RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

I see you got the point, Jerry.   

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 22-Jun-17 19:20



gary f, list:

 

"I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all that 
is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that what I am 
now writing is for the compositor and proof-reader exclusively. I trusted to 
the importance of the subject."

 

Best,

J

 

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 6:11 PM,  > wrote:

Jerry R,

http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm

gary f.

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com  ] 
Sent: 22-Jun-17 18:26

Gary f,

how do you tell the two apart?


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary r, list:



Speaking then, of rheme and reason in:

“Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself,

means “what I am thinking of is a man.”



What do you suppose is the method that gives only one meaning to the
following?



“For only he who is man enough, will - save the woman in woman.”

___



“It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for my opinions.

Should I not have to be a cask of memory,

if I also wanted to have my reasons with me?”



*Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.*



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:15 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F wrote: " I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which
> the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history."
>
> Jerry R asked: how do you tell the two apart?
>
> I personally see no difficulty in distinguishing them--indeed, they are
> *quite* distinct in my view--although there is, naturally, some overlap.
>
> Yet in consideration of particular, especially, scientific communities, a
> number of individuals may *concur* as to a term's meaning whatevver their
> personal histories, for they will each have considered the term in "the
> larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded."
>
> And this is so, of course, not only in scientific dialogue but in ordinary
> thought and speech as well: CSP gives an example which could pertain to
> either:   “Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself, means
> “what I am thinking of is a man.” So, again, "man" to be understand in
> *any* communication requires "the larger text or dialogue or dialogue in
> which the term is embedded." Error, especially in science, occurs when the
> emphasis is reversed and "the context of the reader's personal history" is
> valorized. It isn't as if collateral experience weren't essential--it most
> certainly is. But we compare *our* collateral experience in concurring as
> to what the object of any given term may be in some particular context.
>
> Included in the link Gary F offers comment by Peirce: "Now a sign is
> something which functions triadically. … any common noun, whether
> substantive or adjective, on the one hand signifies something and on the
> other hand names something else. All modern logicians have made much of
> this distinction; and many of them have pointed out that the term of its
> very essence signifies what it does, *while that which it is intended to
> name must be ascertained not from the term itself but by observation of the
> context or other attendant circumstances of its utterance *(emphasis
> added)*. * EP2:429
>
> But "this observation of the context or other attendant circumstances" is
> admittedly a 'tricky' matter. Consider that Gary F also offers this Luhman
> quote: Only in context can meaning be understood, and *context is,
> initially, supplied by one's own perceptual world and memory.*
> Furthermore, understanding always includes misunderstanding, and if one
> does not add on presuppositions, the component of misunderstanding becomes
> so great that the continuation of communication becomes improbable.—
> Luhmann 1995 (emphasis added).
>
> And further as Gary F also writes: The work of context is usually carried
> out unconsciously, but Marvin Minsky . . . came up with a sentence which
> brings it to the fore: ‘The astronomer married the star.’ We stumble over
> this sentence because the context evoked by *astronomer* invites the word
> *star* to mean something incompatible with the context evoked by *married*.
> This would not happen if the discourse in which the sentence occurred had
> been mainly about a movie ‘star.’ Contextual constraints enable us to
> select among the various niches in meaning space which a given text or
> symbol might occupy. *We might say that the ‘quest for meaning’ is
> actually a quest for context* *(emphasis added).*
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 6:26 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Gary f,
>>
>> how do you tell the two apart?
>>
>> Best,
>> jerry r
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I
>>> suggested that terms should always be “taken in context” by a
>>> reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which
>>> the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -Original Message-
>>> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
>>> Sent: 22-Jun-17 09:51
>>>
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge and
>>> then bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them, namely,
>>> here:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F wrote: " I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the
term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history."

Jerry R asked: how do you tell the two apart?

I personally see no difficulty in distinguishing them--indeed, they are
*quite* distinct in my view--although there is, naturally, some overlap.

Yet in consideration of particular, especially, scientific communities, a
number of individuals may *concur* as to a term's meaning whatevver their
personal histories, for they will each have considered the term in "the
larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded."

And this is so, of course, not only in scientific dialogue but in ordinary
thought and speech as well: CSP gives an example which could pertain to
either:   “Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself, means “what
I am thinking of is a man.” So, again, "man" to be understand in *any*
communication requires "the larger text or dialogue or dialogue in which
the term is embedded." Error, especially in science, occurs when the
emphasis is reversed and "the context of the reader's personal history" is
valorized. It isn't as if collateral experience weren't essential--it most
certainly is. But we compare *our* collateral experience in concurring as
to what the object of any given term may be in some particular context.

Included in the link Gary F offers comment by Peirce: "Now a sign is
something which functions triadically. … any common noun, whether
substantive or adjective, on the one hand signifies something and on the
other hand names something else. All modern logicians have made much of
this distinction; and many of them have pointed out that the term of its
very essence signifies what it does, *while that which it is intended to
name must be ascertained not from the term itself but by observation of the
context or other attendant circumstances of its utterance *(emphasis added)
*. * EP2:429

But "this observation of the context or other attendant circumstances" is
admittedly a 'tricky' matter. Consider that Gary F also offers this Luhman
quote: Only in context can meaning be understood, and *context is,
initially, supplied by one's own perceptual world and memory.* Furthermore,
understanding always includes misunderstanding, and if one does not add on
presuppositions, the component of misunderstanding becomes so great that
the continuation of communication becomes improbable.— Luhmann 1995
(emphasis added).

And further as Gary F also writes: The work of context is usually carried
out unconsciously, but Marvin Minsky . . . came up with a sentence which
brings it to the fore: ‘The astronomer married the star.’ We stumble over
this sentence because the context evoked by *astronomer* invites the word
*star* to mean something incompatible with the context evoked by *married*.
This would not happen if the discourse in which the sentence occurred had
been mainly about a movie ‘star.’ Contextual constraints enable us to
select among the various niches in meaning space which a given text or
symbol might occupy. *We might say that the ‘quest for meaning’ is actually
a quest for context* *(emphasis added).*

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 6:26 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Gary f,
>
> how do you tell the two apart?
>
> Best,
> jerry r
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I
>> suggested that terms should always be “taken in context” by a
>> reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which
>> the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
>> Sent: 22-Jun-17 09:51
>>
>> Peircers,
>>
>>
>>
>> I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge and
>> then bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them, namely,
>> here:
>>
>>
>>
>> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00036.html
>>
>> GF:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00037.html
>>
>>
>>
>> I imagine different readers derive different morals from the passage Gary
>> Fuhrman quoted.  It resonates for me with a host of themes going back to my
>> Vita Nuova in many dimensions of life during my first years in college.
>> But memories from fifty years ago are hard to put in order and so what
>> comes more freshly to mind are later harvests of those seeds.
>>
>>
>>
>> One of those outgrowths was the work I did applying Peirce's paradigm to
>> fundamental problems in AI, or Intelligent Systems Engineering as my
>> advisor in Systems Engineering advisedly preferred to call it.
>>
>> I posted a link to a passage from one of my project reports:
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jerry Rhee]

gary f, list:

"I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all
that is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that
what I am now writing is for the compositor and proof-reader exclusively. I
trusted to the importance of the subject."

Best,
J

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 6:11 PM,  wrote:

> Jerry R,
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 22-Jun-17 18:26
>
> Gary f,
>
>
>
> how do you tell the two apart?
>
>
>
> Best,
> jerry r
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:
>
> Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I
> suggested that terms should always be “taken in context” by a
> reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which
> the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history.
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jerry R,

 

http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm

 

gary f.

 

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 22-Jun-17 18:26



Gary f,

 

how do you tell the two apart?

 

Best,
jerry r

 

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  > wrote:

Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I suggested 
that terms should always be “taken in context” by a reader/listener, I was 
referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded, not to 
the context of the reader’s personal history.


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary f,

how do you tell the two apart?

Best,
jerry r

On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I
> suggested that terms should always be “taken in context” by a
> reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which
> the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> Sent: 22-Jun-17 09:51
>
> Peircers,
>
>
>
> I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge and
> then bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them, namely,
> here:
>
>
>
> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00036.html
>
> GF:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00037.html
>
>
>
> I imagine different readers derive different morals from the passage Gary
> Fuhrman quoted.  It resonates for me with a host of themes going back to my
> Vita Nuova in many dimensions of life during my first years in college.
> But memories from fifty years ago are hard to put in order and so what
> comes more freshly to mind are later harvests of those seeds.
>
>
>
> One of those outgrowths was the work I did applying Peirce's paradigm to
> fundamental problems in AI, or Intelligent Systems Engineering as my
> advisor in Systems Engineering advisedly preferred to call it.
>
> I posted a link to a passage from one of my project reports:
>
>
>
> https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#
> Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory
>
>
>
> Many distractions prevented me following up at the time, but let me just
> copy the intro of that section with the aim of moving forward from here:
>
>
>
> 
>
>
>
> Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy
>
> ==
>
>
>
> Functional Conception of Quantification Theory
> ==
>
>
>
> Up till now quantification theory has been based on the assumption of
> individual variables ranging over universal collections of perfectly
> determinate elements.  Merely to write down quantified formulas like
>
> ∀_(x∈X) f(x) and ∃_(x∈X) f(x) involves a subscription to such notions, as
> shown by the membership relations invoked in their indices.  Reflected on
> pragmatic and constructive principles, however, these ideas begin to appear
> as problematic hypotheses whose warrants are not beyond question, projects
> of exhaustive determination that overreach the powers of finite information
> and control to manage.  Therefore, it is worth considering how we might
> shift the scene of quantification theory closer to familiar round, toward
> the predicates themselves that represent our continuing acquaintance with
> phenomena.
>
>
>
> 
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Jon
>
>
>
> On 6/10/2017 9:36 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> > Peircers,
>
> >
>
> > I am occupied with renovations to our house at the moment, so I'll  >
> just submit the following paragraph for common contemplation until  > I can
> get our kitchen reassembled.
>
> >
>
> > https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#
> Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory
>
> >
>
> > Regards,
>
> >
>
> > Jon
>
> >
>
> > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> >
>
> > On 6/9/2017 9:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> >> Jon,
>
> >>
>
> >> What you say is a good reason for
>
> >> (a) not taking terms too “literally”
>
> >> and
>
> >> (2) always taking them in context.
>
> >>
>
> >> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
>
> >>
>
> >> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and
>
> >>fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo.
>
> >>A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
>
> >>assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.  This makes every
>
> >>proposition a conditional proposition at bottom.  In like manner
>
> >>a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with
>
> >>its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.  The common noun
>
> >>happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European
>
> >>languages.  In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated
>
> >>from a verb or participle.  “Man,” if it can be said to mean
>
> >>anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I suggested 
that terms should always be “taken in context” by a reader/listener, I was 
referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded, not to 
the context of the reader’s personal history.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 22-Jun-17 09:51



Peircers,

 

I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge and then 
bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them, namely, here:

 

JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00036.html

GF:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00037.html

 

I imagine different readers derive different morals from the passage Gary 
Fuhrman quoted.  It resonates for me with a host of themes going back to my 
Vita Nuova in many dimensions of life during my first years in college.  But 
memories from fifty years ago are hard to put in order and so what comes more 
freshly to mind are later harvests of those seeds.

 

One of those outgrowths was the work I did applying Peirce's paradigm to 
fundamental problems in AI, or Intelligent Systems Engineering as my advisor in 
Systems Engineering advisedly preferred to call it.

I posted a link to a passage from one of my project reports:

 

 

 
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory

 

Many distractions prevented me following up at the time, but let me just copy 
the intro of that section with the aim of moving forward from here:

 



 

Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy

==

 

Functional Conception of Quantification Theory 
==

 

Up till now quantification theory has been based on the assumption of 
individual variables ranging over universal collections of perfectly 
determinate elements.  Merely to write down quantified formulas like

∀_(x∈X) f(x) and ∃_(x∈X) f(x) involves a subscription to such notions, as shown 
by the membership relations invoked in their indices.  Reflected on pragmatic 
and constructive principles, however, these ideas begin to appear as 
problematic hypotheses whose warrants are not beyond question, projects of 
exhaustive determination that overreach the powers of finite information and 
control to manage.  Therefore, it is worth considering how we might shift the 
scene of quantification theory closer to familiar round, toward the predicates 
themselves that represent our continuing acquaintance with phenomena.

 



 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

On 6/10/2017 9:36 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

> Peircers,

>

> I am occupied with renovations to our house at the moment, so I'll  > just 
> submit the following paragraph for common contemplation until  > I can get 
> our kitchen reassembled.

>

>  
> 
>  
> https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory

>

> Regards,

>

> Jon

>

>   http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

>

> On 6/9/2017 9:44 AM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

>> Jon,

>>

>> What you say is a good reason for

>> (a) not taking terms too “literally”

>> and

>> (2) always taking them in context.

>>

>> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):

>>

>> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and

>>fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo.

>>A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the

>>assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.  This makes every

>>proposition a conditional proposition at bottom.  In like manner

>>a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with

>>its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.  The common noun

>>happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European

>>languages.  In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated

>>from a verb or participle.  “Man,” if it can be said to mean

>>anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

I would like to return to a point where the roads began to diverge
and then bifurcate rather chaotically so far as I could track them,
namely, here:

JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00036.html
GF:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-06/msg00037.html

I imagine different readers derive different morals from the passage
Gary Fuhrman quoted.  It resonates for me with a host of themes going
back to my Vita Nuova in many dimensions of life during my first years
in college.  But memories from fifty years ago are hard to put in order
and so what comes more freshly to mind are later harvests of those seeds.

One of those outgrowths was the work I did applying Peirce's paradigm
to fundamental problems in AI, or Intelligent Systems Engineering as
my advisor in Systems Engineering advisedly preferred to call it.
I posted a link to a passage from one of my project reports:

https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory

Many distractions prevented me following up at the time,
but let me just copy the intro of that section with the
aim of moving forward from here:



Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy
==

Functional Conception of Quantification Theory
==

Up till now quantification theory has been based on the assumption of
individual variables ranging over universal collections of perfectly
determinate elements.  Merely to write down quantified formulas like
∀_(x∈X) f(x) and ∃_(x∈X) f(x) involves a subscription to such notions,
as shown by the membership relations invoked in their indices.  Reflected
on pragmatic and constructive principles, however, these ideas begin to
appear as problematic hypotheses whose warrants are not beyond question,
projects of exhaustive determination that overreach the powers of finite
information and control to manage.  Therefore, it is worth considering
how we might shift the scene of quantification theory closer to familiar
round, toward the predicates themselves that represent our continuing
acquaintance with phenomena.



Regards,

Jon

On 6/10/2017 9:36 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Peircers,
>
> I am occupied with renovations to our house at the moment, so I'll
> just submit the following paragraph for common contemplation until
> I can get our kitchen reassembled.
>
> 
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On 6/9/2017 9:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> Jon,
>>
>> What you say is a good reason for
>> (a) not taking terms too “literally”
>> and
>> (2) always taking them in context.
>>
>> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
>>
>> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and
>>fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo.
>>A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
>>assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.  This makes every
>>proposition a conditional proposition at bottom.  In like manner
>>a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with
>>its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.  The common noun
>>happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European
>>languages.  In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated
>>from a verb or participle.  “Man,” if it can be said to mean
>>anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]
>>
>> On 6/9/2017 8:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>> The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings
>>> by blanking out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases,
>>> along with the related chemical analogies, are engaging
>>> ways of introducing the logic and math of relations but
>>> they both run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally,
>>> and for the same reason.  They tempt one to confuse the
>>> syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with
>>> the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is
>>> the sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on
>>> to its kindred nominalism.
>>>
>>> Here's a short note I wrote the last time questions
>>> about rhemes or rhemata came up on the List:
>>>
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term
>>>
 I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —
 this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —
 about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.

 Rhema, Rheme

 CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n

 CP 3.420-422, 465, 636

 CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441,
 446, 453, 461, 465, 470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621

 Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the years,
 I've decided to avoid those terms for now.  As I am 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Kirsti, ...

I have a sense of what Peirce meant by the “Logic of Science”
and what Dewey meant by calling Logic the “Theory of Inquiry”.
Maybe that's logic in the narrow nerdy sense and not Logic in
the Grandest All-Fired Metaphysical Sense, but it's long been
enough for me, ever since I said farewell to the foundational
crises of my youth and set to work on tools to help us reason.

That is what logic means to me.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/20/2017 12:25 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> Jon,
> I like your tenor, but do not quite agree.
>
> Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say.  But logic?
>
> In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down.
> But it is an ongoing process, with no predictable end.
>
> Now we live in late modern or early post modern times.
> Just to give a vague sense of what I mean by 'modern'.
> With this, I mostly follow Foucault's analysis.
>
> There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. -
> The very position of formal logic is at stake.
>
> The fight really is not about what logically is valid or not.
> Nor is it about which kind of logic gets science on with it's task.
> It is about taking hold of university departments as fortresses.
>
> About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'.
>
> We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and you.
>
> Kirsti
>


Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00:

John, Kirsti, List ...

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive,
but most in modern times have given up on that and realize
that usage will have its day and win out in the long run.
And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so
only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains
a flat affair.

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I
of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our
transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives.
A normative science has different aims even when it looks on
the same materials as a descriptive science.  So logic may
deal with abstractions from language but it is more than
abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

Kirsti and Jon A.

Kirsti

Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly,
by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


Jon

ditto amen qed si.


Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related
by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a
very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.
He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit
by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often
almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic
philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions
that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably
arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."
For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Kirsti,

CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied
the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from
language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.
Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language,
not as a replacement for language.

In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But
Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce
with LW.  Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more
compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.
I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

Kirsti

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace
reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a
limited degree.


I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries
were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please
remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for
several dictionaries.

But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.
Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.
See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer
Adam Kilgarriff:  https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

John







--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[kirstima]

Jon,
I like your tenor, but do not quite agree.

Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say.  But logic?

In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it 
is an ongoing process, with no predictable end.


Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to give a 
vague sense of what I mean by ' modern'. With this, I mostly follow 
Foucault's analysis.


There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. - The 
very position of formal locic is at stake.


The fight really is not about what locically is valid or not. Nor is it 
about which kind of locic gets science on with it's task. It is about 
taking hold of university departments as fortresses.


About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'.

We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and 
you.


Kirsti










Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00:

John, Kirsti, List ...

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive,
but most in modern times have given up on that and realize
that usage will have its day and win out in the long run.
And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so
only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains
a flat affair.

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I
of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our
transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives.
A normative science has different aims even when it looks on
the same materials as a descriptive science.  So logic may
deal with abstractions from language but it is more than
abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

Kirsti and Jon A.

Kirsti
Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even 
partly,

by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


Jon

ditto amen qed si.


Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related
by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or 
logic.


The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a
very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.
He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit
by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language 
often

almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic
philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions
that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably
arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."
For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Kirsti,
CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that 
mistake.


Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied
the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from
language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.
Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language,
not as a replacement for language.

In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But
Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce
with LW.  Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more
compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.
I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

Kirsti

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace
reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a
limited degree.


I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries
were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please
remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for
several dictionaries.

But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.
Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.
See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer
Adam Kilgarriff:  https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

John




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[kirstima]

Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity!

Gratefully,

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39:

On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the
special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal)
in that they study real things and not idealizations.


In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by
Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach.  In the 20th c, it was adopted
by the Vienna Circle in the form of logical positivism.

As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system.
But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost
all the subtlety of Peirce's use.

The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers.
To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were
just summaries of observation data.

The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang
in 1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method:

It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer
concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo
precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods — the 
trouble

being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or of
practical import is being discussed.


Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but
he found Lewis more congenial.  He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of
Wang, Hao (1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What
We Know, MIT Press.

Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found
Carnap's attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap
was there.  Peirce would have found it equally repulsive.  If he had
known that the word 'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce
would have disowned it.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/19/2017 12:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
I’ve just read your article on “Peirce's contributions to the 21st 
century” (http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf)... I couldn’t explain

what’s wrong with it as clearly as you have. (especially in your section
on “logical negativism.”


I got the term "logical negativism" from Hao Wang, who coined that term
to describe Quine -- his former thesis adviser.

Some of the points in that article overlap with related issues in
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf


I notice that you’ve used the term “logic” here in Peirce’s narrow sense...


Yes.  If and when I develop go back to those issues, I should clarify
some of those points.

John





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

John,

 

I've just read your article on "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century"
(http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf) and would recommend it to others
here. It was of special interest to me because I was exposed to a bit of
analytical philosophy in my university days and have avoided it ever since,
with the result that I couldn't explain what's wrong with it as clearly as
you have. (especially in your section on "logical negativism.")

 

One part of the article that struck me in the context of this thread:

[[ .  Peirce equated the lexicon with the set of expressible ideas and
declared logic as essential to the analysis of meaning. Yet he considered
logic only one of the three major subdivisions of his theory of signs: 

1. Universal grammar is first because it studies the structure of signs
independent of their use. The syntax of a sentence, for example, can be
analyzed without considering its meaning, reference, truth, or purpose
within a larger context. In its full generality, universal grammar defines
the types of signs and patterns of signs at every level of complexity in
every sensory modality. 

2. Critical logic, which Peirce defined as "the formal science of the
conditions of the truth of representations" (CP 2.229), is second because
truth depends on a dyadic correspondence between a representation and its
object. 

3. Methodeutic or philosophical rhetoric is third because it studies the
principles that relate signs to each other and to the world: "Its task is to
ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives
birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another" (CP
2.229).  By "scientific intelligence," Peirce meant any intellect capable of
learning from experience, among which he included dogs and parrots. ]]

 

I notice that you've used the term "logic" here in Peirce's "narrow sense,"
i.e. "critical logic"; and that you've replaced Peirce's "speculative
grammar" with "universal grammar." I think this choice is consistent with
your aim to use the terminology that is most immediately accessible to the
audience, who are likely to have an unfortunate association with
"speculative." On the other hand, some of us associate "universal grammar"
with Chomskyan linguistics, which is also unfortunate!

 

In my book Turning Signs (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm) I adopted
a different approach to incorporating Peircean ideas: I've tried to embed
quotations from Peirce (sometimes rather long ones) into a context that
prepares the reader for them by first introducing some of the ideas in more
vernacular terms, and by embedding them into my own philosophical inquiry
rather than presenting them as an 'introduction to Peirce.' I doubt that I
have succeeded as well as you have, but then (as you posted awhile back)
there's room for many different approaches to these things. I think in our
different ways we've both raised the profile of context dependence (for
those who have read us, anyway).

 

Overall, your article also confirms again what I suspected while working on
my book, that many of the key ideas in it had been previously developed by
other researchers that I'd never heard of, much less read. Learning about
this earlier work tends to encourage my hope that these ideas are sound; as
Peirce said, "Any philosophical doctrine that should be completely new could
hardly fail to prove completely false" (CP 5.11).

 

Anyway, thanks for that article!

 

Gary f.

 

} It takes a long time to learn that life is short. [gnox] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

 

-----Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 18-Jun-17 17:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

 

On 6/18/2017 3:50 PM,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or logic, 

> or philosophy, to be "empirical sciences" according to current usage, 

> although they are all "positive sciences" for Peirce, so we can't 

> really substitute the one for the other in discourse.

 

That's probably true.  An article addressed to Peirce scholars would contain
many quotations by CSP.  In that context, a discussion of his terminology
and its implications is appropriate.

 

But Peirce hoped to address the world, not a narrow group of scholars.

Search CP for the many occurrences of the word 'generation'.  The word
'positive' suggests 'logical positivism', which died in the mid 20th c.

It's not likely to win friends and influence new generations.

 

See my article on "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century":

 <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf>
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf

 

See also Putnam's article on "Peirce the Logi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/18/2017 3:50 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or logic,
or philosophy, to be “empirical sciences” according to current usage, 
although they are all “positive sciences” for Peirce, so we can’t 
really substitute the one for the other in discourse.


That's probably true.  An article addressed to Peirce scholars would
contain many quotations by CSP.  In that context, a discussion of his
terminology and its implications is appropriate.

But Peirce hoped to address the world, not a narrow group of scholars.
Search CP for the many occurrences of the word 'generation'.  The word
'positive' suggests 'logical positivism', which died in the mid 20th c.
It's not likely to win friends and influence new generations.

See my article on "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century":
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf

See also Putnam's article on "Peirce the Logician":
http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

John,

 

I think you're right that the term "positive science" is problematic because
of its post-Peircean usage, but the term "empirical science" is also
problematic: few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or
logic, or philosophy, to be "empirical sciences" according to current usage,
although they are all "positive sciences" for Peirce, so we can't really
substitute the one for the other in discourse. 

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 18-Jun-17 09:40
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

 

On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

> The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the 

> character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the special 

> sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal) in that they study 

> real things and not idealizations.

 

In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by Auguste Comte
and Ernst Mach.  In the 20th c, it was adopted by the Vienna Circle in the
form of logical positivism.

 

As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system.

But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost all the subtlety
of Peirce's use.

 

The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers.

To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were just
summaries of observation data.

 

The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang in
1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method:

> It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer 

> concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo 

> precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods - the 

> trouble being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or 

> of practical import is being discussed.

 

Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but he
found Lewis more congenial.  He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of Wang, Hao
(1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know, MIT Press.

 

Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found Carnap's
attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap was there.  Peirce
would have found it equally repulsive.  If he had known that the word
'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce would have disowned it.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the
special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal)
in that they study real things and not idealizations.


In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by
Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach.  In the 20th c, it was adopted
by the Vienna Circle in the form of logical positivism.

As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system.
But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost
all the subtlety of Peirce's use.

The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers.
To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were
just summaries of observation data.

The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang
in 1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method:

It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer
concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo
precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods — the trouble
being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or of
practical import is being discussed.


Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but
he found Lewis more congenial.  He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of
Wang, Hao (1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What
We Know, MIT Press.

Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found
Carnap's attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap
was there.  Peirce would have found it equally repulsive.  If he had
known that the word 'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce
would have disowned it.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

mine 
is represented in Turning Signs). 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 17:59
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

 

Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,

 

A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent 
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the 
idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 
'normative' concerns may be.

 

So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary:

 

GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part 
of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve 
subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is 
indeed normative.

 

What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three 
branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical 
logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by 
Peirce in his late Classification of Sciences. So why are you suggesting that 
speculative grammar is not normative? Or rather, what is this distinction 
between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, 
sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That 
would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are 
designated "normative" by Peirce.

 

GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of 
triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of 
the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent 
its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and 
semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and 
physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I 
have tried to do in my book).

 

I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences 
list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the 
"classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of 
"The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed. 

 

Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, 
apparently contra Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier 
between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure 
to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly 
in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in 
relation to them).

 

After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic 
concerns itself with "what must be the characters of all signs used by a 
“scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of 
learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part):

 

GF: Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is 
capable of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with 
other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into 
it. 

 

This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2) represent at 
most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real experience in 
interaction with an environment.

 

GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real 
intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and 
lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. 

 

You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this 
sentence.

 

GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of 
intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as 
experience in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all 
knowledge is in signs; surely then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce 
strongly implies above. 

 

There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved 
here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that "insight" 
and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort of learning 
(which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the result of the rich 
complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in relation to rule driven 
programming), then I think you go too far. 

 

GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is 
capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to 
mention our concept of intelligence.

 

In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what 
machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot is 
yet, in my opinion,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., List,


You asked:  "I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of 
the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and 
John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire 
argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed."


The arguments in "The Logic of Mathematics" are remarkably varied and 
intertwined. The essay was written before he made a clear division in his 
classification of the sciences between phenomenology and the other parts of 
philosophy. What is more, it was written before he included aesthetics as one 
branch of normative science.


Many of the arguments, I believe, involve mixtures of phenomenological analysis 
and logical analysis--with some largely under-stated references to mathematical 
conceptions involving the monad, dyad and triad. As such, he is drawing mainly 
from common experience and our common sense conceptions for the sake of making 
a classification of different kinds of dyadic and triadic relations. As such, 
the classificatory system itself belongs in the same place as his other remarks 
and classificatory schemes for degenerate and genuine triadic relations.


My hunch is that some of the results properly belong to what is later 
classified as phenomenology. The logical analysis of common experience and 
sense is preparatory for inquiry in the normative sciences and in metaphysics. 
At various points, he draws out some of the conclusions for semiotics and for 
metaphysics--moving, for instance, from the experience of what is ordered in 
time to conclusions about the real character of time.


Any thoughts about the classificatory system for the laws of fact that I've 
tried to draw out of the essay--or about the questions I've tried to frame 
about the classification of these laws of fact in relation to thoroughly 
genuine triadic relations?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 2:58 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,

A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent 
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the 
idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 
'normative' concerns may be.

So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary:

GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part 
of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve 
subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is 
indeed normative.

What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three 
branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical 
logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by 
Peirce in his late Classification of Sciences. So why are you suggesting that 
speculative grammar is not normative? Or rather, what is this distinction 
between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, 
sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That 
would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are 
designated "normative" by Peirce.

GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of 
triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of 
the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent 
its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and 
semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and 
physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I 
have tried to do in my book).

I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences 
list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the 
"classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of 
"The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed.

Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, 
apparently contra Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier 
between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure 
to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly 
in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in 
relation to them).

After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic 
concerns itself with "what must be the characters of all signs used by a 
“scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jeff, John S, list,


A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent
post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and
the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever
the 'normative' concerns may be.


So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary:


GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is
part of “logic” *in Peirce’s broad sense*) as “normative” simply because
you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s *narrow* sense,
which is indeed normative.


What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the
three branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar,
critical logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as
normative by Peirce in his late *Classification of Sciences*. So why are
you suggesting that speculative grammar is n*ot* normative? Or rather, what
is this distinction between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making?
Peirce, it seems to me, sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical
Logic, "logic as logic." That would seem to be the narrower sense of logic.
But all three branches are designated "normative" by Peirce.



GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of
triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some
of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which
prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind,
life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into
biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others
have done, and as I have tried to do in my book).


I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the
sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and
John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the
entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed.


Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and
physics, apparently *contra *Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff
made earlier between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here.
Confusion is sure to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff
commented on soundly in the exchange today on the subtle differences of
meaning of "normative" in relation to them).



After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as
Semeiotic concerns itself with "what *must be* the characters of all signs
used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence
capable of learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part):



GF: Now, an *artificial intelligence* is called that largely because
it is *capable
of learning* (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other
entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it.


This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2)
represent at most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real
experience in interaction with an environment.



GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of
real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly
mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless *capable of learning. *


You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this
sentence.


GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of
intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well
as *experience* in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that
all knowledge is in signs; surely then all *learning* is by means of signs,
as Peirce strongly implies above.


There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved
here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that
"insight" and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort
of learning (which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the
result of the rich complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in
relation to rule driven programming), then I think you go too far.


GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity
is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not
to mention our concept of *intelligence*.


In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what
machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot
is yet, in my opinion, if not absolutely mindless in Peirce's sense in
which mind would appear to occur most everywhere, nonetheless it is
"lifeless" even given the somewhat metaphorical notion of "the life of the
symbol" (which, again, requires--as the Peirce quotation I gave a while
back and which Gary F hasn't yet addressed-- *a life form as a vehicle*.


Best,


Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi John, List,

The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the character of 
the philosophical sciences--as well as the special sciences. They are positive 
(and not merely ideal) in that they study real things and not idealizations. 
The point I wanted to make is that the normative sciences draw on normative 
observations. They also draw on a healthy dose of common sense and common 
experience, but that informs the normative sciences in a different way than the 
particular evaluations of beautiful and ugly states of affairs, right and wrong 
conduct and good and bad arguments.

I don't know where you are going with the comments to the effect that: "I 
sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives. But I don't believe that such a reform is, in 
general, possible or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak."

My hunch is that you may be responding to Jon A's earlier comments about axioms 
and definitions. For my part, I think postulates, axioms and definitions have 
important roles to play in mathematics, but it isn't clear what role such 
conceptions have in philosophy. I tend to think that philosophical hypotheses 
have a different kind of character than mathematical hypotheses.  Peirce seems 
to be wary of any attempt to reduce conceptions in philosophy to primitives.  
The main reason is that the conceptions are so rich--and so deeply connected to 
common sense--that there would no end to the analysis of the key conceptions.

--Jeff 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 1:52 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I think we are general agreement.

I think we mostly agree.  But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'.  I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predictions about some observable phenomena."

I sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives.

But I don't believe that such a reform is, in general, possible
or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak.

For more about the issues of minimizing the vocabulary, see the
article "I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/17/2017 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

I think we are general agreement.


I think we mostly agree.  But I don't see any need for the term
'positive science'.  I would say 'empirical' instead of 'positive'
in the sentence "Every positive science must describe and make
testable predictions about some observable phenomena."

I sympathize with the desire to have a minimal set of primitives
from which all terms can be defined by positive or negative
combinations of the primitives.

But I don't believe that such a reform is, in general, possible
or desirable.  It resembles the double plus ungood Newspeak.

For more about the issues of minimizing the vocabulary, see the
article "I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jeff, Gary R (and list),

 

I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I can't
improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar
(which is part of "logic" in Peirce's broad sense) as "normative" simply
because you've subsumed all of semiotics under "logic" in Peirce's narrow
sense, which is indeed normative.

 

Concerning your later post, about Peirce's classificatory schemes of triadic
relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the
terms used as class names, such as "organic" and "growth," which prevent its
being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and
semiosis. I don't think that can be done without delving into biology and
physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and
as I have tried to do in my book).

 

I'd like to bring the question back to the starting point in CP 2.227, this
time quoting the first sentence in full: 

[[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another
name for semiotic (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of
signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or formal, I mean
that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an
observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we
are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no
means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a
"scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of
learning by experience.]]

 

Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is capable
of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other
entities, rather than passively having its "knowledge" programmed into it.
(Let's not wander off the point by debating whether an electronically
functioning entity made of microcircuits is subject to "experience": that
term could be defined in a way that makes it impossible to settle the
question by empirical observation, but that would serve no useful purpose.)

 

By insisting that an "AI" can only be a "machine" (and thus devoid of real
intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and
lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. This is what I find
implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with
mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as experience in the Peircean
sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely
then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. So
the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is
capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to
mention our concept of intelligence.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 13:34



Gary F., List,

 

My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the
methods of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary
for signs to convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects,
speculative grammar as a normative science may provide descriptive
classifications of different kinds of signs, but the classification is based
on what is necessary for signs to perform their essential function as
representations that convey meaning to minds.

 

What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative
science?

 

--Jeff

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, List,

I think we are general agreement.

Let me modify some points you've made and see where the agreement persists or 
disappears.  You say: "Every empirical science must describe and make testable 
predictions about some observable phenomena."

I would generalize the first claim to say:  Every positive science must 
describe and make testable predictions about some observable phenomena.

Then, I would make a distinction between positive sciences that are purely (or 
perhaps "mainly") normative in character, and positive sciences that are mainly 
empirical in character. Both sorts of sciences may study many of the same 
general phenomena (e.g., both the normative theory of logic and the empirical 
study of linguistics may take the "things people say" as phenomena to be 
explained). Having said that, the two kinds of sciences use different methods, 
focus on different kinds (or aspects) of observations, and are guided by 
somewhat different goals.

You go on to say:  The value judgments that state preferences for some kinds of 
phenomena make a descriptive science normative." These kinds of observations 
are, in large part, normative in character. Normative sciences rely on 
normative observations.  In many cases, it is not just a matter of stating 
given preferences. When reflecting on aesthetic phenomena, we observe the 
beauty and sublimity of what is before us and judge that it is worthy of our 
attention. In morality, we observe the justice and injustice of different 
actions and judge that some are consistent with our moral obligations and some 
are contrary to them. So, too, in the normative theory of logic. We observe 
examples of reasoning and judge that some are valid and that others are 
invalid. These evaluations of particular examples of reasoning serve as the 
observations for the normative theory of logic.

In the more empirical sciences that are special in character--such as 
linguistics, psychology, and the like--there is a strong tendency to abstract 
from the normative character of some of our observations and to focus 
exclusively on the more brute aspects of what is being observed.

You go on to say:  "In any case, I agree with Gary that there is a strong 
connection between grammars of formal logics and grammars of language.  This 
point is independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics purely 
descriptive or both descriptive and normative."

Once again, I would modify the claims:  there is a strong connection between 
the grammatical theories of the normative science of logic, including the study 
of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning,  and the study of the grammars 
of natural languages (e.g., English and French) as well as the grammars of more 
specialized languages (e.g., topology and number theory).  This point is 
independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics to be purely 
descriptive or both descriptive and normative.

A key point we shouldn't ignore is that the philosophical science of semiotics 
is cenoscopic in character, while the sciences of linguistics and psychology 
are idioscopic in character. This is due to the differences in aims as well as 
differences in methodologies.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 11:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,

Jon
> The most important difference between linguistics and logic
> is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

No.  Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative.  Note l'Académie française.  Modern linguists emphasize
the descriptive aspects in order to claim that they are scientists.

Furthermore, Truth is the normative goal of logic.  Language is
the primary means for communicating and reasoning about truth.
That kind of reasoning is usually called informal.  Formal logics
are a helpful, but secondary innovation.

Gary
> Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in
> what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science
> but a descriptive one.  The connection between logical "grammar" and
> linguistic "grammar" is by no means accidental.

Jeff
> What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it
> is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a
> normative science?

Every empirical science must describe and make testable predictions
about some observable phenomena.  The value judgments that state
preferences for some kinds of phenomena make a descriptive science
normative.  Engineering, for example, is normative because it makes
value judgments, such as "Bridges and airplanes should not fall dow

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

Jon A, Gary F, and Jeff BD,

Jon

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.


No.  Grammars and dictionaries have traditionally been considered
normative.  Note l'Académie française.  Modern linguists emphasize
the descriptive aspects in order to claim that they are scientists.

Furthermore, Truth is the normative goal of logic.  Language is
the primary means for communicating and reasoning about truth.
That kind of reasoning is usually called informal.  Formal logics
are a helpful, but secondary innovation.

Gary

Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in
what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science
but a descriptive one.  The connection between logical “grammar” and
linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.


Jeff

What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it
is studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a
normative science?


Every empirical science must describe and make testable predictions
about some observable phenomena.  The value judgments that state
preferences for some kinds of phenomena make a descriptive science
normative.  Engineering, for example, is normative because it makes
value judgments, such as "Bridges and airplanes should not fall down."

In any case, I agree with Gary that there is a strong connection
between grammars of formal logics and grammars of language.  This
point is independent of whether you consider logic and linguistics
purely descriptive or both descriptive and normative.

Jon

Peirce advises a non-psychological approach to logic, which he defines
as formal semiotic, using "formal" to mean "quasi-necessary", which
is the moral equivalent of "normative" to us.


I agree with the text up to the word 'using'.  But the word 'formal'
is a synonym for "according to form", not 'quasi-necessary'.  In the
Century Dictionary, Peirce's definitions of 'form', 'formal', and
'formalism' emphasize the surface patterns (AKA syntax).  See the
attached formalSign.jpg.  To see his definitions of the other terms,
see http://www.global-language.com/century/

The connections among formal, quasi-necessary, moral, normative,
and truth are indirect.  Peirce explicitly said that diagrammatic
reasoning draws quasi-necessary conclusions by observing patterns
by perception, in Greek 'aisthesis'.  Those perceptual patterns are
the basis for aesthetics, the first of the three normative sciences.

The word 'moral' implies ethics, the second of the normative sciences.
Ethics in action and behavior is determined by the beauty of the action
and its consequences in the social setting.  Wanton destruction of the
social fabric is unethical because it is ugly.

Third, truth is determined by aesthetics and ethics in reasoning and
communication.  Truth is good and beautiful.  Falsehood is bad and ugly.

In short, Peirce would never claim that the term 'formal' is a synonym
for 'quasi-necessary', which he would never claim is equivalent to
'normative' by any version of ethics or morality.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Everett, Daniel]

I am currently writing a book (likely) for OUP that touches on this: "Peircean 
Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Empiricist Thought."

In my forthcoming book I argue that in effect Peirce indirectly predicted the 
order and nature of language evolution.
https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957

Dan Everett

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 17, 2017, at 13:33, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:


Gary F., List,


My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory 
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are 
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three 
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be 
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods 
of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to 
convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a 
normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of 
signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to 
perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to 
minds.


What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is 
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative 
science?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM
To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason


Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.



I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.



Gary f.



-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason



John, Kirsti, List ...



The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.



Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.



It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.



Regards,



Jon



On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

>

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

>

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

>

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

>

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

>

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

>

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

>

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

>

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from

>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., List,


My understanding of the architectonic is that, in the mature classificatory 
scheme, speculative grammar, critical logic and speculative rhetoric are 
classified as three branches of semiotics, which is itself one of the three 
branches of normative science. Having said that, semiotic phenomena can be 
studied in the special sciences as well--such as linguistics--but the methods 
of such sciences are not adequate to articulate what is necessary for signs to 
convey meaning and the like. In a number of respects, speculative grammar as a 
normative science may provide descriptive classifications of different kinds of 
signs, but the classification is based on what is necessary for signs to 
perform their essential function as representations that convey meaning to 
minds.


What reasons do you have for thinking that speculative grammar--as it is 
studied in philosophy--is not a branch of semiotic considered as a normative 
science?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2017 4:53 AM
To: 'Jon Awbrey'; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason


Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.



I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.



Gary f.



-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason



John, Kirsti, List ...



The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.



Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.



It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.



Regards,



Jon



On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

>

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

>

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

>

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

>

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

>

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

>

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

>

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

>

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from

> language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.

> Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not

> as a replacement for language.

>

> In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But Frank

> Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW.

> Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with

> Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.

> I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

>

> Kirsti

>> I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, all ...

This is, of curse [sic], one of those recurring discussions.
A 10 minute websearch turns up these signs of a couple times
when I spoke up for the inclusion of a descriptive carrel or
chamber or hall in the architectonics of semiotics:

http://peirce-l.lyris.ttu.narkive.com/ZouKnytT/natural-propositions#post84

> [Arisbe] Re: Critique of Short --€” News Flash --€” The N.O.N.-Psychological
> Jon Awbrey jawbrey at att.net
> Sat Jan 22 11:08:16 CST 2005
>
> Previous message: [peirce-l] Re: Critique of Short --€” News Flash --€” The 
Ineffables
> Next message: [Arisbe] Critique of Short: Significance of MS 148
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> Kirsti,
>
> Strictly speaking, Peirce advises a non-psychological approach
> to logic, which he defines as formal semiotic, using "formal"
> to mean "quasi-necessary", which is the moral equivalent of
> "normative" to us. I have mentioned before that the prefix,
> "non" frequently serves as a generalizing functor in math,
> as in the study of non-associative algebras, which includes
> those algebras that do satisfy the associative axiom along
> with those that do not. It is just as if "non" was really
> an acronym for "not of necessity". I have also argued that
> semiotics in general has room for a descriptive semiotics,
> under which would fall many applications to the descriptive,
> or non-therapeutic, side of psychology, in which Peirce was
> evidently rather interested, of course.
>
> But there is nothing about cardinality, causality, cognition, or continuity
> in the barest unpsychological definitions of sign relations, and so if we
> find those considerations coming into our discussions of sign relations,
> it is either because we have explicitly added some additional axioms and
> definitions, or else because we are treading on unexpressed assumptions,
> which being non-conscious, are likely to vary widely from participant to
> participant in the discussion. Of course, much diversion lies that way.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o

On 6/17/2017 7:53 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.

  


I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.

  


Gary f.

  


-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

  


John, Kirsti, List ...

  


The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.

  


Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.

  


It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

  


Regards,

  


Jon

  


On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:


Kirsti and Jon A.







Kirsti



Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even



partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers,



quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.







Jon



ditto amen qed si.







Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related



by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.







The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a



very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.



He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by



laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often



almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."







My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic



philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions



that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably



arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."



For more detail, see  <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the 
greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative 
grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection 
between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no means accidental.

 

I say “amen” to John’s remarks here.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 17-Jun-17 00:01
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

 

John, Kirsti, List ...

 

The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics 
is descriptive while logic is normative.

 

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern 
times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win 
out in the long run.

And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of 
signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair.

 

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign 
relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs 
in order to realize their objectives.

A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials 
as a descriptive science.  So logic may deal with abstractions from language 
but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

> Kirsti and Jon A.

> 

> Kirsti

>> Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even 

>> partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, 

>> quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake.

> 

> Jon

>> ditto amen qed si.

> 

> Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related 

> by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

> 

> The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a 

> very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.

> He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by 

> laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often 

> almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

> 

> My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic 

> philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions 

> that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably 

> arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."

> For more detail, see  <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf> 
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> 

> Kirsti,

>> CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

> 

> Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied 

> the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

> 

> Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from 

> language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.

> Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not 

> as a replacement for language.

> 

> In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But Frank 

> Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW.  

> Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with 

> Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.

> I discuss those issues in  <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf> 
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

> 

> Kirsti

>> I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 

>> reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a 

>> limited degree.

> 

> I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries were 

> useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please remember 

> that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several 

> dictionaries.

> 

> But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.

> Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.

> See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer 

> Adam Kilgarriff:   <https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

> 

> John

 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

John, Kirsti, List ...

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive,
but most in modern times have given up on that and realize
that usage will have its day and win out in the long run.
And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so
only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains
a flat affair.

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I
of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our
transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives.
A normative science has different aims even when it looks on
the same materials as a descriptive science.  So logic may
deal with abstractions from language but it is more than
abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

Kirsti and Jon A.

Kirsti

Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly,
by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake. 


Jon

ditto amen qed si.


Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related
by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a
very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.
He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit
by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often
almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic
philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions
that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably
arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."
For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Kirsti,

CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied
the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from
language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.
Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language,
not as a replacement for language.

In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But
Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce
with LW.  Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more
compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.
I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

Kirsti

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace
reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a
limited degree.


I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries
were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please
remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for
several dictionaries.

But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.
Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.
See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer
Adam Kilgarriff:  https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

John



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Thanks, Jon, I had not seen that observation from Jappy before.

The operative phrase in what I wrote is “as a substitute for”.
We always have the task of classifying signs and classifying
objects but the problems arise when your favorite ism thinks
that half the work will do double duty.  It hardly ever does.

Dyadic forms of correspondence between syntactic structures
and objective functions are always nice when you can get them
and it's always worth taking advantage of them when they occur.
It would make things a whole lot simpler if the forms of signs
always mirrored the forms of their objects.  That is one of the
attractions of Fregean compositionality and Russell's isomorphism
theory and it's one of the reasons programming language designers
keep to the realm of context-free languages for as long as they can.
Taking the Chomsky–Schützenberger Hierarchy as our first rough guide
to the complexity of formal languages and the competencies demanded of
their processors, we run into a critical point at the threshold between
context-free and context-sensitive languages where the mirror of language
breaks and the triadic nature of genuine symbols can no longer be avoided.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/13/2017 12:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Jon A., List:

JA:  As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and
classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and classifying objects
is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, the idea that the
essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs we use to describe
them.

Not sure if this is related, but Tony Jappy seems to think that Peirce
changed the basis of his efforts at Sign classification from how a Sign
represents its Object (1903) to what sort of Object a Sign represents
(1908).  The latter involves the two different Objects and three different
Interpretants that are associated with each Sign, and situates all six
correlates in Universes (Possible/Existent/Necessitant) rather than
Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), although there is an apparent alignment between
the two types of trichotomy.  Could this perceived shift from phenomenology
to ontology perhaps reflect a desire to emphasize realism over against
nominalism?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 9:15 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Post : The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/

Peircers,

I took some pains to trace the threads on rhemes, rhemata, etc. back before
the U.S. holiday disruptions and the home improvement havoc that wrecked my
own concentration.  Here is the blog rehash of that record leading up to my
opening post on the subject this month.

Re: Peirce List Discussion
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00034.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00043.html )
• GF ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/ )
• GR ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/#comment-1194 )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00044.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00045.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00046.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00047.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00048.html )
• GR ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00051.html )
• JFS ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00052.html )

The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out
pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies to
polyunsaturated chemical valences, make for engaging ways of introducing
the logic of relative terms and the mathematics of relations but they both
run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally, and for the same reason.
They tempt one to confuse the syntactic accidents used to suggest formal
objects with the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is the
sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred
nominalism.

Here's a note I appended to the InterSciWiki article on Relative Terms the
last time questions about rhemes or rhemata came up.

Relative Term
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relative_term

Discussion
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term

I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —
this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —
about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.

Rhema, Rheme

* CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n

* CP 3.420-422, 465, 636

* CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441, 446, 453, 461, 465,
470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621

Reviewing the variations and 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

On 6/15/2017 1:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:


Logic is not linguistics ...



ditto
amen
qed
si
.

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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[PEIRCE-L] RE: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

Jon,

 

I think you first have to learn what games are available to you, before you can 
choose among them (or choose the null game).

The question is whether silicon-based life forms are evolving, i.e. whether AI 
systems are potential players in what Gregory Bateson called “life—a game whose 
purpose is to discover the rules, which rules are always changing and always 
undiscoverable.”

http://gnusystems.ca/TS/pnt.htm#lifgam

 

gary f.

 

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 13-Jun-17 20:55



The first thing about intelligence is knowing what games you want to play ... 
or whether to play at all. 

 

I'm not seeing any AIs that I yet. 

 

Regards,

 

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com






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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

The first thing about intelligence is knowing what games you want to play ... 
or whether to play at all. 

I'm not seeing any AIs that I yet. 

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jun 13, 2017, at 8:21 PM,   wrote:
> 
> John, you've made several important points here, and thanks especially for 
> taking Jerry C's question off my hands.  
>  
> A note about AI … back in the 1970s I played go quite a bit and got 
> reasonably good at it. At that time, chess-playing programs were just 
> beginning to reach the higher levels, and go-playing programs were reportedly 
> so inept that even an amateur like me could have given them a handicap and 
> still beaten them (though I never got a chance to try). So I was fascinated 
> to see a few weeks ago that Google’s latest go-playing robot has beaten one 
> of the top professionals in the game. Of course it’s the bot’s ability to 
> learn from experience that has made it so good, not the go-playing skills of 
> its programmers.
>  
> Personally I’m not terribly worried about robots or operating systems “taking 
> over” when they become faster learners and “smarter” than we humans are. What 
> does worry me is the prospect of humans turning them into autonomous weapons, 
> which apparently some military minds would like to do. Anyway, I see some of 
> these developments as evidence that abduction (as Peirce called it) and 
> “insight” are probably not beyond the capabilities of AI systems that can 
> learn inductively. The go professional who lost to the AI said that it made a 
> brilliantly unexpected move fairly early in the game, and he knew then that 
> he was in trouble. He also commented on how much it had improved since he’d 
> played against it last year.
>  
> Is this growth in AI competence a threat to humanity? I think the much more 
> serious threat is human ignorance and unwillingness to learn. (I was going to 
> say “pigheadedness” but that would be an insult to pigs …)
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
> Sent: 13-Jun-17 18:53
> 
> Gary F, Jerry LRC, and Jerry R,
>  
> GF
> > Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic
> > pragmatically as “the science of the laws of the stable establishment
> > of beliefs” (CP 3.429).
>  
> When you use the term "pragmatically", the issues of how that stable 
> establishment can be achieved in a finite time are important.  There are also 
> serious issues about artificial intelligence (AI) vs. human intelligence.  
> Some general principles:
>  
>   1. Normal human reasoning (what people call "common sense") depends
>  more heavily on semantics than on syntax.
>  
>   2. For doing the syntactic manipulation of formulas, computer systems
>  have far exceeded human capabilities.  Mathematicians, physicists,
>  and engineers routinely use computer-aided methods to carry out
>  the details of complex symbolic processes.
>  
>   3. But humans are still far superior to computers in what is called
>  "insight" -- this usually involves some kind of mental imagery,
> which is still very difficult for computer systems to replicate.
>  
>   4. But there is a large body of reasoning methods for which the number
>  of steps in a proof is relevant.  In general, short proofs are much
>  easier to find by both humans and computers.
>  
>   5. And finally, the point that *formal reasoning* depends on syntax is
>  a fact that every logician has emphasized, *especially* Peirce.
>  What Peirce called "diagrammatic reasoning" is a multi-dimensional
>  version of *syntactic reasoning*.  As Peirce emphasized, algebra is
>  a one-dimensional special case of diagrammatic reasoning.
>  
> JLRC
> > A curious question for you to ponder.  Can you express the differences
> > in meanings of the three terms:  “inference”, “ergo”, “therefore”
> > in terms of the grammar of copula and predicates?
>  
> No.  The rules of inference (or illation, to use Peirce's term) in any 
> version of logic or mathematics are primary.  They determine how one step in 
> a proof follows from any other.  Words like 'ergo', 'therefore', hence, 
> QED..., are informal commentaries about the stages of a proof.
>  
> The words 'copula' and 'predicate' are used to describe the syntax of a 
> sentence or parts of a sentence in a formal or natural language.
> Those syntactic parts affect the way the rules of inference are stated.
> But they are irrelevant to the informal commentary by a logician or 
> mathematician about the steps in a proof.
>  
> As an analogy, think about the moves in a game of chess, bridge, or go.
> The moves in a game are determined by the syntax (patterns) of the boards, 
> pieces, or cards and the rules of the games, which are stated in terms of the 
> syntax.  Informal commentary about the players' moves depends on the rules of 
> the game, but it's not part of the rules.
>  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

John, you've made several important points here, and thanks especially for 
taking Jerry C's question off my hands.  

 

A note about AI … back in the 1970s I played go quite a bit and got reasonably 
good at it. At that time, chess-playing programs were just beginning to reach 
the higher levels, and go-playing programs were reportedly so inept that even 
an amateur like me could have given them a handicap and still beaten them 
(though I never got a chance to try). So I was fascinated to see a few weeks 
ago that Google’s latest go-playing robot has beaten one of the top 
professionals in the game. Of course it’s the bot’s ability to learn from 
experience that has made it so good, not the go-playing skills of its 
programmers.

 

Personally I’m not terribly worried about robots or operating systems “taking 
over” when they become faster learners and “smarter” than we humans are. What 
does worry me is the prospect of humans turning them into autonomous weapons, 
which apparently some military minds would like to do. Anyway, I see some of 
these developments as evidence that abduction (as Peirce called it) and 
“insight” are probably not beyond the capabilities of AI systems that can learn 
inductively. The go professional who lost to the AI said that it made a 
brilliantly unexpected move fairly early in the game, and he knew then that he 
was in trouble. He also commented on how much it had improved since he’d played 
against it last year.

 

Is this growth in AI competence a threat to humanity? I think the much more 
serious threat is human ignorance and unwillingness to learn. (I was going to 
say “pigheadedness” but that would be an insult to pigs …)

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 13-Jun-17 18:53



Gary F, Jerry LRC, and Jerry R,

 

GF

> Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic 

> pragmatically as “the science of the laws of the stable establishment 

> of beliefs” (CP 3.429).

 

When you use the term "pragmatically", the issues of how that stable 
establishment can be achieved in a finite time are important.  There are also 
serious issues about artificial intelligence (AI) vs. human intelligence.  Some 
general principles:

 

  1. Normal human reasoning (what people call "common sense") depends

 more heavily on semantics than on syntax.

 

  2. For doing the syntactic manipulation of formulas, computer systems

 have far exceeded human capabilities.  Mathematicians, physicists,

 and engineers routinely use computer-aided methods to carry out

 the details of complex symbolic processes.

 

  3. But humans are still far superior to computers in what is called

 "insight" -- this usually involves some kind of mental imagery,

which is still very difficult for computer systems to replicate.

 

  4. But there is a large body of reasoning methods for which the number

 of steps in a proof is relevant.  In general, short proofs are much

 easier to find by both humans and computers.

 

  5. And finally, the point that *formal reasoning* depends on syntax is

 a fact that every logician has emphasized, *especially* Peirce.

 What Peirce called "diagrammatic reasoning" is a multi-dimensional

 version of *syntactic reasoning*.  As Peirce emphasized, algebra is

 a one-dimensional special case of diagrammatic reasoning.

 

JLRC

> A curious question for you to ponder.  Can you express the differences 

> in meanings of the three terms:  “inference”, “ergo”, “therefore”

> in terms of the grammar of copula and predicates?

 

No.  The rules of inference (or illation, to use Peirce's term) in any version 
of logic or mathematics are primary.  They determine how one step in a proof 
follows from any other.  Words like 'ergo', 'therefore', hence, QED..., are 
informal commentaries about the stages of a proof.

 

The words 'copula' and 'predicate' are used to describe the syntax of a 
sentence or parts of a sentence in a formal or natural language.

Those syntactic parts affect the way the rules of inference are stated.

But they are irrelevant to the informal commentary by a logician or 
mathematician about the steps in a proof.

 

As an analogy, think about the moves in a game of chess, bridge, or go.

The moves in a game are determined by the syntax (patterns) of the boards, 
pieces, or cards and the rules of the games, which are stated in terms of the 
syntax.  Informal commentary about the players' moves depends on the rules of 
the game, but it's not part of the rules.

 

For more about AI and human reasoning, see the slides about natural language 
understanding:    
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/nlu.pdf

 

JR

> I like where this conversation is headed, for you cannot have this 

> conversation without ultimately lighting on syllogism.

 

Yes, indeed!  But it's not "ultimately" -- it's the starting point.

Benjamin Peirce 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

Gary F, Jerry LRC, and Jerry R,

GF

Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic
pragmatically as “the science of the laws of the stable
establishment of beliefs” (CP 3.429).


When you use the term "pragmatically", the issues of how that stable
establishment can be achieved in a finite time are important.  There
are also serious issues about artificial intelligence (AI) vs. human
intelligence.  Some general principles:

 1. Normal human reasoning (what people call "common sense") depends
more heavily on semantics than on syntax.

 2. For doing the syntactic manipulation of formulas, computer systems
have far exceeded human capabilities.  Mathematicians, physicists,
and engineers routinely use computer-aided methods to carry out
the details of complex symbolic processes.

 3. But humans are still far superior to computers in what is called
"insight" -- this usually involves some kind of mental imagery,
which is still very difficult for computer systems to replicate.

 4. But there is a large body of reasoning methods for which the number
of steps in a proof is relevant.  In general, short proofs are much
easier to find by both humans and computers.

 5. And finally, the point that *formal reasoning* depends on syntax is
a fact that every logician has emphasized, *especially* Peirce.
What Peirce called "diagrammatic reasoning" is a multi-dimensional
version of *syntactic reasoning*.  As Peirce emphasized, algebra is
a one-dimensional special case of diagrammatic reasoning.

JLRC

A curious question for you to ponder.  Can you express the differences
in meanings of the three terms:  “inference”, “ergo”, “therefore”
in terms of the grammar of copula and predicates?


No.  The rules of inference (or illation, to use Peirce's term) in any
version of logic or mathematics are primary.  They determine how one
step in a proof follows from any other.  Words like 'ergo', 'therefore',
hence, QED..., are informal commentaries about the stages of a proof.

The words 'copula' and 'predicate' are used to describe the syntax
of a sentence or parts of a sentence in a formal or natural language.
Those syntactic parts affect the way the rules of inference are stated.
But they are irrelevant to the informal commentary by a logician or
mathematician about the steps in a proof.

As an analogy, think about the moves in a game of chess, bridge, or go.
The moves in a game are determined by the syntax (patterns) of the
boards, pieces, or cards and the rules of the games, which are stated
in terms of the syntax.  Informal commentary about the players' moves
depends on the rules of the game, but it's not part of the rules.

For more about AI and human reasoning, see the slides about
natural language understanding:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/nlu.pdf

JR

I like where this conversation is headed, for you cannot have this
conversation without ultimately lighting on syllogism.


Yes, indeed!  But it's not "ultimately" -- it's the starting point.
Benjamin Peirce taught his son Greek and Latin, and Charles read
everything from antiquity to the early 20th c -- in the original
languages.  In fact, he gave lectures at Harvard on Scholastic logic.

In order to understand Peirce's logic and philosophy, it's necessary
to start with his sources and study how his successors developed
his legacy.   For an overview of logic from antiquity to the early
19th century, see http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/patolog1.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

h, I like where this conversation is headed, for you cannot have this
conversation without ultimately lighting on syllogism.  :)

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 1:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Gary:
>
> On Jun 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> but as Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while mathematics
> is not. Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic
> pragmatically as “the science of the laws of the stable establishment of
> beliefs” (CP 3.429). I think that’s why inference (*ergo*) is the primary
> logical relation.
>
>
> I am curious as to why you consider the word, inference (“therefore”
> (ergo)), to be
>
> the primary logical relation.
>
>
> A curious question for you to ponder.
> Can you express the differences in meanings of the three terms:
> “inference”
> “ergo”
> “therefore”
>
> in terms of the grammar of copula and predicates?
>
> Do you consider the semantic connection between icons and rhema to be an
> inference?
>
> Cheers
>
> jerry
>
>
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary: 
> On Jun 13, 2017, at 1:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> but as Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while mathematics is 
> not. Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic pragmatically 
> as “the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs” (CP 
> 3.429). I think that’s why inference (ergo) is the primary logical relation.
>  
I am curious as to why you consider the word, inference (“therefore” (ergo)), 
to be 
> the primary logical relation.

A curious question for you to ponder.
Can you express the differences in meanings of the three terms:
“inference”
“ergo”
“therefore”

in terms of the grammar of copula and predicates?

Do you consider the semantic connection between icons and rhema to be an 
inference?

Cheers

jerry

 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[gnox]

John, you wrote

“Logicians from Aristotle to Peirce to the present use the *semantic* criterion 
of preserving truth to justify their *syntactic* rules.”

 

Yes, this is crucial! You can’t do formal logic without mathematics, but as 
Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while mathematics is not. 
Computability is not the core issue, when you define logic pragmatically as 
“the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs” (CP 3.429). I 
think that’s why inference (ergo) is the primary logical relation.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 13-Jun-17 13:13



Jon,

 

You said that in an earlier note, and I corrected it:

 

> The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking 

> out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies 

> to polyunsaturated chemical valences... They tempt one to confuse the 

> syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with the essential 

> forms of the objects themselves.  That is the sort of confusion that 

> leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred nominalism.

 

No!  Peirce wrote strong criticisms of nominalism, but he was also very clear 
about the need for precise syntax in *formal* logic.

All formal definitions specify the syntactic *forms*.

 

Peirce emphasized that Thirdness "involves Secondness and Firstness"

-- it does not replace them.  He criticized Hegel for claiming that "Firstness 
and Secondness must somehow be aufgehoben." (CP 5.91)

 

In formal logic, the rules of inference are stated in terms of syntax.

That is key to all *diagrammatic reasoning* -- observing and following the 
relationships among the parts of a diagram.  See his 1887 article on "Logical 
Machines", in which he emphasized the relationships between the parts of the 
machine and the (syntactic) parts of the notation:

 <http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf> 
http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf

 

Logicians from Aristotle to Peirce to the present use the *semantic* criterion 
of preserving truth to justify their *syntactic* rules.

Because of the structural (diagrammatic) mappings, syntactic rules can derive 
semantic truths -- but only if (a) the rules are sound, and (b) the mapping of 
the diagram to and from the subject matter is sufficiently accurate to 
represent the relevant details.  See the excerpt below from my previous note.

 

John

-------- Forwarded Message 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason

Date: 6/12/2017 3:00 PM

From: John F Sowa

 

...

 

[Although Peirce was careful to distinguish syntax and semantics, he used the 
single word 'illation' (inference) without explicitly stating which aspects 
were syntactic and which were semantic (or truth preserving).]  Today, 
logicians use two distinct terms:

 

  1. Implication is defined *formally* -- i.e., by the form (syntax) of

 the propositions.  Every rule of inference in Peirce's algebraic

 notations of 1870 and 1885 and in his graph notations from 1896 on,

 is specified *formally* -- i.e., by the syntactic forms of the

 propositions.

 

  2. Entailment is defined *semantically* -- i.e., by the requirement

 that proposition p entails proposition q if and only if q is true

 of every case in which p is true.  This criterion is independent

 of the syntax of the propositions p and q.

 

A syntactic rule of inference is *sound* if and only if it preserves truth -- 
i.e., implication entails entailment.  All logicians from Aristotle to Peirce 
to the present have used that criterion to justify their rules of inference.

 

The converse of soundness is completeness:  The rules of inference for a logic 
are *complete* if and only if every entailment (p entails q) can be 
demonstrated by a proof (p implies q).

 

For first-order logic, Kurt Gödel (1930) showed that the usual rules of 
inference are sound and complete.  That is true for Peirce's FOL rules for both 
his algebraic notations and his graph notations.

 

But in 1931, Gödel proved his famous incompleteness theorem for higher-order 
logic (more explicitly, the version in Whitehead & Russell's _Principia 
Mathematica_).  Gödel showed that there are infinitely many HOL statements that 
are true, but not provable.

 

...


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

You said that in an earlier note, and I corrected it:

The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out 
pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies to 
polyunsaturated chemical valences... They tempt one to confuse the

syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with the essential
forms of the objects themselves.  That is the sort of confusion that leads
to syntacticism and on to its kindred nominalism.


No!  Peirce wrote strong criticisms of nominalism, but he was also
very clear about the need for precise syntax in *formal* logic.
All formal definitions specify the syntactic *forms*.

Peirce emphasized that Thirdness "involves Secondness and Firstness"
-- it does not replace them.  He criticized Hegel for claiming that
"Firstness and Secondness must somehow be aufgehoben." (CP 5.91)

In formal logic, the rules of inference are stated in terms of syntax.
That is key to all *diagrammatic reasoning* -- observing and following
the relationships among the parts of a diagram.  See his 1887 article
on "Logical Machines", in which he emphasized the relationships between
the parts of the machine and the (syntactic) parts of the notation:
http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf

Logicians from Aristotle to Peirce to the present use the *semantic*
criterion of preserving truth to justify their *syntactic* rules.
Because of the structural (diagrammatic) mappings, syntactic rules
can derive semantic truths -- but only if (a) the rules are sound,
and (b) the mapping of the diagram to and from the subject matter is
sufficiently accurate to represent the relevant details.  See the
excerpt below from my previous note.

John
 Forwarded Message ----
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason
Date: 6/12/2017 3:00 PM
From: John F Sowa

...

[Although Peirce was careful to distinguish syntax and semantics,
he used the single word 'illation' (inference) without explicitly
stating which aspects were syntactic and which were semantic (or
truth preserving).]  Today, logicians use two distinct terms:

 1. Implication is defined *formally* -- i.e., by the form (syntax) of
the propositions.  Every rule of inference in Peirce's algebraic
notations of 1870 and 1885 and in his graph notations from 1896 on,
is specified *formally* -- i.e., by the syntactic forms of the
propositions.

 2. Entailment is defined *semantically* -- i.e., by the requirement
that proposition p entails proposition q if and only if q is true
of every case in which p is true.  This criterion is independent
of the syntax of the propositions p and q.

A syntactic rule of inference is *sound* if and only if it preserves
truth -- i.e., implication entails entailment.  All logicians from
Aristotle to Peirce to the present have used that criterion to justify
their rules of inference.

The converse of soundness is completeness:  The rules of inference for
a logic are *complete* if and only if every entailment (p entails q)
can be demonstrated by a proof (p implies q).

For first-order logic, Kurt Gödel (1930) showed that the usual rules
of inference are sound and complete.  That is true for Peirce's FOL
rules for both his algebraic notations and his graph notations.

But in 1931, Gödel proved his famous incompleteness theorem for
higher-order logic (more explicitly, the version in Whitehead &
Russell's _Principia Mathematica_).  Gödel showed that there are
infinitely many HOL statements that are true, but not provable.

...

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

JA:  As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and
classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and classifying objects is
the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, the idea that the
essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs we use to describe
them.


Not sure if this is related, but Tony Jappy seems to think that Peirce
changed the basis of his efforts at Sign classification from how a Sign
represents its Object (1903) to what sort of Object a Sign represents
(1908).  The latter involves the two different Objects and three different
Interpretants that are associated with each Sign, and situates all six
correlates in Universes (Possible/Existent/Necessitant) rather than
Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), although there is an apparent alignment between
the two types of trichotomy.  Could this perceived shift from phenomenology
to ontology perhaps reflect a desire to emphasize realism over against
nominalism?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 9:15 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Post : The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 9
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that
> -makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/
>
> Peircers,
>
> I took some pains to trace the threads on rhemes, rhemata, etc. back before
> the U.S. holiday disruptions and the home improvement havoc that wrecked my
> own concentration.  Here is the blog rehash of that record leading up to my
> opening post on the subject this month.
>
> Re: Peirce List Discussion
> • GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00034.html )
> • GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00043.html )
> • GF ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/ )
> • GR ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/#comment-1194 )
> • JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00044.html )
> • JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00045.html )
> • JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00046.html )
> • GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00047.html )
> • JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00048.html )
> • GR ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00051.html )
> • JFS ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00052.html )
>
> The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out
> pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies to
> polyunsaturated chemical valences, make for engaging ways of introducing
> the logic of relative terms and the mathematics of relations but they both
> run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally, and for the same reason.
> They tempt one to confuse the syntactic accidents used to suggest formal
> objects with the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is the
> sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred
> nominalism.
>
> Here's a note I appended to the InterSciWiki article on Relative Terms the
> last time questions about rhemes or rhemata came up.
>
> Relative Term
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relative_term
>
> Discussion
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term
>
> I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago — this
> would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 — about
> Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.
>
> Rhema, Rheme
>
> * CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n
>
> * CP 3.420-422, 465, 636
>
> * CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441, 446, 453, 461, 465,
> 470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621
>
> Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the
> years, I've decided to avoid those terms for now. As I am realizing more
> and more in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute
> for analyzing and classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into
> nominalism, namely, the idea that the essence or reality of objects is
> contained in the signs we use to describe them.
>
> Add a comment to this post: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> 2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirc
> e-makes-9/#respond
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Post : The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/

Peircers,

I took some pains to trace the threads on rhemes, rhemata, etc. back before
the U.S. holiday disruptions and the home improvement havoc that wrecked my
own concentration.  Here is the blog rehash of that record leading up to my
opening post on the subject this month.

Re: Peirce List Discussion
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00034.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00043.html )
• GF ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/ )
• GR ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/#comment-1194 )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00044.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00045.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00046.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00047.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00048.html )
• GR ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00051.html )
• JFS ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00052.html )

The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along 
with the analogies to polyunsaturated chemical valences, make for engaging ways of introducing the logic of relative 
terms and the mathematics of relations but they both run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally, and for the same 
reason.  They tempt one to confuse the syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with the essential forms of 
the objects themselves.  That is the sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred nominalism.


Here's a note I appended to the InterSciWiki article on Relative Terms the last time questions about rhemes or rhemata 
came up.


Relative Term
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relative_term

Discussion
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term

I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago — this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly 
from CP 3 & 4 — about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.


Rhema, Rheme

* CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n

* CP 3.420-422, 465, 636

* CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441, 446, 453, 461, 465, 470, 
474, 504, 538n, 560, 621

Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the years, I've decided to avoid those terms for now. 
As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and 
classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, the idea that the essence or reality of 
objects is contained in the signs we use to describe them.


Add a comment to this post: 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/#respond


Regards,

Jon

--

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Gary, all ...

One could hardly dispute the importance of implication relations like A ⇒ B.
The set-theoretic analogues are subset relations like A ⊆ B, which are almost
the canonical way of expressing constraint, determination, information, etc.
There is again a deep analogy or isomorphism between propositions like A ⇒ B
and functional types like f : A → B of considerable importance in the theory
of computation.  That's probably enough for primary and fundamental status
but there are a number of considerations that might keep us from thinking
these order relations are exclusively primary and fundamental.

For one thing, implication in existential graphs is expressed in a compound 
form,
as (A (B)), “not A without B”.  For another, there is Peirce's own discovery of
the amphecks, “not both” and “both not”, which appear to have a primary and
and fundamental status all their own.  Lastly, implicational inferences are
in general information-losing while the fundamental operations in Peirce's
logical graphs, either entitative or existential, give us the option of
equational rules of inference, that is, information-preserving steps.

Just a few things to think about ...

I will get to the remaining points of the quote as I get time.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/9/2017 9:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> Jon,
>
> What you say is a good reason for
> (a) not taking terms too “literally”
> and
> (2) always taking them in context.
>
> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
>
> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and
> fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo.
> A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
> assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.  This makes every
> proposition a conditional proposition at bottom.  In like manner
> a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with
> its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.  The common noun
> happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European
> languages.  In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated
> from a verb or participle.  “Man,” if it can be said to mean
> anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]
>

On 6/9/2017 8:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Peircers,

The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings
by blanking out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases,
along with the related chemical analogies, are engaging
ways of introducing the logic and math of relations but
they both run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally,
and for the same reason.  They tempt one to confuse the
syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with
the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is
the sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on
to its kindred nominalism.

Here's a short note I wrote the last time questions
about rhemes or rhemata came up on the List:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term


I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —
this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —
about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.

Rhema, Rheme

CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n

CP 3.420-422, 465, 636

CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441,
446, 453, 461, 465, 470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621

Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the years,
I've decided to avoid those terms for now.  As I am realizing more and more
in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing
and classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely,
the idea that the essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs
we use to describe them.


Regards,

Jon


--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[John F Sowa]

On 6/11/2017 5:08 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

An icon is an icon when it's interpreted as an icon.
An index is an index when it's interpreted as an index.
The same goes for term, sentence, argument by any name.


The first two sentences are true.  But the third is false.

In natural languages and artificial languages, terms and sentences
are specified and recognized by their syntactic structure.

The word 'argument' happens to be ambiguous.  In a relation such as
R(x,y,z) or a function f(x,y,z)=0, the variables named x, y, and z
are called arguments of the relation R or the function f.

To avoid confusion, it's important to use modern terminology
when relating Peirce's notations to modern notations.

John

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

A rather amusing, if slightly ominous illustration of the
main point I am trying to make here has just popped up in
the daily mayhem.  Let's call this one:

Syntax Proposes, Pragmatics Disposes,
or,
When Does A Question Become A Command?

http://time.com/4811148/comey-testimony-henry-ii-thomas-becket-will-no-one-rid-me-of-this-meddlesome-priest/

The big thing that classification maniacs tend to forget about
types of signs in a sign relational theory of signs is that they
are always interpretive and relative never essential and absolute.

An icon is an icon when it's interpreted as an icon.
An index is an index when it's interpreted as an index.
The same goes for term, sentence, argument by any name.

Category theorists and computer scientists
call that “polymorphism” and they study the
isomorphisms that relate the various types.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/9/2017 8:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Peircers,

The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings
by blanking out pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases,
along with the related chemical analogies, are engaging
ways of introducing the logic and math of relations but
they both run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally,
and for the same reason.  They tempt one to confuse the
syntactic accidents used to suggest formal objects with
the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is
the sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on
to its kindred nominalism.

Here's a short note I wrote the last time questions
about rhemes or rhemata came up on the List:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term


I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —
this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —
about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.

Rhema, Rheme

CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n

CP 3.420-422, 465, 636

CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441,
446, 453, 461, 465, 470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621

Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the years,
I've decided to avoid those terms for now.  As I am realizing more and more
in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing
and classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely,
the idea that the essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs
we use to describe them.


Regards,

Jon



--

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

I am occupied with renovations to our  house at the moment, so I'll just submit 
the following paragraph for common contemplation until I can get  our kitchen 
reassembled. 

https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Functional_Conception_of_Quantification_Theory

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jun 9, 2017, at 9:44 AM,   wrote:
> 
> Jon,
>  
> What you say is a good reason for (a) not taking terms too “literally” and 
> (2) always taking them in context.
>  
> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental 
> logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A proposition, for me, 
> is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and 
> conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. 
> In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition 
> with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. The common noun 
> happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European languages. 
> In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated from a verb or 
> participle. “Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself, means “what 
> I am thinking of is a man.” ]]
>  
> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
> Sent: 9-Jun-17 08:12
> To: Peirce List 
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason
>  
> Peircers,
>  
> The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out 
> pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the related chemical 
> analogies, are engaging ways of introducing the logic and math of relations 
> but they both run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally, and for the same 
> reason.  They tempt one to confuse the syntactic accidents used to suggest 
> formal objects with the essential forms of the objects themselves.  That is 
> the sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred 
> nominalism.
>  
> Here's a short note I wrote the last time questions about rhemes or rhemata 
> came up on the List:
>  
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term
>  
> > I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —  > this 
> > would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —  > about 
> > Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.
> >
> > Rhema, Rheme
> >
> > CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n  >  > CP 3.420-422, 465, 636  >  
> > > CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441,  > 446, 453, 461, 465, 
> > 470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621  >  > Reviewing the variations and 
> > vacillations in Peirce's usage over the years,  > I've decided to avoid 
> > those terms for now.  As I am realizing more and more  > in recent years, 
> > analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing  > and 
> > classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely,  
> > > the idea that the essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs 
> >  > we use to describe them.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon
>  

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