Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

gher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act of nature. 

 

If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to collide, then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.  The result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a higher orbit. That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to this random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. 

 

If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. 

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick 

 

 

 


On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



 
 

 




Sung, List,

And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types (universals)...

 

 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 


 
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Frances, List,

You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of representation, so 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Clark,

 

I don’t use the term “postmodern” at all, because the Deely usage of it has not 
caught on in academic circles, and the usage that is established has more spin 
than denotation to it.

 

I totally agree about the ridiculous pricing of academic books (and the lack of 
ebook versions), especially knowing that the authors don’t make much money from 
these books anyway. That’s why I took the self-publishing route with my book, 
and haven’t even got it printed yet (though I’m working on that). Unfortunately 
that’s meant making no money at all from it (so far), but I prefer that to 
asking people to pay big bucks to read it.

 

Gary f. 

 

} Growth for growth's sake is the ideology of the cancer cell. [Edward Abbey] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:clarkgoble84...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 26-Oct-15 23:04
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

 

 

On Oct 26, 2015, at 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
wrote:

 

The Deely work I had in mind specifically is Purely Objective Reality (Mouton 
de Gruyter, 2009) but he’s touched on the subject (no pun intended!) in a 
number of places.

 

I remembered him discussing it in The Beginning of Postmodern Times: or Charles 
Sanders Peirce and the Recovery of Signum. However it had been years since I 
read it. Now that I’m home and checked it I think it was an ambiguous memory of 
his discussion that may have in part been throwing me off. It’s a great book 
and deals in passing with some of the issues we’ve discussed here. I really 
ought to reread it when I have time. (Perils of having studied something 10 
years ago is you think you remember it only to discover your memories are quite 
fallible)

 

A quote worth giving from his introduction. 
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/redbook.pdf

 

Postmodern times began in philosophy with Peirce’s doctrine of categories. And 
Peirce’s doctrine of categories, in turn, is rooted in the Latin doctrine that 
relation is unique among the modes of being in being objectively indifferent to 
the subjective ground, physical or psychical, which makes the relation actual 
under any given set of circumstances. In other words, postmodernity and 
semiotics are of a piece, even though “semiotics” is destined to be a permanent 
name for the major development of philosophy whose present has arrived in our 
lifetimes, while “postmodern” is destined to be a temporary term of fashion 
which serves relatively to call attention to the need to make intelligible the 
boundary which separates the presemiotic past of modern philosophy from the 
semiotic present of philosophy insofar as philosophy is truly contemporary.

 

I think Deely was writing long after the term “postmodernism” had thoroughly 
been corrupted - especially in the United States. (Certainly after Sokal) So I 
remember when I first encountered his book how surprised I was he used the 
term. I go out of my way now to distance myself from the term even though in my 
youth I embraced it. Not because of a significant change in view but just 
because of all the negative and unfortunate connotations it came to have due to 
sloppy thinkers.

 

His discussion in depth of subjective and objective starts on page 59. 
Unfortunately I don’t have time tonight to reread it (or reread your pages 
since I was only able to skim them this morning) Hopefully this weekend. (And 
I’ll get back to the points I promised Edwina too hopefully)

 

I’d check out this newer Deely book but it appears to only be available with 
library pricing and with not Kindle/iBooks version available. I also noticed 
while looking for it that there’s a John Deely Reader out as well collecting 
most of his major papers. Again I’d likely have leapt at it but there’s no 
eBook version. I’m constantly surprised how many university publishers in this 
day and age don’t offer ebooks. (Especially when they have the text originals) 
After my wife grumbled about the size of my library and being a late convert to 
eBooks I swore I’d only buy ebooks from now on.

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Ozzie]

Stephen, Helmut, List -
We really don't even have randomness in the example as it was given.  The 
photon and atom collided for unspecified reasons.   My point is that the logic 
of the 'transaction' is contained in the interpretants of the atom and photon.  
If they collided for 'random' reasons, then I can work with that.  

If we enter the story just as the collision occurs, then we can of course focus 
on the logic of what happens after that.  Then, however, we need to consider 
such things as velocity, direction, energy levels, etc. for the two objects.  
That mechanism must be fleshed out, or it is a black box instead of logic.  
Collisions between photons and atoms don't only have one possible outcome. 

Regards,
TW




> On Oct 27, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for 
> Peirce  mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do.
> 
> "... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the 
> characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202
> 
> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl 
> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
> 
>> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>  
>> You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on 
>> "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was 
>> representation, because there is both an immediate and a dynamical object. 
>> But, as there is no meaning transmitted, it is nor real thirdness neither 
>> real triadicity, maybe.
>> Regards,
>> Helmut
>>  26. Oktober 2015 um 23:24 Uhr
>>  Thomas <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Helmut, List ~
>> "A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate 
>> object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps 
>> to a higher orbit) is the interpretant ..."
>>  
>> Why did the photon hit the atom?  The collision ('hitting event') is the 
>> 'transaction' that produced the consequences.  Consequences 'belong' to the 
>> the object(s) that triggered the transaction.  It you shot a photon into the 
>> atom, then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If 
>> you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act 
>> of nature. 
>>  
>> If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to 
>> collide, then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was 
>> performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.  The 
>> result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a 
>> higher orbit. That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to this 
>> random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. 
>>  
>> If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. 
>>  
>> Regards,
>> Tom Wyrick 
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> 
>> On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> Sung, List,
>> And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The 
>> photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is 
>> the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the 
>> interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? 
>> "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human 
>> concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ 
>> conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this 
>> pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know 
>> what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis 
>> sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  
>> Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the 
>> wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in 
>> types (universals)...
>>  
>>  26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
>> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>  
>> Hi,
>>  
>> Correction: 
>>  
>> Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any 
>> communication." in my previous post to 
>> ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."
>>  
>> Thanks.
>>  
>> Sung
>>  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 27, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for 
> Peirce  mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do.
> 
> "... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the 
> characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202

How are we using the word “meaning” in these discussions? It seems quite 
different from Peirce’s maxim which was his criteria of meaning.

Or is it that while we can measure in some cases spontaneity in terms of its 
breadth (and thus a kind of meaning) but not the spontaneity in itself. That 
however seems uncomfortably close to the Kantian thing in itself which Peirce 
opposes. Add in to this that in at least some places Peirce sees consciousness 
as the inward phenomena of spontaneity.

I suspect we just need to unpack carefully what it is we’re talking about.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Aw: Re: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

 

You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was representation, because there is both an immediate and a dynamical object. But, as there is no meaning transmitted, it is nor real thirdness neither real triadicity, maybe.

Regards,

Helmut


 26. Oktober 2015 um 23:24 Uhr
 Thomas <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote:
Helmut, List ~

"A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant ..."

 

Why did the photon hit the atom?  The collision ('hitting event') is the 'transaction' that produced the consequences.  Consequences 'belong' to the the object(s) that triggered the transaction.  It you shot a photon into the atom, then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act of nature. 

 

If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to collide, then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.  The result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a higher orbit. That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to this random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. 

 

If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. 

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick 

 

 

 


On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



 
 

 




Sung, List,

And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types (universals)...

 

 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
------ Forwarded message ------
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All t

Re: Re: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Stephen C. Rose]

Randomness can hardly be meaningless if it also implies chance which for
Peirce  mean First. I suppose I am missing something. Usually do.

"... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the
characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

>
> You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on
> "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was
> representation, because there is both an immediate and a dynamical object.
> But, as there is no meaning transmitted, it is nor real thirdness neither
> real triadicity, maybe.
> Regards,
> Helmut
>  26. Oktober 2015 um 23:24 Uhr
>  Thomas <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Helmut, List ~
> "A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the
> immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect
> (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant ..."
>
> Why did the photon hit the atom?  The collision ('hitting event') is the
> 'transaction' that produced the consequences.  Consequences 'belong' to the
> the object(s) that triggered the transaction.  It you shot a photon into
> the atom, then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your
> logic. If you drop a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe
> is an act of nature.
>
> If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to
> collide, then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was
> performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.
> The result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to
> a higher orbit. That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to
> this random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand
> logic.
>
> If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight.
>
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
>
>
>
>
> On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Sung, List,
> And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom:
> The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting
> event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit)
> is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical
> object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of
> the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural
> laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the
> mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism?
> I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism.
> As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the
> wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in
> types (universals)...
>
>  26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
> "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Correction:
>
> Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any
> communication." in my previous post to
> ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."
>
> Thanks.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
> To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>
>
> Helmut. lists,
>
> " . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of
> interaction- . . . "
>
> I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for
> "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We
> have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of
> these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and
> "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot
> lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in
> Figure 1.
>
>
>f g
> Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
>  (Object)  (Interpretant

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

 wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 


 
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Frances, List,

You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, nothing could happen?

Best,

Helmut

 

 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
 frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
 


To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. 

The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate referred object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that this form of vehicle then determines and is emb

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to collide, then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was performed then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.  The result of the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a higher orbit. That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to this random event does not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. 

 

If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. 

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick 

 

 

 


On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
 



 
 

 




Sung, List,

And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types (universals)...

 

 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 


 
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Frances, List,

You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a phy

Re: Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Thomas]

Helmut, List ~
"A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate 
object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a 
higher orbit) is the interpretant ..."

Why did the photon hit the atom?  The collision ('hitting event') is the 
'transaction' that produced the consequences.  Consequences 'belong' to the the 
object(s) that triggered the transaction.  It you shot a photon into the atom, 
then the electron's higher orbit is the interpretant of your logic. If you drop 
a bowling ball on your toe, we don't say your broken toe is an act of nature. 

If separate 'acts of nature' originally caused the photon and atom to collide, 
then it seems like a random event.  The initial act of 'logic' was performed 
then, when the atom and photon were sent on a collision path.  The result of 
the collision may, but may not, cause the electron to jump to a higher orbit. 
That adds a second random element.  Assigning meaning to this random event does 
not seem the easiest way to explain/understand logic. 

If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight. 

Regards,
Tom Wyrick 




On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

 
 
 
Sung, List,
And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The 
photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the 
representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the 
interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? 
"Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human 
concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ 
conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this 
pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know 
what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: 
"It´s only words, and words are all I have..."
Best,
Helmut
 
Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong 
idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types 
(universals)...
 
 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 
Hi,
 
Correction: 
 
Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." 
in my previous post to 
". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."
 
Thanks.
 
Sung
 
 
 
 
 
---------- Forwarded message ------
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 
" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of 
interaction- . . . "
 
I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  
Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples 
of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because 
"interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, 
dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic 
interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
   f g
Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
 (Object)  (Interpretant)
 | ^
 | |
 |__|
   h
 
Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can 
interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A 
may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's 
message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too 
obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF 
Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is 
triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or 
interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication
 
All the best.
 
Sung
 
 
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
> Frances, List,
> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and 
> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I 
> use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
> or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peir

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Thanks Clark!

The Deely work I had in mind specifically is Purely Objective Reality (Mouton 
de Gruyter, 2009) but he’s touched on the subject (no pun intended!) in a 
number of places.

 

Gary f.

 

 

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 26-Oct-15 15:31
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

 

 

On Oct 26, 2015, at 12:26 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
wrote:

 

There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjective” and 
“objective” starting in the 17th century, but no such reversal with “subject” 
and “object.” This is explained in the Turning Signs chapter at  
<http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm, 
which includes (toward the end) Peirce’s entry on the matter in the Century 
Dictionary. As for changes in the usage of the term “subject”, another TS 
chapter goes into that:

 <http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/slf.htm> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/slf.htm. 
John Deely’s recent work covers the subject in much more detail.

 

 

Thank you very much for that Gary. I truly appreciate it.

 

What recent work of Deely’s were you thinking of? (I loved a lot of his work 
but haven’t kept up on what he’s been doing)

 

To what you were correcting I had thought that in addition to the issue with 
adjectives there was also the shift for Aristotle’s use of subject as substrate 
to the linguistic sense of subjects of predicates (which also comes from 
Aristotle originally I think). You included both in that second link.

 

I’ll confess I’m only loosely up on the history — usually just when an author 
deals with it in passing as they advance to their main topic. However it seems 
to me you get at the idea of “independent existence” versus “substance in which 
attributes inhere.” That was more what I was getting at. Maybe it is just my 
context, but I very rarely here this latter use and I’ve notice it confuses 
people at times. I’d assumed this was primarily a shift along with the shift in 
subjective. But I guess I was incorrect in that.

 

Thank you again for the links. I learned quite a bit from them and plan to read 
them again this weekend.

 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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Re: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Gary writes, 

> Your original question, “How is a sign embodied in two different objects?”, 
> does not make sense in that context.


Sense making? 

My original question stands; the additional text does not clarify the meaning 
for me.

I understand that you (Gary) can not make sense of the question.

Is it possible that from a wider perspective of symbol-making, that the 
sentence makes sense?

Some find that it requires substantial imagination to follow CSP texts.
Further, some find that different readers find different glosses for CSP's 
texts.

When I phrased the question, I was seeking understanding of the text.

Cheers

Jerry



On Oct 25, 2015, at 2:10 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 
> editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one 
> that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion 
> about Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the first 
> meaning you quote from the Apple dictionary. Here are the two paragraphs 
> together:
>  
> [[ I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will 
> try. A thought is notper se in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the 
> same sense as I might say that Right or Truth would remain what they are 
> though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a 
> thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A 
> thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of 
> dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self of 
> the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires a 
> mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination of 
> a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider 
> for example a blank-book. It is meant to be written in. Words written in that 
> in due order will have quite another force from the same words scattered 
> accidentally on the ground, even should these happen to have fallen into 
> collections which would have a meaning if written in the blank-book. The 
> language employed in discoursing to the reader, and the language employed to 
> express the thought to which the discourse relates should be kept distinct 
> and each should be selected for its peculiar fitness for the purpose it was 
> to serve. For the discoursing language I would use English, which has special 
> merits for the treatment of logic. For the language discoursed about, I would 
> use the system of Existential Graphs throughout which has no equal for this 
> purpose.
> I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
> its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
> mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
> Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
> necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
> of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another 
> subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the 
> communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it 
> really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet 
> we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what 
> that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these 
> apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the 
> immediate object from the dynamical object. ]]
>  
> The one sentence that you quoted from this in your earlier post says that the 
> Form (which is communicated or extended by the Sign) is embodied in two 
> subjects, in one of them independently of the communication, and in the other 
> as a consequence of the communication.  Your original question, “How is a 
> sign embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> } Wipe your glosses with what you know. [Finnegans Wake 304] {
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: 25-Oct-15 13:57
> To: Peirce List 
> 
>  
> List:
>  
> In a separate post, it is stated:
>  
> Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in 
> two differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; 
> even thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is 
> “embodied” when it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, 
> instead of being just a possibility.
>  
>  
> This assertion (usage) is problematic and certainly in remote from my 
> interpretation of the meaning of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 12:26 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjective” and 
> “objective” starting in the 17th century, but no such reversal with “subject” 
> and “object.” This is explained in the Turning Signs chapter at 
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm , 
> which includes (toward the end) Peirce’s entry on the matter in the Century 
> Dictionary. As for changes in the usage of the term “subject”, another TS 
> chapter goes into that:
> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/slf.htm . 
> John Deely’s recent work covers the subject in much more detail.
>  

Thank you very much for that Gary. I truly appreciate it.

What recent work of Deely’s were you thinking of? (I loved a lot of his work 
but haven’t kept up on what he’s been doing)

To what you were correcting I had thought that in addition to the issue with 
adjectives there was also the shift for Aristotle’s use of subject as substrate 
to the linguistic sense of subjects of predicates (which also comes from 
Aristotle originally I think). You included both in that second link.

I’ll confess I’m only loosely up on the history — usually just when an author 
deals with it in passing as they advance to their main topic. However it seems 
to me you get at the idea of “independent existence” versus “substance in which 
attributes inhere.” That was more what I was getting at. Maybe it is just my 
context, but I very rarely here this latter use and I’ve notice it confuses 
people at times. I’d assumed this was primarily a shift along with the shift in 
subjective. But I guess I was incorrect in that.

Thank you again for the links. I learned quite a bit from them and plan to read 
them again this weekend.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

 




Sung, List,

And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: Please forget what I wrote about nominalism, I have had the wrong idea about it: It obviously is not belief in names, but disbelief in types (universals)...

 

 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
-- Forwarded message ------
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 


 
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Frances, List,

You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, nothing could happen?

Best,

Helmut

 

 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
 frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
 


To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs or that 

Aw: Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

Sung, List,

And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A photon hits an atom: The photon and the atom (tokens) are the immediate object, the hitting event is the representamen, the effect (electron jumps to a higher orbit) is the interpretant, and the types "photon" and "atom" are the dynamical object? "Type" may be replaced with "intension", but not the intension of the human concepts "atom" or "photon", but the intension in the natural laws´ conceptuality- so, if concepts were by definition affairs of the mind, this pansemiotism would lead to panmentalism. Or is this nominalism? I dont know what nominalism is, because I cannot imagine a non-nominalism. As Elvis sang: "It´s only words, and words are all I have..."

Best,

Helmut

 

 26. Oktober 2015 um 01:52 Uhr
"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
 


Hi,
 

Correction: 

 

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to 

". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 
 

 

 
-- Forwarded message ------
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

 
Helmut. lists,
 

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . "

 

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".  Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.  

 

 

                                   f                 g

                Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
                 (Object)                              (Interpretant)

                     |                                             ^
                     |                                             |
                     |__|
                                           h

 

Figure 1.  Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 


 
On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Frances, List,

You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, nothing could happen?

Best,

Helmut

 

 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
 frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
 


To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representam

RE: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[gnox]

Jerry, you were ostensibly asking a question about Peirce’s text.

Peirce’s text does not say, nor does it imply, that a sign is “embodied in two 
different objects.”

Therefore your original question, as it stands, does not pertain to Peirce’s 
text, which is the context I referred to.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: 26-Oct-15 13:08
To: Peirce List 



 

List:

 

Gary writes, 

 

Your original question, “How is a sign embodied in two different objects?”, 
does not make sense in that context.

 

Sense making? 

 

My original question stands; the additional text does not clarify the meaning 
for me.

 

I understand that you (Gary) can not make sense of the question.

 

Is it possible that from a wider perspective of symbol-making, that the 
sentence makes sense?

 

Some find that it requires substantial imagination to follow CSP texts.

Further, some find that different readers find different glosses for CSP's 
texts.

 

When I phrased the question, I was seeking understanding of the text.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

 

 

On Oct 25, 2015, at 2:10 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:





Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 
editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one 
that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion about 
Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the first meaning you 
quote from the Apple dictionary. Here are the two paragraphs together:

 

[[ I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will 
try. A thought is notper se in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same 
sense as I might say that Right or Truth would remain what they are though they 
were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain 
any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special 
variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from 
the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the 
general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if 
external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind 
is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for example a blank-book. It is 
meant to be written in. Words written in that in due order will have quite 
another force from the same words scattered accidentally on the ground, even 
should these happen to have fallen into collections which would have a meaning 
if written in the blank-book. The language employed in discoursing to the 
reader, and the language employed to express the thought to which the discourse 
relates should be kept distinct and each should be selected for its peculiar 
fitness for the purpose it was to serve. For the discoursing language I would 
use English, which has special merits for the treatment of logic. For the 
language discoursed about, I would use the system of Existential Graphs 
throughout which has no equal for this purpose.

I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by 
something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant 
or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order 
rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In 
order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it 
should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in 
which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The 
Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]

 

The one sentence that you quoted from this in your earlier post says that the 
Form (which is communicated or extended by the Sign) is embodied in two 
subjects, in one of them independently of the communication, and in the other 
as a consequence of the communication.  Your original question, “How is a sign 
embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context.

 

Gary f.

 

} Wipe your glosses with what you know. [Finnegans Wake 304] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 13:57
To: Peirce List  >




 

List:

 

In a separate post, it is stated:

 

Jerry, the sign 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 25, 2015, at 8:36 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
>  There is reason to think that the sense of the word ''object'' that means 
> objective, purpose, target, intention, goal, end, aim, and so on is more 
> fundamental than the more restrictive sense of a compact physical object. 
> That is in fact one of the most critical insights that comes down to us from 
> long lines of physical theory and also from the traditions known as “process 
> thinking”, suggesting that our concepts of physical objects are derivative in 
> relation to our concepts of process, since they arise from our ability to 
> discover “invariants under transformations”, that is, the formal constructs 
> that are preserved by the operations or processes that transform the states 
> of a system.

Just a quick thought before I have to go silent for a while.

We should remember that our current terminology largely arises out of 
Descartes. Prior to that point the terms object and subject were largely 
reversed. Given Peirce’s influence from the scholastics and his overreaching 
critique of Descartes we should always read carefully with the terms. (Of 
course Peirce being a product of his time also has to use the common 
vernacular) Typically in passages it’s not that hard to figure out how he’s 
using the terms. But when reading short snippets it’s easy to get confused. (Or 
maybe I should say I easily get confused)

While I’m skeptical of how well it captures the mature Peirce’s thought, Kelly 
Parker’s work on Peirce as a neoplatonist is well worth considering here. The 
origin of Peirce’s cosmology in semiotics tells us a lot about how he conceives 
of objects. We just have to be careful since most of Parker’s paper deals with 
texts from early on as Peirce was working out his ideas.


> On Oct 25, 2015, at 4:13 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> So for Peirce it is communication or extension (what is extension in this 
> case btw?), and for you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an 
> object) belong to the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of 
> communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, 
> what Peirce means by "extension"? 

I think interaction has to be part of it. Consider indexical signs like a 
weather vane for instance. I think that the notion of communication is wide 
enough to capture this. Although in practice people tend to use the term more 
narrowly as just linguistic communication. When we think of communication as 
the idea of transport then I think Peirce’s notions make much more sense. 
(Especially the key index and icon aspects of the sign)

The quote Gary put up yesterday seems quite good at getting at what Peirce 
means by quasi-mind. If there are signs there are quasi-minds. 

The only reason I might quibble between the terms interaction and communication 
is that the former often refers to secondness while the latter emphasizes the 
idea of something being communicated between two subjects. This relationship 
between secondness and thirdness is of course quite important for understanding 
what goes on.



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Clark, list,

 

There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjective” and 
“objective” starting in the 17th century, but no such reversal with “subject” 
and “object.” This is explained in the Turning Signs chapter at 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm, which includes (toward the end) Peirce’s 
entry on the matter in the Century Dictionary. As for changes in the usage of 
the term “subject”, another TS chapter goes into that:

http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/slf.htm. John Deely’s recent work covers the 
subject in much more detail.

 

Gary f.

 

} You can read the signs. You've been on this road before. [Laurie Anderson] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 26-Oct-15 11:52
To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

 

 

On Oct 25, 2015, at 8:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net 
<mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:

 

 There is reason to think that the sense of the word ''object'' that means 
objective, purpose, target, intention, goal, end, aim, and so on is more 
fundamental than the more restrictive sense of a compact physical object. That 
is in fact one of the most critical insights that comes down to us from long 
lines of physical theory and also from the traditions known as “process 
thinking”, suggesting that our concepts of physical objects are derivative in 
relation to our concepts of process, since they arise from our ability to 
discover “invariants under transformations”, that is, the formal constructs 
that are preserved by the operations or processes that transform the states of 
a system.

 

Just a quick thought before I have to go silent for a while.

 

We should remember that our current terminology largely arises out of 
Descartes. Prior to that point the terms object and subject were largely 
reversed. Given Peirce’s influence from the scholastics and his overreaching 
critique of Descartes we should always read carefully with the terms. (Of 
course Peirce being a product of his time also has to use the common 
vernacular) Typically in passages it’s not that hard to figure out how he’s 
using the terms. But when reading short snippets it’s easy to get confused. (Or 
maybe I should say I easily get confused)

 

While I’m skeptical of how well it captures the mature Peirce’s thought, Kelly 
Parker’s work on Peirce as a neoplatonist is well worth considering here. The 
origin of Peirce’s cosmology in semiotics tells us a lot about how he conceives 
of objects. We just have to be careful since most of Parker’s paper deals with 
texts from early on as Peirce was working out his ideas.

 

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477

 

Gary f.

 

} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  

 

  

List,

I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, 
and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its 
permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that 
is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, 
an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. 
So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not 
permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a 
representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is 
it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited 
clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following 
sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same 
entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an 
event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal 
clipping from a result, which result is an event again.

A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one 
entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that 
apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and 
place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real 
space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in 
an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair 
understandable for me.

Best,

Helmut

 

Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or 
otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been 
positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the 
case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas 
or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.






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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Sungchul Ji]

by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen,
> but not necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms
> and things and beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of
> other objects and as signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is
> felt to permeate the whole phenomenal being of the world.
>
> (In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and
> semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often
> vague, and perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called 
> representants
> and referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as
> vehicles and mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal 
> representamen
> and existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually 
> signs
> of objects.)
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca
> <http://g...@gnusystems.ca>]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM
> *To:* 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
>
>
>
> Helmut,
>
> Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and
> dynamic(al) object.
>
>  [[ I use the word “*Sign*” in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something,
> called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be
> borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object
> and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or
> communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a
> Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there
> should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in
> consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of
> the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent
> of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can
> be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to
> reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to
> distinguish the* immediate* object from the* dynamical* object. ]]
> —EP2:477
>
> Gary f.
>
> } The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
>
> *http://gnusystems.ca/wp/* <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> }{* Turning Signs*
> gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [*mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de*
> <http://h.raul...@gmx.de>]
> *Sent:* 25-Oct-15 07:16
>
> List,
>
> I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common
> understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main
> trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an
> entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time).
> But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad:
> Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to
> this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce
> writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which
> denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve
> this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt
> of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object
> is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a
> similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event
> (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal
> clipping from a result, which result is an event again.
>
> A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than
> one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities,
> that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same
> time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place
> in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is
> a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole
> affair understandable for me.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or
> otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having
> been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while
> in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity
> (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.
>
>
>
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> o

Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

Correction:

Please change "  . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any
communication." in my previous post to
". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."

Thanks.

Sung





-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>


Helmut. lists,

" . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of
interaction- . . . "

I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication".
Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many
examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists.  This
is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic.  In
other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication.  Only
triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1.


   f g
Person A  -->  Sign  --->  Person B
 (Object)  (Interpretant)
 | ^
 | |
 |__|
   h

*Figure 1. * Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication".  A
can interact with B   by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and
g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to
receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common
language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas).  A is said to
communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF
and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic.  f = sign production;
g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e.,
communication

All the best.

Sung


On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Frances, List,
> You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and
> what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited:
> "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the
> communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is
> communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for
> you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to
> the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be
> widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by
> "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because
> everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an
> interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I
> guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or
> mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in
> a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind,
> nothing could happen?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr
>  frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote:
>
>
> To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth.
>
> Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need
> only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield
> phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can
> be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that
> are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly
> be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. 
> Existent
> synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not
> yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until
> they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent
> semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by
> signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal
> representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose
> formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole
> represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a
> ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject.
>
> The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects
> and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or
> hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It se

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

The dynamic object, according to Peirce, does not have to be a real thing; it 
can be “altogether fictive”. One example he gives is “Hamlet’s madness.” 
Although it is imaginary, it still determines the embodiment in a subject (such 
as the reader of Shakespeare or a member of a theater audience) of a form which 
is the thought-sign of that object, which in turn determines an interpretant 
(such as an actor’s performance of the role, or a reader’s impression of the 
character).

 

The unicorn is imaginary, but as an idea it already exists in the public 
domain, and that quasi-existing idea is the dynamic object of the general sign 
“unicorn.” Your personal idea of a unicorn as you read this sentence, on the 
other hand, is the immediate object of your present use of the word to 
represent the unicorn.

 

Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in two 
different subjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; even 
thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is “embodied” when 
it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, instead of being 
just a possibility.

 

Gary f.

 

} Where the body is, there the eagles will be gathered together. [Luke 17:37, 
RSV]

Where the corpse is, there the vultures will gather. [Luke 17:37, New English 
Bible] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 12:32



 

Gary F.,

Thank you! Now I understand it like: The triad representamen / immediate object 
/ interpretant is irreducible, and the interpretant is possibly a representamen 
again, in the next sign, that relates to the same dynamical object. But this 
only accounts for cases, in which a dynamical object exists. Or is there always 
one? For example: A unicorn in a fantasy story: Does it not have a dynamical 
object, or is the dynamical object merely unknown, might be a horse and a 
narwhale skeleton, which two items a drunken sailor had combined in his mind on 
12th october 1614? I mean, when Peirce writes: "It is necessary that it should 
have been really embodied in a subject independently of the conmmunication", 
that would mean, that there cannot be a pure fantasy. Interesting, but can make 
sense, I think.

Best,

Helmut

 25. Oktober 2015 um 13:41 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca  
 

Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477

 


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Re: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

In a separate post, it is stated:

> Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in 
> two differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; 
> even thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is 
> “embodied” when it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, 
> instead of being just a possibility.
>  

This assertion (usage) is problematic and certainly in remote from my 
interpretation of the meaning of the EP2:477. 

The dictionary definition of "embody" is the meaning CSP is referring to, I 
presume (because of his background in logic and chemistry):

Apple dictionary states:

"embody" as defined in a dictionary is the meaning that I refer to:

embody |emˈbädē|
verb ( embodies, embodying, embodied ) [ with obj. ]
1 be an expression of or give a tangible or visible form to (an idea, quality, 
orfeeling): a team that embodies competitive spirit and skill.
• provide (a spirit) with a physical form.
2 include or contain (something) as a constituent part: the changes in law 
embodiedin the Freedom of Information Act.


Gary's usage is problematic.

CSP usage (as well as the dictionary's and mine) are consistent with usages 
such as "atoms are embodied in molecules"
Or, propositional terms are embodied in propositional logic.
Or, "DNA is embodied as a chemical fact of biological reproductions"

Cheers

Jerry


On Oct 25, 2015, at 11:32 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

> List:
> 
> On Oct 25, 2015, at 7:41 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
>> it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject 
>> independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be 
>> another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of 
>> the communication.
> 
> Are there two mysteries associated with EP2:477?
> 
> What is the philosophical meaning of embodiment in this context?
> 
> How is a sign embodied in two different objects?
> 
> What is the meaningful distinction between  "communication" in 
> 
>> should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
>> communication
> 
> and "communication" in
> 
>> same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication.
> 
> 
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[frances.kelly]

To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. 

Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be 
nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal 
existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be synechastic 
objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that are either not signs 
or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly be mystically phantural, or 
materially physical, or mentally psychical. Existent synechastic objects 
initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not yet signs nor semiotic 
tridents or terns in their formal structure, until they become semiosic objects 
by way of representation; but some existent semiosic objects also need not be 
signs, until enacted as signs by signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely 
to become phenomenal representamen that are signs by way of represented 
evolution, and whose formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is 
composed of a sole represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred 
objects in a ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. 

The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects and 
the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or 
hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It seems that the immediate referred 
object determines the immediate vehicular representamen, and that this form of 
vehicle then determines and is embedded in the immediate interpretant subject, 
and that this immediate interpretant subject determines both the dynamic 
referred object together with the dynamic interpretant subject, and that this 
dynamic interpretant subject determines the final interpretant subject. The 
dependence of these semiosic forms would seem to be in the reverse order. 

The whole wide world is felt by stuff to be a phenomenal representamen, but not 
necessarily as an object nor a sign or signer. What makes forms and things and 
beings and objects and mediums into signs, and as signs of other objects and as 
signers of signs, is the act of representation, which is felt to permeate the 
whole phenomenal being of the world. 

(In the first grand division of informative or grammatic semiotics and 
semiosis, the common terms of sign and object and subject are often vague, and 
perhaps for contextual clarity should therein be called representants and 
referentants and interpretants. Furthermore, all semiosic forms as vehicles and 
mediums and objects and subjects are in fact phenomenal representamen and 
existent objects, and all such objects in fact are mostly and usually signs of 
objects.) 


From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, 25 October, 2015 8:42 AM
To: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

Helmut,
Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and 
dynamic(al) object.
 [[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called 
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in 
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the 
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is 
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently 
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject 
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. 
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]  —EP2:477
Gary f.
} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, 
and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its 
permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that 
is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, 
an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. 
So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not 
permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a 
representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is 
it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary l

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F.,

Thank you! Now I understand it like: The triad representamen / immediate object / interpretant is irreducible, and the interpretant is possibly a representamen again, in the next sign, that relates to the same dynamical object. But this only accounts for cases, in which a dynamical object exists. Or is there always one? For example: A unicorn in a fantasy story: Does it not have a dynamical object, or is the dynamical object merely unknown, might be a horse and a narwhale skeleton, which two items a drunken sailor had combined in his mind on 12th october 1614? I mean, when Peirce writes: "It is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a subject independently of the conmmunication", that would mean, that there cannot be a pure fantasy. Interesting, but can make sense, I think.


Best,

Helmut


 25. Oktober 2015 um 13:41 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut,

 

Peirce’s solution to your problem is the distinction between immediate and dynamic(al) object.

 

[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. ]]  —EP2:477

 

Gary f.

 


} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway


 




From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16  



 





  



List,



I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in the Peircean sense, an object is part of an irreducible triad: Representamen, object, interpretant. So it is spatiotemporally limited to this one sign, and therefore not permanent. On the other hand, Peirce writes, that an interpretant can become a representamen again, which denotes the same object. This is not consistent, is it? I might only solve this problem by saying: An object is a temporary limited clipping/excerpt of an entity, as it appears in one sign. In the following sign, the object is a different one: Another clipping, but from the same entity. In a similar manner, a representamen is a spatial clipping from an event (limited in time, but not in space), and an interpretant a spatiotemporal clipping from a result, which result is an event again.



A second problem is, that an event can, and usually does, affect more than one entity. So maybe an object is the sum of all clippings from entities, that apeear in a Sign, i.e. that are interacting with an event at the same time and place. The place in the semiosis with a dynamic object is a place in real space, and the place of a semiosis/Sign with an immediate object is a place in an imagined space. These proposals at least might make the whole affair understandable for me.



Best,



Helmut



 



Supplement: In case of dynamic object, the sign process is a mixing- or otherwise combining-process of two or more matterginetic entities having been positioned side by side from the start. This is somehow special, while in the case of immediate object it is quite regular: More than one entity (eg. ideas or memory contents), combined in the mind to one objective.





 











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Embodiment Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

On Oct 25, 2015, at 7:41 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject 
> independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be 
> another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the 
> communication.

Are there two mysteries associated with EP2:477?

What is the philosophical meaning of embodiment in this context?

How is a sign embodied in two different objects?

What is the meaningful distinction between  "communication" in 

> should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
> communication

and "communication" in

> same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication.



Cheers

Jerry






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RE: Embodiment (Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?)

[gnox]

Jerry, EP2:477 is from a 1906 letter from Peirce to Lady Welby, and the EP2 
editors chose to omit part of it, including the paragraph preceding the one 
that I quoted. Restoring this context may help to clear up your confusion about 
Peirce’s usage of “embodied,” which is compatible with the first meaning you 
quote from the Apple dictionary. Here are the two paragraphs together:

 

[[ I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will 
try. A thought is not per se in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in the same 
sense as I might say that Right or Truth would remain what they are though they 
were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But a thought, to gain 
any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A thought is a special 
variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from 
the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the 
general future. Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if 
external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind 
is itself a sign, a determinable sign. Consider for example a blank-book. It is 
meant to be written in. Words written in that in due order will have quite 
another force from the same words scattered accidentally on the ground, even 
should these happen to have fallen into collections which would have a meaning 
if written in the blank-book. The language employed in discoursing to the 
reader, and the language employed to express the thought to which the discourse 
relates should be kept distinct and each should be selected for its peculiar 
fitness for the purpose it was to serve. For the discoursing language I would 
use English, which has special merits for the treatment of logic. For the 
language discoursed about, I would use the system of Existential Graphs 
throughout which has no equal for this purpose. 

I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication 
or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by 
something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant 
or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order 
rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In 
order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it 
should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the 
communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in 
which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The 
Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the 
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must 
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it 
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it 
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. 
]]

 

The one sentence that you quoted from this in your earlier post says that the 
Form (which is communicated or extended by the Sign) is embodied in two 
subjects, in one of them independently of the communication, and in the other 
as a consequence of the communication.  Your original question, “How is a sign 
embodied in two different objects?”, does not make sense in that context.

 

Gary f.

 

} Wipe your glosses with what you know. [Finnegans Wake 304] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-15 13:57
To: Peirce List 



 

List:

 

In a separate post, it is stated:

 

Jerry, the sign is not embodied in two different objects, it is embodied in two 
differentsubjects. Communication always involves at least two subjects; even 
thought, according to Peirce, is dialogic. Any given thought is “embodied” when 
it actually occurs to (or is initiated by) a living subject, instead of being 
just a possibility.

 

 

This assertion (usage) is problematic and certainly in remote from my 
interpretation of the meaning of the EP2:477. 

 

The dictionary definition of "embody" is the meaning CSP is referring to, I 
presume (because of his background in logic and chemistry):

 

Apple dictionary states:

 

"embody" as defined in a dictionary is the meaning that I refer to:

 

embody |emˈbädē|verb ( embodies, embodying, embodied ) [ with obj. ]1 be an 
expression of or give a tangible or visible form to (an idea, quality, 
orfeeling): a team that embodies competitive spirit and skill.• provide (a 
spirit) with a physical form.2 include or contain (something) as a constituent 
part: the changes in law embodiedin the Freedom of Information Act.

Gary's usage is problematic.
CSP usage (as well as the dictionary's and mine) are consistent with usages 
such as "atoms are embodied in molecules"

Or, propositional terms