Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I share Peirce's preference for the terms Breadth and Depth, rather than
extension and intension, and suspect that there are subtle differences in
their meanings.  What I have proposed is that the Immediate Object
corresponds to Essential Breadth and the General Object corresponds to
Substantial Breadth, more or less as Peirce defined those terms in 1867.

I am not sure what you mean by "the categorial-modal affair," since I do
not conceive of semiosis in those terms.

I follow Peirce in viewing all semiosis of any kind as dialogical,
requiring three Quasi-minds--the Utterer, the Interpreter, and the
Commens--but recognizing that they may correspond to three temporal phases
of the *same *Quasi-mind.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Thank you for clarification! Is it so, that the general object and the
> final interpretant (of a rheme) are what in some other theory is the
> extension and the intension of a term?
>
> Before, I had assumed, that these (in- and extension) might be the two
> submodes (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) of the DO.
>
> How does the general object fit into the categorial-modal affair?
>
> And is it so, that we are talking about language-communication-signs, for
> which the sign system is two or more individuals, and that it is also
> possible to talk about a thought-sign of one person who hears, reads, or
> just thinks the term, and that in this case the stuff applies I had
> written, with primisense, altersense, medisense?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

Thank you for clarification! Is it so, that the general object and the final interpretant (of a rheme) are what in some other theory is the extension and the intension of a term?

 

Before, I had assumed, that these (in- and extension) might be the two submodes (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) of the DO.

 

How does the general object fit into the categorial-modal affair?

 

And is it so, that we are talking about language-communication-signs, for which the sign system is two or more individuals, and that it is also possible to talk about a thought-sign of one person who hears, reads, or just thinks the term, and that in this case the stuff applies I had written, with primisense, altersense, medisense?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

14. September 2018 um 00:26 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Edwina, Helmut, List:
 

I could comment on what I consider to be several fundamental misunderstandings throughout this exchange, but Gary R. already pointed out a few of them; so instead, I will simply take the opportunity to illustrate (and hopefully clarify further) why I am now advocating the notion of a General Object for every Sign (Type).

 

The word "dog" is a common noun, which makes it a term in traditional logic, a Rheme in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy ("_ is a dog"), and a Seme in his later taxonomies.  As such, the Immediate Interpretant is its meaning within the Sign System of written English, and the Immediate Object is the range of what a Replica of "dog" possibly could denote accordingly to someone with mere Sign System Acquaintance, consisting entirely of all such definitions and nothing else (Essential Knowledge).

 

The Dynamic Object is the individual that a Replica of "dog" actually does denote to someone with previous Collateral Experience of dogs in a single concrete Instance of the Sign, which is an occurrence that produces a feeling, exertion, or other Sign-Instance as the Dynamic Interpretant in accordance with fallible Interpretative Habits (Informed Knowledge).  I agree with Edwina that this only (or at least primarily) happens when the Replica of the term/Rheme/Seme is involved in a Replica of a proposition/Dicisign/Pheme, such as "Buster is a dog," "Any dog is a mammal," "This dog is a poodle," "Some dog is black," or even a child simply pointing at a dog and saying "Dog!"

 

The General Object is the collection of all Real dogs, which is what the Sign (Type) necessarily would denote in the final opinion at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community, corresponding to the Final Interpretant that would be produced in accordance with infallible Interpretative Habits (Substantial Knowledge).  I disagree with Edwina that this implies Platonism, because--entirely consistent with Aristotelianism, specifically Peirce's extreme scholastic realism--the General Object is a Reality that only exists in its members, which are all particular dogs.  Likewise, the Sign (Type) only exists in its Replicas; or more precisely, in its Instances (Tokens).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Helmut, you wrote:

"I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog"."

Yes - you have to process the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign further to get the specifics, but - the FACT that a rhematic iconic qualisign emerged in your sensations - is due to the fact that a dog or something/animal is in the room. Your experience of that dog is as a rhematic iconic qualisign, i.e, that sensation/feeling of something there..You then process it further - and can interpret as 'a dog' and even 'that dog'...

Edwina

On Thu 13/09/18 4:19 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, list,

 

I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like what Peirce called "primisense".

If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like: "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...". When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is not a dog, because it does not bark".

So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.

I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".

 

Best,

Helmut

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

Yes, I wrote: "And therefore, in a sense, no DO or even IO. One must
even wonder if it is a Sign, that triad of O-R-I?! Or is it the
"nothing of boundless freedom', or potentiality' [6.219] that is
somehow connected, in a few seconds -  to semiosis [the triadic use
of this potentiality] as a source of the potential?"

Yes, I do wonder if a force in a state of pure Firstness is a
triadic Sign. I suggest that it is not.  But note, the Rhematic
Iconic Qualisign - is indeed, one of Peirce's classes of Signs - and
all three Relations are in a mode of Firstness. It is, as he wrote:
'any quality insofar as it is a sign' [2.254]..and is 'interpreted as
s sign of essence, that is, a Rheme". That is, the interactions among
the triad are, in Firstness, expressed as 'feeling'. So- I don't
understand your quibble about its being a state of pure feeling. 

And I apologize - I should clarify; I'm not talking about a Relation
in a triad that is in a mode of Firstness - which can be called a
Rheme - and is that state of pre-conscious feeling. I'm talking about
the mode of Firstness as it is ..as it is articulated in matter before
being constrained within the semiosic unit. 

I agree there is no such thing as an 'Icon'; but the Relation
between the DO and R can be 'iconic'; i.e., in a mode of Firstness.
So I'm not sure of your point.

But that is not what I am wondering about. My question is the
natural force of spontaneity, of chance, of freedom in our world, 
which is not yet a triadic sign - and what is it? We have enough
descriptions of Firstness in Peirce to understand its nature:
'presentness...'The present, being such as it is while utterly
ignoring everything else, is positively such as it is". 5.44. This
suggests to me - that this force is NOT harnessed by any Relations.

As Peirce noted, in his discussion of 'Absolute Chance [6.47--] he
rejects the arguments that 'absolute chance is inconceivable'; that
it is unintelligible'..and concludes 'by thus admitting pure
spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and
everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing
infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with
infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of
the universe" 6.59.  

Chance, spontaneity, that absence of Relations -- are attributes of
Firstness - and I consider that it IS 'pure Firstness'. 

Edwina
 On Thu 13/09/18  3:11 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, list,
 In recent posts you've suggested that a Rheme is pure 1ns despite
the fact that Peirce held that there was no such thing as pure 1ns
even in phenomenology let alone semeiotic. Indeed, when one does turn
to semeiotic, he held that there isn't even a pure icon, that such
signs may at best be icon ic. 
 1898 | On Existential Graphs  | MS [R] 484:4-5

. . . A pure icon, could such a sign exist, would present to us a
pure sense-quality, without any parts nor any respects, and
consequently without positive generality. But in fact there is no
pure icon. . . 

You've written that a Rheme is a "state of pure feeling," whereas
Peirce offers no semeiotic but only phenomenological thought
experiments to suggest what might be analogous to the quality
(feeling) of 1ns as such, for example, awakening to a particular
color or sound which, out of time and space, would consume ones
hypothetical instantaneous consciousness. Here's a generalized
account of what "a state of pure feeling" (actually impossible) might
be like. 
 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise
 | CP 2.85

Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present
instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only
guess; for nothing is more occult than the absolute present. There
plainly could be no action. . . There might be a sort of
consciousness, or feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have
its tone. . . I do not think there could be any continuity like
space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an
educated mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all;
and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized;
and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There could not
even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of
vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general
consciousness by a feeling. . .  The world would be reduced to a
quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of
binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality.
I may call its form Firstness. . .
 You've even suggested that the Rheme is not a Sign at all. Well,
that flies in the face of everything I know that Peirce ever wrote
about the Rheme, which he will refer to otherwise, and 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

FB:  Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to
explicating what that notion meant in 1904.


Of course we have an alternative--we can take into account Peirce's *further
development* of that notion over the subsequent years.  Why should we be
limited to his writings of 1904-1906, and precluded from incorporating
those of 1907-1908?

FB:  As far as I know, there is no reference in Peirce's writings to the
fact that quantification is an aspect of the IO


There is also no reference in Peirce's writings to the alleged "fact" that
a Rheme does not have an IO.  These are two different *interpretations *of
his writings, which lead to two different *frameworks *for understanding
Signs and semiosis.

FB:  If rhemes had an IO, since the IO is the indication of the DO, where
is such an indication in a rheme?


In the significant characters (Tones) of its Replicas.  Any competent
reader of English knows what "man," as a particular configuration of ink on
paper or pixels on a screen, *may *denote within that particular Sign
System.  This is what I take to be the Rheme's *Immediate *Object, the
*idea *that its Replica calls up in the mind upon being *recognized* as a
Token of the Type--the range of its *possible *Objects for someone who
knew only the meanings of various Sign-Replicas, corresponding to the
Immediate Interpretant that *could be *produced in accordance with *minimal
*Interpretative Habits.

The *Dynamic *Object is the individual that a single *Instance *of the
Sign--an occurrence, not an enduring entity--*does *denote, which always
depends on Collateral Experience and corresponds to a Dynamic Interpretant
that *actually is *produced in accordance with *fallible * Interpretative
Habits.  The *General *Object is the complete collection or continuum of
Real Objects that any Sign-Instance *would *denote in the final opinion at
the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community, which corresponds to
the Final Interpretant that *would be* produced in accordance with *infallible
* Interpretative Habits.

Put another way ...

   - The General Object, Sign (Type), and Final Interpretant are in a *genuine
   *triadic relation that *would be* realized in the state of
*Substantial *Knowledge
   (complete omniscience).
   - The Dynamic Object, Sign-Instance (occurrence of a Token), and Dynamic
   Interpretant are in a *degenerate *triadic relation that *actually*
*is *realized
   in the state of *Informed *Knowledge (finite Collateral Experience).
   - The Immediate Object, Sign-Replica (entity) with its characters
   (Tones), and Immediate Interpretant are in a *doubly degenerate* triadic
   relation that *could be* realized in the state of *Essential *Knowledge
   (mere Sign System Acquaintance).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 1:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.
>>
>> FB:  Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO
>> are either p, s, or u.
>>
>>
>> Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
>> general (not universal).
>>
>
> There is plenty of evidence that in that context vague means particular
> and general means universal. Cf. the relevant parts of R 7–11 (c. 1903) and
> of R 399 (entries of 1905)
>
>
>> In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's 1904-1906
>> efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a viable framework for
>> understanding Signs and their relations based on Peirce's *entire *corpus,
>> especially his late writings.
>>
>
> Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to explicating
> what that notion meant in 1904.
>
>
>> He eventually generalized the division of Signs according to the IO as
>> Descriptive/Designative/Copulative, which is *not *inherently limited to
>> propositions.  All Symbols (including propositions) are Copulative overall,
>> Designative with respect to Rhemes that serve as subjects, and Descriptive
>> with respect to Rhemes that serve as predicates.
>>
>
> I wrote in my book that the notion of Io changed after 1907 in consequence
> of the discovery of continuous predicates. But this is of little help in
> explicating what the IO was in 1904.
>
>>
>> FB:  This means that only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible
>> according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are
>> divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are
>> divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).
>>
>>
>> Or it means that Peirce *primarily *had propositions in mind when he
>> wrote the word "signs" *in that context*.
>>
>
> Exactly!
>
>
>> Again, my interpretation is that quantification is an *aspect* (not
>> "part") of the IO *of a proposition*, 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List


> I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.
>
> FB:  Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
> either p, s, or u.
>
>
> Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
> general (not universal).
>

There is plenty of evidence that in that context vague means particular and
general means universal. Cf. the relevant parts of R 7–11 (c. 1903) and of
R 399 (entries of 1905)


> In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's 1904-1906
> efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a viable framework for
> understanding Signs and their relations based on Peirce's *entire *corpus,
> especially his late writings.
>

Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to explicating
what that notion meant in 1904.


> He eventually generalized the division of Signs according to the IO as
> Descriptive/Designative/Copulative, which is *not *inherently limited to
> propositions.  All Symbols (including propositions) are Copulative overall,
> Designative with respect to Rhemes that serve as subjects, and Descriptive
> with respect to Rhemes that serve as predicates.
>

I wrote in my book that the notion of Io changed after 1907 in consequence
of the discovery of continuous predicates. But this is of little help in
explicating what the IO was in 1904.

>
> FB:  This means that only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible
> according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are
> divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are
> divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).
>
>
> Or it means that Peirce *primarily *had propositions in mind when he
> wrote the word "signs" *in that context*.
>

Exactly!


> Again, my interpretation is that quantification is an *aspect* (not
> "part") of the IO *of a proposition*, but is not intrinsic to the concept
> of the IO *in general*.
>

As far as I know, there is no reference in Peirce's writings to the fact
that quantification is an aspect of the IO


> Specifically, I continue to maintain that quantification is what converts
> the *general *Object of the subject Rheme into the *individual *Object of
> its Replica for a particular *Instance *of the proposition.  Otherwise,
> why did Peirce explicitly say elsewhere that *every *Sign has an IO?  By
> contrast, as far as I know, he *never *said that *any *class of Sign *does
> not* have an IO.
>
> FB:  That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is
> what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal",
> the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either
> not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is
> "For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in
> "Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is
> mortal".
>
>
> That is *one *way to analyze a proposition--throwing everything into the
> predicate except the quantification.  Another is to "throw into the subject
> everything that can be removed from the predicate," which Peirce
> evidently came to prefer because it carries the analysis "to its ultimate
> elements" (SS 71-72; 1908).  In "Any/Some/This man is mortal," the
> subjects are "Any/Some/This man" (Designative) and "mortality"
> (Descriptive), while the (continuous) predicate is "_ possesses the
> character of _" (Copulative).
>

Again, this alternative analysis was possible after the discovery of
continuous predicates. But to use the notion of continuous predicate to
explicate the 1904 notion of IO is to put the cart before the horse

>
> FB:  The predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have
> "subjects", they are not quantified.
>
>
> Rhemes do not *have *subjects, but they *serve *as the subjects of
> propositions
>

I fully agree. Being IOs, they do not have IOs


> as I just outlined.  That being the case, here is what I sincerely would
> like to understand from a *systematic *standpoint.  If Rhemes (including
> terms) did not have *Immediate *Objects, how could they have *Dynamic 
> *Objects?
>
>

If rhemes had an IO, since the IO is the indication of the DO, where is
such an indication in a rheme? "_ is man" is a rheme. The alleged
indication cannot be the rheme itself! Here the idea that a proposition
separately indicates its object can be usefully employed: a rheme does not
have a separate part that indicates the DO, and yet it has a DO, i.e.
everything that satisfies the characters implied by being a man.

Best
Francesco

>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 12:31 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List
>>
>> Thanks for the summary.
>>
>> To say that particular/singular/universal is 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.

FB:  Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
either p, s, or u.


Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
general (not universal).  In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to
explicate Peirce's 1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to
develop a viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations
based on Peirce's *entire *corpus, especially his late writings.  He
eventually generalized the division of Signs according to the IO as
Descriptive/Designative/Copulative, which is *not *inherently limited to
propositions.  All Symbols (including propositions) are Copulative overall,
Designative with respect to Rhemes that serve as subjects, and Descriptive
with respect to Rhemes that serve as predicates.

FB:  This means that only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible
according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are
divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are
divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).


Or it means that Peirce *primarily *had propositions in mind when he wrote
the word "signs" *in that context*.  Again, my interpretation is that
quantification is an *aspect* (not "part") of the IO *of a proposition*,
but is not intrinsic to the concept of the IO *in general*.  Specifically,
I continue to maintain that quantification is what converts the
*general *Object
of the subject Rheme into the *individual *Object of its Replica for a
particular *Instance *of the proposition.  Otherwise, why did Peirce
explicitly say elsewhere that *every *Sign has an IO?  By contrast, as far
as I know, he *never *said that *any *class of Sign *does not* have an IO.

FB:  That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is
what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal",
the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either
not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is
"For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in
"Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is
mortal".


That is *one *way to analyze a proposition--throwing everything into the
predicate except the quantification.  Another is to "throw into the subject
everything that can be removed from the predicate," which Peirce evidently
came to prefer because it carries the analysis "to its ultimate elements" (SS
71-72; 1908).  In "Any/Some/This man is mortal," the subjects are
"Any/Some/This man" (Designative) and "mortality" (Descriptive), while the
(continuous) predicate is "_ possesses the character of _"
(Copulative).

FB:  The predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have
"subjects", they are not quantified.


Rhemes do not *have *subjects, but they *serve *as the subjects of
propositions, as I just outlined.  That being the case, here is what I
sincerely would like to understand from a *systematic *standpoint.  If
Rhemes (including terms) did not have *Immediate *Objects, how could they
have *Dynamic *Objects?  How could they have Logical *Breadth*, as Peirce
explicitly affirmed, if there were nothing in the Sign-Replica itself that
somehow "hints" at its Object?  More narrowly, how could they have *Essential
*Breadth corresponding to the *minimal *state of knowledge that *only
*encompasses
the meanings of words?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 12:31 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> Thanks for the summary.
>
> To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is
> to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e.
> that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906
> that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that
> only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for
> otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to
> the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO
> into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g  and
> since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
> follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.
>
> Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly
> means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that
> non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if one wonders 
> *what
> on earth *the IO of a proposition is, that non-propositional signs have
> no IO becomes evident.
>
> For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g,
> that which constitutes the 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Francesco, Jon S, List,


I find the interpretative argument that only propositions and arguments have 
immediate objects interesting, but I'm trying to square it with other things 
Peirce says about immediate objects and the classification of signs.


Consider the following passage, where Peirce characterizes the immediate object 
of a percept:


The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, 
the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with Pragmaticism, which holds 
that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought proper is Conduct. Nothing is 
more indispensable to a sound epistemology than a crystal-clear discrimination 
between the Object and the Interpretant of knowledge; very much as nothing is 
more indispensable to sound notions of geography than a crystal-clear 
discrimination between north latitude and south latitude; and the one 
discrimination is not more rudimentary than the other. That we are conscious of 
our Percepts is a theory that seems to me to be beyond dispute; but it is not a 
fact of Immediate Perception. A fact of Immediate Perception is not a Percept, 
nor any part of a Percept; a Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate 
Perception or rather the Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the 
Immediate Interpretant, is a Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of 
the Percept, and of which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, and is with some 
considerable difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), distinguished 
from the Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly significant. But 
not to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the 
Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes 
up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical 
Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual 
Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original 
Immediate Object of every Percept. Of course, I must be understood as talking 
not psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants 
furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the 
Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts. 
(CP 4.538)



Finally, and in particular, we get a Seme of that highest of all Universes 
which is regarded as the Object of every true Proposition, and which, if we 
name it [at] all, we call by the somewhat misleading title of "The Truth." (CP 
4.539)


Without getting into the challenges of interpreting each suggestion Peirce 
offers here, I would like to focus attention on his claim that the "Immediate 
Object of a Percept is excessively vague". What does this imply about the 
possibility that some semes, if not all, have an immediate object--even if it 
is vague?


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Francesco Bellucci 
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 10:31:21 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Jon, List

Thanks for the summary.

To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is to 
say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e. that only 
propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are 
according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that only that which is 
either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should 
have said: some signs are divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and some 
other signs are divisible according to the IO into x, y, z). Now, since only 
propositions are either p, s, or g  and since that which is either p, s, or u 
is divisible according to the IO, it follows that only propositions are 
divisible according to the IO.

Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly means 
that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that non-propositional signs 
also have an IO. This I concede. But if one wonders what on earth the IO of a 
proposition is, that non-propositional signs have no IO becomes evident.

For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g, that 
which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I see no 
warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is "part" of the 
IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should have made it clear that 
propositions are divisible according to a part (= the quantificational part) of 
the IO into p, s, and g. He should have made it clear that the IO does not 
exhaust the quantificational dimension of propositions, and, I surmise, he 
should have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to one part 
of the IO into p, s, and g, and according to another part of 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List

Thanks for the summary.

To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions is
to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a proposition, i.e.
that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906
that signs are according to their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that
only that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for
otherwise Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to
the IO into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO
into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g  and
since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.

Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO ceratinly
means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude that
non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if one
wonders *what
on earth *the IO of a proposition is, that non-propositional signs have no
IO becomes evident.

For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g,
that which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I
see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is
"part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should have made
it clear that propositions are *divisible according to a part *(= the
quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He should have made it
clear that the IO does not exhaust the quantificational dimension of
propositions, and, I surmise, he should have made it clear that
propositions are divisible according to one part of the IO into p, s, and
g, and according to another part of the IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far
as I know, Peirce never speak of "parts" of the IO, one of which would be
the quantificational dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that
which constitutes the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division
into p, s, and g.

That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is what
Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are mortal", the
Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is "x is either not
a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the Peircean subject is "For
some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a man and mortal"; in "Socrates
is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and the predicate "x is mortal". The
predicates in these sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects",
they are not quantified. Since that which allows the division into p, s,
and g is the IO, and since the IO is – in the case of those signs for which
it is *comprehensible* what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows
that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO.

In sum:

In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s, and g
(this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are divisible
according to the IO into p, s, and g.)
Rhemes are not divisible into p, s, and g
Therefore, rhemes do not have an IO

Francesco




Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
> To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
>
>1. Only Dicisigns and Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially*
>indicate their Objects.
>2. Only Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially* express their
>Interpretants.
>3. The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the Sign
>to be the Sign's Object.
>4. Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
>complete Signs than Arguments.
>5. Rhemes cannot be true or false.
>6. Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
>7. Quantification is an aspect of a *proposition's *Immediate Object.
>
> However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically
> unwarranted and systematically problematic.
>
>1. Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.
>2. Rhemes and Dicisigns do not *have *Immediate Interpretants.
>3. Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
>Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
>4. Quantification is required for *any *Sign to have an Immediate
>Object.
>
> It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes *cannot *denote their
> Objects *at all*, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns *cannot 
> *signify
> their Interpretants *at all*; yet it was already well-established in
> logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both early and late--that terms
> (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.  #3 would mean that in his late
> taxonomy, the trichotomy according to the Immediate Object comes *after *the
> one according to the relation between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the
> order of determination.  #4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce
> himself, as far as I know, never imposed.
>

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.

   1. Only Dicisigns and Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially*
   indicate their Objects.
   2. Only Arguments *distinctly/separately/specially* express their
   Interpretants.
   3. The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the Sign to
   be the Sign's Object.
   4. Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
   complete Signs than Arguments.
   5. Rhemes cannot be true or false.
   6. Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
   7. Quantification is an aspect of a *proposition's *Immediate Object.

However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically
unwarranted and systematically problematic.

   1. Rhemes do not *have *Immediate Objects.
   2. Rhemes and Dicisigns do not *have *Immediate Interpretants.
   3. Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
   Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
   4. Quantification is required for *any *Sign to have an Immediate Object.

It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes *cannot *denote their
Objects *at all*, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns
*cannot *signify
their Interpretants *at all*; yet it was already well-established in logic,
and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both early and late--that terms
(Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.  #3 would mean that in his late
taxonomy, the trichotomy according to the Immediate Object comes *after *the
one according to the relation between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the
order of determination.  #4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce
himself, as far as I know, never imposed.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> JAS:  If one holds that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately
> representing their Objects *have *Immediate Objects, then one must also
> hold that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their
> Interpretants *have *Immediate Interpretants.  If a Rheme does not have
> an Immediate *Object*, then a Rheme or Dicisign does not have an
> Immediate *Interpretant*; but Peirce never said or implied this.
>
> Peirce said something like this, but before the distinction between
> different kinds of interpretants had emerged. He said that a proposition
> does not separately represent its interpretant:
>
> CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the representative element, or
> reason *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, is left vague and unexpressed, but in
> which the reactive element *[i.e. the object, FB]* is distinctly *[i.e.
> separately, FB]* indicated. [...] An argument is a bad name for a symbol
> in which the representative element *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, or reason,
> is distinctly expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)
>
> CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object
> which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be
> what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
>
> CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An
> argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is
> intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an
> argument *[i.e. which separately shows what interpretant it is intended
> to determine, FB]*, but which separately indicates what object it is
> intended to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such
> separate part" (EP 2: 204, 1903)
>
>  CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not separately indicate
> its object; […] A proposition is a representamen which separately indicates
> its object, but does [not] specially show what interpretant it is intended
> to determine […] An argument is a symbol which especially shows what
> interpretant it is intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903).
>
> Now, the question is: in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants,
> what is the interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument
> does, separately represent?
>
>>
>> CSP:  …*every sign* has *two *objects. It has that object which it
>> represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being
>> than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as
>> the Kantian logicians used to say a merely *Objective *Being ... The
>> Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)
>>
>>
> I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object which it
> represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains me, means that
> the sign has that object which the sign represents itself to have, not that
> it has the object that the sign represents in its (i.e. the object's)
> qualities or characters. That is, the immediate object is the object 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List

JAS:  If one holds that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately
representing their Objects *have *Immediate Objects, then one must also
hold that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their
Interpretants *have *Immediate Interpretants.  If a Rheme does not have an
Immediate *Object*, then a Rheme or Dicisign does not have an Immediate
*Interpretant*; but Peirce never said or implied this.

Peirce said something like this, but before the distinction between
different kinds of interpretants had emerged. He said that a proposition
does not separately represent its interpretant:

CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the representative element, or
reason *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, is left vague and unexpressed, but in
which the reactive element *[i.e. the object, FB]* is distinctly *[i.e.
separately, FB]* indicated. [...] An argument is a bad name for a symbol in
which the representative element *[i.e. interpretant, FB]*, or reason, is
distinctly expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)

CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which
it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its Interpretant to be what it
may” (CP 2.95, 1902

CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an argument. An
argument is a representamen which separately shows what interpretant it is
intended to determine. A proposition is a representamen which is not an
argument *[i.e. which separately shows what interpretant it is intended to
determine, FB]*, but which separately indicates what object it is intended
to represent. A rhema is a simple representation without such separate
part" (EP 2: 204, 1903)

 CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not separately indicate
its object; […] A proposition is a representamen which separately indicates
its object, but does [not] specially show what interpretant it is intended
to determine […] An argument is a symbol which especially shows what
interpretant it is intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903).

Now, the question is: in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants, what
is the interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument does,
separately represent?

>
> CSP:  …*every sign* has *two *objects. It has that object which it
> represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being
> than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as
> the Kantian logicians used to say a merely *Objective *Being ... The
> Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)
>
>
I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object which it
represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains me, means that
the sign has that object which the sign represents itself to have, not that
it has the object that the sign represents in its (i.e. the object's)
qualities or characters. That is, the immediate object is the object that
is represented by the sign to be the sign's object, not the object in the
characters that the sign represents it to have.


>
> CSP:  *Every sign* must plainly have an immediate object, however
> indefinite, in order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold added)
>
>
This indeed seems contrary to the claim that only propositions have an
immediate object. There is another occurrence of such a claim, in another
1907 writing (a letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice that since the
beginning of this discussion I was talking of the classification of signs
of 1904–1906, in which the notion of immediate object first emerged. The
two contrary statements are from 1907, and I suspect that after 1907 his
notion of immediate object changed. Perhaps the qualification "however
indefinite" can help us explain how it changed.

But in general, I repeat, I think that often "sign" has to be taken to mean
"complete sign" (i.e. "proposition"). If in such apparently contrary
statements we adopt this strategy, problems vanish. Peirce says as much:

CSP: "a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are
signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete
sign" (R 7: 2).

A rheme, though it is a sign, may not possess all the essential characters
of a proposition. In particular, while a proposition separately represent
its own object (i.e. while it has an immediate object), a rheme does not.

CSP: "a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real
object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of
definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false" (R 7:
3–4).

Please note that R 7 was probably composed in 1903, i.e. before the IO/DO
distinction had emerged. The sufficiently complete sign must specify, with
some degree of definiteness (either singularly, vaguely, or generally) the
object, i.e. the DO in the later terminology, this specification, this
"hint" ("The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its
 substance, is the Immediate Objec"), being the IO. He also says 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

I believe that we are in general agreement on CP 2.305 and the "Ground
arms!" example, but definitely not on which Signs have Immediate
Objects/Interpretants.

JAS:  I am curious--for the sake of consistency, do you likewise hold that
only Arguments have Immediate Interpretants?
FB:  Yes, propositions are signs which separately represent an object
(which after 1904 I take to be equivalent to: propositions are signs that
have an immediate object), arguments are signs which separately represent
an interpretant (which after 1904 I take to be equivalent to: arguments are
signs that separately represent an immediate interpretant).


This is *inconsistent*, since Peirce's language is precisely parallel.  If
one holds that *only *Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing
their Objects *have *Immediate Objects, then one must also hold that
*only *Sign-Replicas
distinctly/separately representing their Interpretants *have *Immediate
Interpretants.  If a Rheme does not have an Immediate *Object*, then a
Rheme or Dicisign does not have an Immediate *Interpretant*; but Peirce
never said or implied this.

On the contrary, *every *Sign-Replica--except perhaps that of a pure Index,
if there were such a thing--has an Immediate *Interpretant*; otherwise, it
would be incapable of *signifying *anything.  Likewise, *every
*Sign-Replica--except
perhaps that of a pure Icon, if there were such a thing--has an Immediate
*Object*; otherwise, it would be incapable of *denoting *anything.  A
Sign-Replica cannot have an *actual *(Dynamic) Interpretant unless it
has a *possible
*(Immediate) Interpretant, and it cannot have a *Real *(Dynamic) Object
unless it has a *possible *(Immediate) Object.

FB:  There is an asymmetry: all signs have a dynamic object, but only
propositions and arguments (because they are made out of propositions) have
an immediate object ... But perhaps at some point Peirce wanted to maintain
a stronger thesis: only arguments have an immediate interpretant (which is,
obviosuly enough, the conclusion).


This is sheer speculation, contrary to Peirce's explicit statements after
1904, and therefore no longer *exegetical*.

CSP:  …*every sign* has *two *objects. It has that object which it
represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being
than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as
the Kantian logicians used to say a merely *Objective *Being ... The
Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)

CSP:  *Every sign* must plainly have an immediate object, however
indefinite, in order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold added)


CSP:  The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression
that *a sign* is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction. (CP 8.315;
1909, bold added)

CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that *each Sign*
must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ...
The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility.
(SS 110; 1909, bold added)


The second quote affirms that the Immediate Object can be *indefinite*;
i.e., it need not be be *distinctly/separately* represented.  There are
various other passages like the third quote, where Peirce discussed the
Immediate Object and/or Immediate Interpretant of "a Sign," implying no
limitation whatsoever on the classes that he had in mind.  In short, I see
no warrant at all for claiming that he limited the Immediate Object to
Dicisigns and Arguments, or the Immediate Interpretant to Arguments alone.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Jeffrey, Gary F., Jon, List
>
> CSP "Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce
> to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as
> it was once grasped the problem was solved"
>
> I take this to mean: until the fact that indices are indispensable in
> mathematics was comprehended, it was impossible to give a satisfactory
> treatment of the logic of relations. A triadic relative, like "Gxyz", may
> occur in a multiply quantified sentence. Now (as e.g. Dummett has
> magisterially explained in his book on Frege, but the explanation holds
> mutatis mutandis for Peirce), the proper treatment of multiply quantified
> sentences is only possible once a proper notation for variables and
> quantifiers is adopted. And this notation requires that individuals may be
> denoted by variables that range over a domain, and a variable is an index.
> Peirce's reference to "the logic of triadic and higher relations failed" is
> a clear reference to his General Algebra of Logic (1885), where an
> apparatus of 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

ings desired by
> the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully
> expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. (CP 8.178, EP 2:493;
> 1909)
>
>
> From this, it seems to me that (as Gary F. noted) the Dynamic Object of
> the command is the action that the officer *intends*, while its Dynamic
> Interpretant is the action that the soldiers *execute*; but I would
> certainly not consider these to be "identical."  On the contrary, this is
> consistent with Peirce's identification of the Object and Interpretant as
> the "essential ingredient" of the Utterer and Interpreter, respectively
> (cf. EP 2:404-409; 1907).  I further suggest that the Immediate
> Interpretant of the command is its *definition *within the Sign System of
> military lingo, and its Immediate Object is the action that its Utterer is 
> *capable
> *of intending accordingly.
>
> As for relative pronouns, Peirce did not say that they create *their own*
> Objects, but that their Objects are "the images in the mind which *previous
> *words have created" (CP 2.305; 1901-1902, emphasis added).  I believe
> that these are the *Interpretants *of those previous words, rather than
> their Immediate Objects, based on other passages in the same letter quoted
> above.
>
> CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that ... so determines some actual or
> potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created
> by the Sign ... The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter
> ... And this creature of the Sign is called the Interpretant. It is created
> by the Sign ... It is created in a Mind ...  (EP 2:492-493; 1909)
>
>
> Finally, I am not sure that it was any particular "insight about the
> relations between indices and immediate objects" that enabled Peirce to
> "reduce to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations."  It may have
> simply been his recognition that Indices are required for *all *reasoning--not
> only regarding matters of fact, but also in pure mathematics.  On the other
> hand ...
>
> CSP:  An *index *represents an object by virtue of its connection with
> it. It makes no difference whether the connection is natural, or
> artificial, or merely mental. There is, however, an important distinction
> between two classes of indices. Namely, some merely stand for things or
> individual quasi-things with which the interpreting mind is already
> acquainted, while others may be used to ascertain facts. Of the former
> class, which may be termed *designations*, personal, demonstrative, and
> relative pronouns, proper names, the letters attached to a geometrical
> figure, and the ordinary letters of algebra are examples. They act to force
> the attention to the thing intended. Designations are absolutely
> indispensable both to communication and to thought. No assertion has any
> meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of
> reality or what universe of fiction is referred to. (CP 8.368n23; c.
> 1899-1900?)
>
>
> Of course, "Designative" was later one of Peirce's names for a Sign for
> which the Mode of Presentation of the *Immediate *Object is Existent; so
> perhaps this is what he had in mind when writing CP 2.305.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:13 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Francesco, list,
>>
>> In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground
>> Arms", Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign
>> is the *immediate* object. I think it is the *dynamic* object, the same
>> one that determines the Sign — which is of course an imperative sentence.
>> It’s a peculiarity of imperatives that their dynamic object is in a sense
>> identical with their dynamic interpretant; an order is given (especially in
>> the context of a military drill) with the *intention* of being obeyed
>> with as little intellection as possible interfering with the dyadic
>> *force* of the order. That is, the interpretant is to be caused by the
>> utterance of the sign with no more *interpretation* than the automatic
>> muscular action with which the soldiers have been trained to respond to
>> that sign. Ideally, the only difference between the action intended by the
>> officer and that carried out by the soldiers is that the one precedes and
>> ‘triggers’ the other.
>>
>> If you ask what the *immediate* object of that sign, I’d be tempted to
>> say that it’s simply the words, “Ground arms.” Those words ar

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

eff, Francesco, list,
>
> In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground
> Arms", Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign
> is the *immediate* object. I think it is the *dynamic* object, the same
> one that determines the Sign — which is of course an imperative sentence.
> It’s a peculiarity of imperatives that their dynamic object is in a sense
> identical with their dynamic interpretant; an order is given (especially in
> the context of a military drill) with the *intention* of being obeyed
> with as little intellection as possible interfering with the dyadic
> *force* of the order. That is, the interpretant is to be caused by the
> utterance of the sign with no more *interpretation* than the automatic
> muscular action with which the soldiers have been trained to respond to
> that sign. Ideally, the only difference between the action intended by the
> officer and that carried out by the soldiers is that the one precedes and
> ‘triggers’ the other.
>
> If you ask what the *immediate* object of that sign, I’d be tempted to
> say that it’s simply the words, “Ground arms.” Those words are the “hint”,
> the part of the sign which indicates the dynamic object (which is both the
> officer’s intention and the soldiers’ action). But I’m not sure what the
> implications of this view would be for the “reduction to rule” problem you
> introduce in the latter part of your post.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> *Sent:* 7-Sep-18 15:58
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Francesco Bellucci  googlemail.com>
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
> Francesco, List,
>
> I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion
> that, in some cases, the sign *creates* the immediate object.  He uses
> the same language of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the
> sign can *create* its interpretant.
>
> In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground
> Arms", for instance, Peirce says "At any rate, it [i.e, object]
> determines the Sign although it [i.e., the immediate object] is to be
> created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is relative to
> the momentary state of mind of the officer. (CP 8.178)
>
> The case is clearer, he says, when we consider relative pronouns. He puts
> the point in the following way:
>
> Thus, while demonstrative and personal pronouns are, as ordinarily used,
> "genuine indices," relative pronouns are "degenerate indices"; for though
> they may, accidentally and indirectly, refer to existing things, they
> directly refer, and need only refer, to the images in the mind which
> previous words have created. (CP, 2.305)
>
> I find the implications of these claims about the creation of immediate
> objects to be of some interest. In the same paragraph, he says:
>
> Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
> mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, *all* *efforts to
> reduce to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed*; while
> as soon as it was once grasped the problem was solved (my emphasis). The
> ordinary letters of algebra that present no peculiarities are indices. So
> also are the letters *A*, *B*, *C*, etc., attached to a geometrical
> figure. Lawyers and others who have to state a complicated affair with
> precision have recourse to letters to distinguish individuals. Letters so
> used are merely improved relative pronouns.
>
> Why, do you think, was this insight about the relations between
> indices and immediate objects necessary in order to "reduce to rule" the
> logic of triadic and higher relations? It isn't clear to me why previous
> efforts failed or what the successful "*reduction to a rule"* really
> involves.
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
>
> *From:* Francesco Bellucci 
> *Sent:* Friday, September 7, 2018 12:12:24 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
>
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
>
> The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
> Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
> represented as an Englishman by the sign.
>
>
>
> The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
> own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
> this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on
> being that part of the sign that indicates the DO
>
>
>
> Francesco
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry, list

Here are some quotes:

4.536

"I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that
is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an
exertion or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. But
it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, and more
than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate
Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and
whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the
Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some
means contrives to determines the Sign to its Repesentation".

See also 5.473, where he differentiates 'that thing which causes a
sign as such is called the objectbut more accurately, the
existent object' [this is from the example of Ground arms]. Note -
Peirce changed the 'existent object to Dynamic Object...

And, the immediate object is the 'mental representation - NOT the
interpretation, but the mental representation..

8.314, 1909] 
 We must distinguish between the Immediate Object - ie the Object as
represented in the sign, and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object
is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore, )
say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things,
the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the
interpreter to find out by collateral experience"...and the example
is the weather and his wife's question about it..

"Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as
this is common to her mind and mind - not the character of it, but the
identity of it.."The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual or
Real meteorological conditions at the moment …

I don't know if the above is of any use to you.

Edwina.
 On Fri 07/09/18  4:11 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear list, 
I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored. 
I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or
neither. 
Yet, the question is posed where  
if the distinction between internal and external objects are
important enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to
be saved when discussing general matters regarding triadic relations, 

then  

that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.   

But I don’t see how this can be done. 
Will no one help me?   

Where is the reference that decides the matter,  

or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?   
If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,  

then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the
matter. 
With best wishes, 
 Jerry R 
 On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
 On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
  But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
  I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
 mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
 for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
 For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
 for years.
  So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
 semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
 wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
  Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
 I think they're very good.
 But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
 language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
 Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
 In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
 developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
 of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
 and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
 That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
 Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
 Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
 are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
 Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
 http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf [2]
 John
 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu [3] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu [4] with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
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Links:
--

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Jeff, Francesco, list,

In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms",
Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign is the
immediate object. I think it is the dynamic object, the same one that
determines the Sign — which is of course an imperative sentence. It’s a
peculiarity of imperatives that their dynamic object is in a sense identical
with their dynamic interpretant; an order is given (especially in the
context of a military drill) with the intention of being obeyed with as
little intellection as possible interfering with the dyadic force of the
order. That is, the interpretant is to be caused by the utterance of the
sign with no more interpretation than the automatic muscular action with
which the soldiers have been trained to respond to that sign. Ideally, the
only difference between the action intended by the officer and that carried
out by the soldiers is that the one precedes and ‘triggers’ the other.

If you ask what the immediate object of that sign, I’d be tempted to say
that it’s simply the words, “Ground arms.” Those words are the “hint”, the
part of the sign which indicates the dynamic object (which is both the
officer’s intention and the soldiers’ action). But I’m not sure what the
implications of this view would be for the “reduction to rule” problem you
introduce in the latter part of your post. 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 7-Sep-18 15:58
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Francesco Bellucci

Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Francesco, List,

 

I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion that,
in some cases, the sign creates the immediate object.  He uses the same
language of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the sign can
create its interpretant.

 

In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms",
for instance, Peirce says "At any rate, it [i.e, object] determines the Sign
although it [i.e., the immediate object] is to be created by the Sign by the
circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of
the officer. (CP 8.178)

 

The case is clearer, he says, when we consider relative pronouns. He puts
the point in the following way: 

 

Thus, while demonstrative and personal pronouns are, as ordinarily used,
"genuine indices," relative pronouns are "degenerate indices"; for though
they may, accidentally and indirectly, refer to existing things, they
directly refer, and need only refer, to the images in the mind which
previous words have created. (CP, 2.305)

 

I find the implications of these claims about the creation of immediate
objects to be of some interest. In the same paragraph, he says:

 

Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to
rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it
was once grasped the problem was solved (my emphasis). The ordinary letters
of algebra that present no peculiarities are indices. So also are the
letters A, B, C, etc., attached to a geometrical figure. Lawyers and others
who have to state a complicated affair with precision have recourse to
letters to distinguish individuals. Letters so used are merely improved
relative pronouns. 

 

Why, do you think, was this insight about the relations between indices and
immediate objects necessary in order to "reduce to rule" the logic of
triadic and higher relations? It isn't clear to me why previous efforts
failed or what the successful "reduction to a rule" really involves.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

 

 

 

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

  _  

From: Francesco Bellucci mailto:bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> >
Sent: Friday, September 7, 2018 12:12:24 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object 

 

Helmut, List 

 

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an Englishman",
Obama remains an American and is not affected by being represented as an
Englishman by the sign. 

 

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on being
that part of the sign that indicates the DO

 

Francesco

 

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote:

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O)
stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as
the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign
o

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored.



I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or neither.



Yet, the question is posed where



if the distinction between internal and external objects are important
enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to be saved when
discussing general matters regarding triadic relations,



then

that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.

But I don’t see how this can be done.



Will no one help me?

Where is the reference that decides the matter,

or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?



If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,

then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the matter.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
>
>> But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
>>
>
> I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
> mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
> for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
> For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
> for years.
>
> So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
>> semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
>> wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
>>
>
> Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
> I think they're very good.
>
> But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
> language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
> Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
>
> In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
> developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
> of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
> and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
> That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
>
> Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
> Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
> are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
> Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Francesco, List,



I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion that, in 
some cases, the sign creates the immediate object.  He uses the same language 
of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the sign can create its 
interpretant.



In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms", 
for instance, Peirce says "At any rate, it [i.e, object] determines the Sign 
although it [i.e., the immediate object] is to be created by the Sign by the 
circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of 
the officer. (CP 8.178)



The case is clearer, he says, when we consider relative pronouns. He puts the 
point in the following way:



Thus, while demonstrative and personal pronouns are, as ordinarily used, 
"genuine indices," relative pronouns are "degenerate indices"; for though they 
may, accidentally and indirectly, refer to existing things, they directly 
refer, and need only refer, to the images in the mind which previous words have 
created. (CP, 2.305)



I find the implications of these claims about the creation of immediate objects 
to be of some interest. In the same paragraph, he says:



Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in mathematics; 
and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to rule the logic 
of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it was once grasped 
the problem was solved (my emphasis). The ordinary letters of algebra that 
present no peculiarities are indices. So also are the letters A, B, C, etc., 
attached to a geometrical figure. Lawyers and others who have to state a 
complicated affair with precision have recourse to letters to distinguish 
individuals. Letters so used are merely improved relative pronouns.



Why, do you think, was this insight about the relations between indices and 
immediate objects necessary in order to "reduce to rule" the logic of triadic 
and higher relations? It isn't clear to me why previous efforts failed or what 
the successful "reduction to a rule" really involves.



Yours,



Jeff







Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Francesco Bellucci 
Sent: Friday, September 7, 2018 12:12:24 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an Englishman", 
Obama remains an American and is not affected by being represented as an 
Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its own 
DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In this 
sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on being that 
part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien 
mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
Francesco, List,
I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) 
stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the 
epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? 
Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it 
is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they 
are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is 
(affected by the sign).
I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational 
performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
Best,
Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
mailto:bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>> 
wrote:

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, 
yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. 
But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic 
object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, 
because the dynamic object is the object too.

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external 
to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. 
internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an 
immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so 
is the subject of the sentence

F

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. 
The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign 
minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing 
exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing 
unkno

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
represented as an Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on
being that part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Francesco, List,
> I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable
> (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental
> as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the
> sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the
> andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at
> all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO
> "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).
> I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational
> performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
>> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).

I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!

Best,

Helmut

 

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
 


Helmut, List
 







Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.







 

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

 

F

 







To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut


 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr


"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 





Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



If:

“It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign)



then:

what is the ‘Object’ in Sign Object Interpretant or Object Sign
Interpretant?



Will you supply a reference where the matter can be settled?



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:52 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Helmut, List
>
> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>>
>> ET
>> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> > application to material life.
>> >
>> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
>> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
>> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
>> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
>> relating his 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F


> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but
> its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in
> the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the
> knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
> would be so easy.
> Best, Helmut
>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>
> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>
> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
> (EP 2:494)
>
> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> > faculty.
>
> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> > application to material life.
> >
> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>
> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
> > my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> > terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> > primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
> 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

I agree with Edwina, because to make my ideas clearer, I need to check them with real-life-affairs, such as biosemiotics, and other special sciences like physics. Especially if I want to overcome the somehow ever-present idea of mind-matter-duality, to explain it away by replacing it with mind-monism, would be to reconstruct it with the idea of spatiotemporal scales. E.g. that matter is effete mind, is a time-scale thing, I would say. And therefore it helps very much, I think, to regard biosemiotics, with its different time scales in the evolution of matter/energy, organisms, animals, mammals, humans, and cultural habits. So, only speaking for myself, I get good aha-experiences more likely by switching between cenoscopy and idioscopy (or between pure reason and examples from experience) all the time from the start.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 06. September 2018 um 19:31 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 



Edwina, John S., List:
 

As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.  This is a necessary and important step before we can properly identify and explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in other fields, beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such as biosemiotics.  After all, Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

 

Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."  Why keep bringing it up?

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


John, list

Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.

Edwina

On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:



On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but 
> my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely, 
> that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system. 

I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
logic to language, thought, and life.

I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.

Basic point: It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
than to translate language to logic. But the exercise of writing
the logic is necessary for precision.

John







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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John S., List:

As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much
on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its *own
*sake, but primarily for the purpose of *making our ideas clear*.  This is
a necessary and important step *before *we can properly identify and
explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in *other *fields,
beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such
as biosemiotics.  After all, Peirce *defined *pragmatism as "no attempt to
determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining
the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400;
1907).

Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic
idealism."  Why keep bringing it up?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list
>
> Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
> Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in
> its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three
> 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is often
> on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often changed
> these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean
> semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics -
> which is its pragmaticism.
>
> And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric [but
> not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually
> denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
> > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
> > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.
>
> I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
> in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
> logic to language, thought, and life.
>
> I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
> language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
> or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
> precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.
>
> Basic point: It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
> than to translate language to logic. But the exercise of writing
> the logic is necessary for precision.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that
Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic,
but in its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there
are three 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is
often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce
often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground
of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of
Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism. 

And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this
rhetoric [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism -
which actually denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and
Matter. 

Edwina
 On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but  
 > my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce;
namely,  
 > that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system. 
 I agree with your concerns.  I know many logicians who get lost 
 in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating 
 logic to language, thought, and life. 
 I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary 
 language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics 
 or mathematical logic.  Peirce knew that.  But he also knew that 
 precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic. 
 Basic point:  It's vastly easier to translate logic to language, 
 than to translate language to logic.  But the exercise of writing 
 the logic is necessary for precision. 
 John 

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but my
concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely, that
his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system. It rests its
viability not in intellectual rhetorical definitions and assertions
of Platonic idealism but in the application of logic to pragmatic
reality; i.e., it is 'objective idealism'.

Edwina
 On Thu 06/09/18 10:16 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 9/6/2018 12:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: 
 > FB: As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses 
 > "general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object
(vs 
 > indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are
general 
 > in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and
universally 
 > quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce 
 > ("distributively general" his preferred term).  
 >  
 > JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general
Object  
 > and (only) Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current  
 > understanding is instead that /every /Sign is a Type, has a
General  
 > Object, and only exists in Replicas, each of which has an
individual  
 > Dynamic Object. 
 In my previous note to this thread, I replied to Francesco: 
 > I believe that it's important to use Peirce's own tools for
stating 
 > the criteria precisely:  his versions of logic. 
 >  
 > For each of those three senses, any definition in his algebraic 
 > notation of 1885 would have a universal quantifier, and any 
 > definition in existential graphs would have a line of identity 
 > in a negative area.  
 It's important to emphasize that Peirce's later MSS on semiotic 
 came *after* and *during* his later MSS on logic.  He was trying 
 to restate much of his later ideas on semiotic in his later MSS 
 on EGs, and many ideas in one stimulated and extended ideas in 
 the other. 
 Many of his later MSS on semiotic were written as letters to 
 his correspondents, most of whom had little understanding of 
 formal logic.  By writing in English, he could say much more 
 than he was able to restate in his EGs.  That enabled him 
 to cover a broader range of topics. 
 Unfortunately, he no longer had correspondents who could 
 (1) understand his logic, (2) understand his semiotic, and 
 (3) understand his writings about how #1 and #2 are related. 
 JAS 
 > How should we explain the difference between the Essential, 
 > Informed, and Substantial Breadth of a Sign?  Peirce's definitions

 > for them similarly require careful differentiation. 
 Answer:  Continue the project that Peirce himself was trying to 
 accomplish:  restate them in logic. 
 CSP 
 > ... Breadth and Depth, which the logic-books restrict to one class

 > of signs, namely to terms, are equally applicable, by a legitimate

 > and easy generalization of their meanings, not only to
propositions 
 > and to arguments, but also to icons, indices, and all kinds of
signs  
 > ... Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the
sign, 
 > while Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of
the 
 > sign ... (R 200:E87; 1908) 
 Thanks for quoting this passage.  Note that it shows how Peirce 
 was thinking about logic at the same time that he was developing 
 his semiotic.  As he said, logic is formal semiotic. 
 FB 
 > Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent
would 
 > mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, 
 > which Peirce was far from having done. 
 The only way to show that the definitions are consistent is to 
 translate them to some version of logic and to show that there 
 exists a model for them (either endoporeutic or Tarski-style). 
 Unfortunately, Peirce did not have the time to do that for his 
 late writings to Lady Welby.  To understand all the implications, 
 it's essential to take up the task he was unable to complete. 
 And by the way, most of the MSS that have never been scanned 
 or microfilmed are from his later years.  Many of the MSS in 
 black and white microfilm are inadequate to show the details. 
 And black and white cannot distinguish colored inks and pencils. 
 John 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

>
>
> Would you mind clarifying, please?
>
> What’s the problem again and what rules?
>

According to the Syllabus, a Symbol can only be a Legisign (= Famisign in
the 1908 terminology), and thus cannot be a Sinsign (=Actisign in the 1908
terminology).

Best
F

>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, list
>>
>> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
>> Peirce.
>>
>> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
>> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
>> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
>> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
>> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
>> akin to a Platonic Form.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
>> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>>
>> Jon, Gary, List
>>
>> thanks for your replies.
>>
>> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
>> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
>> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
>> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
>> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
>> term).
>>
>> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
>> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
>> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
>> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>>
>>
>> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
>> object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
>> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
>> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object"
>> is used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
>> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
>> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
>> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
>> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
>> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
>> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
>> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
>> interpretation of Peirce.
>>
>>
>> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
>> already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent
>> to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
>> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
>> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
>> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
>> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
>> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
>> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
>> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition
>> .
>>
>>
>> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
>> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
>> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
>> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
>> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
>> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
>> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
>> p. 67
>>
>>
>> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
>> Indefinite Sign
>> Singular Sign
>> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>>
>> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
>> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
>> 284, p. 67)
>>
>> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
>> rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a
>> sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
>> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
>> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
>> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
>> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
>> the immediate object.
>>
>> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
>> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
>> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Welcome Francesco;

dear list,



You said:



The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.

But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign.

*The problem is already here*.



Would you mind clarifying, please?

What’s the problem again and what rules?



Thanks,



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Francesco, list
>
> Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used by
> Peirce.
>
> One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move away
> from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process. That is, the
> term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a symbol; by a
> legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic embedded nature suggests
> that the term cannot be set up to operate as a pure intellectual construct,
> akin to a Platonic Form.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 05/09/18 2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
>
> Jon, Gary, List
>
> thanks for your replies.
>
> As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general" in
> at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
> have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
> types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally quantified sentences are
> also said to be "general" by Peirce ("distributively general" his preferred
> term).
>
> GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
> quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not have had
> occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a general
> object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
>
>
> At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the object
> of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is whatever
> possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce, generals are
> real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368 "general object" is
> used in another sense: "distributively general object" means the
> universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why the notion of a general
> object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic, and not as a species of the
> immediate) looks very unPeircean to me: if we mean the object of a symbol,
> it's the dynamic object which is general; if we mean the object of a
> universally quantified sentence, it's the immediate object that is general;
> if we mean a legisign, it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I
> don't see what other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
> interpretation of Peirce.
>
>
> JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I already
> quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not equivalent to
> "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are mortal") and
> particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are general, as opposed
> to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover, any common noun, such as
> "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904)
> despite not being quantified at all; and it does have an Immediate
> Object, which is whatever possesses the set of characters that corresponds
> to its definition--i.e., its Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification
> only comes into play when this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
>
>
> The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
> 2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
> opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite". Cf. e.g.
> R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is opposed to vague and
> singular, it means "distributively general". That the sense in which
> "general" is used in the division of signs according to the immediate
> object is "distributively general" is clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284,
> p. 67
>
>
> According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
> Indefinite Sign
> Singular Sign
> Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
>
> General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the logically
> formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive Generality. (R
> 284, p. 67)
>
> Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the rheme
> "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol, i.e. a sign
> whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses the set of
> characters that corresponds to its definition. But the general object of a
> symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of characters that
> corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the dynamic, not the immediate
> object. For icon/index/symbol is a division according to the dynamic, not
> the immediate object.
>
> Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that possesses
> the set of characters that corresponds to its definition, is the immediate
> object. What it is that possesses the set of characters that corresponds to
> the definition of man? 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Francesco, list

Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used
by Peirce.

One thing to note, in my view,  is that at no time does Peirce move
away from using this term as embedded within the semiosic process.
That is, the term 'general' refers to that which is referred to by a
symbol; by a legisign; and by a full sentence. This pragmatic
embedded nature suggests that the term cannot be set up to operate as
a pure intellectual construct, akin to a Platonic Form.

Edwina
 On Wed 05/09/18  2:57 AM , Francesco Bellucci
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent:
 Jon, Gary, List
 thanks for your replies. 
 As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses
"general" in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs
indices, which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general
in themselves (as types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally
quantified sentences are also said to be "general" by Peirce
("distributively general" his preferred term).  
 GR: May I ask just one question for now: In light of the several
quotations which Jon offered (in another thread which you may not
have had occasion to read)  [...] [w]hy do write that the notion of a
general object  appears to you as "very unPeircean"?
 At CP 5.426 and 5.430 Peirce say general objects are real. It's the
object of a symbol which is real. "Man" is a symbol, its object is
whatever possesses the characters of men. Since, according to Peirce,
generals are real, the object of a symbol is real. At EP 2, p. 368
"general object" is used in another sense: "distributively general
object" means the universal quantifier: "any man ". That's why
the notion of a general object (as opposed to immediate and dynamic,
and not as a species of the immediate) looks very unPeircean to me:
if we mean the object of a symbol, it's the dynamic object which is
general; if we mean the object of a universally quantified sentence,
it's the immediate object that is general; if we mean a legisign,
it's the sign, not the object, that is general. I don't see what
other uses of "general object" are relevant or needed in the
interpretation of Peirce. 
JAS: I am afraid that I am not following the argument here.  As I
already quoted Peirce explicitly stating, "general" is  not
equivalent to "universally quantified"; both universal ("All men are
mortal") and particular ("Some men are mortal") propositions are
general, as opposed to singular ("This man is mortal").  Moreover,
any common noun, such as "man," is a  general Rheme ("_ is a
man," cf. EP 2:309-310; 1904) despite not being quantified at all;
and it does have an Immediate Object, which is whatever possesses the
set of characters that corresponds to its definition--i.e., its
Immediate Interpretant.  Quantification  only comes into play when
this general Rheme is employed in a proposition.
The first point is easily answerable. In those contexts (such as  CP
2.324) in which "general" includes universal and existental and is
opposed to singular, Peirce most often uses the term "indefinite".
Cf. e.g. R 9, pp. 2–3. But in most contexts, when general is
opposed to vague and singular, it means "distributively general".
That the sense in which "general" is used in the division of signs
according to the immediate object is "distributively general" is
clear from R 339, p. 253 and R 284, p. 67 
 According to the Immediate Object (how represented)
 Indefinite Sign
 Singular Sign
 Distributively General Sign (R 339, p. 253)
 General Sign. The sign represents its Immediate Object in the
logically formal character of the Tertian, which is Distributive
Generality. (R 284, p. 67) 
 Second, I perfectly agree that any common noun, such as "man" or the
rheme "---is a man"; is general: but in the sense of being a symbol,
i.e. a sign whose object is, as Jon justly says, whatever possesses
the set of characters that corresponds to its definition. But the
general object of a symbol, i.e. the object that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the symbol's definition, is the
dynamic, not the immediate object. For icon/index/symbol is a
division according to the dynamic, not the immediate object.  
 Suppose that the object of "---is a man", i.e. the object that
possesses the set of characters that corresponds to its definition,
is the immediate object. What it is that possesses the set of
characters that corresponds to the definition of man? Of course,
every really existing man, as well as those existed and those that
will exist. If this is the immediate object of the rheme "--is a
man", what's its dynamic object? 
 Another example. Take the sign "Napoleon is lethargic". It contains
a proper name, "Napoleon", which refers to the real Napoleon, the
historical figure. Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the
proper name, is its "object" (he says so in very many 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supp.: E.G. in "Catfish tastes well", the term "Catfish" is a rheme (it carries information), because in children´s language "Catfish Hamlet" makes sense, it means "This catfish´s name is "Hamlet"". But in "all men are mortal", "all men Hamlet" does not make sense. Though it might mean "all men are like Hamlet", but that would be suggesting too much wisdom to the child speaking??




Dear Francesco,

 

That is very interesting and new to me. I had thought, a rheme was a term. In the below quotation from Commens Dictionary "rheme", Peirce writes, that it may be a term, but a term "contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature" . Now I wonder, does the replacement argument cover a term-as-rheme too? Maybe in children´s language?

"



1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10


If from a propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a rhema; but I shall take the liberty of calling it a term. [—] On the whole, it appears to me that the only difference between my rhema and the “term” of other logicians is that the latter contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature. But this is as much as to say that logically their meaning is the same; and it is for that reason that I venture to use the old, familiar word “term” to denote the rhema.

"





Best,

Helmut


 02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
wrote:


Dear Helmut
 

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

 

Best

Francesco
 
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Dear Francesco, list,

 

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
wrote:







Dear All,
 

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

 

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

 

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

 

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme. 

 

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear Francesco,

 

That is very interesting and new to me. I had thought, a rheme was a term. In the below quotation from Commens Dictionary "rheme", Peirce writes, that it may be a term, but a term "contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature" . Now I wonder, does the replacement argument cover a term-as-rheme too? Maybe in children´s language?

"



1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10


If from a propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a rhema; but I shall take the liberty of calling it a term. [—] On the whole, it appears to me that the only difference between my rhema and the “term” of other logicians is that the latter contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature. But this is as much as to say that logically their meaning is the same; and it is for that reason that I venture to use the old, familiar word “term” to denote the rhema.

"





Best,

Helmut


 02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
wrote:


Dear Helmut
 

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

 

Best

Francesco
 
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Dear Francesco, list,

 

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
wrote:







Dear All,
 

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

 

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

 

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

 

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme. 

 

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a proper name, like "Hamlet", this does not yield again a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Dear Helmut

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic
adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what
remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we
obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that
what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is
extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

Best
Francesco

On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear Francesco, list,
>
> For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can
> you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci" 
> wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is
> Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in
> Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.
>
> Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative
> Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on
> Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further
> thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the
> discussion.
>
> One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate
> objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have
> immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in
> the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone
> discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their
> immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the
> vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina
> Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the
> history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity:
> Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called
> particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which
> traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the
> vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest
> that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object
> into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has
> been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we
> should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least
> that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the
> "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.
>
> Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division,
> then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their
> immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable
> to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a
> "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to
> a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding
> to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the
> idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all
> men" is a rheme.
>
> But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a
> rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by
> a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when
> the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all
> men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been
> extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us
> imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are
> mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a
> proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition:
> "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And
> since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is
> that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction
> to *all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.
>
> Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:
>
> "a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that
> Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute
> its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the
> unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"
>
> If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object
> of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague,
> singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the
> proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic
> Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters
> (arguably, his madness). Is this 

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, yes, in the future. I will just have to wait when the train stops, because there is no schedule that says whether it has reached the terminal or will go on.

Best, Helmut

 

30. Juni 2018 um 22:47 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut,

Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07











  



Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last part of it.



Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in the world outside the sign.



I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:



A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written "matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.





  



Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.



All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.




Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.






List,



One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 



In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).



To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.



Best,



Helmut



  



















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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Helmut,

Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would 
make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07

  

Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last 
part of it.

Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is 
better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the 
ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in 
the world outside the sign.

I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:

A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, 
they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something 
ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A 
function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, 
the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do 
with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: 
Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like 
that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written 
"matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not 
functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. 
In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts 
would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the 
things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.

  

Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely 
a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, 
having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the 
spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, 
but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) 
reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.

All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To 
uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.

Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between 
existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and 
phaneron.

List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking 
process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When 
this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject 
is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real 
(immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it 
functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and 
(functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of 
reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign 
via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that 
Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical 
object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its 
function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to 
me.

Best,

Helmut

  


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

Good heavens - I didn't know that your adamant arguments for the
triad of IO-R-II was due to any attempt on your part to 'reconcile
with my model of semiosis'!!! I thought you were arguing for that
triad because you believed in it as a valid model! After all - you
were quite insistent on its validity, and openly rejecting my
inclusion of the DO!

And I didn't know that you abandoned it - not because you didn't
believe any longer in its validity - but because you couldn't use it
to 'reconcile with my model'. So- I'm to blame both for your support
for the model and also, for your abandoning it. Hmmm.

And the argument isn't over the term 'Sign' as differentiated from
the term  'Representamen'. Peirce does that already. And he readily
uses the term 'Sign' when he means the full triadic process - and
also - when he refers only to the action of mediation. Therefore, one
has to be careful when reading the text.

The argument is over the operative nature of the basic semiosic
triad - which I claim is DO- [IO/R/II]. 

Edwina
 On Mon 25/06/18  9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II
because I hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on
that basis, to reconcile our two different models of semiosis.  It
became evident a few months ago that this is not the case, since we
still cannot even agree on how Peirce defined "Representamen." 
Consequently, I took a closer look at his usage and came to realize
what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a Representamen with a
mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were basically
synonymous and interchangeable.  More to the point, nowhere in
Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a  component of
the Sign.  Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of
terminology, if one wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes
the IO, the II, and whatever is left over after those are "removed,"
one must come up with a new name for the latter; Peirce never called
it a "Representamen," or anything else as far as I can tell.
 Regards,
 Jon S.  
 On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I have to include myself with Gary R as  - in my 1stness - stunned
by your abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of
II-R-II! You fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for
months. I recall your chastising me for daring to include the DO
within the definition of the full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in
the night, you casually tell us that you..some time ago...abandoned
this notion. 

Whew. 

Edwina
 On Sun 24/06/18  8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the
Sign itself as a triad of IO-R-II?  This goes back to the fact that
Peirce never distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in
the specific way that such a model entails.  I still affirm that the
IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI are external
to it; and below I quoted Peirce's statement that the two Objects
determine the Sign, which determines the three Interpretants; so I
suspect that this indeed boils down to "a terminological matter." 
 Does that clarify things?  If not, maybe I have just been staring at
the pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours
consecutively. :-)
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
  Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by
this, and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter.
Still, Peirce says in many, many places that what happens within the
sign is this tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which 
determines some Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject
this internal structure (or am I wrong about that too?) 
 In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure
in your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you,
etc." prologue to an response? :-)
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary R., List:
 Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons
the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the
Sign for its Interpretant?  I am sincerely baffled by this
suggestion.  Here is what I said.
 JAS:  a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some
of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken
together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its
Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form
(Entelechy/3ns).
 I am describing what the Sign does, not what the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

With regard to the question of whether the rheme plays a role within
biosemiosis - I would say 'yes' - but only within the semiosic Sign
classes which include connections to either Secondness or Thirdness;
i.e., a Rhematic Iconic Sinsign; a Rhematic Iconic Legisign, a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, A Rhematic Indexical Legisign. But a pure
Rhematic Iconic Qualisign? No...Because it is unconnected at this
time, current time,  to either actual or mental reality. 

Could this isolate rheme, in the biological realm,  have a semiosic
role; that is, if this isolate rheme is unconnected to any current
actual or mental reality - [which would, in a way, function as a
Dynamic Object to determine the semiosic process]. . This is, perhaps
incorrectly, what I understand Gary F to be discussing. I may be wrong
- but - I felt that an isolate rheme [a rhematic iconic qualisign]
would have no information in the biosemiosic realm. It wouldn't have
an Immediate Object - since there wouldn't be any Dynamic Object. But
- does such a process - of pure Firstness exist and have a function?

I am extremely interested in the concept of Anticipation - and have
written on both strong and weak anticipation. I consider that the
rheme, i.e., the open interpretant, when linked to indexical
information or laws [2ns, or 3ns] does play a vital role in
biosemiosic, enabling robust adaptation and evolution. But - the pure
rheme? I'm thinking of it as confined to the human realm - pure
imagination.

Understanding the rheme as the term for an Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness - then - I'd suggest that it plays a vital role in abduction
- where the nature of the Dynamic Object isn't known, and therefore,
the informational content of that DO can't be imparted as the IO.
There would be no IO. Not now - but-  it could be, in the future. So
- I'm suggesting that in conceptual or human semiosis - that this
openness-to-interpretation, separate from facts,  plays a vital role
in our capacity to imagine and innovate.

Edwina
 On Sun 24/06/18  6:24 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, list,
 Thank you for a very stimulating and intellectually generous post. 
 I will continue to disagree with Gary F's position in this matter,
but want to explore it further and so will begin reading other
chapters of Bellucci's book. I'll keep the question open until, as
Gary F has suggested, I have grasped enough of Bellucci's argument
(more than which appears in Chapter 8 and which Gary F has presented
on list) to assess it more adequately. But since much of his argument
appears in Chapter 8 and I have not yet been convinced by it, this is
something of a kind of "leap of faith" that Gary Fuhrman, a scholar I
very much respect, would not be advocating for it so strongly if there
weren't  something to it. 
 For it has become quite clear to me since reading Stjernfelt's book
and engaging in a slow read of it here a few years ago (organized,
btw, by Gary F), that the dicisign is of particular interest for
human and biosemiotics. However, I will not be reading any additional
Frege! :-) I rejected his logic decades ago in reading John Sowa on
the derailment of logic as a consequence of the analytic turn--begun
by Frege, Russell, and Carnap--which dismissed Peirce's contribution
to logic with faint praise (actually, the praise was often effusive,
but Peirce's work was then either (mis)appropriated or ignored).   
 For now I will only 'touch' very lightly upon the interesting
biosemiotic question you've posed as to whether there even is a rheme
in biological processes (my present sense is that there perhaps is one
for a reason extrapolated from the conclusion of your post which I'm
responding to; so, see below). I would be interested, of course, in
what other Peircean influenced biosemioticians think about this
matter if there's anything in the literature concerning the role the
rheme might play in biosemiosis. 
 I'm glad that for human semiosis at least that you've begun
entertaining the notion that the link between, "the external Dynamic
Object and the processing triadic Sign of IO/R/I," as you phrased it,
might be in futuro.
  ET: This link [from the DO to the Sign as semiosic process]
provides information from the DO which is transformed into the
IO..and then, further transformed within the Representamen/mediation
..as an II and IO. But - again - could this link be future-oriented
rather than actual?
 As I suggested in my earlier posts, it is my sense that at least in
human semiosis that an uninterpreted rheme yet carries with it any
number (perhaps thousands or more) of associations, connotation,
partial characters, vague possible qualities, etc. All these are, as
I see it,  in some way connected to the dynamic object, but what that
particular information is (or, rather, will be) cannot be revealed at
least until the rheme 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}I'm not sure if quantum actions will link to the future-  since the
future has to be open to multiple interactions.  I think that quantum
actions link to the non-local and to the vague and general.

Edwina
 On Sun 24/06/18 12:28 PM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 I think it is unquestionable that we have a link to the future since
it is impossible to conceive of the PM working without there being
some consideration based on what is to come -- the practical result
of consideration. Garnier-Malet has explored this but I do not think
his work is essential to understanding this as a necessary inference
from Peirce himself. The quantum confirmation of this will probably
eventuate soon.

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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

. The reason that a rheme is not
interpreted as affording information is that it is not interpreted as
directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by
definition. This point is closely related to one that Peirce makes in
the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces  graphs of graphs:

[[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a
proposition that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to
be true. But to say that it is true implies that it really is affected
by its object; and in order that this object should have a real effect
upon it, this object must be a subject of force, which is an
individual. Consequently, an adequate interpretant of a graph must
represent it as a sign of an  individual. How, then, can there be a
graph of a graph, considering that a graph is a legisign, or sign
which has the mode of being of a general type, just as any word is a
general type, and not a single individual object in a single definite
place at a single instant. The answer is that a graph can only have a
graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can only refer to a
graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any graph-replica
you please so long as it be  equivalent to a given graph replica. ]R
470 CSP 126-8]

The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being
really affected by its object, but only “understood as representing
such and such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object
by making it a part of a dicisign, and it will afford the  depth
component of the information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the
absence of some part of the sign indicating what that information is
about, it can’t be interpreted as informational. 

 I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of
the “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for
that purpose is, of course, up to you.

Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond  
 Sent: 23-Jun-18 15:37
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
Gary F, Jon S, list,

I will respect your wish, Gary, not to engage in what you consider
not to be an inquiry concerning the status of the immediate object in
Peirce's various sign classes but a mere debate, and even though I
don't think the matter is at all settled. You have also stated that
you have nothing to add to what you've already written and that I
should at least read Bellucci's Chapter 8 in order to defend my
position (" If you feel that your position needs defending against
Bellucci’s) whereas I think Bellucci's/your position is the one
which needs defending.

For the record, I have read Chapter 8 of Bellucci's book and am
clearly not as swayed in this matter by it as you clearly are. On the
other hand, I began by reading the Peirce quotations in that chapter
out of context before re-reading them in the context of Bellucci's
discussion, and there is a great deal to be learned there, especially
in consideration of Peirce passages not readily available. 

May I ask you a couple of questions even if you decline to inquire
together on this topic (including, I would imagine, further
explicating your/Bellucci's position)? 

You and Bellucci claim that Stjernfeld holds your position that only
the Dicisign has an Immediate Object. Can you point to a passage where
Stjernfeld explicitly states that? The snippet at the conclusion of
your post today addressed to Jon S seems to be making a more general
statement about the DO and the IO. In any event, do you agree with
that Stjernfeld quote? 

Belluci (on "that confusion between the object and the interpretant
of a sign against which Peirce warned us): 

As far as I know, the only Peirce scholar who has fully recognized
that the immediate object of a sign has nothing to do with its
“meaning” is Frederik Stjernfelt: “neither the Immediate Object
nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with descriptive characters —
this is left to the meaning categories. Both deal with the identity
of reference" (2014, 98).  

Also, do you agree, Gary, with Bellucci's characterization of
Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung
(reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn
(sense) as expressed in the Abstract of Bellucci's paper "Exploring
Peirce's speculative grammar: The immediate object of a sign?" That
he has "exposed" what he seems to suggest is a misunderstanding of
the nature of the two Objects? 

The paper argues against what I call the “Fregean
interpretation” of Peirce’s distinction between the immediate and
the dynamic object of a sign, according to which Peirce’s dynamic
object is akin to Frege’s  Bedeutung, while Peirce’s immediate
object is akin to Frege’s Sinn. After having exposed the Fregean
interpretation, I briefly reconstruct the genesis of Peirce’s
notion of immediate object in his semiotic writings of the 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., Helmut, List:

GF:  You could also regard the rheme as a proposition with some parts
missing, as Peirce sometimes does.


Exactly, which is why a Rheme has an Immediate Object just as much as a
proposition/Dicisign.  As a Symbol, it is necessarily Copulative, with its
(incomplete) logical form as its IO; and it is also Designative and/or
Descriptive, based on how one or more of its blanks are filled.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:29 PM,  wrote:

> Helmut, you ask,
>
> “In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object
> a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law."
> Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?”
>
> No. A qualisign is a sign that IS a quality, and a sinsign IS a sign that
> is an existent, not a sign OF an existent; same for a “sign of
> law”/legisign. That trichotomy is about what the sign is in itself, not
> what it is in respect to its immediate object. That sentence was Peirce’s
> first (1904) attempt at a trichotomy of signs in respect to their immediate
> objects, and it is not at all clear what it means! Peirce did better later
> on.
>
> Regarding “the object as cognized in the sign, the idea,” you *might*
> interpret that as saying that the predicational or qualitative content of
> the sign is included in the immediate object. And you might say, as
> Stjernfelt does, that Peirce “vacillates” on the point of how much
> predicative content the immediate object has in itself. But I think
> Stjernfelt gives a good explanation of why this would be the case. You
> could also regard the rheme as a proposition with some parts missing, as
> Peirce sometimes does. And things get even more complicated when Peirce
> starts “throwing everything into the subject” or “throwing everything into
> the predicate” in his late analyses of propositions. But in any case, that
> shouldn’t cause you to ignore the less vague definitions Peirce gives of
> the IO.
>
> Speaking of vagueness, Bellucci’s book includes a good explanation of the
> difference between vagueness and generality which might help with the
> question you were asking about that a few days ago:
>
> [[ A vague sign is the subject of a particular or existentially quantified
> proposition like "Some man" in "Some man is wise." The "man" is indefinite,
> i.e., vague, because the principle of contradiction does not apply to it. A
> singular sign is the sign of an individual in a proposition, like
> "Socrates" in "Socrates is wise." Both the principle of contradiction and
> the principle of excluded middle apply to it. A general sign is the subject
> of a general proposition, like "Any man" in "Any man is wise." The term
> "man" is, as the medieval doctors used to say, "distributed" over a whole
> collection of individuals. It is general because the principle of excluded
> middle does not apply to it. ] Bellucci 2017, p. 295]
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* 22-Jun-18 13:57
> *To:* h.raul...@gmx.de
> *Cc:* g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate objec
>
> Sorry, Gary, not Gray! In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to
> its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an
> existent, or of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?
>
> Gray, list,
>
> by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in
> Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes
> donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but
> mostly he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate object. Why
> should the object as cognized in the sign, the idea, not be conveyed with a
> rheme? I guess it is merely more "vague", I would prefer "general", than
> with a proposition.
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>

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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Helmut, you ask,

“In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object a sign 
may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." Does that not 
mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?”

No. A qualisign is a sign that IS a quality, and a sinsign IS a sign that is an 
existent, not a sign OF an existent; same for a “sign of law”/legisign. That 
trichotomy is about what the sign is in itself, not what it is in respect to 
its immediate object. That sentence was Peirce’s first (1904) attempt at a 
trichotomy of signs in respect to their immediate objects, and it is not at all 
clear what it means! Peirce did better later on.

Regarding “the object as cognized in the sign, the idea,” you might interpret 
that as saying that the predicational or qualitative content of the sign is 
included in the immediate object. And you might say, as Stjernfelt does, that 
Peirce “vacillates” on the point of how much predicative content the immediate 
object has in itself. But I think Stjernfelt gives a good explanation of why 
this would be the case. You could also regard the rheme as a proposition with 
some parts missing, as Peirce sometimes does. And things get even more 
complicated when Peirce starts “throwing everything into the subject” or 
“throwing everything into the predicate” in his late analyses of propositions. 
But in any case, that shouldn’t cause you to ignore the less vague definitions 
Peirce gives of the IO.

Speaking of vagueness, Bellucci’s book includes a good explanation of the 
difference between vagueness and generality which might help with the question 
you were asking about that a few days ago:

[[ A vague sign is the subject of a particular or existentially quantified 
proposition like "Some man" in "Some man is wise." The "man" is indefinite, 
i.e., vague, because the principle of contradiction does not apply to it. A 
singular sign is the sign of an individual in a proposition, like "Socrates" in 
"Socrates is wise." Both the principle of contradiction and the principle of 
excluded middle apply to it. A general sign is the subject of a general 
proposition, like "Any man" in "Any man is wise." The term "man" is, as the 
medieval doctors used to say, "distributed" over a whole collection of 
individuals. It is general because the principle of excluded middle does not 
apply to it. ] Bellucci 2017, p. 295] 

 

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 22-Jun-18 13:57
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

  

  

Sorry, Gary, not Gray! In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its 
immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or 
of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?

Gray, list,

by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in 
Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes 
donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but mostly 
he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate object. Why should the 
object as cognized in the sign, the idea, not be conveyed with a rheme? I guess 
it is merely more "vague", I would prefer "general", than with a proposition.

Best,

Helmut

  

 22. Juni 2018 um 17:46 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
 

Jon, list,

Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are 
certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together 
constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this 
dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not 
yours. The problem I have with yours is that you take it as definitive of the 
IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see 
any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic 
sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only 
dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has 
two objects by definition.

Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO 
(http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your 
serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s 
definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need 
to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes 
in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior 
“understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes 
the basis of your definition.

Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that 
every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple 
oc