoever."  I understand his claim to be that the Reality of God--or
Mind, as Edwina prefers to say--as *Ens necessarium* is the only postulate
or premise that can account for the reality of the three Universes of
Experience, *without *already assuming it.  On the other hand, if we take
all three Categories to be primordial overall, then *none *of them needs to
be explained--and I suspect that Peirce would reject this as blocking the
way of inquiry.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:40 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the original
> continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as "a generalizing
> tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity") reminded me that
> Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like Peirce's idea of
> "would-be's" (3ns) than it is like the notion of simple possibility, or,
> "may-be's" (1ns).
>
> Both these thinkers argued that the distinction between simple
> possibilities *versus* potentialities hinges on the idea that the later
> (unlike simple possiblities) can come into being of their own accord, so to
> speak, only when the conditions are ripe for this (emergence, evolution) to
> happen and nothing interferes with it happening.
>
> So, in several papers and on this list I have sometimes extended Peirce's
> term "would-be's" in just this direction by writing that we should think of
> potentialites as "would-be's *were* the conditions in place for their
> coming into being."
>
> One of the fundamental conditions for this emergence is "that primordial
> continuity" which you noted. Something likes this seems to me essential in
> consideration of all emergence, evolution, autopoiesis, 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce archive MSS 1 to 1641 online

[Benjamin Udell]

List,

I've dug around and found some old information about the Humboldt U. 
Peirce archive. It was built with the cooperation of the Peirce Edition 
Project. From PEP head André De Tienne's report to the Charles S. Peirce 
Society 21 February 2013 
http://peircesociety.org/minutes/cspsminutes_2013.pdf :


   The second initiative is international: In August and September 2012
   the Project collaborated with a team of researchers from
   Humboldt-Universität in Berlin on a proposal for the NEH/DFG
   Bilateral Digital Humanities Program titled “An Online Image-based
   Research Environment for the Humanities: The Digital Peirce Archive
   as a Case Study.” The collaboration also involves members of the Max
   Planck Digital Library and the Houghton Library at Harvard. We
   propose to build a generic open-source image management and research
   environment endowed with a collaborative, multifunctional structure
   that humanities users can customize at will at minimal cost. Our
   solution is to build on, and expand, a dynamic scholarly image
   database called imeji that is being developed under the aegis of the
   Max Planck Digital Library in Munich. Imeji’s strength is the
   collection of tools it provides to describe, enrich, connect,
   magnify, index, and link image data through a configurable set of
   metadata definitions. Our goal is to transform it into a
   collaborative research environment capable of seamless integration
   into the workflow of STEP and CORPUS. Its design will be tested
   through its exemplary application in the Peirce Digital Archive
   (DPA), which will be an online dynamic repository of digital images
   of the Peirce manuscripts. The principal result of this
   collaboration will be twofold: a generic and customizable
   image-based research environment,and the free, publicly accessible
   Digital Peirce Archive endowed with an HCI-compliant interface.
   TheDPA represents a foundational module both for STEP and CORPUS
   since it would essentially feed them with digital images of the
   Peirce papers. We will learn about the outcome of that NEH/DFG grant
   competition in April.

   [END QUOTE]

Here's a search on Humboldt at the Peirce Society website:
https://www.google.com/search?q=humboldt+site:peircesociety.org/

On Oct. 21, 2014, Moritz Queisner posted the following at his website
http://www.moritzqueisner.de/the-charles-sanders-peirce-archive/ :


 The Charles Sanders Peirce Archive

   *Imeji Days 2014. Institut für Kunst und Bildgeschichte, Humboldt
   University Berlin, Oct 21, 2014 (with Tullio Viola, Franz Engel,
   Frederik Wellmann)*

   The Peirce Archive aims at designing and implementing an image-based
   archiving repository of the Nachlass of the American philosopher
   Charles S. Peirce. The archive will assemble around 100,000
   ma­nu­script pa­ges that span more than five decades, and touch on
   very different disciplinary domains. With an eye to improving the
   methodology of investigation of Peirce’s intellectual legacy, the
   archive will set up a citable online research environment to search,
   filter, describe, com­ment, link, compare, share, export, edit, and
   browse the manuscript pages, using the metadata management software
   imeji.

   [END QUOTE]

* * *

My numbers in my previous message didn't add up. The Digital Peirce 
Archive planned to put 100,000 MS images online. I should have said, 
that all of the Peirce manuscripts (mostly texts) _/listed in the Robin 
Catalogue/_  appear to be online now. Those are what add up to around 
50,000. Apparently the rest are drawings and the like. I remember a 
figure of around 60%, probably I read that in one of the free PDFs that 
the publisher De Gruyter of _Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. Peirce_ 
has taken offline. In 2010, Aud Sissel Hoel mentioned "thousands and 
thousands of drawings, ranging from meticulous and bizarre notation 
systems and variational sequences of Kandinsky-like line drawings, via 
intricate labyrinths and physiognomies, to idle doodles and mere scribbles."


I'll quote her whole post here to ensure its survival.
https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20110707185056/http://www.audsisselhoel.com/wordpress?p=69 



   April 2, 2010


 Trip to Berlin, March 2010:

   By audhoe in Travelogues

   *Peirces Pictorial Thinking*
   Workshop

   /I do not think I ever reflect in words./

   Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce Papers; Ms. 619:8, 1909)

   March 21 and 22 this year I took part in a scholarly event quite out
   of the ordinary. The focal point of this event was a tableau of
   drawings made by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce
   (1839-1914), exhibited here, in the premises of the Collegium for
   the Advanced Study of Picture Act and Embodiment (Humboldt
   University, Berlin), for the first time in history. As it turns out,
   Peirce drew incessantly throughout his life, quite literally
   sketching out his philosophical ideas. The 

[PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Edwina, Jon S.,

 

As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I supplied is 
“that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous.” If 
all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge is in signs. If we ask 
what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous to, those laws are dynamic 
objects of the signs we are now using to describe them. If we agree that those 
objects are themselves signs, that the real Universe is a vast representamen, 
“precisely an argument,” any knowledge we can have of them must be both in 
signs and of signs which are real. It follows that the real signs we are 
talking about are analogous to the signs we are using to talk about them, which 
are propositions (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns). 

 

But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply 
acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can we 
know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of nature.” If 
you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless unless you call 
upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the dynamic object of 
the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience consists of having done 
the sort of thing we are doing right now, participating in an ongoing argument. 
Our hypothesis that the “laws of nature” are symbols participating in an 
argument is empty of content unless those laws, those signs, are analogous to 
the signs in which our thought about them is expressed. Our thought is thus 
metaphorical insofar as it deploys that analogy.

 

In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural laws 
is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of symbols and of 
propositions is our own use of them to participate in arguments. Unless your 
use of the word “symbol” differs from the conventional use well formulated by 
Peirce, our acquaintance with its dynamic object can only be drawn from the 
commens, and only by analogy with that can we mean something definite by asking 
whether the laws of nature are symbols.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 7-Apr-17 12:04
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 


Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those 
pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection.

No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't real. I am 
sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which was to question 
first, the nature of these natural laws, which are symbolic but not in the 
human sense of symbolic. And second, to question that our primary experience of 
these natural laws is metaphorical.

 I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in 
that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually 
analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step. As 
Peirce said - "every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon". I'm 
talking about prior to the scientific explanation which, since it suggests 
Reason functioning within the natural world - can be 'anthropomorphic' [if we 
define Reason as particularly human]. But I consider our analysis of these laws 
irrelevant. My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in themselves, and how 
they operate.

Edwina
-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM ,   g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot 
be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.

 

For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s 
Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage 
was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here:

 

[[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I 
reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis 
that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and 
that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human 
convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth 
of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there 
is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in 
shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. 

Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the 
Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great 
symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now 
every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions 
and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier]

Thanks for the references.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 07 April 2017 6:30 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier] Snip
Well my problem ultimately is over statistical mechanics and the eventual death 
of the universe which Peirce pretty well denies seeing it merely as an issue of 
heat inefficiencies which he thinks chance avoids.


[John Collier] I don’t think there is a heat death, either. I think that 
certain structures get frozen out, and it is also possible (in a very large 
universe that still has a reasonable density) that new ones could form. If the 
expansion is so fast that any remaining structures are pretty much isolated 
this would not happen. It would depend on things that Peirce was not aware of, 
and that we still don’t know.
John

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