Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand
in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.
Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are *Indices *of
the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>
> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
> response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
> hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
> *only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
> *without *a DO.
>
>
> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>
> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for
> a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
> have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid
> down the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life,
> and that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the
> shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for
> which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
> *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
> *
>
> As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
> termed "physiosemiosis" not only "played a role in the shaping of the
> physical universe prior to the advent of life" but has played one since and
> does so today, and not only in the formation of crystals. But, again, in my
> view, once the crystal is formed the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it
> continues to have a relation to its environment, and there will be atomic
> and sub-atomic activity necessarily occurring, but I personally have yet to
> be convinced that such activity constitutes a form of semiosis, while some
> physicists have argued that it does).
>
> Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
> (esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
> Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of
> Biosemiotics holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in
> relation to its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex
> semiosic activity. I would tend to 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, list,

For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
*only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
*without *a DO.


My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).

John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for a,
shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down
the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
*

As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
termed "physiosemiosis" not only
"played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent
of life" but has played one since and does so today, and not only in the
formation of crystals. But, again, in my view, once the crystal is formed
the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it continues to have a relation to its
environment, and there will be atomic and sub-atomic activity necessarily
occurring, but I personally have yet to be convinced that such activity
constitutes a form of semiosis, while some physicists have argued that it
does).

Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
(esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of Biosemiotics
holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in relation to
its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex semiosic
activity. I would tend to strongly agree.


2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.


While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, I
do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
child herself.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."


As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
"Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
includes more ordinary cases as well.

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.


​At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there seems
to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form seems to
me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of related
elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the elements
themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many if not
all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
> 

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



The word ‘reality’, which in the concept of the thing sounds other than the
word ‘existence’ in the concept of the predicate, is of no avail in meeting
this objection.  For if all positing (no matter what it may be that is
posited) is entitled reality, the thing with all its predicates is already
posited in the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the
predicate this is merely repeated.  But if on the other hand, we admit, as
every reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are
synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate of existence
cannot be rejected without contradiction?  This is a feature which is found
only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes
their analytic character.



*I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations
in a direct manner*, by an accurate determination of the concept of
existence, had I not found that the illusion which is caused by the
confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, with a predicate
which determines a thing) is almost beyond correction.  Anything we please
can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be
predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content.



*If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come
to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow*;



*if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought
to a stand before the goal is reached*, and compelled to retrace their
steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they
are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and
may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark.



*In these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if
we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel*, in
order to arrive at any results — even if it should be found necessary to
abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed
for its attainment.



*Socrates *

It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and
of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good
soul.



*Hippias *

But surely he has.



*Socrates *

Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias,
if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.



*Hippias *

I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.



*Socrates *

Nor I with myself, Hippias ; but that appears at the moment to be the
inevitable result of our argument ; however, as I was saying all along, in
respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same
opinion ;



and that* I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising ; *

*but** if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us
also*, *if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our
straying.*



Hth and with best wishes,

Jerry R


On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, Helmut, List:
>
> The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP
> 6.360-361 (from Baldwin's *Dictionary*, 1902) highlight the importance of
> being clear about *what we mean* by "Form" when we talk about it;
> likewise "Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the
> following.
>
> ... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness
> of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or
> form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No
> embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies
> the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not
> exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being
> represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such
> as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an
> element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the
> element of existence. The suchness of *red *is such as it is in its own
> suchness, and in nothing else.
>
> *Matter*, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every
> respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world
> that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an
> existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether
> corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my
> present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever *red *is, it is of its very
> essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite.
> But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form,
> as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of
> fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in
> reference to something else than 

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Edwina, Helmut, List:

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP
6.360-361 (from Baldwin's *Dictionary*, 1902) highlight the importance of
being clear about *what we mean* by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise
"Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness
of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or
form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No
embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies
the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not
exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being
represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such
as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an
element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the
element of existence. The suchness of *red *is such as it is in its own
suchness, and in nothing else.

*Matter*, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every
respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world
that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an
existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether
corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my
present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever *red *is, it is of its very
essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite.
But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form,
as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of
fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in
reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)


The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then
comes the following.

This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge
besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the
element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The
philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form
fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not
so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)


Hence in this *particular *manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter
is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated
the following.

But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is merely
the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form *of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a
"fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to
be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of
perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may
adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should
be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may
have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by
it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The
"Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign.


Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian *Form *corresponds to the
*characters
*(1ns) that a Sign *signifies*, Aristotelian *Matter *corresponds to the
*object *(2ns) that a Sign *denotes*, and Aristotelian *Entelechy *corresponds
to the *unity *of these (3ns) that a Sign *expresses*.

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our
interpretation of Peirce's *other *writings is another question.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> My view of Peirce's Form and Matter is quite different from that of JAS. I
> refer you to Vol 6, 354-364, which has an extensive outline of different
> types of form. Indeed, he associates Form with 'forma corpus' and 'morphe'
> {Note: I am transliterating from the Greek]. Whereas, he associates
> Firstness with chance, quality, vagueness - none of which have spatial
> extension or a 'body' [corpus/morphe].
>
> I don't 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Jon A, I assume you were responding to the Peirce quote and disagreeing. My
own feeling is that violence and doing harm are addressed by Peirce and
accepted by Aristotle and that binary thinking is more inclined to violence
than triadic.

Note to Gary R. If you can provide instruction on how to delete items in a
series that are not germane I will gladly do so.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Stephen,
>
> I know not what course others may take but
> I count Aristotle as the first pragmatist.
> Whatever he may owe to Plato, he exerted
> himself to maintain a connection between
> forms (ideas) and practical matters in
> real-life experience.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 2/12/2018 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered.  This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years — though old enough is
>> the general idea itself.  Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts
>> of butchers and bakers that never heard of him — is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

Helmut, List,

Here is one of my musements on
a few pertinent paragraphs from
Aristotle's treatise “On the Soul”:

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension

Consider especially:



We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia), and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle), 
which in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe) or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is 
directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.


Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used 
in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein).




Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week *plus*
additional copies.

What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.

Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
in that message.

In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."

Best,

Gary (writing as list moderator)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>
> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, so
> hopeless.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
>
>
> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>
>
> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>> for archiving or reply.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>
>>> Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are
>>> occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about
>>> meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both unPeircean
>>> (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not particularly
>>> well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings or cognizant of
>>> the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many philosophers.
>>>
>>> I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice to
>>> Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the consequences of
>>> his epistemology for modern linguistics (which has been deeply Cartesian in
>>> the main for decades). So when more experienced Peirce scholars discuss his
>>> terms, it can be educational.
>>>
>>> I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before
>>> responding and perhaps responding once a day instead of several times
>>> would/could lead to better responses of more benefit to others.
>>>
>>> To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there is
>>> nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and then delete
>>> them if I am going to. Time-consuming.
>>>
>>> At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep
>>> shooting out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us will
>>> be more likely to read them if they come less frequently. If these are just
>>> personal quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to be on the list. If
>>> they are felt worthy for the entire list, frequency reduction would be
>>> useful. But if not, I won’t say another word on the subject.
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>>
>
>
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: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

My view of Peirce's Form and Matter is quite different from that of
JAS. I refer you to Vol 6, 354-364, which has an extensive outline of
different types of form. Indeed, he associates Form with 'forma
corpus' and 'morphe' {Note: I am transliterating from the Greek].
Whereas, he associates Firstness with chance, quality, vagueness -
none of which have spatial extension or a 'body' [corpus/morphe]. 

I don't see how one can assign only ONE category to matter - whether
that one category be 1stness or 2ndness or 3rdness.. The point of
anything in 'thisness',[haecceity]  is that it is made up of three
categories. 

Therefore, something discrete and individual, would be made up of a
mode of 'potentiality' [1stness]; as well as 'thisness' [haecceity;
2ndness] as well as habits and even 'esse in futuro' 2.148 of these
habits continuing on [3rdness] 

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18  3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Dear All, I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that.
To me it rather seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and
entelechy 3ns. That is because I cannot see more than one mode in
matter, but 2 in form: Reason for it, and aim (telos) of it.
Aristotle said, that form consists of energy and entelechy, so two
parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material reason of the form,
or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies keeping the
form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s formal
reason, which is it´s aim. Also, I see "quality" rather associated
with matter than with form. As the form of a thing is more likely to
change due to circumstances than its matter is, I see "actuality"
rather suiting with "form" than with "matter". Does "entelechy"
contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?  Best, Helmut  12.
Februar 2018 um 18:42 Uhr
  "Ben Novak" 

 wrote:  Dear All:   A quarter of a century ago (December 1993),
several of the subjects of this discussion thread (either explicit,
implied, or merely mentioned) were rather eloquently addressed in an
article in First Things, "Discovering the American Aristotle," by
Edward T. Oakes:  
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle
[1]   Ben Novak 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702 Mobile: (814) 424-8501   
 "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the
arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last
bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored
canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the
last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler 
   On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen
C. Rose  wrote:  Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the
rather over the top dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own
work maintained initially that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for
the ethical problems of our first two millennia and I laid that at the
feet of his reliance on virtues which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle
reads almost modern and cannot be superseded by Peirce unless others
see his work as seismic in the same sense that A's work became seen.
I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a marvelous antidote to
virtues ethics. S   amazon.com/author/stephenrose [3]
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
List:   As the chief culprit for the recent glut of
messages--apparently I was the sender of more than one-third of the
200+ over the first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology,
and my promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current
discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying goes) in
responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me directly off-List
if you think that I am getting out of hand again.   I am replying in
this thread only because I believe that the following excerpt
provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.CSP:  Aristotle held
that Matter and Form were the only elements of experience. But he had
an obscure conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be a
groping for the recognition of a third element which I find clearly in
experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the three. It was
this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he
is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist
with vague intimations of realism , endeavors to express the universe
in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I
hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which
recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone,
that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of
nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

On a related note ...

That Aristotling Town
=

The man’s reputation for dualing exceeds him.
It’s a mode more the eyebeam of the beholden.
Western wayfarers will claim him their founder,
But they founder on the way his meta*physick
Straddles the narrow straits of their harbor.

Jon Awbrey
30 Oct 2012

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/11/01/that-aristotling-town/

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

Stephen,

I know not what course others may take but
I count Aristotle as the first pragmatist.
Whatever he may owe to Plato, he exerted
himself to maintain a connection between
forms (ideas) and practical matters in
real-life experience.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/12/2018 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered.  This is what the world
has been most thinking of for the last forty years — though old enough is
the general idea itself.  Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts
of butchers and bakers that never heard of him — is but a metaphysical
evolutionism.

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose



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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear All,

I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that. To me it rather seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and entelechy 3ns. That is because I cannot see more than one mode in matter, but 2 in form: Reason for it, and aim (telos) of it. Aristotle said, that form consists of energy and entelechy, so two parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material reason of the form, or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies keeping the form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s formal reason, which is it´s aim.

Also, I see "quality" rather associated with matter than with form. As the form of a thing is more likely to change due to circumstances than its matter is, I see "actuality" rather suiting with "form" than with "matter".

Does "entelechy" contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?


Best,

Helmut


12. Februar 2018 um 18:42 Uhr
 "Ben Novak" 
wrote:


Dear All:
 

A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were rather eloquently addressed in an article in First Things, "Discovering the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:

 

https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle


 









 
Ben Novak

5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142

Telephone: (814) 808-5702

Mobile: (814) 424-8501




"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler

 

 

 

 

 

 

 












 

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:


Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 



On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:





List:

 

As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.

 

I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.

 


CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism, endeavors to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c. 1903?, emphasis added)


 

This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



As regards the 200 emails,



It is obvious why we don’t appreciate that.

It is not so obvious that we appreciate *Gorgias* and Peirce’s sense of
humor for a similar reason.



On the topic of Discovering the American Aristotle, Peirce also said *of it*,
remember:



Aristotle was not much of a Greek.

That he was not altogether a Greek-minded man is manifest.



..like the Aristotelianism which is this gentleman's particular *bête noire*,


it will be as Shakespeare said (*of it*, remember):



"Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,

But musical as is Apollo's lute,” etc*.*



For philosophic readers he would do almost more than enough by drawing
their attention to the fact that he did not object to telling lies which
were noble, or tales which were merely similar to truth.



For the burden of proof rests with the censor.



..he must show that certain literary deficiencies of the work are not due
to chance, but that the author used a given ambiguous expression
deliberately, or that he constructed a certain sentence badly on purpose.



To argue this, however, is to presuppose that the esoteric writer had a
phenomenal control over his text; indeed, it is to presuppose that his text
is constructed like a living animal, in which each and every part, no
matter how accidental it seems, functions to create the overall meaning.



I do not doubt that you are wiser than I; but it is always my custom to pay
attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me
to be wise; and because I desire to learn what he means..



Ἰδέα is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for εἶδος,
class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any
group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality.
An ἰδέα is perceptible only by the mind, but the word does not denote the
content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary
English.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 11:51 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Excellent piece. And excellent quote which I think I had better paste in.
> I created the triad Reality Ethics Aesthetics as a suggested post-Peirce
> basis for philosophy. It fits in with previous quotes in this thread and
> explicitly so with the following:
> “Esthetics and logic seem at first blush to belong to different universes
> . . . . [But] that seeming is illusory; on the contrary, logic needs the
> help of esthetics.” Just as it needs the help of ethics: “Logical goodness
> and badness, which we shall find is simply the distinction of *Truth *and
> *Falsity*in general, amounts in the last analysis to nothing but a
> peculiar application of the more general distinction of Moral Goodness and
> Badness, or Righteousness and Wickedness.” Peirce does not mean to equate
> these three realms, of course, for that would lead to the conclusion that
> every fallacy is a sin, which is absurd. But he does insist, in a manner
> reminiscent of Cardinal Newman, that “good morals and good reasoning are
> closely allied.”
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:
>
>> Dear All:
>>
>> A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of
>> this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
>> rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*,
>> "Discovering the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:
>>
>> https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-
>> the-american-aristotle
>>
>>
>> *Ben Novak*
>> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
>> 
>> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>>
>> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
>> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
>> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and
>> a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
>> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
>>> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
>>> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
>>> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
>>> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
>>> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
>>> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
>>> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 List:

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[kirstima]

List,

I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings 
seem to be adjunct to this problem.

People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.

If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, 
so hopeless.


Best, Kirsti



Ia mail is sent to the list,

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:

Peircers,

I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
for archiving or reply.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are 
occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about 
meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both 
unPeircean (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not 
particularly well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings 
or cognizant of the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many 
philosophers.


I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice 
to Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the 
consequences of his epistemology for modern linguistics (which has 
been deeply Cartesian in the main for decades). So when more 
experienced Peirce scholars discuss his terms, it can be educational.


I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before 
responding and perhaps responding once a day instead of several times 
would/could lead to better responses of more benefit to others.


To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there 
is nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and 
then delete them if I am going to. Time-consuming.


At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep 
shooting out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us 
will be more likely to read them if they come less frequently. If 
these are just personal quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to 
be on the list. If they are felt worthy for the entire list, frequency 
reduction would be useful. But if not, I won’t say another word on the 
subject.


Dan




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Excellent piece. And excellent quote which I think I had better paste in. I
created the triad Reality Ethics Aesthetics as a suggested post-Peirce
basis for philosophy. It fits in with previous quotes in this thread and
explicitly so with the following:
“Esthetics and logic seem at first blush to belong to different universes .
. . . [But] that seeming is illusory; on the contrary, logic needs the help
of esthetics.” Just as it needs the help of ethics: “Logical goodness and
badness, which we shall find is simply the distinction of *Truth *and
*Falsity*in general, amounts in the last analysis to nothing but a peculiar
application of the more general distinction of Moral Goodness and Badness,
or Righteousness and Wickedness.” Peirce does not mean to equate these
three realms, of course, for that would lead to the conclusion that every
fallacy is a sin, which is absurd. But he does insist, in a manner
reminiscent of Cardinal Newman, that “good morals and good reasoning are
closely allied.”

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear All:
>
> A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of
> this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
> rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*, "Discovering
> the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:
>
> https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-
> aristotle
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> 
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
>> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
>> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
>> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
>> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
>> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
>> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
>> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was
>>> the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
>>> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
>>> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
>>> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
>>> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>>>
>>> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
>>> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
>>> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>>>
>>> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
>>> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls
>>> *entelechy*, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a
>>> third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the
>>> most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it
>>> ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be
>>> described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors
>>> to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be
>>> remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and
>>> Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that
>>> which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone,
>>> that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of
>>> nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which
>>> recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent
>>> Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these
>>>  last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
>>> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
>>> 1903?, emphasis added)
>>>
>>>
>>> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
>>> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
>>> suchness), 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Ben Novak]

Dear All:

A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of this
discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*, "Discovering
the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:

https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle


*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
Mobile: (814) 424-8501

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was
>> the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
>> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
>> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
>> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
>> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>>
>> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
>> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
>> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>>
>> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
>> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
>> which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
>> find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
>> three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
>> far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
>> nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
>> universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
>> as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
>> there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
>> Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
>> recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
>> which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
>> Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
>> would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last
>> three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
>> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
>> 1903?, emphasis added)
>>
>>
>> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
>> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
>> suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns
>> (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>>> evolutionism.
>>>
>>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>>
>>>
>>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what
>>> did Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an
>>> old book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist
>>> or nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>
>>
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the
> sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>
> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
> which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
> find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
> three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
> far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
> nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
> universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
> as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
> there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
> Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
> recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
> which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
> Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
> would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last
> three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
> 1903?, emphasis added)
>
>
> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
> suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns
> (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon,
Excellent quote; thanks, Jon. I had not seen (recalled?) it
before, and it offers another example of Peirce's universal
categories, plus is the clearest statement I have seen yet of
Peirce's definition of nominalism v realism.
Mike


On 2/12/2018 11:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
  wrote:


  
List:


As
  the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently
  I was the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the
  first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology, and my
  promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current
  discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying
  goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
  directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand
  again.


I
  am replying in this thread only because I believe that the
  following excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s
  question about whether Peirce classified Aristotle as a
  nominalist.



  CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were
the only elements of experience. But he had an obscure
conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be
a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most
overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to
overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and
  he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague
  intimations of realism, endeavors to express the
universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be
remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories,
Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be
seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form
alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that
which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds
of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy
alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to
me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that
which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds
of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which
recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
1903?, emphasis added)



This
  is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in
  other recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with
  1ns (quality or suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a
  fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which brings together
  Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).


Regards,

  

  

  
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
  Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
  

  

  
  
  On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM,
Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

  
173. But fallibilism cannot be
  appreciated in anything like its true significancy
  until evolution has been considered. This is what the
  world has been most thinking of for the last forty
  years -- though old enough is the general idea itself.
  Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world for
  so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes
  over the thoughts of butchers and bakers that never
  heard of him -- is but a metaphysical evolutionism.
Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a
  study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did Peirce's
  alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found
  in an old book I have but it is also in CP. Did
  classify Aristotle as a dualist or nominalist? Or more
  narrowly as here?  


  

  

  

  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 List:

As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the
sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.

I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.

CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three
being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy
which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c. 1903?,
emphasis added)


This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other recent
threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or suchness),
Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which
brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
> evolutionism.
>
> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>
>
> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Yes, I had that in mind in sending the CP quote and it seems relevant to
recent discussions. Then there is this: "IN an article published in The
Monist for January 1891, I endeavored to show what ideas ought to form the
warp of a system of philosophy, and particularly emphasised that of absolute
chance." Is that an exaggeration? Or is it God's notion of correcting
errors that would otherwise occur? Or?


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear Stephen:
>
> As I have read, Peirce desired nothing more than to accede to the title of
> "Second Aristotle"
>
> From the first paragraph of  first volume of CP:
>
> "[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say,
> to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the
> entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
> mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
> and in whatever other departments may be, shall appear as the filling up of
> its details."
> http://paulhague.net/kindred-spirits/peirce/
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> 
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - Peirce was 'Aristotelian' in issues about Matter and Form;
and the primacy of sensate data in our experience - and the nature of
Reality vs the individual Existence. But - Aristotle's evolution
theory was  - as he points out - metaphysical, in that it has nothing
to do with material or mental interaction, i.e., with semiosics. The
Platonic and Aristotelian theory of evolution was that each species
was 'fixed' and did not adapt/evolve into another species. This of
course fit into the Christian view of Creationism and also, of the
societal view that 'you were born into your class [i.e., as a peasant
vs lord]. 

Aristotle's view was almost a beautiful architecture - all species
had their allotted space and role in this 'great chain of being' from
the simple to the complex. 

The concept that change was within the life-forms rather than a
priori, and self-organized, and developed within individual organisms
- by the random mutations of Darwinism [Note: this randomness is
challenged in modern biology] - went against the stable architecture
of Aristotle.

And of course - this Darwinian-Wallace idea, that change was
natural, was self-organized - crept into the sociopolitical ideology
as well...and the old static, stable class hierarchy began to
collapse.

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18 10:22 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the
world has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though
old enough is the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that
dominated the world for so many ages and still in great measure
tyrannizes over the thoughts of butchers and bakers that never heard
of him -- is but a metaphysical evolutionism.  

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In
what did Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I
found in an old book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify
Aristotle as a dualist or nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?   
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]


Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Ben Novak]

Dear Stephen:

As I have read, Peirce desired nothing more than to accede to the title of
"Second Aristotle"

From the first paragraph of  first volume of CP:

"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to
outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire
work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
and in whatever other departments may be, shall appear as the filling up of
its details."
http://paulhague.net/kindred-spirits/peirce/




*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
Mobile: (814) 424-8501

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
> evolutionism.
>
> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>
>
> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
evolutionism.

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
for archiving or reply.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:

Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are occasionally 
(rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about meaning. As I have 
tried to point out, they strike me as both unPeircean (no practical 
consequences, no problem solved) and not particularly well-connected to the 
vast literature on lexical meanings or cognizant of the kind of “essentialist 
disputes” that bothers many philosophers.

I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice to 
Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the consequences of his 
epistemology for modern linguistics (which has been deeply Cartesian in the 
main for decades). So when more experienced Peirce scholars discuss his terms, 
it can be educational.

I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before responding and 
perhaps responding once a day instead of several times would/could lead to 
better responses of more benefit to others.

To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there is 
nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and then delete 
them if I am going to. Time-consuming.

At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep shooting 
out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us will be more 
likely to read them if they come less frequently. If these are just personal 
quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to be on the list. If they are felt 
worthy for the entire list, frequency reduction would be useful. But if not, I 
won’t say another word on the subject.

Dan



--

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academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List - 200 in one week? That's about 20 per day! I admit I wasn't
aware of that many.

What seems to happen is that list members are involved in only a few
but not all discussions. With most topics, there can be a great deal
of discussion among just a few participants - if I myself don't
participate then I simply delete them - even without reading if it's
a topic outside of my focus. 

That would be my suggestion for the 'many posts'. I'm on other lists
and the same thing happens; a few participants get into a topic in
depth. If it's outside of my focus or I can't participate for various
reasons  - I simply delete. 

Edwina
 On Sun 11/02/18 11:45 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List,
 John Sowa wrote: "Since the beginning of February, there have been
over 200 emailson Peirce-L."
  Thanks, John, for seconding my idea that it might be important--and
even valuable--for very active participants in the forum to make an
attempt to reduce the frequency of their postings. 
 I would hope that John's observing that there have "over 200 emails"
on the list in February--and we haven't yet reached the middle of the
month!--ought suggest to all that there may have been of late an all
too rapid exchange of messages to Peirce-l from a very few
participants. And I can't imagine that I am the only reader of these
many posts who has noticed that there has been quite a bit of, shall
we say, redundancy of content of some (many?) posts. 
 I hope that I've made it clear that I do not want in any way to
inhibit participation on the list. But there ought to be a way in
which frequent contributors to our forum might find their way to
practicing some additional self-discipline as to frequency of
posting. 
 Again, as I first wrote: 
 GR: I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to
discussions consider holding off on at least some responses
(especially when they are but a sentence or three), posting fewer but
perhaps somewhat longer messages. The benefit--besides there being
fewer postings--could be that such an approach might allow for more
time for additional thoughtful reflection on the matter(s) under
consideration (and not only for active contributors) . 
 In short, such self-discipline could possibly benefit all of us:
participants and lurkers. 
 Best,
 Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 11:06 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
 On 2/10/2018 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
  I have recently received a few complaints and two requests to
 be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as
 list moderator that naturally concerns me.
  Since the beginning of February, there have been over 200 emails
 on Peirce-L.  I've been tied up with other work and have only
 had a chance to sample a few snowflakes in this storm.
 Fortunately, I direct all Peirce-L notes to a special folder,
 where they can pile up undisturbed.  I don't want to block
 anybody's "way of inquiry", but I second Gary's concerns.
 John
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: [PEIRCE-L] signs and things

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - even a Dicent Indexical Sinsign functions in a triad - that
infamous weathervane...which is an interaction between two subjects. 

And for dyadic actions to take place, the two agents in brute
interaction are, in themselves, triads [the wind, the wooden vane]

So- I can do nothing about your confusion.

Edwina
 On Sun 11/02/18 10:18 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I continue to be confused by your latest comments.  From a purely
logical standpoint, "no Signs are things" entails "no things are
Signs," unless there is some sort of equivocation on the meaning of
"Signs" and/or "things."  You said that you agree with me that "a
sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303), but subsequently said that "a
'thing' must also be a Sign."  Which is it? 
 You also seem to be saying now that every interaction of one "thing"
with another "thing" is "always semiosic," and even that "all
interactions are semiosic."  I do not believe that this was Peirce's
view; in fact, he explicitly denied it in "Pragmatism," which I just
finished rereading.
 CSP:  All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or
psychical, either takes place between two subjects,--whether they
react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient,
entirely or partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions
between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action,
or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of  three
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions
between pairs. (EP 2:411; 1907)
 Besides semiosic (triadic) action, which is not "resolvable into
actions between pairs," there is also brute dynamical (dyadic)
action, which is "resolvable into actions between pairs."  Do you
deny the existence of the latter?  On the contrary, Peirce seems to
have considered it to be the  defining characteristic of existence.
 CSP:  A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the
other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it
is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, consists
in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. (CP 6.343; 1907)
 From a cosmological standpoint, my guess is that this is what Peirce
meant when he described matter as "mind whose habits have become fixed
so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them" (CP 1.601;
1902).  I wonder if this is precisely the difference between a
"thing" and a "Quasi-mind"; the latter must still have at least  some
capability for Habit-change, as all human minds obviously do.
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 6:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - I am saying that a 'thing' cannot exist unless it is in
interaction with another 'thing'. This interaction is always
semiosic. Therefore, an insect does not exist 'per se' but only in
interaction with...the air, other insects, the sun..etc etc.. And all
interactions are semiosic.

Therefore, yes, a 'thing' must also be a Sign [again, remembering
that I mean: DO-[IO-R-II]) . 

Edwina 
 On Sun 11/02/18  6:38 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I am having trouble following you here.  Since you agree that a Sign
is not a thing, what does it mean to say that things must also be
Signs?  Are you suggesting that all things must also be Signs, or
that all Dynamic Objects must also be Signs, or something else
entirely?  In this context, since a thing cannot be a genuine Sign,
by "Signs" do you mean "ordinary" Sinsigns or  Replicas of genuine
Signs? 
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon AS - I agree with your outline of the 'sign is not a real
thing'.

With regard to the necessity of the Dynamic Object, I'd suggest that
this Dynamic Object, as a thing also requires that it be related, so
to speak, with a Mind that is interacting with it. That is, things
must also be Signs.

Edwina
 On Sun 11/02/18  3:15 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut, Gary F., List:
 I suspect that we are misplacing the emphasis if we read Peirce as
saying that "a sign is not a real thing"; I take him to be saying
instead that "a sign is not a real thing."  In other words, genuine
Signs are constituents of the third Universe of Experience, rather
than the second that corresponds to "the Brute Actuality of things
and facts" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908).  That is why he added that a
Sign "is of such a nature as to exist in  replicas"; existence, in
his terminology, pertains only to whatever belongs to the second
Universe.
 Peirce's definition of "Real" is "having Properties, i.e. characters
sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they
be anywise attributed to it by any single man