[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Just one word about a small part of your response (I am now lacking time for a much detailed response). You wrote: I had said that "your scenario implies that a mind gets object-acquaintance from a sign (the previous interpretant) to that same mind about the object." So you contradicted Peirce in order to get those two triangles. "A mind gets acquaintance with the object from a sign" : Yes and No. The apparent contradiction seems to me to be solved precisely by the duality between the continuous agreggate of experience of some object and the instantaneous effect of the same object through its actual sign. 1)On the side of continuity the interpreter's mind holds an history, a digest of an object through the aggregation of a multiplicity of instantaneous signs of it. Such an aggregation we call experience. In this sense we can say that object acquaintance comes -indirectly- with a series of signs. This lets open several questions: a) the identity of the object to which such an experience refers and b) the kind of the processes that proceed to the aggregation (the question of memory, be it individual or collective, c)how short could be the series in order to be effective for acquaintance, etc. I remember an old discussion on the list with Cathy Legg in order to know what happens with the first sign of some object (for example the first occurrence of a new word). 2)On the other side there is the instantaneous effect of a sign of the same object for the interpreter's mind. This effect does not bear anymore the identity of the object. In this sense the sign does not offers acquaintance with its object. It can only tell something about it. 3) Putting into relation 1) and 2) does the whole job. But analytically speaking, collateral experience is not genuinely distinct from the basic S-O-I relation. It is only a particular manifestation of such a relation qua entering into a continuous series of actualized signs. To my understanding of this, if somebody wanted to do a basic revision of Peirce's semiotic it should consist not to add a fourth element but to argue that without psychology (the aggregation process in some human head) there could hardly be any semiosis at all. The other "angle d'attaque" would be to argue that the recourse to time (the series of signs) requires to change the theory of signs. None of them was accepted by Peirce of course. Regards Bernard --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Bernard, list, >[Bernard] A few precisions which my initial text had overlooked, all along >your comments. [Joe] The only thing that presently interests me about Ben's thesis about verification concerns it as a claim made about taking it into account in the basic category theory. When you broaden it to being about experimenal procedure instead that broadens it quite beyond my concern. >>>[Bernard] OK. I will try to answer Ben on the categorial aspect of the >>>matter further. However my point was precisely that in order to don't throw >>>too roughly verification into a category of its own, it is necessary to put >>>it into its proper context. This context is I think the scientific method >>>and in the same way as nobody would make of -say- the effects of a >>>conception a category of its own, the same goes for verification. But there >>>is something in Ben's argumentation that deserves interest, namely the role >>>of recognition and experience in the flow of living signs as well as their >>>involvement in the basic theory of signs. In short, I think that if the >>>solution of the collateral experience does not consist in the invention of a >>>new category, yet the problem remains. >>>[Bernard] In a sense your response below (see after my message) shows that >>>either you consider the problem as being concerned by the communication >>>theory properties of scientific exchanges or you consider it as not being a >>>problem at all. >>>[Bernard] I strongly agree with you on the fundamental role of trust in >>>recognition (and I read trust as Firstness: something which is as it is >>>without needing anything else). The reason is that since "all evolution of >>>thought is dialogical" a precondition for the dialogue can take place is >>>trust. I often muse over the following passage from Peirce, which I think >>>says just the same concerning the dialogue of our reason with the universe: >>>[Bernard quoting Peirce] " Our Reason is akin to the Reason that governs the >>>universe, we must assume that or despair of finding out anything. Now >>>despair is always illogical, and we are warranted in thinking so, since >>>otherwise all reasoning will be in vain" (NEM, Vol 3). In other words we can >>>trust a familiarity, affinity of our reason with the world, and this trust >>>is logical Peirce adds. The same goes for argumentation. >>>[Bernard] Now the fact that the dialogue is supported by trust, the fact >>>that as you are saying there is a normal presumption of credibility in human >>>communication, does not give an account of the ways in which the dialogue >>>itself develops: it is just a prerequisite for the dialogue to take place. >>>Collateral experience is a dialogue between two signs: a sign of an object >>>for an interpretant on the one side and another sign (which is nothing but >>>the previous interpretant) of the SAME object on the other side. I say >>>"another sign" because experience, as thought, is in signs >>[Ben] Your scenario implies that a mind gets object-acquaintance from a sign >>(the previous interpretant) to that same mind about the object. It's okay for >>you to disagree with Peirce on that issue, but you should come out and say >>so. (Do you, in fact, agree or disagree with Peirce about it?). However, as >>far as I can tell, you're simply trying to use hidden semiotic reference >>frame shifts as a legitimate basis for reasoning. You're saying, that >>experience is mediated by signs, ergo a mind X's experience of an object is >>mind X's sign of the object. But it's only for another mind Y, or for the >>same mind X qua other mind Y, that the experience of the object may be merely >>a sign of the object. Mind X's experience of the object is mind Y's sign of >>the object. That happens often enough. It doesn't mean, willy-nilly and in a >>blur of illation symbols, that mind X's experience of the object is mind X's >>sign of the object. >[Bernard] I don't know if Peirce saw the matter as I see it myself but I have >not found in the sources something that contradicts my own idea of that. >Nevertheless, I try to be more precise because it seems that you did not >understand my point. The keypoint is that we are working here with a >particular level of semiotics, the level of the evolution of signs in actu or >semiosis. Thus the "dynamic" aspect of the relationship between successive >actualized signs of the same object is essential. And I see the question of >collateral experience of the object as another way of saying that you can't >determine the identity of a moving body (the actual sign of some object) at >the instant t without knowing its previous trajectory. To put it by means of a >mathematical image, collateral experience can be figured by the partial >integral of a curve to which the actual sign comes to complete with a "delta" >(hence the phrasing "perhaps a much more developped sign" for the >interpretant). It i
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Thank you for your response. I suppose at the crack of doom humans will still be wrestling with definitions. These exchanges are useful for egocentrics like me who assume their terms mean the same as someone else's. When I think of "immediate," I think of something very like Peirce's "immediate state of consciousness." In the prior post I used the example of an infant's experience of a hunger pang or hurt. That also seems to me to be compatible with Peirce's A is immediate to B formulation. But when we clip the prefix from "immediate" I think I leave the definitional camp. When I speak of mediation, I'm talking about the use of a medium, some constrained/limited system which we use informationally, such as the sensory system or language. From the standpoint of information, the medium is not an obstructive intermediary, but the necessary if often unconsciously used means of information processing. So I may be at odds with you and Peirce as regards the concept of "mediation." - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 1:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Bill, list, Peirce does disgtinguish between "direct" and "immediate." See Joe's post from Feb. 15, 2006, which I reproduce below. It's not very clear to me at the mmoment what Peirce means by "without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation." -- which is part of how he means "direct." I know at least that when I say "direct" I mean such as can be mediated, and I've thought that Peirce meant "direct" in that sense too. So by "direct" I guess I mean something like -- if mediated, then such as not to create impediments, buffers, etc., and such as instead to transmit "brute" or unencoded, untranslated determination of the relevant kind by the shortest distance. (I.e., insofar as the mediation means an "encoding," it's not the relevant kind of determination anyway). Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 8:36 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: immediate/mediate, direct/indirect - CORRECTION I did a check against an aging photocopy of the MS of the quote from Peirce in my recent message, and found some errors of transcription, and also a typo of punctuation that needed correction as well. I also include in this correction an indication of the words which are underlined in the original (using flanking underscores). I show one illegible word as a set of six question marks enclosed in brackets because the illegible word appears to have six letters, maybe seven. Here is the passage again, corrected (though not infallibly): A _primal_ is that which is _something_ that is _in itself_ regardless of anything else. A _Potential_ is anything which is in some respect determined but whose being is not definite. A _Feeling_ is a state of determination of consciousness which apparently might in its own nature (neglecting our experience of [??] etc.) continue for some time unchanged and that has no reference of [NOTE: should be "to"] anything else. I call a state of consciousness _immediate_ which does not refer to anything not present in that very state. I use the terms _immediate_ and _direct_, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is _immediate_ to B means that it is present in B. _Direct_, as I use it means without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation. -- MS 339.493; c. 1904-05 Logic Notebook Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Dear Jim, list, > Dear Ben, Folks-- >[Jim] Thanks for the reassuring clarification, Ben. Here's my thought on the >matter for today. >[Jim] The distinction between the knowledge we gain from direct acquaintance >with an object verses the knowledge we gain of the same object through a >symbolic sign of that object is that direct aquaintance is mediated by an >actually indexed icon of the object whereas indirect symbolic aquaintance is >mediated by an imputed icon of the object. You've shifted the semiotic reference frame. For another mind my acquaintance may be merely a sign -- an index with an icon. If they were my index & icon, then, as per Peirce, I couldn't get acquaintance or experience from them. So we note that most observers will not have direct access to the oberving mind in question, and that therefore for most observers the experience belonging to the observing mind in question will be a sign rather than an experience. And this we call 'mediation.' It's not really mediation, though; it's only similar to mediation. The genuine mediation by semiosis is in the fact that the observing mind in question is in and subject to some underlying semiosis whereof the observing mind in question is unconscious, and this involves unconsciousness not only about objects, signs, and interpretants, but also even about recognitions, (dis-)verifications, learnings. If it doesn't involve learning and (dis-verification), then it's not semiosis, but merely preprogrammed information processing which, apart from the perspective of the recipient, learning, and evolution, is triadic -- source, encoding, decoding -- which is stuff which probably does mediate at some deep unintelligent level. It is only at the individual vegetable level that such a structure can be considered, in some qualified sense, to comprehensively characterize a system. The other observing minds need to avoid the move toward solipsism and, in any case the move into vegetabilism, which is involved in failing to see that the mind in question has experiences and observations which are not _that_ mind's interpretations, even though those experiences and observations are not themselves experiences and observations belonging to the other observing minds. Those more tangible and visible and glossable indices and icons and symbols -- break it down into those? It really is not so unlike saying that we're just atoms and molecules, but it's even less justified. It is difficult enough to grasp the interpretiveness of those signs which clarify in terms of values and interests and standards of practical bearing and non-banality rather different than our own, the values and interests of other species, other communities, other _kinds_. The interpretant selects ramifications, specializing "down" from the universe represented by the sign. It will be that much more difficult to grasp the recognitiveness of objects -- or I should say experiential subjections -- which are those of individual minds other than our own, caught up in different places and times in the tapestry of history and geography.. The analysis of experience which breaks experience down into mediative elements of object, sign, and interpretant but not also of unconscious recognitions, unconscious "experiences" of them in respect of each other, is simply leaving something out. And it involves an unnecessary complication of the language of description. I see and handle the thing -- it is my focus of interest, and it has a certain forcefulness and resistance, and a certain appearance. Calling those indices and icons when I'm just interested in them for themselves complicates the issue unnecessarily, and will lead to one's calling an icon's appearance also an icon, and that second icon's appearance, in turn, also an icon. Meanwhile, the unconscious mediation (which I agree is there) via indices and icons will also have unconscious interpretants and verifications. At least, at the atomic level, there is no appearance of little interpretant and verification structures which go simply ignored. Thus the analysis of experience into entirely non-experiential semiotic elements is less justified than the analysis of mind/brain down to mere atoms. By your reasoning and your use of the hidden semiotic-reference-frame shift, one could likewise analyze the triad down to dyads and those down to monads (a reductive analysis about which I went into some detail some months ago). All defenses of the triad which work by the reduction of experience to object-sign-interpretant that I've seen have involved the same abandonment of triadist defenses against dyadism and monadism in order break tetradism's defenses. >[Jim] The meaning of symbols depends in part upon the reliability of >linguistic conventions, customs and habits. The meaning of icons depends >primarily upon the reliability of direct observation. >[Jim] Ideally the meanings we assign to our symbols
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, I don't understand why a person can't represent two signs as either alike or unlike without resorting to some sort of representation that is outside of representation as represented by Peirce. I encounter a sign of an object in some context where the object is not present. I interpret that sign. Later I go find the actual collateral object that the I originally interpreted the sign to stand for. I observe that collateral object -- which is to say I conceive the collateral object through the process of representing as having some meaning or consequences. Later I compare my original interpretation of the object's meaning that I derived from the sign with my interpretation of the collateral object's meaning that I based upon observing the object itslef. I do this by representing the a new object which I call the difference or similarity between the object of the original sign and the object which I observed. I'm trying to address two issues here. The first issue is what I take to be the fact that even observation involves representation. The second issue is that comparison is also a matter of representation. Enjoying and hopefully learning from your challenging arguments! Not sure you'd agree that I'm learning anything, but I do see a subtle evolution in your argument in response to the comments of others -- and this I find to your credit! Jim Piat - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 3:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Bill, list, Peirce does disgtinguish between "direct" and "immediate." See Joe's post from Feb. 15, 2006, which I reproduce below. It's not very clear to me at the mmoment what Peirce means by "without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation." -- which is part of how he means "direct." I know at least that when I say "direct" I mean such as can be mediated, and I've thought that Peirce meant "direct" in that sense too. So by "direct" I guess I mean something like -- if mediated, then such as not to create impediments, buffers, etc., and such as instead to transmit "brute" or unencoded, untranslated determination of the relevant kind by the shortest distance. (I.e., insofar as the mediation means an "encoding," it's not the relevant kind of determination anyway). Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 8:36 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: immediate/mediate, direct/indirect - CORRECTION I did a check against an aging photocopy of the MS of the quote from Peirce in my recent message, and found some errors of transcription, and also a typo of punctuation that needed correction as well. I also include in this correction an indication of the words which are underlined in the original (using flanking underscores). I show one illegible word as a set of six question marks enclosed in brackets because the illegible word appears to have six letters, maybe seven. Here is the passage again, corrected (though not infallibly): A _primal_ is that which is _something_ that is _in itself_ regardless of anything else. A _Potential_ is anything which is in some respect determined but whose being is not definite. A _Feeling_ is a state of determination of consciousness which apparently might in its own nature (neglecting our experience of [??] etc.) continue for some time unchanged and that has no reference of [NOTE: should be "to"] anything else. I call a state of consciousness _immediate_ which does not refer to anything not present in that very state. I use the terms _immediate_ and _direct_, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is _immediate_ to B means that it is present in B. _Direct_, as I use it means without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation. -- MS 339.493; c. 1904-05 Logic Notebook Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have pe
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Dear Bill, I did not mean to suggest that direct aquaintance with an object was unmediated by signs . I was trying to make just the opposite point -- that all meaningful conceptions are mediated by signs whether we are in direct contact with the object or indirectly as when the object is represented by a symbol. My further point was that direct contact permitted actual iconization of the object based upon direct observation whereas the symbol only provided an imputed icon which depended in part upon community conventions. So I think I am more in agreement with your position that I made clear in my earlier posts. I even agree with the thrust of your argument that meaning guides perception rather than vice versa. We do not perceive truly unknown objects that are meaningless to us. An unfamiliar object that is a member of a familiar class is of course not instance of a meaningless object becuase we have a framework in which to perceive its broad outlines. But a truly unknown object would escape our notice because it has no meaningful contours. As to firstness -- I seem to be in a mininority around here as to what constitutes a feeling, a quality or a firstness. I say we have no conception of firsts (other than as firsts of thirds) because without the sign we have no conception of anything. In the beginning is the word. Sorry I have not responded more directly to your comments. I find them interesting as always but just now I'm in a big rush. Still I could not resist a comment or two of my own. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called "objective." Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn't dodge the predator's charge until after you'd named the predator, the attack and what to do. For most of our lives, the subject-object relationship analysis only enters when things go wrong, when the ride breaks down and we have to get off to fix it. The rest of the time the perceptual information/data that we treat as "objective" is submerged in our comparatively "mindless" states of feeling and doing. We write or type instead of moving our fingers and hands to produce selected results. We drive three quarters of the way to work and "wake up" to realize we've no memory of the prior two miles. Or we come home angered by someone at work and yell at spouses and kids. That's the everyday world we live in, and in that world the organic unity of the sensory system means responses to environmental impingments (exteroception) are inherently conditioned by what we are feeling and doing--by interoc
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
. I think that it is an unnecessary luxury Bernard For my part, the cenopythagorean categories are quite relevant and belong in one-to-one correspondence with the basic semiotic elements just as they are with various kinds of signs (icon, index, symbol). But it's that much harder, for instance, to argue about the final interpretant, the final recognizant, and their particular importance (and I do hold with those ideas), if people remain undeclared on their views about the relevance of the cenopythagorean categories to the basic semiotic elements. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ [Joe] I should say, though, that I think that verification in science is motivated in the same say as in ordinary life, namely, by the occurrence of a real question being at least pertinent or justifiable if not actually raised about a given claim made. In practice, scientists tend to accept research claims made by those they regard as peers as unquestioningly as one does in ordinary life in regards to claims made by ordinary life peers. Huaan relationships depend importantly on this: someone who thinks that everything anyone else says is questionable prima facie is living in hell (which, unfortunately, does indeed occur all too frequently in human life, as the daily news testifies). Peirce's brief discussion of "credenciveness" in the New Elements paper (in Essential Writings 2) is very suggestive in this respect, and I note that Peirce is responsible for the definition of "credencive" in the Century Dictionary, though I can't check up on that right at the moment while in process of composing this message. But, to put the point in brief, I think Peirce reognizes the fundamental importance of there being a normal presumption of credibility in human communication: the recognition of the speech acts of assertion, statement making, etc., is a theoretical understanding of that pre-theoretical practice in daily life and in science as well. It is a recognition of the fundamental role of trust. - Original Message From: Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, September 1, 2006 5:48:29 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Ben, Gary, Joe, Charles and list I followed the discussion about verification with interest and while I don't think that the question of verification calls for a fourth category, some arguments from Ben deserve to be studied carefully. As an example I will take a passage out of the last reply from Joe, a short extract in order to limit the subject to one point that I think to be important. Joe writes : "Scientific verification is really just a sophistication about ways of checking up on something about which one has some doubts, driven by an unusually strong concern for establishing something as "definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing more than an ideal of checking up on something so thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be raised again.But it is no different in principle from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make sure" of something that we think might be so but about which we are not certain enough to satisfy us." It seems to me that the Peirce's quote given by Ben makes clear that scientific "verification" is NOT the same as checking something in ordinary life as Joe puts it. I reproduce a fragment of the quote : Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the true cause of the success of modern science when he has said that it was *_verification_*. I should express it in this way: modern students of science have been successful because they have spent their lives not in their libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the field; and while in their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by thought, but have been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories. The cause of their success has been that the motive which has carried them to the laboratory and the field has been a craving to know how things really were, and an interest in finding out whether or not general propositions actually held good -- which has overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all passion. (CP 1.34) The main differences are: - the originator of the verification: according to Joe, an individual being doubting of something ; according to Peirce a group of students motivated by a desire to know. Doubt isn't an essential part of the verification motive in science. - the goal of the verification: the fact that no real question will be raised again on the subject according to Joe ; wether or not a GENERAL proposition ACTUALLY holds good
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Bill, list, Peirce does disgtinguish between "direct" and "immediate." See Joe's post from Feb. 15, 2006, which I reproduce below. It's not very clear to me at the mmoment what Peirce means by "without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation." -- which is part of how he means "direct." I know at least that when I say "direct" I mean such as can be mediated, and I've thought that Peirce meant "direct" in that sense too. So by "direct" I guess I mean something like -- if mediated, then such as not to create impediments, buffers, etc., and such as instead to transmit "brute" or unencoded, untranslated determination of the relevant kind by the shortest distance. (I.e., insofar as the mediation means an "encoding," it's not the relevant kind of determination anyway). Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 8:36 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: immediate/mediate, direct/indirect - CORRECTION I did a check against an aging photocopy of the MS of the quote from Peirce in my recent message, and found some errors of transcription, and also a typo of punctuation that needed correction as well. I also include in this correction an indication of the words which are underlined in the original (using flanking underscores). I show one illegible word as a set of six question marks enclosed in brackets because the illegible word appears to have six letters, maybe seven. Here is the passage again, corrected (though not infallibly): A _primal_ is that which is _something_ that is _in itself_ regardless of anything else. A _Potential_ is anything which is in some respect determined but whose being is not definite. A _Feeling_ is a state of determination of consciousness which apparently might in its own nature (neglecting our experience of [??] etc.) continue for some time unchanged and that has no reference of [NOTE: should be "to"] anything else. I call a state of consciousness _immediate_ which does not refer to anything not present in that very state. I use the terms _immediate_ and _direct_, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is _immediate_ to B means that it is present in B. _Direct_, as I use it means without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation. -- MS 339.493; c. 1904-05 Logic Notebook Joe Ransdell - Original Message ----- From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called "objective." Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
I reply to myself to note that I left off a paragraph: Through habituation, as with the rest of our information processing, we deal also with the acquired objective social reality in the primary mode of processing until we get into trouble. Because we have supporting groups for that "reality," it's sometimes difficult to get off and fix a social reality with the wheels coming off. I think of "intersubjectivity" as primary level social information processing. Scientific investigation, or Peirce's community of investigators is what I consider the acme of secondary level social information processing. - Original Message - From: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 12:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called "objective." Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn't dodge the predator's charge until after you'd named the predator, the attack and what to do. For most of our lives, the subject-object relationship analysis only enters when things go wrong, when the ride breaks down and we have to get off to fix it. The rest of the time the perceptual information/data that we treat as "objective" is submerged in our comparatively "mindless" states of feeling and doing. We write or type instead of moving our fingers and hands to produce selected results. We drive three quarters of the way to work and "wake up" to realize we've no memory of the prior two miles. Or we come home angered by someone at work and yell at spouses and kids. That's the everyday world we live in, and in that world the organic unity of the sensory system means responses to environmental impingments (exteroception) are inherently conditioned by what we are feeling and doing--by interoception and proprioception. I understand this primary level of information processing to be essentially what Peirce means by "firstness." I don't think we can get to secondness until there can be some degree of separation in the so-called subjective and objective elements of experience can be separated. We may discover, contrary to our desires, alas, we cannot eat rocks without the pain. But it is only in thirdness that we can represent experience to ourselves and ultimately through communication work out an objective social reality. It is in thirdness, a secondary level of information processing, that we mediate between objective reality and how we feel about it. It is this secondary level of information processing that we (sometimes) fix the wagon when the wheels come off. Other times we may just kick and brutalize the damnably perverse inanimate object. I'd be delighted to have any errors pointed out in my application of Peirce. Cheers,
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions "direct acquaintance" or "direct experience" if those terms mean "unmediated," or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called "objective." Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn't dodge the predator's charge until after you'd named the predator, the attack and what to do. For most of our lives, the subject-object relationship analysis only enters when things go wrong, when the ride breaks down and we have to get off to fix it. The rest of the time the perceptual information/data that we treat as "objective" is submerged in our comparatively "mindless" states of feeling and doing. We write or type instead of moving our fingers and hands to produce selected results. We drive three quarters of the way to work and "wake up" to realize we've no memory of the prior two miles. Or we come home angered by someone at work and yell at spouses and kids. That's the everyday world we live in, and in that world the organic unity of the sensory system means responses to environmental impingments (exteroception) are inherently conditioned by what we are feeling and doing--by interoception and proprioception. I understand this primary level of information processing to be essentially what Peirce means by "firstness." I don't think we can get to secondness until there can be some degree of separation in the so-called subjective and objective elements of experience can be separated. We may discover, contrary to our desires, alas, we cannot eat rocks without the pain. But it is only in thirdness that we can represent experience to ourselves and ultimately through communication work out an objective social reality. It is in thirdness, a secondary level of information processing, that we mediate between objective reality and how we feel about it. It is this secondary level of information processing that we (sometimes) fix the wagon when the wheels come off. Other times we may just kick and brutalize the damnably perverse inanimate object. I'd be delighted to have any errors pointed out in my application of Peirce. Cheers, Bill - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 10:50 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Dear Ben, Folks-- Thanks for the reassuring clarification, Ben. Here's my thought on the matter for today. The distinction between the knowledge we gain from direct acquaintance with an object verses the knowledge we gain of the same object through a symbolic sign of that object is that direct aquaintance is mediated by an actually indexed icon of the object whereas indirect symbolic aquaintance is mediated by an imputed icon of the object. The meaning of symbols depends in part upon the reliability of linguistic conventions, customs and habits. The meaning of icons depends primarily upon the reliability of direct observat
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
ry, I argue for the retention of the object-sign-interpretant structure and for the _recognition_ that -- via the characterization of the interpretant and via the Pragmatic Maxim and via the characterizations of sign and semiotic object dependently on the characterization of the interpretant --the object-sign-interpretant structure already is based, thoughout itself, on the appeal to a fourth element, practically relevant experience which would tend to support or overturn interpretant and sign with respect to the obect. It still remains unclear to me what you and Joe mean by "category theory." Normally I would take that to mean theory about, first of all, the cenopythagorean categories 1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness. But both of you seem to be talking only about the object-sign-interpretant triad. This matters because it is not clear whether you, and whether Joe, currently hold that there is a one-to-one correlation between the cenopythagorean categories and the basic semiotic elements, and whether either of you currently has a definite view on the question at all. For my part, the cenopythagorean categories are quite relevant and belong in one-to-one correspondence with the basic semiotic elements just as they are with various kinds of signs (icon, index, symbol). But it's that much harder, for instance, to argue about the final interpretant, the final recognizant, and their particular importance (and I do hold with those ideas), if people remain undeclared on their views about the relevance of the cenopythagorean categories to the basic semiotic elements. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ >>[Joe] I should say, though, that I think that verification in science is >>motivated in the same say as in ordinary life, namely, by the occurrence of a >>real question being at least pertinent or justifiable if not actually raised >>about a given claim made. In practice, scientists tend to accept research >>claims made by those they regard as peers as unquestioningly as one does in >>ordinary life in regards to claims made by ordinary life peers. Huaan >>relationships depend importantly on this: someone who thinks that everything >>anyone else says is questionable prima facie is living in hell (which, >>unfortunately, does indeed occur all too frequently in human life, as the >>daily news testifies). Peirce's brief discussion of "credenciveness" in the >>New Elements paper (in Essential Writings 2) is very suggestive in this >>respect, and I note that Peirce is responsible for the definition of >>"credencive" in the Century Dictionary, though I can't check up on that right >>at the moment while in process of composing this message. But, to put the >>point in brief, I think Peirce reognizes the fundamental importance of there >>being a normal presumption of credibility in human communication: the >>recognition of the speech acts of assertion, statement making, etc., is a >>theoretical understanding of that pre-theoretical practice in daily life and >>in science as well. It is a recognition of the fundamental role of trust. > - Original Message > From: Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: Peirce Discussion Forum > Sent: Friday, September 1, 2006 5:48:29 AM > Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor > > Ben, Gary, Joe, Charles and list > > I followed the discussion about verification with interest and while I don't > think that the question of verification calls for a fourth category, some > arguments from Ben deserve to be studied carefully. As an example I will > take a passage out of the last reply from Joe, a short extract in order to > limit the subject to one point that I think to be important. > > Joe writes : > >"Scientific verification is really just a sophistication about ways of >checking up on something about which one has some doubts, driven by an >unusually strong concern for establishing something as "definitively" as >possible, which is of course nothing more than an ideal of checking up on >something so thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be raised >again.But it is no different in principle from what we do in ordinary life >when we try to "make sure" of something that we think might be so but about >which we are not certain enough to satisfy us." > >It seems to me that the Peirce's quote given by Ben makes clear that >scientific "verification" is NOT the same as checking something in ordinary >life as Joe puts it. I reproduce a fragment of the quote : > >Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come >pretty near to stating the true cause of the
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Dear Ben, Folks-- Thanks for the reassuring clarification, Ben. Here's my thought on the matter for today. The distinction between the knowledge we gain from direct acquaintance with an object verses the knowledge we gain of the same object through a symbolic sign of that object is that direct aquaintance is mediated by an actually indexed icon of the object whereas indirect symbolic aquaintance is mediated by an imputed icon of the object. The meaning of symbols depends in part upon the reliability of linguistic conventions, customs and habits. The meaning of icons depends primarily upon the reliability of direct observation. Ideally the meanings we assign to our symbols are rooted in aquaintance with the actual objects to which they refer, but customs take on a life of their own and are notoriously susceptible to the distorting influence of such factors as wishful thinking, blind allegiance to authority, tradition and the like. Science and common sense teach us that it is useful to periodically compare our actual icons with our theories and symbolic imputations of them. Symbols provide indirect aquaintance with objects. Actual observation of objects provides direct aquaintance. However in both cases the aquaintance (in so far as it provides us with a conception of the object) is mediated by signs. In the case of direct aquaintance the sign is an icon. In the case of indirect aquaintance the sign is a symbol with an imputed icon. Whenever we make comparisons we do so with signs. Mere otherness is basically dyadic. Comparison is fundamentally triadic. "A is not B" is not a comparison but merely an indication of otherness from which we gain no real sense of how A compares to B. On the other hand the analogy that "A is to B as B is to C" is a comparison which actually tells us something about the relative characters of the elements involved. Comparing a collateral object with a symbol for a collateral object is really a matter of comparing the meaning of an actual icon with the meaning of an imputed icon. We are never in a position to compare an actual object with a sign of that object because we have no conception of objects outside of signs. Sometime I think, Ben, that you are just blowing off the notion that all our conceptions of objects are mediated by signs. You say you agree with this formulation but when it comes to the collateral object you seem to resort to the position that direct aquaintance with the collateral object is not "really" mediated by signs but outside of semiosis. But what Peirce means (as I understand him) is that the collateral object is not actually iconized in the symbol that stands for it but is merely imputed to be iconized. To experience the actual icon we must experience the collateral object itself. That is the sense in which the collateral object is outside the symbol but not outside semiosis. One of the recurring problems I personally have in understanding Peirce is that I am often unsure in a particular instance whether he is using the term sign to refer to a symbol, an icon or an index. Morevover when it comes to icons and indexes I am often unclear as to whether he means them as signs or as degenerate signs. Maybe this is where I am going astray in my present analysis of the role of the collateral object in the verification of the sign. In anycase I continue to find this discussion helpful. Best wishes to all-- Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
life peers. Huaan relationships depend
importantly on this: someone who thinks that everything anyone else
says is questionable prima facie is living in hell (which,
unfortunately, does indeed occur all too frequently in human life, as
the daily news testifies). Peirce's brief discussion of
"credenciveness" in the New Elements paper (in Essential Writings 2)
is very suggestive in this respect, and I note that Peirce is
responsible for the definition of "credencive" in the Century
Dictionary, though I can't check up on that right at the moment while
in process of composing this message. But, to put the point in brief,
I think Peirce reognizes the fundamental importance of there being a
normal presumption of credibility in human communication: the
recognition of the speech acts of assertion, statement making, etc.,
is a theoretical understanding of that pre-theoretical practice in
daily life and in science as well. It is a recognition of the
fundamental role of trust.
Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
- Original Message
From: Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Friday, September 1, 2006 5:48:29 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Gary, Joe, Charles and list
I followed the discussion about verification with interest and while
I don't think that the question of verification calls for a fourth
category,
some arguments from Ben deserve to be studied carefully. As an
example I will take a passage out of the last reply from Joe, a short
extract in order to limit the subject to one point that I think to be
important.
Joe writes :
"Scientific verification is really just a
sophistication about ways of checking up on something
about which one has some doubts, driven by an
unusually strong concern for establishing something as
"definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing
more than an ideal of checking up on something so
thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be
raised again.But it is no different in principle
from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make
sure" of something that we think might be so but about
which we are not certain enough to satisfy us."
It seems to me that the Peirce's quote given by Ben
makes clear that scientific "verification" is NOT the
same as checking something in ordinary life as Joe puts
it. I reproduce a fragment of the quote :
Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1)
seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the
true cause of the success of modern science
when he
has said that it was *_verification_*. I should
express it in this way: modern students of science
have been successful because they have spent their
lives not in their libraries and museums but in their
laboratories and in the field; and while in their
laboratories and in the field they have been not
gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in
passive perception unassisted by thought, but have
been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid
of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories.
The cause of their success has been that the motive
which has carried them to the laboratory and the field
has been a craving to know how things really were, and
an interest in finding out whether or not general
propositions actually held good -- which has
overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all
passion. (CP 1.34)
The main differences are:
- the originator of the verification: according to Joe,
an individual being doubting of something ; according
to Peirce a group of students motivated by a desire to
know. Doubt isn't an essential part of the verification
motive in science.
- the goal of the verification: the fact that no real
question will be raised again on the subject according
to Joe ; wether or not a GENERAL proposition ACTUALLY
holds good with regards to a PARTICULAR fact according
to Peirce
- the means of the verification: our own satisfaction
(I suppose) according to Joe ; observation ("perception
by the aid of analysis") for Peirce.
In scientific "verification" we take advantage of
theories to be tested. Is there the same, or some
equivalent in ordinary life conduct? I don't know but
perhaps psychologists could answer. However I don't see
why it would be required that the same goes for ordinary
life conduct and scientific activity.
In fact "verification" is the word borrowed by
Peirce
from G.H. Lewes here but I think that we would better say
today "experimental method" of which the strict
verification is but one little stage. As already said it
requires what Peirce calls a general proposition and what
we would call today a "model" or a theory and what is
ascertained with the help of the method is an actuality.
Hence the verification step needs reiterations on several
c
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Dear Ben, Joe, Folks -- Ben, are you saying that Peirce's categories (including representation) are inadequate to account for comparisons between knowledge gained from direct aqauintance with a collateral object and knowledge gained from a sign of a collateral object? That when we make these sorts of comparisons we engage in some category of experience (such as checking, recognition. verification or the like) that is not accounted for in the Peircean categories? Is that basically what you are saying or am I missing your point? I want to make sure I'm stating the issue to your satisfaction before I launch into further reasons why I disagree with that view. I fear we we may be talking past one another if we don't share a common understanding of what is at issue. So I want to make sure I'm correctly understanding what you take to be at issue. When and if you have the energy and interest, Ben. I admire your stamina and good cheer. And yours, too, Joe. I think that dispite its frustrating moments this has been a worthwhile discussion. For me the notion of what we can know and how we know it is at the core of Peirce's philosophy. Each time the list revisits this issue in one form or another I gain a better understanding of what is a stake -- and also of some erroneous assumptions or conclusions that I have been making. Thanks to all -- Jim Piat Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, September 01, 2006 3:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, list, >[Joe] I was just now rereading your response to Charles, attending particularly to your citation of Peirce's concern with verification, and I really don't see in what you quote from him on this anything more than the claim that it is the special concern for making sure that something that someone -- perhaps oneself -- has claimed to be a fact or has concluded to be so (which could be a conviction more or less tentatively held) really is a fact by putting the claim or acceptation of that conclusion to the test, in one way or another. This verificational activity could involve many different sorts of procedures, ranging from, say, reconsidering the premises supporting the claim as regards their cogency relative to the conclusion drawn to actively experimenting or observing further for the same purpose, including perhaps, as a rather special case, the case where one actually attempts to replicate the procedure cited as backing up the claim made. Scientific verification is really just a sophistication about ways of checking up on something about which one has some doubts, driven by an unusually strong concern for establishing something as "definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing more than an ideal of checking up on something so thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be raised again. But it is no different in principle from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make sure" of something that we think might be so but about which we are not certain enough to satisfy us. The purpose (http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01288.html also at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1344) of my quoting Peirce on verification was to counter Charles' claim that verification amounts to nothing more than one's acting as if a claim were true, and Charles' making it sound like there's something superfluous about verification, that it's somehow meaningless to think of really verifying or disverifying a claimed rule like "where there's smoke, there's fire," meaningless insofar as it supposedly involves indulging in Cartesian doubt and insofar one has already done whatever verification one can do, by acting as if the claimed rule were true -- as if the way to understand verification were to understand it as a piece of symbolism about a rule only hyperbolically doubtable, understand verification as an act which stands as symbol (or, for that matter, as index or whatever) to another mind, rather than as an observing of sign as truly corresponding to object, and of interpretant as truly corresponding to sign and object. Verification does not need to be actually public and shared among very distinct minds, though it should be, at least in principle, sharable, potentially public in those ways. (Of course, _scientific_ verification has higher standards than that.) I quoted Peirce on verification to show that, in the Peircean view, the doubting of a claimed rule is not automatically a universal, hyperbolic, Cartesian doubt of the kind which Peirce rejects, especially rejects as a basis on which (a la Desca
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben says: BU: I quoted Peirce on verification to show that, in the Peircean view, the doubting of a claimed rule is not automatically a universal, hyperbolic, Cartesian doubt of the kind which Peirce rejects, especially rejects as a basis on which (a la Descartes) only deductive reasoning will be allowed to build -- a Cartesian needle's eye of doubt through which all philosophical ideas are mistakenly forced to pass or be discarded. I was defending myself against Charles' claim that my view of verification implied some systematic incorporation of Cartesian doubt into research practices and against Charles' suggestion that therefore maybe I was a nominalist. . . . Evidently you still think that I'm talking only of conscious deliberate verification involving the taking of physically active steps. That is not at all the only kind of verification which I've been discussing. <>The things which you describe are only part of that which I mean by "verification," which I'm using as a forest term for the various trees. In experience and life, the greater part of experience whereby the mind supports and verifies (to whatever extent) is experience which the mind already has, and the main active steps are usually at most a bit of digging through memory. The whole "feeling" of experience, acquaintance, knowledge, recognition, etc., as involving a _pastward_ orientation is no mere accident of linguistic history; likewise the "feeling" of settlement, establishment, etc., as involving becoming part of the past (not in the sense of the departed but instead in the sense of that which has been, that which is the foundation on which we stand). Oftenest, when a mind forms an interpretant supported by that mind's experience, that's it right there -- recognition takes place at near lightspeed -- "verification accomplished," as far as that mind is concerned, and accomplished more or less fallibly as is often if not always also recognized by the given mind. That is a big part of what I mean by "verification," and I hold that it happens just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously at every semiosic stage and level, just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously as objectification, representation, and interpretation happen. Science is distinguished by (among other things) a very active attitude of taking verificational steps in a context where an everyday mind (and also a scientific mind busy with other things) is often content to stand/sit/rest on the established. <>[JR: Omitting more to the same effect.] <>BU: If, after all this, you wish that I would just use some other word than "verification," I'm open to suggestions. I've also used "recognition" but the problem with that word is that it also names a psychological act in some sense that "interpretation" and "representation" do not, and there are other and related problems with it as well. Though I didn't see it clearly from the start, "recognition" in the sense in which I've used it really should not be _equated_ with "acknowledgement" any more than "representation" should be _equated_ with "assertion." "Establishment" seems to come closest to the desired sense, but it is also used in the sense of "founding" or "setting up" as in "establishing an organization" etc., and even in the verificational sense it's kind of strong in its "up-or-down" feeling; one is particularly unaccustomed to a phrase like "degrees of establishment." Also it's hard to form a word like "interpretant" or "recognizant" from "establish" -- going back to Latin, it should be "stabilient" but that word does not evoke the word "establish." Maybe I could go half-Spanish and coin "establecent." Or "establizant"? "Establicant"? "Establishant"? JR: I don't think you will find another word that will work, Ben. Anyway, I looked up "verify" (and its conjugate terms) in the on-line Century Dictionary. (It is not listed as one of the the entries written by Peirce himself, by the way, but I've come to think of the Century as being the best dictionary to consult for any word in use during his lifetime, in any case.) For every of the several closely related senses the implication is always there that there is some prior claim requiring the verification and I don't see how that would make sense if it is supposed that what is being verified has already involved that very component. BU: Lately I've noticed that people talk about "the categories" and seem to mean the basic semiotic elements (object, sign, interpretant). When I see "categories" or "categorial" I usually take it initially in the cenopythagorean sense (quality, reaction, representation). Anyway, I'm unsure how you mean "categorial" here, but it may ultimately make not that much difference. Anyway, I'll respond to the rest of your post later. JR: I was just referring to the context as being one in which the problematics of category theory are relevnat,
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, This is to say that I am gratified and somewhat relieved to learn that you found something worthwhile in my "as if" post, and that I am not ignoring your responses to my recent posts. On the contrary, you have prompted me to reexamine my "Three Worlds" speculation together with some of the Peirce material that I included (especially CP 5.119 in connection with CP 4. 157) with the result that I am now thinking in terms both of some revision and expansion. It may take a while as I am now under some time constraints from which I had some reprieve over the last three weeks. In any case, if and when I think I have something cogent in hand I will post it. Charles PS The answer to your question off list about who and where I am is yes. On Mon, 28 Aug 2006 12:41:44 -0400 Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Charles, list, One of the Peirce quotations in your "as if" post strongly supports your notion, reiterated here, that it is possible and, indeed, desirable to make a double trichotomic distinction of Sign - External Object - Interpreter and Sign - Immediate Object - Interpretant, and that especially the relation between these Inner and Outer semeiotic trichotomies might prove fertile grounds for further inquiry. I've myself (and bouncing off your "as if" post) have begun work reflecting upon and diagramming some of your questions, ideas, also my own abductions as to the relationship holding between the two triads, etc. However, it's much too early for me to offer a report on any of this except to say that you are asking some very stimulating questions, Charles, which have certainly gotten me thinking in refreshing new directions. In any case, here is the quotation in your "as if" post which I'm pointing to: Were I to undertake to establish the correctness of my statement that the cardinal numerals are without meaning, I should unavoidably be led into a disquisition upon the nature of language quite astray from my present purpose. I will only hint at what my defence of the statement would be by saying that, according to my view, there are three categories of being; ideas of feelings, acts of reaction, and habits. Habits are either habits about ideas of feelings or habits about acts of reaction. The ensemble of all habits about ideas of feeling constitutes one great habit which is a World; and the ensemble of all habits about acts of reaction constitutes a second great habit, which is another World. The former is the Inner World, the world of Plato's forms. The other is the Outer World, or universe of existence. The mind of man is adapted to the reality of being. Accordingly, there are two modes of association of ideas: inner association, based on the habits of the inner world, and outer association, based on the habits of the universe. (CP 4.157)Commenting on this passage you wrote: CR: I am also thinking that Consciousness as such is First for the Inner World, that the Present as such is First in the Outer World, and that Actionresponsiveness reactivenessthat mediates relations between the Inner and Outer Worlds creates a Third World and Third Worlds within worlds among which is the Human World, which, as I see it, would be to say that, as Peirce puts it, MAN is a Signa Representamen.Your present extension of this idea seems to me generally sound, while I am thinking at this point that one might extend the notion of Interpreter quite a bit further than you seem to be doing. For example, in biological evolution higher and more complex systems and structures tend to entrain less complex systems (making them sub-systems in respect to the evolutionary advances made) suggesting to me that there is something which receives & contributes "as if" it were Interpreter, and so this sentient 'something' need not necessarily be human in contributing to "acts of representation". In other words, while it would appear to be true that from the standpoint of the further evolution of consciousness it is necessary that we humans direct ourselves to the reflective self-control of our own form of evolution (and all that this implies for re-presentation); yet without any help from us the cosmos apparently "represented" to itself exactly the patterns necessary for the evolution of that creature -- homo sapiens -- which could eventually undertake that very human self-reflective task (and where else would our power of representation come from if not from Firstness and Thirdness active in the Universe itself?--however, you may see my use of "represented" here as too vague and loose as to be useful). I might add that while we humans have seemingly not yet fulfilled our own evolutionary vocation--this being epitomized in my thinking of the past few year by especially the Engelbartian a
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
n't really understand what you are saying most of the time, whereas I usually find you very good at understanding and commenting upon what Peirce is saying, but I do not find myself inclined to trust your judgment on this particular topic because I find you saying so many things that seem to me to be off in some way, even though I usually can't say exactly why. I can't simply refute your claim, Ben, but I am suspicious enough of so much of what you are saying in that connection that I am content with the hunch that you are mistaken, and I do think that the reasons I have adduced in respect to the claim about verification as being or essentially involving a fourth categorial factor are pretty good ones for rejecting that particular claim of yours. >[Joe] Well, maybe that really is the last word on that for me! Best regards, Joe - Original Message - (http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01288.html also at http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1344 ) From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 2:46 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of. Charles, list, --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
rstand what you are saying most of the time, whereas I usually find you very good at understanding and commenting upon what Peirce is saying, but I do not find myself inclined to trust your judgment on this particular topic because I find you saying so many things that seem to me to be off in some way, even though I usually can't say exactly why. I can't simply refute your claim, Ben, but I am suspicious enough of so much of what you are saying in that connection that I am content with the hunch that you are mistaken, and I do think that the reasons I have adduced in respect to the claim about verification as being or essentially involving a fourth categorial factor are pretty good ones for rejecting that particular claim of yours. >[Joe] Well, maybe that really is the last word on that for me! Best regards, Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 2:46 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of. Charles, list, --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
ll never get to anything very interesting or worthwhile. And it is easy to be seriouisly mistaken in both ways, which raises important questions about research methodology in philosophy that are too often avoided. But as regards the matter in question here, I can only say that I have a strongly felt hunch that your argumentation is being distorted by the misguided attempted to try to fit the problematics of verification into the context of the problematics of category theory, where it simply doesn't fit. You are mistaken in thinking that I am so totally persuaded that there is no fourth category to be added to Peirce's three that I am simply prejudiced against what you are saying for that reason. In fact, I am not persuaded of that at all and would not be inclined to want to put the time in on trying to demonstrate it. I just don't know of any reason that persuades me that there is such a thing. As regards your work, It is just that when I read what you say on the topic I don't really understand what you are saying most of the time, whereas I usually find you very good at understanding and commenting upon what Peirce is saying, but I do not find myself inclined to trust your judgment on this particular topic because I find you saying so many things that seem to me to be off in some way, even though I usually can't say exactly why. I can't simply refute your claim, Ben, but I am suspicious enough of so much of what you are saying in that connection that I am content with the hunch that you are mistaken, and I do think that the reasons I have adduced in respect to the claim about verification as being or essentially involving a fourth categorial factor are pretty good ones for rejecting that particular claim of yours. Well, maybe that really is the last word on that for me! Best regards, Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2006 2:46 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of. Charles, list, >[Charles] With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in this context, I too will probably "go quiet." >[Charles] On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" writes: >>[Ben] Charles, list, >> I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet." >> Charles wrote, >>>[Charles] [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] >>[Ben] The recognition or recognizant, in the core narrow sense, is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind) formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten from the sign and is outside the interpretant. So you're simply contradicting the definition. >[Charles] I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign, distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule (a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign. What I have been trying to say is that acts of inter
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of. Charles, list, >[Charles] With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in this context, I too will probably "go quiet." >[Charles] On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" writes: >>[Ben] Charles, list, >> I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet." >> Charles wrote, >>>[Charles] [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] >>[Ben] The recognition or recognizant, in the core narrow sense, is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind) formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten from the sign and is outside the interpretant. So you're simply contradicting the definition. >[Charles] I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign, distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule (a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign. What I have been trying to say is that acts of interpretation which include recognition are semiosical, and that recognizing is an interpretant or included in interpretants of a sign or signs that are collateral to the interpretant of any particular sign. (Assuming that you intend no practical difference made by differences between "recognizing" and "recognition" etc.) -- Insofar as "recognizing" in the current discussion is defined as "forming an experience as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object," you're saying that an experience formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object is an interpretant of that object. That's just a contradiction, both internally and to Peirce. It is not an interpretant in Peirce's view, which is that acquaintance with the object is not part of the interpretant about that object. From C.S. Peirce, Transcribed from Letter to Lady Welby Dec 23, 1908 (in _Semiotics and Significs: Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby_, ed. Charles Hardwick, Indiana U. Press, 1977, p.83) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html also at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html . Quote: Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. End quote. Note that Peirce does _not_ say that _collateral_ acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is not stating such a truism. Instead he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance at all, must be gained by collateral experience. There is good reason for Peirce to hold that view, since experience of the sign of an object is not experience of that object, which in turn is because the sign is (usually) not the object, and part of the whole point of signs is to lead the mind to places where, in the relevant regard, experience and observation have not gone yet but could conceivably go. This is as true as ever even when the experienced object is a sign experienced in its signhood or an interpretant sign experienced in its interpretancy. It is not clear to me whether you are tacitly d
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles, list, >[Charles] With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in this context, I too will probably "go quiet." >[Charles] On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >>[Ben] Charles, list, >> I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet." >> Charles wrote, >>>[Charles] [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] >>[Ben] The recognition or recognizant, in the core narrow sense, is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind) formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten from the sign and is outside the interpretant. So you're simply contradicting the definition. >[Charles] I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign, distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule (a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign. What I have been trying to say is that acts of interpretation which include recognition are semiosical, and that recognizing is an interpretant or included in interpretants of a sign or signs that are collateral to the interpretant of any particular sign. (Assuming that you intend no practical difference made by differences between "recognizing" and "recognition" etc.) -- Insofar as "recognizing" in the current discussion is defined as "forming an experience as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object," you're saying that an experience formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object is an interpretant of that object. That's just a contradiction, both internally and to Peirce. It is not an interpretant in Peirce's view, which is that acquaintance with the object is not part of the interpretant about that object. From C.S. Peirce, Transcribed from Letter to Lady Welby Dec 23, 1908 (in _Semiotics and Significs: Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby_, ed. Charles Hardwick, Indiana U. Press, 1977, p.83) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html also at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html . Quote: Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. End quote. Note that Peirce does _not_ say that _collateral_ acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is not stating such a truism. Instead he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance at all, must be gained by collateral experience. There is good reason for Peirce to hold that view, since experience of the sign of an object is not experience of that object, which in turn is because the sign is (usually) not the object, and part of the whole point of signs is to lead the mind to places where, in the relevant regard, experience and observation have not gone yet but could conceivably go. This is as true as ever even when the experienced object is a sign experienced in its signhood or an interpretant sign experienced in its interpretancy. It is not clear to me whether you are tacitly disputing Peirce or believe that you are agreeing with him or are unsure of his view but are inclined to dispute hi
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, list, Ben, With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in this context, I too will probably "go quiet." On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Charles, list, I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet." Charles wrote, > [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] The recognition or recognizant, in the core narrow sense, is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind) formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten from the sign and is outside the interpretant. So you're simply contradicting the definition. I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign, distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule (a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign. What I have been trying to say is that acts of interpretation which include recognition are semiosical, and that recognizing is an interpretant or included in interpretants of a sign or signs that are collateral to the interpretant of any particular sign. Beyond the primitive perceptual event seeing a virtually meaningless something, any meaning that accrues to seeing something by means of which it is recognizably (a classification) and recognizable as (a singularization of a clsssification) smoke rather than steam (which for a young child it might not) is semiosical. Apart from acting as if rules that are linguistic and/or embedded in habits are in some sense true or valid, neither you nor I nor anyone else seeing smoke would look for fire, and no particular instance of seeing smoke, following it to its source, and, sure enough, seeing fire, can verify that a rule of thumb like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. is true. What if you had been unable to find a fire before the smoke disappeared? Would you have then concluded that your seeing smoke was an illusion of some sort? Would you have concluded that the rule of thumb, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. is false? I believe that you may be conflating Peirces distinction between signs and replicas of signs by criticizing his theory of signs in terms of experience and conduct mediated by signs together with sign replicas about which Peirce has relatively little to say. I also believe that you are ignoring Peirces critique and rejection of the possibility of universal doubtas if doubting were as easy as lyingin his discussions of the relation between doubt and belief. In short, it appears to me that you are interpreting Peirce nominalistically. Charles --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles, list, One of the Peirce quotations in your "as if" post strongly supports your notion, reiterated here, that it is possible and, indeed, desirable to make a double trichotomic distinction of Sign - External Object - Interpreter and Sign - Immediate Object - Interpretant, and that especially the relation between these Inner and Outer semeiotic trichotomies might prove fertile grounds for further inquiry. I've myself (and bouncing off your "as if" post) have begun work reflecting upon and diagramming some of your questions, ideas, also my own abductions as to the relationship holding between the two triads, etc. However, it's much too early for me to offer a report on any of this except to say that you are asking some very stimulating questions, Charles, which have certainly gotten me thinking in refreshing new directions. In any case, here is the quotation in your "as if" post which I'm pointing to: “Were I to undertake to establish the correctness of my statement that the cardinal numerals are without meaning, I should unavoidably be led into a disquisition upon the nature of language quite astray from my present purpose. I will only hint at what my defence of the statement would be by saying that, according to my view, there are three categories of being; ideas of feelings, acts of reaction, and habits. Habits are either habits about ideas of feelings or habits about acts of reaction. The ensemble of all habits about ideas of feeling constitutes one great habit which is a World; and the ensemble of all habits about acts of reaction constitutes a second great habit, which is another World. The former is the Inner World, the world of Plato's forms. The other is the Outer World, or universe of existence. The mind of man is adapted to the reality of being. Accordingly, there are two modes of association of ideas: inner association, based on the habits of the inner world, and outer association, based on the habits of the universe.” (CP 4.157) Commenting on this passage you wrote: CR: I am also thinking that Consciousness as such is First for the Inner World, that the Present as such is First in the Outer World, and that Action—“responsiveness – “reactiveness”—that mediates relations between the Inner and Outer Worlds creates a Third World and Third Worlds within worlds among which is the Human World, which, as I see it, would be to say that, as Peirce puts it, “MAN” is a Sign—a Representamen. Your present extension of this idea seems to me generally sound, while I am thinking at this point that one might extend the notion of Interpreter quite a bit further than you seem to be doing. For example, in biological evolution higher and more complex systems and structures tend to entrain less complex systems (making them sub-systems in respect to the evolutionary advances made) suggesting to me that there is something which receives & contributes "as if" it were Interpreter, and so this sentient 'something' need not necessarily be human in contributing to "acts of representation". In other words, while it would appear to be true that from the standpoint of the further evolution of consciousness it is necessary that we humans direct ourselves to the reflective self-control of our own form of evolution (and all that this implies for re-presentation); yet without any help from us the cosmos apparently "represented" to itself exactly the patterns necessary for the evolution of that creature -- homo sapiens -- which could eventually undertake that very human self-reflective task (and where else would our power of representation come from if not from Firstness and Thirdness active in the Universe itself?--however, you may see my use of "represented" here as too vague and loose as to be useful). I might add that while we humans have seemingly not yet fulfilled our own evolutionary vocation--this being epitomized in my thinking of the past few year by especially the Engelbartian abduction of the co-evolution of man and machine--does not mean that we never will. The Peircean doctrine offers hope that we may yet rise to our fully human vocation, that is, to express the truly reasonable (and loving) in itself. It is perhaps precisely the interpenetration of hierachies of the ordering of the inner and outer semiotic worlds which might lead to this fulfillment since, as your concluding quotation in the "as if" post has it, the distinction between the two "is after all only relative." “The main distinction between the Inner and the Outer Worlds is that inner objects promptly take any modifications we wish, while outer objects are hard facts that no man can make to be other than they are. Yet tremendous as this distinction is, it is after all only relative. Inner objects do offer a certain degree of resistance and outer objects are susceptible of being modified in some measure by sufficient exertion intelligently directed.” (CP 5.45) So, again, further inquiry into the relationship between the two semio
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
uote.
From post from Mats Bergman to Peirce Discussion Forum, Tue, 1 Jun 2004,
[peirce-l] Re: Mats Bergman's paper
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/1991/08/appendix-mats-bergmans-june-1-2004.html#bb
Quote: The passage you quote is curious, for
there Peirce does indeed state that collateral observation = index. However, it
seems to me that the passage is somewhat anomalous, for instance by making icons
and indices to be thought-signs (very 1860s...). One question that arises is
whether we should not distinguish collateral observation from collateral
experience. Peirce does not seem to put forth such a distinction. Instead,
Peirce distinguishes three kinds of indicatively effective signs, and mostly
holds all of these separate from the relation s that form collateral
experience. End quote.
Quote: I would formulate the relationship
between a reagent and collateral experience as follows: a reagent is a bit of
collateral experience (environment, for instance) employed semiotically as an
index, but typically based on previous experiences. This is not elegantly put,
but I hope it is possible to catch my idea. End quote.
Quote: This I do not quite see. What _semiotic_
relation have I treated as dyadic? The index? Where precisely?
I indeed hold that collateral experience is primarily of the character of
secondness, a position that seems to clash with the passage you quoted but not
necessarily with the one I quoted above ("a reagent can indicate nothing unless
the mind is already acquainted with its connection with the phenomenon it
indicates"). I do agree that it may be wise not to overemphasise the gap between
the index and collateral experience; I may have been careless with in this
respect. I would say that the index is precisely a sign that is capable of
bringing collateral experience within the semiotic sphere. But - and this is my
concern - this does _not_ mean that the brute secondness of the experience would
thereby be subsumed into the world of thirdness. I think this is precisely
Peirces' criticism of the Hegelians and their tendency to "aufhoben" less
complex forms of experience, but a trap into which he himself seems to have
fallen by asserting that "all is representative" or by the unqualified
statements to the effect that the object is always also a sign. End
quote.
From post from Benjamin Udell to Peirce Discussion Forum, sent: Sunday,
August 06, 2006 3:22 PM, [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph"
metaphor
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1276 also
at http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01228.html
Quote: Peirce's purpose in the conception of
collateral experience was to account for how the mind knows, indeed as a
precondition, to what the signs refer; but even his own example of the word
"soleil" is one of somebody's gaining collateral experience regarding an object
(the word "soleil") about which the person has already had signs (the teacher's
definition of the word "soleil"). This is not a light example, and it is a
dramatization of that which teachers and large dictionaries do systematically;
it is a normal order of learning. These learning experiences about signs &
objects already acquired are not limited to cases where the teacher is a human
professional teacher of French. Experience itself is the great teacher. These
learning experiences, testing, as they do, the sign & interpretant systems
themselves, are decision points in the _evolution_ of the given semiosis
and of the given mind. Moreover, the conception of such learning experience is
how one accounts for semiosis' capacity to correct itself and learn the
difference between sense & nonsense, both in hopeful-monster interpretants
and in typical interpretants under changing conditions. One learns from
experience. Otherwise the picture of semiosis depends on a radical coherentist
faith, probably not observed or espoused anywhere, that the process, along with
its assumptions and premisses, is already perfected, i.e., infallible.
End quote.
From post from Benjamin Udell to Peirce Discussion Forum, sent: Saturday,
August 19, 2006 3:21 AM (ET), [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph"
metaphor http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1313 also
at http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01261.html
Quote: In the examples, across his various
discussions, [Peirce] usually talks about collateral observations and
experiences of the object, not collateral signs and interpretants of the object.
It doesn't sound like he means that the core way to check on a book is to read
some other book or books (except when the first book is _about_ the
other book(s)). His theory of inquiry involves getting into lab and field.
When Peirce discusses experience of the object, he means something qualitativ
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Ben, Jim, list, Thanks, Gary, for calling attention to the possible connection between yours and my Inner and Outer distinction that, until you mentioned it, had not occurred to me, and for reminding me of the location of my "as if" post. Not sure that I follow you close enough to compare our notions, in lieu of a comparison, I am elaborating on some thigs I have said in light of possibly taking a run later at a comparison later on. I use the word semiosis in reference to sign processes or the activity of human and possibly other sentient beings mediated by signs, and the word semiotic or theory of signs in reference to analyses of sign processes. That is, I take semiosis as the subject of semiotic. My saying that there are two semiosical triads is to say that as I understand Peirce, his analysis (semiotic) reveals that sign processes (semiosis) embody two interrelated but distinguishable triads, the triad (Interpreter Sign Object) that accounts for the existence of signs and the triad (Interpretant Sign Object) that accounts for how signs acquire and determine their significant effects. I understand Peirce to say that anything suited to be a sign becomes a sign when and only when it is interpreted as a sign. The world is not littered with signs waiting to be interpreted, but with things suited to becoming and being signs if and when they are interpreted as signs. In short, involuntary and deliberate acts of interpretation or representation bring signs qua signs into existence. Apart from Interpreters or Representers involved in acts of interpretation or representation there would be no signs, and, hence, no Interpretants. I understand Peirce to say in New Elements that, interpreted or uninterpreted, anything suited to be an Index when interpreted as an Index will be interpreted as being just the Index that it is suited to be. I take this to mean both that anything suited to be an Index is not, but would become, an Index when it is interpreted as an Index and just the Index that it is suited to be (its connection to an object makes its Dynamical Object nonnegotiable). Uninterpreted as an Index, what is absent from anything suited to be an Index that is required for it to be and function as a sign is an Interpretant which determines and embodies the Semiosical Object of the sign that must be furnished either, like Bens response to seeing smoke that an artist might have represented Iconically, more or less directly by an Interpreters interpreting it as an Index, or indirectly by its being represented as an Index in and by a Symbol that differs from Icons and Indices by its determining its Interpretant. Peirce goes on to say in New Elements that being interpreted is part of what must be included in anythings being suited to be a Symbol. Uninterpreted, anything suited to be some kind of sign may be suited to be an Icon or Index, but it is not suited to be a Symbol. Acts of Interpretation or Representation (re-presentation) do not, as with Icons and Indices, interpret or represent things always already suited to be Symbols, but actually participate in suiting things to be Symbols. As I presently see it, the contribution of acts of representation to suiting things to be Symbols is to the Interpretant. Together with the signs contribution to determining its Interpretant, acts of representation participate in determining the Interpretants of Symbols and, hence, to some degree, complete them. The Symbols determining its interpretant for an Interpreter occurs together with the Interpreters contribution. [I am thinking here of signs and not replicas of signs such as instruction manuals.] Symbols manifest a vagueness that varies according to the ratio, so to speak, of the Interpreters to the Signs contribution to determining its Interpretant. The symbolic interpretations of the performance of a play among various members of the audience will vary considerably as a consequence of their Interpretants being to a considerable degree idiosyncratically determined by the Interpreters. The symbolic interpretations of mathematicians reviewing an original proof of a theorem, the Interpretants of which are to a greater degree determined by the form of the argument, will vary considerably less. [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] What I have outlined above is at least obliquely related to my speculation on the Inner and Outer Worlds at the end of my as if post. The Outer World furnished with objects in themselves interacts with the Inner World furnished with conscious, actively responsive and responding beings (mind or quasi-minda FIRST) whose response (collectively) and responses (particularly and singularly) to the interaction (a SECOND) bring a Third Semiosical World into
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Yeah, I think enough's enough on this, Ben, for the time being anyway. Best, Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 5:17 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, Let's just say that I misunderstood what you were saying and read too much into it about inquiry priorities. It certainly was not a "blatant diversionary tactic." It was what I thought at the time. If neurons have a lot of triadicity, that's fine with me. At some level, we're biological information processes and I wouldn't expect to see a recipient/recognizant role distinctly embodied all the way down. It's clear to me at this point that you have some recondite conception of verification. I really don't know what you're thinking of in regard to it. I have specified that I'm using "verification" as a "forest" term for the various "trees" of confirmation, corroboration, proof, etc. Maybe you think that I'm talking only of a conscious deliberate act, or some sort of counterpart thereto at a neuronal level. I have already specified otherwise. Any time you enter a situation with some conjectures, expectations, understandings, memories, etc., you are testing them, whether that's your purpose or not. And you're always entering a situation with such orientations. And you see what happens, and are surprised, unsurprised, etc. As an intelligent system, you learn from the result and accordingly revise, even if only slightly in particular cases, the system which you are. That is evolution (as opposed, say, to pre-programmed development). The "universal category" of _accidens_ involved is that of consistency, truth, validity, soundness, legitimacy, etc. Now, looking at the four (the first three are similar to Peircean ones): 1. reaction, force, connection ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. meaning, importance, import, good/ill 2. aptness, tendency, etc. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. truth, legitimacy, etc. You can see that I'm actually relating categories and semiosis back to more traditional philosoophical structures. Or maybe you can't see it, haven't thought about the four causes and related conceptions that much, don't "get" a strong-apt-good-true 4-chotomy, just aren't familiar enough with those byways to see the structure there, and so on. But actually I've argued these subject matters all in much more detail elsewhere. I'm growing tired of this. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com Ben, let's focus on the following interchange: [JR] The universal categories are analytical elements involved in all cases alike and any individual case must already be fully constituted as being of the nature of a cognition of some sort before the question of its verificational status can even arise. The verificational factor therefore cannot be on par with the sort of universal element we are concerned with when we are concerned with the categories. [BU] In other words, never mind pointing out a contradiction in semiotics and arguing for a given solution as most common-sensical and accordant with general experience, though it would undermine the category theory, instead, do a whole new category theory before critically looking at semiotics. REPLY: No, those are not other words for the same thing, but merely a blatant bit of diversionary rhetorical ploy. [BU continuing] Even for those for whom Peirce's category theory is _that well established_, that argument should not be valid, at least as it is formulated, since the truth is that a problem arising in a special area can _lead_ to revisions in a more general area; it really depends on the case, and no theory is allowed such sheer monolithicism as to immunize it from revision. REPLY: The specific point I made is simply ignored in favor of inveighing against a supposed commitment of mine to some general thesis about special cases and general areas which is supposedly designed to immunize Peirce's view from all criticism. Come on, Ben. [BU continuing:] But Peirce's category theory is not even well established among philosophers generally, so this sort of requirement has that much less credibility. REPLY: What sort of requirement? You say nothing about what I actually said. Skipping over a paragraph about a past message in which you outlined "an alternate category theory", you then go on to say: [BU]: But where Joe really goes wrong is in saying _that a cognition must be fully constituted before the question of its verificational status can even arise
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Joe, Let's just say that I misunderstood what you were saying and read too much into it about inquiry priorities. It certainly was not a "blatant diversionary tactic." It was what I thought at the time. If neurons have a lot of triadicity, that's fine with me. At some level, we're biological information processes and I wouldn't expect to see a recipient/recognizant role distinctly embodied all the way down. It's clear to me at this point that you have some recondite conception of verification. I really don't know what you're thinking of in regard to it. I have specified that I'm using "verification" as a "forest" term for the various "trees" of confirmation, corroboration, proof, etc. Maybe you think that I'm talking only of a conscious deliberate act, or some sort of counterpart thereto at a neuronal level. I have already specified otherwise. Any time you enter a situation with some conjectures, expectations, understandings, memories, etc., you are testing them, whether that's your purpose or not. And you're always entering a situation with such orientations. And you see what happens, and are surprised, unsurprised, etc. As an intelligent system, you learn from the result and accordingly revise, even if only slightly in particular cases, the system which you are. That is evolution (as opposed, say, to pre-programmed development). The "universal category" of _accidens_ involved is that of consistency, truth, validity, soundness, legitimacy, etc. Now, looking at the four (the first three are similar to Peircean ones): 1. reaction, force, connection ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. meaning, importance, import, good/ill 2. aptness, tendency, etc. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. truth, legitimacy, etc. You can see that I'm actually relating categories and semiosis back to more traditional philosoophical structures. Or maybe you can't see it, haven't thought about the four causes and related conceptions that much, don't "get" a strong-apt-good-true 4-chotomy, just aren't familiar enough with those byways to see the structure there, and so on. But actually I've argued these subject matters all in much more detail elsewhere. I'm growing tired of this. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com Ben, let's focus on the following interchange: [JR] The universal categories are analytical elements involved in all cases alike and any individual case must already be fully constituted as being of the nature of a cognition of some sort before the question of its verificational status can even arise. The verificational factor therefore cannot be on par with the sort of universal element we are concerned with when we are concerned with the categories. [BU] In other words, never mind pointing out a contradiction in semiotics and arguing for a given solution as most common-sensical and accordant with general experience, though it would undermine the category theory, instead, do a whole new category theory before critically looking at semiotics. REPLY: No, those are not other words for the same thing, but merely a blatant bit of diversionary rhetorical ploy. [BU continuing] Even for those for whom Peirce's category theory is _that well established_, that argument should not be valid, at least as it is formulated, since the truth is that a problem arising in a special area can _lead_ to revisions in a more general area; it really depends on the case, and no theory is allowed such sheer monolithicism as to immunize it from revision. REPLY: The specific point I made is simply ignored in favor of inveighing against a supposed commitment of mine to some general thesis about special cases and general areas which is supposedly designed to immunize Peirce's view from all criticism. Come on, Ben. [BU continuing:] But Peirce's category theory is not even well established among philosophers generally, so this sort of requirement has that much less credibility. REPLY: What sort of requirement? You say nothing about what I actually said. Skipping over a paragraph about a past message in which you outlined "an alternate category theory", you then go on to say: [BU]: But where Joe really goes wrong is in saying _that a cognition must be fully constituted before the question of its verificational status can even arise_. At this point I have no idea what Joe means by "verification," surely he doesn't think that it's something that only professional scientists do. It's something, instead, that children do every day, and shout about, often enough. "Prove it!" "Yeah, I don't need to prove it!" "Oh yes you do!" And so on. On some subjects their standards of verification will leave something to be desired, but standards indeed they do have. Even a dog can learn to check whether a stick has actually departed from the throwing hand. Anybody who thinks that a cognition can be fully constituted without a verificational aspect which helped form it, is saying that cognition is nothi
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben: It is true that I am not especially interested at this time in the analysis of verification, though not true that I have paid no attention to what you have had to say about that. The reason is that verification is obviously a special kind of cognition and therefore not a generic element in any cognition whatsoever. whereas in being concerned with Peirce's category analysis I am concerned with the essential conceptual elements of anything cognitional. By a "cognition" I mean any instance of thinking that something is so, any understanding of any sort that can be regarded as assessable in terms of its truth value, whether true or false. This would seem to cover what Peirce had in mind in his category analysis in the New List, which he characterizes as being concerned with the nature of assertion. This would include such things as perfectly ordinary perceptions, conscious or unconscious, such as are occurring constantly, very few of which are normally regarded as requiring any verification and far fewer of which can possibly be construed as themselves verifications. This does not imply any lack of interest in verification, as a philosophically relevant topic, but only a lack of present concern with the topic owing to being primarily concerned with the category theory. When you say something like: "Yes, generally I point out that sign and interpretant don't give experience of the object and that verification involves experience of the object. There's a cogent general argument right there." The very phrase "sign and interpretant don't give experience of the object" suggests, by being so ill-formed -- which would be equally so if you said "do" rather than "don't" -- suggests, I say, some misunderstanding as regards what the category theory is actually about. In any case, at the end of your message, after complaining that I have not responded to your challenge about diagramming something to do with verification, you say: "Recently you verbally partly outlined how such a diagram would work, and I responded quite specifically on how it seemed that it would work and posed you a question about it, and haven't heard about it from you since then." The question you originally posed had to do with diagramming collateral acquaintance, and I explained how that is done because that does have bearing on the category question. If I didn't respond to some further question about it, it must have had something to do with diagramming verification or some other topic with which I am not concerned at this time because my present focus of interest is on the category theory, as I have already explained. I don't feel under any intellectual obligation at this time to produce a reduction argument for there being only three basic categories, as you seem to think I should. Maybe there aren't only three. I have no deep conviction as regards that question myself, though I find the idea that three are enough to be appealing and have found thus far no reason to think that there is indeed any need for a further one. But that is not the question at issue between us, as far as I am concerned, which is rather your claim that a fourth one is required, and moreover one which you are suggesting. I see no reason thus far to think so. That is where the issue stands with me at present. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 12:02 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, list, Joe, I don't know why it seems to you like I'm suddenly releasing a "tirade of verbal dazzle." The prose there looks pretty mundane to me and I certainly didn't mean it intimidate you. Generally when I write such prose I'm just trying to present links in arguments, keep from being confusing, and keep the internal cross-references clear. I try (not always successfully) to avoid trying to write "dazzling" prose because often enough when I've looked at it months later it seems a bit stilted and labored. My editing consists most of all in replacing pronouns with nouns and phrases, even though it leads to repetition, because it worked very well for Fritjof Capra in his _The Tao of Physics_, and he pushed that sort of writing about as far as it can reasonably go, to excellent effect. As for showing that there's no subtle weird complex way that one could reduce verification to the triad, I don't know why you were expecting such in my response to Jim. I've said earlier that I was working on something, and that it would take maybe a week. Then you soon posted to me on other stuff in regard to verification, and that led to the current dis
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Benjamin Udell wrote: In any case, you've made an assertion, not an argument, and I've made arguments, including many on this thread. Rather than improvising a rehash of them to a very general assertion, I refer you to them. Your arguments which seem apodictic to you have not ever made much sense to me (perhaps I, like Joe, may just be obtuse), for example, your recent analysis of a fire in a post addressed to Joe (of which more later). My analysis (in diagrammatic form) of a line from a Shakespeare play was a preliminary attempt at using the two semiosical triads of Charles Rudder to relate the three Peircean semeiotic elements to real world objects while not introducing a fourth element (I don't recall your even commenting on that attempt; but then you had earlier suggested to Charles that one of his semiosical triads wasn't valid, or at least had no basis in Peirce's analysis, a conclusion with which I would strongly disagree). Having tried unsuccessfully for years to grasp your reasons for a putative need for a fourth category, all I've been able to do recently is to point to the kinds of arguments (for example, in the "composite photograph" piece in Transactions) which are congruent with my own understanding of three categories/semeiotic elements as being necessary and sufficient. But I'm going to try one last time to make the Peircean case from the standpoint of collateral knowledge. I know I've said "one last time" before. But truly, as I see it, I really now have spent enough time studying and trying to understand your position, trying to respond to it as best I can; while certainly nothing that I have said in support of Peirce's three categories and elements has been anything but ignored or rejected by you. Meanwhile a long, deep, intense study of Peirce's arguments for an essentially triadic Science has been so compelling to me that sometimes I've thought that just quoting him would be sufficient to make the triadic case (and who could argue it better than Peirce?) Although you've rejected all my previous efforts, I will however try once again. But first I'd want to say that I fully concur with Joe in his saying: JR: The universal categories are analytical elements involved in all cases alike and any individual case must already be fully constituted as being of the nature of a cognition of some sort before the question of its verificational status can even arise. The verificational factor therefore cannot be on par with the sort of universal element we are concerned with when we are concerned with the categories. and JR: There is nothing. . . that requires some new type of entity functioning as nodes other than something of the nature of a sign, something of the nature of an interpretant of a sign, and something of the nature of an object of a sign. Basically, It is still just a diagram about signs referring to objects, some of which are being referred to as signs and some of which are not. and JR . . .the point to the basic category analysis is to make it possible to represent cognitions of any and every sort in a helpfully analytic way, and once you have the elements required for the analysis of any given cognition, you ipso facto have what is required for such special cases as, say, that of verifying cognitions For those of us who see it this way, your insisting on a fourth element because of your "special experience of the object itself" just doesn't hold water; indeed your response to Joe's argumentation (which I found strong--the excerpts above are really more just conclusions and do not represent the subtlety of his argumentation) seemed strangely dismissive. Now, I think we all agree that there is are dynamical objects and that there is collateral knowledge of them; yet as I see it there are but three worlds of experience, three universal categories, three existential categories, three essential logical modalities, etc. and my "merely asserting" that at this point assumes that you have read enough of Peirce's own arguments to know that line of thought (Lord knows, I've quoted him often enough in the matter!) And, again, while your arguments for the four make almost no sense to me, Peirce's arguments for the three make great good sense and have almost always gained in clarity upon rereading. For "we Peirceans" it is of the nature of cognition (and, as Joe pointed out, of re-cognition) that it--cognition--takes precisely a triadic form, and so also in consideration of such matters as the extraordinary complexity of semeiotic events (and their relations) involved in verification and the like. So it's always, as you've even insisted, been a matter of trying to grapple with your reasons why Peirce's analysis is insufficient and wrong (and it would then follow that his whole philosophy. steeped in triads and trichotomies, would have to be abandoned) while yours is sufficient and correct. Enough of this triadic confusion! Now for the collateral case. Again I'll leave most
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
I misunderstood what you were attempting to do in the messages in question, Ben. I can't respond fully to what you say below right at the moment, but will do that later, as soon as I get some time, maybe tonight, maybe tomorrow morning. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 12:02 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, list, Joe, I don't know why it seems to you like I'm suddenly releasing a "tirade of verbal dazzle." The prose there looks pretty mundane to me and I certainly didn't mean it intimidate you. Generally when I write such prose I'm just trying to present links in arguments, keep from being confusing, and keep the internal cross-references clear. I try (not always successfully) to avoid trying to write "dazzling" prose because often enough when I've looked at it months later it seems a bit stilted and labored. My editing consists most of all in replacing pronouns with nouns and phrases, even though it leads to repetition, because it worked very well for Fritjof Capra in his _The Tao of Physics_, and he pushed that sort of writing about as far as it can reasonably go, to excellent effect. As for showing that there's no subtle weird complex way that one could reduce verification to the triad, I don't know why you were expecting such in my response to Jim. I've said earlier that I was working on something, and that it would take maybe a week. Then you soon posted to me on other stuff in regard to verification, and that led to the current discussion, so I don't know where you think that I'd have found the time to work on the no-reduction argument. And when I said that I've practical matters also to attend to, I wasn't just making it up. Now, I didn't see any reason to rush the kind of argument which you asked me to make, since it would be the first time that I'd made such an argument on peirce-l. And I see it as dealing with more challenges than you see it as dealing with, for I don't seem able, even after all this time, to get you to _focus_ on analyzing the verificatory act, for instance, of checking on what a person says is happening at some house. You refer to such an act but you don't look at it. Somebody tells me there's a fire at a house, I form an interpretation that there's a fire at that house, I run over and look at it, and looka there, it's on fire! Feel the heat! Look at the fire trucks! Cross to the other side of the street in order to get past it. Verification, involving experience of the object(s). Now, if that experience merely represented the house to me, the smoke, its source, etc., then it wouldn't be acquainting me with the house as the house has become. Doubts about this lead to the interesting question of _what are signs for, anyway_? Meanwhile, if the house really is on fire, then subsequent events and behaviors will corroborate the verification. Once, from around 16 blocks away, I saw billowing smoke rising from the vicinity of my building. I rushed up to the elevated train station but couldn't get a clearer view. Finally I ran most of the way to my building, where I observed that the smoke was coming from a block diagonally away -- the Woolworth's store was aflame and my building was quite safe and sound. I hadn't sat around interpreting a.k.a. construing, instead I had actively arranged to have a special experience of the objects themselves, an experience logically determined in its references and significances both prior and going forward, by the interpretation that my building was afire; and the experience determined semiosis going forward as well, and was corroborated in my interactions with fellow witnesses and by subsequent events, including the gutting and rebuilding the store. - Was the experience the object in question? - No. - Was it the sign? - No. - Was it the interpretant? - No. - Was it determined logically by them? - Yes. - Was it, then, another interpretant of the prior interpretants and their object? - No, because it was not an interpretant of the object, instead it further acquainted me with the object. Now, if you don't see a problem for triadicism there, then I'd say that you've set the bar exceedingly high for seeing a problem. And if you reply that you don't find that sequence of questions and answers convincing of anything, even of the plausible appearance of a problem, without pointing to just where the logic breaks down, then I'll conclude that you've merely skimmed it, and haven't reasoned your way through it at all.
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
ne next to one interpreter, a thought of the need to pay a bill at just that moment) and what each takes it to mean, possibly accompanying thoughts, etc. 1/2/3 |> 3. The interpretant also will be very different for each (much could be said about the various interpretants, but not in this diagram!) 2. The immediate object varies considerably for each (you'll have to imagine what this might entail, but there is enough difference to suggest what I have in mind) -- >[Gary] Although this is perhaps different from how Charles sees the two relating, I connected them in the following way in a recent post [this kind of analysis "back and forth" between two communicators within the context of a real world of experience is also Peirce's approach in the "Stormy Day" letter to William James which, btw, has pertinence to the present discussion] >[Gary] --- outer semiosical triad: . . inner semiosical triad: . . . . . . . . . . . . sign sign: . . . . . . . . . |> interpretant |> interpreter . . . . . . immediate object dynamical object Generally, I don't see that there is anything in this that contradicts what I said about (the conception of) an interpreter not introducing something unaccounted for, in terms of basic semiotic elements, in the object-sign-interpretant trichotomy. If, however, this is in some sort of relation to an conception of recognition as "really" being an interpreter, a grand interpretant, I've addressed it a lot more explicitly and with arguments in past posts. >[Gary] Well, whether or not this particular analysis will hold, the point is to connect the sign with the inferences of living, breathing, thinking, feeling, human intelligences (Man as symbol) and as this occurs in the world of experience where object and sign are not just roles. As for the individual as he is involved in these complex patterns of semioses: >[Gary] CP 7.583 We have already seen that every state of consciousness [is] an inference; so that life is but a sequence of inferences or a train of thought. At any instant then man is a thought, and as thought is a species of symbol, the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol. . . I hope I've already clarified that I don't regard logical roles as roles in a mereness sense. However, I don't see where you've addressed the question of how an experience receives logical determination from semiosis such as to be a recognition of the consistency, truth, validity, soundness, etc., of object, sign, interpretant in respect to one another, and how the experience would do this without being an interpretant that, contradictorily to Peircean semiotics, acquaints or further acquaints the mind with the object. >[Gary] Ben gives the inference process as a fourth element. >>[Ben] - 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process - >[Gary] But there is no need for a fourth semeiotic element to explain such inference in the way of looking at matters as suggested by 7.583. Well, I hope you haven't gotten the idea that I think that the four semiotic elements are to be equated rather than merely correlated to those processes mentioned in my table. The point was inter-table correlations across to various other tables in my post [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor, August 20, 2006 (August 21st at gmane, http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1325 ). In any case, you've made an assertion, not an argument, and I've made arguments, including many on this thread. Rather than improvising a rehash of them to a very general assertion, I refer you to them. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Joe, list, Joe, I don't know why it seems to you like I'm suddenly releasing a "tirade of verbal dazzle." The prose there looks pretty mundane to me and I certainly didn't mean it intimidate you. Generally when I write such prose I'm just trying to present links in arguments, keep from being confusing, and keep the internal cross-references clear. I try (not always successfully) to avoid trying to write "dazzling" prose because often enough when I've looked at it months later it seems a bit stilted and labored. My editing consists most of all in replacing pronouns with nouns and phrases, even though it leads to repetition, because it worked very well for Fritjof Capra in his _The Tao of Physics_, and he pushed that sort of writing about as far as it can reasonably go, to excellent effect. As for showing that there's no subtle weird complex way that one could reduce verification to the triad, I don't know why you were expecting such in my response to Jim. I've said earlier that I was working on something, and that it would take maybe a week. Then you soon posted to me on other stuff in regard to verification, and that led to the current discussion, so I don't know where you think that I'd have found the time to work on the no-reduction argument. And when I said that I've practical matters also to attend to, I wasn't just making it up. Now, I didn't see any reason to rush the kind of argument which you asked me to make, since it would be the first time that I'd made such an argument on peirce-l. And I see it as dealing with more challenges than you see it as dealing with, for I don't seem able, even after all this time, to get you to _focus_ on analyzing the verificatory act, for instance, of checking on what a person says is happening at some house. You refer to such an act but you don't look at it. Somebody tells me there's a fire at a house, I form an interpretation that there's a fire at that house, I run over and look at it, and looka there, it's on fire! Feel the heat! Look at the fire trucks! Cross to the other side of the street in order to get past it. Verification, involving experience of the object(s). Now, if that experience merely represented the house to me, the smoke, its source, etc., then it wouldn't be acquainting me with the house as the house has become. Doubts about this lead to the interesting question of _what are signs for, anyway_? Meanwhile, if the house really is on fire, then subsequent events and behaviors will corroborate the verification. Once, from around 16 blocks away, I saw billowing smoke rising from the vicinity of my building. I rushed up to the elevated train station but couldn't get a clearer view. Finally I ran most of the way to my building, where I observed that the smoke was coming from a block diagonally away -- the Woolworth's store was aflame and my building was quite safe and sound. I hadn't sat around interpreting a.k.a. construing, instead I had actively arranged to have a special experience of the objects themselves, an experience logically determined in its references and significances both prior and going forward, by the interpretation that my building was afire; and the experience determined semiosis going forward as well, and was corroborated in my interactions with fellow witnesses and by subsequent events, including the gutting and rebuilding the store. - Was the experience the object in question? - No. - Was it the sign? - No. - Was it the interpretant? - No. - Was it determined logically by them? - Yes. - Was it, then, another interpretant of the prior interpretants and their object? - No, because it was not an interpretant of the object, instead it further acquainted me with the object. Now, if you don't see a problem for triadicism there, then I'd say that you've set the bar exceedingly high for seeing a problem. And if you reply that you don't find that sequence of questions and answers convincing of anything, even of the plausible appearance of a problem, without pointing to just where the logic breaks down, then I'll conclude that you've merely skimmed it, and haven't reasoned your way through it at all. Yes, generally I point out that sign and interpretant don't give experience of the object and that verification involves experience of the object. There's a cogent general argument right there. But if you see no problem for semiotics in the question of signs and experience, no problem that can't be "taken care of" later, some time, when somebody gets around to it, meanwhile let somebody prove beyond this doubt, then that doubt, then another doubt, that there's some sort of problem there that needs to be addressed, well, then, you'll never feel a burden of need to deal with it. Generally I''m okay with this, because it leads to my exploring interesting questions. In response to my points about collateral experience, some asked, among other things -- "but
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Benjamin Udell wrote: Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their distinction is a logical distinction As I see it, it's not that simple because of the dynamical object, the fact of inter-communication as well as internal inference, etc. Charles may mean something somewhat different from what I'm taking his two semiosical triads to be referring to (I hope he'll comment further on them at some point), but I'll show how I see the two through an example diagramming them in relationship to each other. [Btw, I would recommend an analysis Charles posted 12/1/05--his "as if" post--in which he considers certain Peircean passages which brought him to his inner/outer notion] This is admittedly only a very preliminary analysis and I may see things differently as I consider the two triads further (I may be conflating some of the inner and outer aspects, or not connecting them properly--it appears, not surprisingly, to be a very complex relationship indeed) outer semiosical triad: The sign in this case is a particular line spoken in a particular production of Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing by a particular actor at one outdoor performance in a New York City park. |> The audience members hearing it spoken are these (selected) interpreters: (a) a young acting student who is studying the given role, (b) an 8 y.o. child attending her first live play, (c) a Spanish speaking man without much English language skills dragged to it by his girlfriend. (d) the director of the play The dynamical object is whatever meaning/emotion Shakespeare, the actor, the director mean to convey/express in that line, through its delivery, etc. However this sign as reflected in semiotic processes of the various audience members are naturally very different semioses ( a, b, c and d) at the moment of their each hearing and "following the meaning" of the line: inner semiosical triad [read 1/2/3]: 1. The sign is pretty much whatever the line spoken is heard as (given educational backgrounds, language skills, the coughing of someone next to one interpreter, a thought of the need to pay a bill at just that moment) and what each takes it to mean, possibly accompanying thoughts, etc. 1/2/3 |> 3. The interpretant also will be very different for each (much could be said about the various interpretants, but not in this diagram!) 2. The immediate object varies considerably for each (you'll have to imagine what this might entail, but there is enough difference to suggest what I have in mind) Although this is perhaps different from how Charles sees the two relating, I connected them in the following way in a recent post [this kind of analysis "back and forth" between two communicators within the context of a real world of experience is also Peirce's approach in the "Stormy Day" letter to William James which, btw, has pertinence to the present discussion] outer semiosical triad: . . inner semiosical triad: . . . . . . . . . . . . sign sign: . . . . . . . . . |> interpretant |> interpreter . . . . . . immediate object dynamical object Well, whether or not this particular analysis will hold, the point is to connect the sign with the inferences of living, breathing, thinking, feeling, human intelligences (Man as symbol) and as this occurs in the world of experience where object and sign are not just roles. As for the individual as he is involved in these complex patterns of semioses: CP 7.583 We have already seen that every state of consciousness [is] an inference; so that life is but a sequence of inferences or a train of thought. At any instant then man is a thought, and as thought is a species of symbol, the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol. . . Ben gives the inference process as a fourth element. 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process But there is no need for a fourth semeiotic element to explain such inference in the way of looking at matters as suggested by 7.583. Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
bravery, (b) duely confident behavior, (c) prudence, (d) "realism" -- & an out-of-season -- (a) rashness, (b) complacency, (c) cowardice, (d) defeatism.) In a sense the distinction (interpretant vs. verification) which I'm discussing is an aspect of the ancient one traceable between meaning, value, good, end (telos), actualization, affectivity and factuality, validity, soundness, true, entelechy, reality, establishment, cognition. To make it four-way: 1. object ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. interpretant 2. sign ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. recognition, verification 1. strength, dynamism ~ ~ ~ 3. vibrancy, value, good 2. suitability, richness ~ ~ ~ 4. firmness, soundness, truth etc. 1. will & character ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. affectivity & sensibility 2. ability & competence ~ ~ 4. cognition & intelligence 1. agency ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. act, actualization 2. bearer ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. borne, supported 1. beginning, leading, arche ~ ~ 3. end, telos, culmination 2. middle, means ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. check, entelechy 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process 1. forces ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. life 2. matter ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. intelligent life Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ ----- Original Message ----- From: Jim Piat To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 1:54 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Charles Rudder wrote: >> That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores.>> Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge does seem to be a popular view of the issue of how reality is accessed or known. But I think this is a view Peirce rejected in the New List. However this is not to say that there is no practical distinction between what is meant by an object and what is meant by a representation of an object. An object is that which is interpreted as standing for (or representing) itself. A sign is something that is interpreted as standing for something other than itself. Thus one can compare one's interpretation of a sign of a collateral object with one's interpretation of the referenced collateral object itself even though both the object of the sign and the collateral object are known only through representation. The collateral object and the object of some discussion of it are in theory the same object. The distinction is between one's direct representation of the object vs it's indirect representation to one by others. In both cases the object is represented. There are no inherent distinctions between those objects we interpret as objects and those we interpret as signs -- the distinction is in how we use them. The object referred to by a sign is always collateral to the sign itself unless the sign is referring to itself in some sort of convoluted self referential fashion. The distinction between direct (albeit mediated) knowledge of an object and the sort of second hand knowledge one gains from the accounts of others poses no special problems. There is nothing magic about direct personal knowledge that gives it some sort of special objective validity over the accounts of others. What makes such personal aquaintance valuable is not their imagined "objectivity" but their trustworthiness (in terms of serving one's own interests as opposed to the interests of others). OTOH multiple observation gathered from different "trustworthy" POVs do provide a more complete and thus more reliable and useful (or "true"as some say) account of reality. And finally, verification (conceiving a manifold of senuous impressions as having some particular meaning) IS repres
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Jim, Charles, Gary, Joe, Jacob, list, (Let me note parenthetically that, in my previous post, I used the word "mind" in a number of places where I probably should have used the word "intelligence," given the far-reaching sense which the word "mind" can take on in a Peircean context.) Jim below says things pretty near to that which I'm saying in terms of the distinction between object and sign, and it seems that the "bad regression" stuff that I've said about his previous stuff no longer applies. Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their distinction is a logical distinction, not a metaphysical or physical or material or biological or psychological distinction, though it takes on complex psychological relevance insofar as a psyche will be an inference process and will not only develop structures which manifest the distinction, but will also tend consciously to employ the distinction and even thematize it and make a topic (a semiotic object) out of it (like right now). However, my argument has been that, when one pays sufficient attention to the relationships involved, one sees that a verification is _not_ a representation, in those relationships in which it is a verification, -- just as an object is not a sign in those relationships in which it is an object. Even when a thing-in-its-signhood is the object, the subject matter, then it is _in that respect_ the object and not a sign, though it wouldn't be the object if it were not a sign (and indeed every object is a sign in some set of relationships). These logical distinctions don't wash away so easily. Meaning is formed into the interpretant. Validity, soundness, etc., are formed into the recognition. Meaning is conveyed and developed through "chains" and structures of interpretants. Validity, soundness, legitimacy, is conveyed and developed through "chains" and structures of recognitions. One even has some slack in "making" the distinction between interpretant and verification -- it's a slack which one needs in order to learn about the distinction so as to incorporate those learnings into oneself as a semiosic sytem and so as to employ the distinction in a non-reckless but also non-complacent manner. (For everything -- (a) boldness, (b) confident behavior, (c) caution, (d) resignation -- there is a season -- (a) bravery, (b) duely confident behavior, (c) prudence, (d) "realism" -- & an out-of-season -- (a) rashness, (b) complacency, (c) cowardice, (d) defeatism.) In a sense the distinction (interpretant vs. verification) which I'm discussing is an aspect of the ancient one traceable between meaning, value, good, end (telos), actualization, affectivity and factuality, validity, soundness, true, entelechy, reality, establishment, cognition. To make it four-way: 1. object ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. interpretant 2. sign ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. recognition, verification 1. strength, dynamism ~ ~ ~ 3. vibrancy, value, good 2. suitability, richness ~ ~ ~ 4. firmness, soundness, truth etc. 1. will & character ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. affectivity & sensibility 2. ability & competence ~ ~ 4. cognition & intelligence 1. agency ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. act, actualization 2. bearer ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. borne, supported 1. beginning, leading, arche ~ ~ 3. end, telos, culmination 2. middle, means ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. check, entelechy 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process 1. forces ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. life 2. matter ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. intelligent life Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ ----- Original Message - From: Jim Piat To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 1:54 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Charles Rudder wrote: >> That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores.>> Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which on
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
that that was a good explanation for Peirce's neologism). Apart from those considerations, an interpretant is just an interpretation. After all, the interpretant does not give experience of the object. Experience of the interpretant does not give experience of the object. Etc. However, by the time one encounters Peirce's discussions of collateral experience and sees that experience of the object is "outside the interpretant," one may already have formed a rather hardened sense about the interpretant as something which could be verificatory about the object. But, as I've said, this is probably too speculative, and moreover it would require still more of a stretch to adapt such an explanation to Peirce himself personally. >[Charles] Your references to extrasemiosical collateral experience appear to me to focus on the triad (Interpreter - Sign - Object) and to isolate the (Interpreter - Object) relation (extrasemiosical collateral experience) from an Interpreter's relation to signs, interpretants of signs, and objects of signs--the semiosical (Interpretant - Sign - Object) relation. That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they _are_ independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores. Partly we get into a question of what one means by "semiosis" -- in the Peircean sense I'm talking about something "outside" semiosis -- but, as I've said in various posts, I am not discussing an unmediated cognition. I said, in August 19, 2006 [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1317 : 66~~~ "To say that establishment or verification are a fourth element is to say that, in being mediated by signs and interpretants, experience is also mediated -- or is, at any rate, structured and restructured -- by establishments and verifications, in the small and in the large. " Here I meant that some might argue that this is not "mediation" in the strictest sense, that sense in which for instance one says that the sign mediates between object and interpretant, but the interpretant does not mediate between object and sign. ~~~99 I said, August 12/13, 2006 [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1292 : 66~~~ There is this experience, of them collaterally to one another, which seems, for its part, the experience, to rely on mediation by some unconscious substrate such that one's experience of object, sign, and interpretant is direct but mediated. But if this unconscious substrate does not itself involve unconscious recognition and unconscious experience, then it is a mistake to suppose it to be an inferential, semiotic process at all -- it is instead at best an information process basically vegetable-organismic in kind, further analyzable into material and mechanical processes, though, at every stage of the reduction, we know that something is lost. However, as I said, there seems good reason to think that there _are_ unconscious inference processes. My guess is that they "work their way down" pretty deep, and get rather strange, but are still inference processes. ~~~99 I said, in July 29, 2006 [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1270 : 66~~~ I hope it's clear now that I agree that it's all mediated. That doesn't mean that it's not sometimes direct. Peirce distinguishes between "immediate" and "direct." A lens, for instance, mediates, but one sees directly through the lens and indeed could not see clearly at all but for certain lenses." ~~~99 I both agree and disagree with Jim's statement that "That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge . . ." seems to be a commonplace notion that Peirce rejects." I agree insofar as I agree that Peirce rejects some sort of unmediated, non-semiosic or extra-semiosic knowledge which would arise without the involvement of r
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Here's my take (reflecting Charles' 2 semiosical triads diagrammed in relation to each other)-- outer semiosical triad: . . inner semiosical triad: . . . . . . . . . . . . . sign sign: . . . . . . . . . |> interpretant |> interpreter . . . . . . immediate object dynamical object Gary Jim Piat wrote: Charles Rudder wrote: >> That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores.>> Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge does seem to be a popular view of the issue of how reality is accessed or known. But I think this is a view Peirce rejected in the New List. However this is not to say that there is no practical distinction between what is meant by an object and what is meant by a representation of an object. An object is that which is interpreted as standing for (or representing) itself. A sign is something that is interpreted as standing for something other than itself. Thus one can compare one's interpretation of a sign of a collateral object with one's interpretation of the referenced collateral object itself even though both the object of the sign and the collateral object are known only through representation. The collateral object and the object of some discussion of it are in theory the same object. The distinction is between one's direct representation of the object vs it's indirect representation to one by others. In both cases the object is represented. There are no inherent distinctions between those objects we interpret as objects and those we interpret as signs -- the distinction is in how we use them. The object referred to by a sign is always collateral to the sign itself unless the sign is referring to itself in some sort of convoluted self referential fashion. The distinction between direct (albeit mediated) knowledge of an object and the sort of second hand knowledge one gains from the accounts of others poses no special problems. There is nothing magic about direct personal knowledge that gives it some sort of special objective validity over the accounts of others. What makes such personal aquaintance valuable is not their imagined "objectivity" but their trustworthiness (in terms of serving one's own interests as opposed to the interests of others). OTOH multiple observation gathered from different "trustworthy" POVs do provide a more complete and thus more reliable and useful (or "true"as some say) account of reality. And finally, verification (conceiving a manifold of senuous impressions as having some particular meaning) IS representation -- at least for Peirce (as I understand him). Just some thoughts as I'm following this discussion. Best, Jim --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles Rudder wrote: >> That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores.>> Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge does seem to be a popular view of the issue of how reality is accessed or known. But I think this is a view Peirce rejected in the New List. However this is not to say that there is no practical distinction between what is meant by an object and what is meant by a representation of an object. An object is that which is interpreted as standing for (or representing) itself. A sign is something that is interpreted as standing for something other than itself. Thus one can compare one's interpretation of a sign of a collateral object with one's interpretation of the referenced collateral object itself even though both the object of the sign and the collateral object are known only through representation. The collateral object and the object of some discussion of it are in theory the same object. The distinction is between one's direct representation of the object vs it's indirect representation to one by others. In both cases the object is represented. There are no inherent distinctions between those objects we interpret as objects and those we interpret as signs -- the distinction is in how we use them. The object referred to by a sign is always collateral to the sign itself unless the sign is referring to itself in some sort of convoluted self referential fashion. The distinction between direct (albeit mediated) knowledge of an object and the sort of second hand knowledge one gains from the accounts of others poses no special problems. There is nothing magic about direct personal knowledge that gives it some sort of special objective validity over the accounts of others. What makes such personal aquaintance valuable is not their imagined "objectivity" but their trustworthiness (in terms of serving one's own interests as opposed to the interests of others). OTOH multiple observation gathered from different "trustworthy" POVs do provide a more complete and thus more reliable and useful (or "true"as some say) account of reality. And finally, verification (conceiving a manifold of senuous impressions as having some particular meaning) IS representation -- at least for Peirce (as I understand him). Just some thoughts as I'm following this discussion. Best, Jim --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
A minor correction Ben. In my last post where I said, "assuming that what I have referred to as assessing the 'fidelity' of a sign's representation of its object is or includes what you are calling 'verification' . . ." I intended to say "is or is included in what you call verification." Charles --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, I didn't meant to intimate that you are inarticulate or that I had no inkling of how your position differs from Peirce's. I have asked for additional clarification because I have been trying to formulate for myself a reasonably succinct statement of your position relative to Pierce's that might serve as a benchmark for further conversation. I have suspected that in addition to your penchant for "quadricity" you might disagree with Peirce on some ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological issues which, in responding to my posts, your might address, and which, it seems to me that, somewhat obliquely, in your last two posts you have. Assuming that what I have referred to as assessing the "fidelity" of a sign's representation of it object is or includes what you are calling "verification," and, without going into further detail, here is how I presently see it. I understand Peirce to say that there are two interrelated but distinguishable semiosical triads, namely, the triad (Interpreter - Sign - Object) and the triad (Interpretant - Sign - Object). Your references to extrasemiosical collateral experience appear to me to focus on the triad (Interpreter - Sign - Object) and to isolate the (Interpreter - Object) relation (extrasemiosical collateral experience) from an Interpreter's relation to signs, interpretants of signs, and objects of signs--the semiosical (Interpretant - Sign - Object) relation. That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores. Charles On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 18:02:48 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, The occasion here is that Charles wrote, "I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits." The idea that one can't even grasp what I'm saying leads me to make one last try. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Nor do I know what else to say to you on this topic, Ben, except that I just don't get the sense that we are even talking about the same topic. It baffles me, but I will just have to leave it at that. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, August 19, 2006 5:02 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, The occasion here is that Charles wrote, "I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits." The idea that one can't even grasp what I'm saying leads me to make one last try. What do I think the relation omits? I think that the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits recognition, verification, establishment. I mean "recognition," "verification," "estabishment," and the like, in a pretty commonsense way. I'm trying to think of how to get the tetradic idea across. First, I'd point out that the difference between interpretation and verification can be taken in a common-sense way with which we are all familiar. That common-sense way is at the basis of how I mean it. But I've pointed that out in the past. I've even brought the plot of _Hamlet_ (because peirce-l is classy :-)) into the discussion. Now, there's a weak sense of the word "understanding" where one says "well, it's my _understanding_ that Jack is going to come" -- one is saying that one doesn't _know_ whether Jack is actually going to come -- one hasn't _verified_ it, even to oneself -- one means that, instead, it's _merely one's interpretation_. I think that we're all familiar with these ways of talking and thinking. I talk and think that way, and my impression is that most people talk and think that way. Those ways of talking and thinking are quite in keeping with object-experience's being outside the interpretant. An interpretation is a construal. An unestablished, unsubstantiated interpretation is a _mere_ construal in the strongest sense of the word "mere." (In a similar way, one should think of a sign which is unsubstantiated in whatever respect as a _mere_ sign, a _mere_ representation, in that respect.) One should not let the _word_ "interpretant" evoke anything stronger in such a case, but, instead, one should stick with the common notion of interpretation. Even a biological mutation, considered as an interpretant, should be considered as a construal and as a random experiment which "experience" or actual reality will test. Research and thought had thousands of years to show that one can make much progress by merely making representations and construals about other researchers' representations and contruals and by, at best, verifying representations and construals _about_ representations and construals -- doing so via books about other books and by researchers' going back and checking the originals and considering the ideas presented there. This sort of thing in the end makes little progress when the subject matter is not thought itself but instead, say, physics or biology. One needs to verify by experiences of the subject matter. The logical process must revisit the object, somehow, some way. Second, I'd point to the analogy between decoding and interpretation, an analogy which has been referred to and alluded to often enough, e.g., in David Lodge's "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage." I'd point to the extended analogy, and ask, why does triadic semiotics have no analogue for the recipient? source ~~~ object encoding ~~ sign decoding ~~ interpretant recipient ~~ ? Is it merely that in early scenarios the decoding was usually mechanical and the recipient a human? Why does a recipient notice redundancies and inconsistencies which a decoder does not notice? What is the difference in function between a decoding and a "recipience"? Why, at the fourth stage, does the analogy suddenly break down between information theory and triadic semiotics? Does one of them have the wrong scenario? Which one? Is it normal or is it a warning alarm, when a tenable analogy just suddenly goes bad? If the interpretant is analogous both to decoding and to recipient, what functions analogous to theirs does it combine? Should a semiotic philosopher be concerned about such questions? Especially a Peircean one accustomed to tracing extensive analogies and correlations, a philosopher who believes in doing that sort of thing? But I've pointed this all out in the past. T
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, The occasion here is that Charles wrote, "I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits." The idea that one can't even grasp what I'm saying leads me to make one last try. What do I think the relation omits? I think that the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits recognition, verification, establishment. I mean "recognition," "verification," "estabishment," and the like, in a pretty commonsense way. I'm trying to think of how to get the tetradic idea across. First, I'd point out that the difference between interpretation and verification can be taken in a common-sense way with which we are all familiar. That common-sense way is at the basis of how I mean it. But I've pointed that out in the past. I've even brought the plot of _Hamlet_ (because peirce-l is classy :-)) into the discussion. Now, there's a weak sense of the word "understanding" where one says "well, it's my _understanding_ that Jack is going to come" -- one is saying that one doesn't _know_ whether Jack is actually going to come -- one hasn't _verified_ it, even to oneself -- one means that, instead, it's _merely one's interpretation_. I think that we're all familiar with these ways of talking and thinking. I talk and think that way, and my impression is that most people talk and think that way. Those ways of talking and thinking are quite in keeping with object-experience's being outside the interpretant. An interpretation is a construal. An unestablished, unsubstantiated interpretation is a _mere_ construal in the strongest sense of the word "mere." (In a similar way, one should think of a sign which is unsubstantiated in whatever respect as a _mere_ sign, a _mere_ representation, in that respect.) One should not let the _word_ "interpretant" evoke anything stronger in such a case, but, instead, one should stick with the common notion of interpretation. Even a biological mutation, considered as an interpretant, should be considered as a construal and as a random experiment which "experience" or actual reality will test. Research and thought had thousands of years to show that one can make much progress by merely making representations and construals about other researchers' representations and contruals and by, at best, verifying representations and construals _about_ representations and construals -- doing so via books about other books and by researchers' going back and checking the originals and considering the ideas presented there. This sort of thing in the end makes little progress when the subject matter is not thought itself but instead, say, physics or biology. One needs to verify by experiences of the subject matter. The logical process must revisit the object, somehow, some way. Second, I'd point to the analogy between decoding and interpretation, an analogy which has been referred to and alluded to often enough, e.g., in David Lodge's "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage." I'd point to the extended analogy, and ask, why does triadic semiotics have no analogue for the recipient? source ~~~ object encoding ~~ sign decoding ~~ interpretant recipient ~~ ? Is it merely that in early scenarios the decoding was usually mechanical and the recipient a human? Why does a recipient notice redundancies and inconsistencies which a decoder does not notice? What is the difference in function between a decoding and a "recipience"? Why, at the fourth stage, does the analogy suddenly break down between information theory and triadic semiotics? Does one of them have the wrong scenario? Which one? Is it normal or is it a warning alarm, when a tenable analogy just suddenly goes bad? If the interpretant is analogous both to decoding and to recipient, what functions analogous to theirs does it combine? Should a semiotic philosopher be concerned about such questions? Especially a Peircean one accustomed to tracing extensive analogies and correlations, a philosopher who believes in doing that sort of thing? But I've pointed this all out in the past. Third, I'd point out the following logical stream of thought: Peirce says that to represent an object is not to provide experience or acquaintance with the object. There are good reasons to agree with Peirce about this, which I've discussed in the past. It is rooted in the fact that, except in the limit case of their identity, the sign is not the object but only, merely, almost the object. However, in being almost the object, it does convey information about the object; however, acquaintance with the object can't be gained from the sign. Now, when one forms an acquaintance or experience with an object, what does that give to one, that a sign, indeed, acquaintance with a sign, does not give to one? Why is object acquaintance or object experience involved with confirming s
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, >[Charles] Following up on Joe's saying: >>[Joe] "If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all semeiosis is at least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other words self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical description of it will REQUIRE appeal to a fourth factor (which is somehow of the essence of verification) in addition to the appeal to the presence of a sign, of an object, and of an interpretant, allowing of course for the possibility of there being more than one of any or all of these, as is no doubt essential for anything of the nature of a process. The appeal to the additional kind of factor would presumably have to be an appeal to something of the nature of a quadratic relational character. To be sure, any given semeiosis might involve the fourth factor only in a triply degenerate form, just as the third factor might be degenerate in a double degree in some cases, which is to say that the fourth factor might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis, just as thirdness might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis." Note for anybody reading at http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/maillist.html : I find that a few recent posts from me and Joe didn't get posted at mail-archive.com. They can be found here: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1311 (post from me August 19, 2006) http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1312 (post from Joe Ransdell August 19, 2006) >[Charles] and your saying: >>[Ben] "Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is >>[Ben] -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object are, by Peirce's own account, outside the interpretant, the sign, the system of signs. >>[Ben] -- and that, therefore, the recognition is not sign, interpretant, or their object in those relationships in which it is the recognition of them; yet, in being formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object, it is logically determined by them and by the object as represented by them; it is further determined by the object separately by observation of the object itself; and by the logical relationships in which object, sign, and interpretant are observed to stand. Dependently on the recognitional outcome, semiosis will go very differently; it logically determines semiosis going forward. So, how will you diagram it? You can't mark it as object itself, nor as sign of the object, nor as interpretant of the sign or of the object. What label, what semiotic role, will you put at the common terminus of the lines of relationship leading to it, all of them logically determinational, from the sign, the object, and the interpretant? >[Charles] I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits. >[Charles] Suppose I am given a photograph to use as a means of finding a person whom I have never seen. As far as I can see there would be nothing "tested" in my looking for the person unless I fail to find the person, in which case, assuming that the person was present, I might wonder if the photograph is recent, if the person has gained or lost weight, grown or shaved a beard, etc. That is, I might question what I sometimes fall the "fidelity" of a sign or how precisely the Immediate or Semiosical Object of the sign represents its Dynamical Object--in this illustration how closely the features of the photographic image resemble the features of the person photographed. Having failed in an attempt to _use_ a sign, I might and actually have questioned its _usefulness_ as a sign. Inference may be deliberate, conscious, controlled (and that's reasoning or ratiocination) or nondeliberate, unconscious, uncontrolled. The question of whether inference or testing or such things take place, is not the question of whether one is conscious of inferring or testing or such things and of learning thereby, but rather of whether intentionally or unintentionally, indeed consciously or unconsciously, one so infers or tests such that, intentionally or unintentionally, and consciously or unconsciously, one learns. It is quite natural to look back on experiences and realize that they involved trials whereof one was unaware or only confusedly aware at the time. The point is whether one incorporates and practices one's learnings from them, whether or not one is aware of having done so. Not
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Joe, list: Following up on Joe's saying: JR: "If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all semeiosis is at least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other words self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical description of it will REQUIRE appeal to a fourth factor (which is somehow of the essence of verification) in addition to the appeal to the presence of a sign, of an object, and of an interpretant, allowing of course for the possibility of there being more than one of any or all of these, as is no doubt essential for anything of the nature of a process. The appeal to the additional kind of factor would presumably have to be an appeal to something of the nature of a quadratic relational character. To be sure, any given semeiosis might involve the fourth factor only in a triply degenerate form, just as the third factor might be degenerate in a double degree in some cases, which is to say that the fourth factor might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis, just as thirdness might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis." and your saying: BU: "Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object are, by Peirce's own account, outside the interpretant, the sign, the system of signs. -- and that, therefore, the recognition is not sign, interpretant, or their object in those relationships in which it is the recognition of them; yet, in being formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object, it is logically determined by them and by the object as represented by them; it is further determined by the object separately by observation of the object itself; and by the logical relationships in which object, sign, and interpretant are observed to stand. Dependently on the recognitional outcome, semiosis will go very differently; it logically determines semiosis going forward. So, how will you diagram it? You can't mark it as object itself, nor as sign of the object, nor as interpretant of the sign or of the object. What label, what semiotic role, will you put at the common terminus of the lines of relationship leading to it, all of them logically determinational, from the sign, the object, and the interpretant?" CR: I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits. Suppose I am given a photograph to use as a means of finding a person whom I have never seen. As far as I can see there would be nothing "tested" in my looking for the person unless I fail to find the person, in which case, assuming that the person was present, I might wonder if the photograph is recent, if the person has gained or lost weight, grown or shaved a beard, etc. That is, I might question what I sometimes fall the "fidelity" of a sign or how precisely the Immediate or Semiosical Object of the sign represents its Dynamical Object--in this illustration how closely the features of the photographic image resemble the features of the person photographed. Having failed in an attempt to use a sign, I might and actually have questioned its usefulness as a sign. When, for instance, I introduce an _expression_ like "fidelity of a sign" I think about how other people might interpret it in an effort to evaluate and predict its usefulness as a means of representing what I have in mind. When, as I have here, I use the _expression_, I am both trying to represent what I have in mind and, if light of any response I may get, trying to evaluate its usefulness--the "fidelity"of its "correspondence" to an Object--as a means of representing what I am thinking. Does what I have set out above come anywhere close, Ben, to characterizing and illustrating the kind of circumstances in which you think something more than Peirce's (Interpretant - Sign - Object) is involved? In any case, it appears to me that there is a reflexivity in what I have described in so far as in my using the _expression_ "fidelity of a sign" in an attempt to engage in conversation with you and others on the list, I am also in conversation with myself about using the _expression_. It also seems to me that I am using the _expression_ as a sign with its interpretant to represent an object other than the sign while at the same time I am making the _expression_ an object of a different sign and interpretant; which is to say that the reflexivity is semiosical or part of a semiosical p
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
W will just have to leave it as a stand off, Ben. I have no more to say on this than I have already said. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, August 19, 2006 2:21 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, Gary, Jim, Charles, Jacob, list, It's obvious that in _some_ sense or other I disagree with Peirce about how semiosis is related to experience. However, I think I find sufficient material in Peirce to make the argument in Peirce's own terms, especially in Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, where he plainly says that one needs experience collateral to sign and interpretant of the object in order to identify the object. And I don't get the idea of finding the equation or dis-equation of an experience and a sign/interpretant so confusing that "it literally makes no sense," so confusing that one can't make sufficient sense of it in order to argue against it in terms of what experience is, what interpretation is, etc. If it were true that it is, -- in your words, "a confusion in virtue of talking about the interpretant as being an 'experience or observation.' In talking about the sign-object-interpretant relationships we are doing so in the process of analyzing such things as experience or observation (or verification) and it literally makes no sense to me put in that way," -- then Peirce's discussions of collateral experience would make no sense. He's far too specific in delineating relationships of semiosis to experience for those delineations to be compatible with that which you say. Why would Peirce say things like "All that part of the understanding of the Sign which the Interpreting Mind has needed collateral observation for is outside the Interpretant. It is...the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the sign." Why would Peirce say, "Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience"? Note that he does not say that _collateral_ acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. He is not stating such a truism. Instead, he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance at all, must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is saying that the _representing_ of the object is never an _acquainting_ with the object (except, as usual, in the limit case where the representing sign and its object are the selfsame thing). But that is just the sort of statement which you say _makes no sense_ to you. How do you account for that? Do you deny that that's what he is saying? If so, how do you justify such a denial? I don't know why it makes no sense to you to speak of denying or affirming that one's experience of an object is or isn't one's sign of an object, least of all can I understand why this would be a consequence of talking about object-sign-interpretant relationships in the process of analyzing such things as experience or observation. You talk as though experience were something like the moon or the color green or the letter "C," which one would certainly not expect to see treated as basic semiotic elements on a par with object, sign, and interpretant. But we have Peirce right above characterizing _all_ signs in terms of experience and, in particular, distinguishing them -- _all_ of them -- from acquaintance, observation, experience of the object. How could this make sense if it doesn't make sense to speak of an object experience as being a sign of the object or not being a sign of the object? I have only one Peirce collateral-experience discussion which presents me with any problems for my views or, more specifically, for my use of his views -- you have all the rest of his collateral-experience discussions contradicting you. You say, "The semeiotical terminology is properly used in explication of such notions as that of experience, observation, verification, etc. and therefore signs and interpretants cannot except confusedly be equated with such things as observations or experiences or verifications." I would say that conceptions of objects, signs, interpretants, and verifications are all of them analytic tools for analyzing processes of objects, signs, interpretants, and verifications (and more generally, experiences), and none of this stops us from clearly dis-equating experiences/verifications from interpretations, etc. Or maybe you mean that sometimes one's experience of the object is one's sign of the object, and sometimes not? I.e., that one only confusedly equates or confusedly dis-equates th
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Joe, Gary, Jim, Charles, Jacob, list, It's obvious that in _some_ sense or other I disagree with Peirce about how semiosis is related to experience. However, I think I find sufficient material in Peirce to make the argument in Peirce's own terms, especially in Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, where he plainly says that one needs experience collateral to sign and interpretant of the object in order to identify the object. And I don't get the idea of finding the equation or dis-equation of an experience and a sign/interpretant so confusing that "it literally makes no sense," so confusing that one can't make sufficient sense of it in order to argue against it in terms of what experience is, what interpretation is, etc. If it were true that it is, -- in your words, "a confusion in virtue of talking about the interpretant as being an 'experience or observation.' In talking about the sign-object-interpretant relationships we are doing so in the process of analyzing such things as experience or observation (or verification) and it literally makes no sense to me put in that way," -- then Peirce's discussions of collateral experience would make no sense. He's far too specific in delineating relationships of semiosis to experience for those delineations to be compatible with that which you say. Why would Peirce say things like "All that part of the understanding of the Sign which the Interpreting Mind has needed collateral observation for is outside the Interpretant. It is...the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the sign." Why would Peirce say, "Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience"? Note that he does not say that _collateral_ acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. He is not stating such a truism. Instead, he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance at all, must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is saying that the _representing_ of the object is never an _acquainting_ with the object (except, as usual, in the limit case where the representing sign and its object are the selfsame thing). But that is just the sort of statement which you say _makes no sense_ to you. How do you account for that? Do you deny that that's what he is saying? If so, how do you justify such a denial? I don't know why it makes no sense to you to speak of denying or affirming that one's experience of an object is or isn't one's sign of an object, least of all can I understand why this would be a consequence of talking about object-sign-interpretant relationships in the process of analyzing such things as experience or observation. You talk as though experience were something like the moon or the color green or the letter "C," which one would certainly not expect to see treated as basic semiotic elements on a par with object, sign, and interpretant. But we have Peirce right above characterizing _all_ signs in terms of experience and, in particular, distinguishing them -- _all_ of them -- from acquaintance, observation, experience of the object. How could this make sense if it doesn't make sense to speak of an object experience as being a sign of the object or not being a sign of the object? I have only one Peirce collateral-experience discussion which presents me with any problems for my views or, more specifically, for my use of his views -- you have all the rest of his collateral-experience discussions contradicting you. You say, "The semeiotical terminology is properly used in explication of such notions as that of experience, observation, verification, etc. and therefore signs and interpretants cannot except confusedly be equated with such things as observations or experiences or verifications." I would say that conceptions of objects, signs, interpretants, and verifications are all of them analytic tools for analyzing processes of objects, signs, interpretants, and verifications (and more generally, experiences), and none of this stops us from clearly dis-equating experiences/verifications from interpretations, etc. Or maybe you mean that sometimes one's experience of the object is one's sign of the object, and sometimes not? I.e., that one only confusedly equates or confusedly dis-equates them because there's no such general rule? But I don't understand why anybody would think, that, even if only sometimes, something serving as _another_ sign of the object in a given context and situation would be a collateral experience of the object, when experience of the object will be outside that sign qua sign-in-that-situation-and-context. It's just a logical contradiction. In a given situation for a given mind, experience of the object is outside the sign, interpretant, and sign system. Therefore, in that situation for that mind, that mind's experience of the object will not be serving as that mind's sign or int
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
ry to make my point to you was that I thought you would see that the representation of verification is merely one of the things which the distinction between sign, object, and interpretant might make possible, among the many different things of logical interest that his basic analysis provides the basic elements for. Why? Because the point to the basic category analysis is to make it possible to represent cognitions of any and every sort in a helpfully analytic way, and once you have the elements required for the analysis of any given cognition, you ipso facto have what is required for such special cases as, say, that of verifying cognitions, and not all cognitions have that function, as for example in the case of the cognitions being verified. And there are surely a vast number of cognitions that go unverified. One more sort of example to make my point. Verification is relevant to any thing regarded as purportedly being the truth about something where some occasion has arisen that makes that questionable. It need not be verification of a scientific theory, for example, but can be concerning some matter of fact about something at a particular time or place. Anything reported in a newspaper is something that normally ought be, if not verified, at least verifiable. Now suppose that it is said that a certain event occurred at a certain time and place. Someone has a belief or at least claims to have a belief that it occurred and one is a reporter needing verification that it occurred at all. One way of doing that would be to try to find out if there are other reports by other persons that are in agreement with that report. Now, each of these other reports may be, considered by itself, no more or less reliable than the report in question, but it clearly makes a difference whether such other reports do or do not agree and/or what proportion of them do. If the degree of agreement is very high it might seem reasonable to conclude that the original report has been verified, taking due account of the various reasons why this or that report might or might not be such as to be counted as a verification or a disverification. But there is nothing about the original or first report, the cognition requiring verification, that makes it something to be verified or disverified in contradistinction from being something that verifies or disverifies it. Perhaps the verification is simply the sum total of reports considered in respect to their agreement on the matter in question. How could it possibly be supposed, then, that being a verification of something is an analytic element on par logically with the analytical elements that are involved in all of the cases, regardless of whether they are verifiers or that which is verified? The universal categories are analytical elements involved in all cases alike and any individual case must already be fully constituted as being of the nature of a cognition of some sort before the question of its verificational status can even arise. The verificational factor therefore cannot be on par with the sort of universal element we are concerned with when we are concerned with the categories. I just don't see that anything you say takes account of this, Ben. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 7:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, Currently, I'm focused on answering Joe's recentest post to me, particularly in regard to the question of how to argue that some very complicated complexus of objects, signs, and interpretants will not amount to a verification. My focus there has as much to do with trying to restrain my prolixity as anything else! Still, I'd like to attempt at least a brief response here. A point which I'll be making in my response to Joe, and which may be pertinent here, is that the "reflexivity" involved in semiosis is not just that of feedback's adjusting of behavior but instead that of learning's effect on the semiotic system's very design -- solidifying it or undermining it or renovating it or augmenting it or redesigning it or etc. Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object ar
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
tain slack and experimentability which the mind has in understanding and practicing the difference between an interpretant and a recognition/verification, not a distinction such that the mind "makes" the distinction and employs it as an option tied neither to penalty nor to reward, but, instead, a distinction such that the mind _learns_ how to practice it.) Another way to put it is that, given the rule is that experience with the object is outside the interpretant, then an interpretant takes form as a _conception as reached by inference_, not as a judgment as reached by inference, even if it takes the form of a proposition (or even of an argument). It is a conception as inferred-to consciously or unconsciously. In the case of a conception unconsciously inferred-to, the interpretant conception (or its embodiment as a commonly perceptible sign) may be a sign formed "from life," like a painting of an actual person, and intended more as an occasion for interpretation and less as an outcome of interpretation. (Most of us, and most artists, will rightly not regard such a painting as actually an "uninterpretive" sign; W.C. Williams' novel _White Mule_ is not mere "slice of life" writing; but even when one is aware of its interpretive aspects, there are very likely even more aspects that could be fairly called interpretive than those of which one is aware). The interpretant is the idea, the clarification, the elucidation, that one comes up with from the sign; the recognition is the establishment, in greater or lesser firmness, of said idea, and takes form as a judgment as reached by inference, a concluding judgment. The inferred-to conception may be vibrant to the mind and important to it, etc. I agree with the view to which Peirce came, that even a name can reasonably have something like assertoric force, influencing the mind. I've called the conscious inference to a conception "conceptiocination," though that is not a general enough term. Given that in commonsense perception one can form a perceptual judgment, I would tend to regard that as involving percepts rather than perceptual "conceptions." It is perfectly possible to act upon an unverified -- or an inadequately verified -- interpretant, and this is experimentation. It also may be bold and may be rash or brave. It does, when deliberate, involve at least the conscious recognition of the interpretant _as_ an interpretant, and this is a kind of recognition which we experience, observe, and practice every day. Somebody says, "well that's just your interpretation," and the addressee says, "well, yes, but I believe that I'll be able to prove it this afternoon." Coming up with an idea is one thing, establishing it is another. That's common sense, and the burden is on critical common sense if it wishes to reject the common sense. A recurrent problem , as Peirce pointed out in regard to pre-modern science, is mistakenness about verification itself, not some lack of verificatory spirit; and, as Peirce wrote elsewhere, everybody thinks himself or herself already sufficiently good at logic. There is an order of being, whereby we explain things by inferred objects, laws, etc., and an order of knowledge, whereby we verify; in that sense, the explanatory "ultimates" means what is farthest from the mind, while verificational "ultimates" means what is nearest to the mind and most familiar. So it's natural to believe oneself to have little of worth yet to learn about logic unless one truly believes oneself to be low in intelligence by some standard which one actually holds. The question in the current discussion seems now to be revolving over the issue of whether establishment and verification are a formal logical element on a par with object, sign, and interpretant, though Joe's recentest post raises the idea once again (if it was ever really left aside) of whether a verification might be merely some complexus of objects, signs, and interpretants in considerable multiplicity. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Charles F Rudder To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 12:08 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Ben, list: Ben, I am struggling to understand exactly what it is you are saying Peirce overlooks in connection with verification. In an effort to get some further clarification of your position, I am including a statement of my understanding of some of what Peirce says on the subject followed by some questions. I. Peirce on Verification TRANSUASION (CP 2.98): A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an Argument which sets out from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous Abduction, and from virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results of possible experiments, a
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, list: Ben, I am struggling to understand exactly what it is you are saying Peirce overlooks in connection with verification. In an effort to get some further clarification of your position, I am including a statement of my understanding of some of what Peirce says on the subject followed by some questions. I. Peirce on Verification TRANSUASION (CP 2.98): A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an Argument which sets out from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous Abduction, and from virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results of possible experiments, and having performed the experiments, concludes that the hypothesis is true in the measure in which those predictions are verified, this conclusion, however, being held subject to probable modification to suit future experiments. Since the significance of the facts stated in the premisses depends upon their predictive character, which they could not have had if the conclusion had not been hypothetically entertained, they satisfy the definition of a Symbol of the fact stated in the conclusion. This argument is Transuasive, also, in respect to its alone affording us a reasonable assurance of an ampliation of our positive knowledge. By the term "virtual prediction," I mean an experiential consequence deduced from the hypothesis, and selected from among possible consequences independently of whether it is known, or believed, to be true, or not; so that at the time it is selected as a test of the hypothesis, we are either ignorant of whether it will support or refute the hypothesis, or, at least, do not select a test which we should not have selected if we had been so ignorant. (END QUOTE) I take the word "verification" as a synonym for the consequences of Peirce's transuasive arguments (distinguishable from abductive and deductive arguments) that set out the conditions under which individuals will be most likely to agree to act as if statements referring to perceptual events and relations between and among perceptual events are true. I say "act as if" because I understand Peirce to say that "belief" necessarily entails both cognitive and behavioral action. Granting that there are semiosical antecedents to one's being able to name and otherwise classify perceptual events like seeing a burning building, any physically and psychologically normal person who sees a burning building will most likely voluntarily or quasi voluntarily agree to report seeing or having seen a burning building as a consequence of their experience's compelling them to act as if they are or were in the actual presence of a burning building. The cognitive assent in agreeing to say there is or was a building burning in which Thirdness is predominant is inseparably connected to a nonvoluntary inability dominated by Secondness to act as if seeing a burning building is or was an hallucination, optical illusion, etc. To refuse to report or to quibble over reporting that a building is or was burning would be an instance of "paper doubt." Say what you will, the consequences of acting as if there is or was no building burning are identical to what we conventionally mean (the import of Peirce's pragmatic maxim) by saying that a building is burning is true. Peirce's transuasive argument does not set out conditions under which all rational individuals ought to agree, but conditions under which, over time, most people will in actual fact agree as a consequence of an inability to act as if what is predicted will not occur. Belief has the character of a wager. Whatever a person's state of mind, relative to present states of information the odds favor acting as if the conclusions of transuasive arguments are true. II. Questions 1. Do you generally agree with my summary of Peirce's transuasive argument? If not, where in your opinion have I gone astray? 2. If you do generally agree with my account of transuasion, what does Peirce's transuasive argument fail to address in connection with verification? --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben: If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all semeiosis is at least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other words self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical description of it will REQUIRE appeal to a fourth factor (which is somehow of the essence of verification) in addition to the appeal to the presence of a sign, of an object, and of an interpretant, allowing of course for the possibility of there being more than one of any or all of these, as is no doubt essential for anything of the nature of a process. The appeal to the additional kind of factor would presumably have to be an appeal to something of the nature of a quadratic relational character. To be sure, any given semeiosis might involve the fourth factor only in a triply degenerate form, just as the third factor might be degenerate in a double degree in some cases, which is to say that the fourth factor might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis, just as thirdness might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis. That seems possible. Is that your view? I pose it in this abstract way to make sure we are talking about something on par with the sign, the object, and the interpretant. If so how do you know that semeiosis cannot be adequately described without recourse to that factor, i.e. cannot be described on the basis of an appeal to some complexity possible through recursion and referential reflexivity involving only three kinds of elements or factors -- as Peirce would have to claim? Joe Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] . - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Jacob, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, >[Jacob] Theres been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it >almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input >about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some. >[Jacob] Ben wrote: I dont know how Peirce and others have missed the >distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open >regarding that question, thats about all. I dont have some hidden opinion >on the question. >[Jacob] Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: I dont think Peirce >overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a >distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and >Peirces approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesnt mislead him into >thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. >[Jacob] I want to agree with Joe; its hard for me to see Peirce overlooking >that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isnt a >formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking. >[Jacob] The discussion sounds like everyones talking about isolated >instances. All the examples given to illustrate testing here are >particular, individual cases where one person observes something, draws a >conclusion, and checks to see if hes right. Thats not the only way to view >the development of thought. >[Jacob] Take Joes common-sense example: You tell me that you observed >something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a >certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the >edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there >myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the >place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing >about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about >it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my >report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and >find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at >the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . . >Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? >(This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) >[Jacob] I dont think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the >difficulty with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is >making. >[Jacob] It also seems to me theres some confusion about what were arguing >about. The role of verification in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of >individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean. >[Jacob] When checking your work, you might discover that youd made an error >(often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer >but somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the >individual level. But animals reason too, though they dont verify. And >thats telling. (This was Bens point
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Jacob, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, >[Jacob] Theres been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it >almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input >about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some. >[Jacob] Ben wrote: I dont know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct >and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding >that question, thats about all. I dont have some hidden opinion on the >question. >[Jacob] Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: I dont think Peirce >overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a >distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirces >approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesnt mislead him into thinking that >one has to give a formal account of such a thing. >[Jacob] I want to agree with Joe; its hard for me to see Peirce overlooking >that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isnt a >formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking. >[Jacob] The discussion sounds like everyones talking about isolated instances. >All the examples given to illustrate testing here are particular, individual >cases where one person observes something, draws a conclusion, and checks to >see if hes right. Thats not the only way to view the development of thought. >[Jacob] Take Joes common-sense example: You tell me that you observed >something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a >certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice >in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to >check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you >said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might >think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some >financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification >of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both >confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim >disverified. But then some fourth person . . .Well, you get the idea. >So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim >Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) >[Jacob] I dont think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the difficulty >with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is making. >[Jacob] It also seems to me theres some confusion about what were arguing >about. The role of verification in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of >individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean. >[Jacob] When checking your work, you might discover that youd made an error >(often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer but >somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the individual >level. But animals reason too, though they dont verify. And thats telling. >(This was Bens point when quoting Lewes on Aristotle: science is science >because of proof, testing, verification.) Animals don't deliberately verify. Even most human verification is not carried out with a specifically verificative purpose. To the extent that animals learn and are capable of unlearning, they do test, verify, disverify, etc. I throw a stick for a dog to fetch, we go through it a couple of times. Then I make the motion but don't release the stick. The dog runs, can't find the stick, walks half-way back, and I show the stick to the dog. Soon enough the dog realizes that just because I make that rapid throwing motion doesn't mean I throw the stick. The dog waits till it sees the stick flying through the air, at least until it thinks that I've stopped pretending about throwing the stick. >[Jacob] At the general level it doesnt seem to be the case. I cannot think of >any time in the history of physical sciences when the scientific community at >large said anything like, Copernicus goofed Ptolemy was right after all! and >*reverted* to the original way of doing things. It just doesnt happen. When a >development occurs in knowledge, its pretty much forward-moving. The same goes >for other fields of inquiry. Actually Copernicus brought about a reversion to the heliocentric view of Aristarchus, who arrived at it in apparently a reasonably scientific manner. (The view also appears in some of the ancient Vedas.) Yet there is a forward motion. A new theory is supposed to explain that which the old theory explained, and then some. The decrease of massive overturnings of previous scientific views pertains to research's becoming really good at verification, in those fields where research has done so. Freud held sway for quite a time, but many now say it's all junk; others say that his concepts of transference, denial, projection, etc., are solid additions to psychological theory, even if one rejects other asp
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
goes way back before I joined (a week or so ago). Just trying to help clarify the problem. Best wishes, jacob Original-Nachricht Datum: Sat, 12 Aug 2006 13:36:47 -0500 Von: ���Joseph Ransdell��� <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> An: ���Peirce Discussion Forum��� Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: The ���composite photograph��� metaphor > Ben: > > I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of distinguishing > sense from nonsense. That���s what the pragmatic maxim is all about, isn���t > it? > Tom��� Short���s take on this has to do with Peirce���s supposed failure to > realize that his view of infinite interpretability entailed an infinite > deferral of sense being given to the initially senseless symbol. In my view > Tom > doesn���t understand what Peirce���s view in the work of the late 1860���s > actually is. I think I can establish pretty persuasively that Peirce was, to > put > it mildly, a bit more sophisticated than Tom credits him with being. It is > really just a matter of understanding what he meant by an ���imputed > quality��� in defining the symbol in the New List, which Tom finds too > distastefully > Lockean to be taken seriously; but it has to be laid out and tediously > tracked through text after text in order to put an end to the sort of > misreading of Peirce that Tom gives, which is what I am currently completing. > I > don���t see that it has anything to do with verification, though. It is just > a > question of what his theory of meaning is. > > Joe Ransdell > - Original Message - > From: Joseph Ransdell > To: Peirce Discussion Forum > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 1:01 PM > Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The ���composite photograph��� metaphor > > > Ben Says: > > I don���t know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and > irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that > question, that���s about all. I don���t have some hidden opinion on the > question. Tom > Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis > learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw > this problem. I wasn���t convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think > that it���s the verification problem; I can���t help thinking that if Peirce > had > seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. > > REPLY: > > I don���t think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just > that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way > you think it is, and Peirce���s approach to logic as theory of inquiry > doesn���t > mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a > thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and > how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do > what one can describe as ���verifying��� them. That would involve discussing > such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no > doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely > involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of > results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but > distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather > obvious > implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or > disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don���t think there would be > anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. > > Take a common sense case of that. You tell me that you observed > something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a > certain > location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in > question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check > it > out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. > Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think > we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some > financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification > of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both > confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim > disverified. But then some fourth person . . .Well, you get the idea. > So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what > Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) > > The question is, why have philosophers of science so often gotten all > agitated about the problem of verification as if something really important > hinged on giving an exact account of what does or
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
whom any task of verification falls, along with the task of determining redundancy of the message's information with respect to information from outside the message or set of messages. How does the recipient do this? Presumably with some resort to info from alternate information channels, indeed, _an indefinite totality of alternate info channels_, not depicted in the standard diagram. That doesn't mean that it makes sense to drop the recipient out of the picture and replace the recipient with a "grand decoder." The decoder, in any usual sense, doesn't test the system itself or redesign it, rearchitect it, guide its evolution on the basis of learnings. That "totality of alternate channels" and sources, encoding, decodings, the same recipient behaving variously across those channels but also other recipients as sources, etc., -- is the world with its existential consequences; the recipient is the one who takes on the challenge of dealing in terms of those consequences and seeks to shape them and learn from them and evolve, intelligently let himself be shaped by them, allowing and even actively arranging for truth itself to decide many things. In all those alternate info channels, the recipient is there too. They get omitted from the standard diagram because they're not in question at the time. Some of them seem so transparent to the recipient that they hardly seem worth calling "channels." Some of them are so clear and also so sure and sound that they are anchorage. That sureness and soundness is on the basis of existential consequences arising from the recipient's total world and is something for the recipient to learn, not the decoder (though of course one could imagine a decoder being evolved, however long it might take, into a nontrivial recipient). The accumulation of anchorage, a totality of sure 'channels,' sources, encodings, decodings, and recipience, combined into that "earth" to which we refer in the phrase "down to earth," is the job of the recipient; and the recipient is an element in each of those channels too. I hope that there is some clarification in my example above. I also think that the example points a way to building bridges between semiotics and information theory. Not that I'm interested in a "reduction" of semiotics to information theory. Information theory is not really _about_ the recipient's design activity, so far as I can tell, though plenty of information theory and cybernetics are about how to design and improve systems. To turn around and study those designers, that is another thing. As subject matter, self-reference, the ongoing redesign of systems, intelligent evolution, a consequential self-testing of the system at every moment -- such things lead into the business of semiotics and philosophy. You also seem to see a problem in the notion that I conceive the act of verification as singular. Just because you or I "verify" something, just because you or I do some reasonable corroboration (I'm using "verify" as the forest term for all the trees of "confirm," "corroborate," "prove," etc.), doesn't mean that it is _really_ true. You seem to be looking in my talk of verification for a conception which would do the job of a final interpretant. But I wouldn't look for _that_ kind of verification as being actually available to you or me or any finite community of investigators. I have already used other ways to distinguish verification from interpretation, and have no need or desire for a _final_ attainment of truth to be part of it. I remain as steadfast as ever against the "consensus" truth theory mis-ascribed to Peirce. Instead I conceive of a final recognition along with Peirce's final interpretant, as a limiting idea at least, the final recognition of the final interpretant, etc., which research _would_ be destined to reach sooner or later if pushed indefinitely far. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 8:31 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Ben: JR: I must say that I think you are missing my point because of some mistaken assumption that I can't identify. The reason I gave the simple example of a common sense verification was to make as clear as I could that there is no deep logical point involved. Consider again my simple example: You see something and tell me about it and I take a verifying look. I see what I expect to see given what you told me to expect and that's enough for me. That is a verification. It doesn't follow that either of us grasped the truth of the matter, but if you did indeed grasp it by taking a look as you passed by the obj
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Joe, Jim, list, Ben, not having gotten your argument for a putative necessary fourth semeiotic element earlier--and I've certainly tried--your most recent comments have also not helped me get any closer to what you apparently find near-obvious, or at least "simple." You write: [BU] It really should be setting off one's philosophical alarm bells if one finds oneself denying that experience, recognition, verification, have a logically determinational role. I wouldn't disagree that experience, recognition and verification have their logical roles which appear to me to occur as semeiotic events in the Peircean, that is, triadic sense (allowing for an extra-semiotic dynamical object, and that one can build up collateral experience which "points" to such a reality which simply is what it is, etc.) You write: BU: I don't understand how anybody could argue that a claim does not logically determine the character of its verification (in the sense that, e.g., a claim that a horse is on the hill determines a verification consisting in looking for a horse on the hill) or that the claim's verification does not logically determine further inference involving the claim (e.g., a horse was confirmed to be on the hill, and it's good news that a horse is nearby, and it's also good news that the semiosis leading up to the verification was faring quite well, and Joey the horse-spotter was right again, and so forth, and all those items factor determinatively into semiosis going forward, a semiosis which would go _very differently_ if it had been dis-confirmed that a horse was on the hill). I don't understand how anybody could argue such, but I'm willing to examine such an argument if one is offered. Again, it's a matter of one's understanding of the semiotic role of "verification." No one--and least of all Peirce--has argued against verification, experience, collateral knowledge as important. But I see verification as a stage in a given semiosis, just as the writing (or reading) of Hamlet would have stages (of recognition, for example, as Hamlet begin to see the intimate relationship of Gertrude to the villainous king). I don't think I would say with you that it logically determines the character of its verification as meaning for it appears to me part of an existential-semeiotic thread which intertwines with the rest of the threads of the evolving cable/symbol. In short it is a stage, albeit a significant stage, in some semeiotic event. I thought that this was a part of Joe's point too (in both his earlier response and his more recent and expanded one) Joe quoted you then commented: [BU] I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. REPLY: [JR] I don't think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce's approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn't mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. I agree with Joe that "verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry." You say it is up to us argue against something which for me at least isn't even there as "a distinctive formal element in inquiry"--as I've remarked, I cannot find it to argue against it. You say it is there; I (we?) say it is not. So while this is very simple (and obvious) to you, to me it remains a mystery. You wrote: [BU] <>Now, the following seems simple to me: __The object does not, of itself, convey experience or even information. The sign & interpretant convey information but not experience of their object. Those considerations settle in the negative the question of the adequacy of a triad of interpretant, sign, and object, for verificative purposes. Verification, qua verification, has a determinational role in logic.__ I don't know why any of this doesn't seem simple to others. Well, I've simply come to another conclusion: the immediate object is involved in the semeiosis, and "verification, qua verification" points exactly to its involvement in the growing symbol, the richer, truer meaning--say, perhaps, of my life as a sign-user and whatever role I might play in my society as a result of my seeing that object more clearly. Perhaps I don't think verification is "determinative" in the way you say it does. "The object determines the sign for the interpreter" and there is both a dynamical and an immediate object determining. Verif
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben: JR: I must say that I think you are missing my point because of some mistaken assumption that I can't identify. The reason I gave the simple example of a common sense verification was to make as clear as I could that there is no deep logical point involved. Consider again my simple example: You see something and tell me about it and I take a verifying look. I see what I expect to see given what you told me to expect and that's enough for me. That is a verification. It doesn't follow that either of us grasped the truth of the matter, but if you did indeed grasp it by taking a look as you passed by the object and I did indeed grasp it by taking another look then we are both correct. But where in all of that is this all important difference you keep talking about between mere interpretation and experience" There was no more or less experience in my look than in yours, and no more or less interpretation, as far as that goes, other than the memory that the reason I took a look myself was because I wanted to see if what you saw is what you thought it to be, which I am willing to credit if, after taking a look myself, the description matches up. There is no denial of verification involved in any of this. It is an imaginary account of a very simple case of verification. JR: Now you can complicate it as much as you want, turn the look at a macroscopic object requiring no special instruments of vision (a burning fire) into, say, the look at the object which is involved in the case of scrutinizing a bunch of measurement data gathered from cranking up a particle accelerator at CERN with the help of a thousand other people, and the basic idea of verification or disverification is unchanged except for being required to be vastly more sophisticated, given the enormously different conditions of perceptual access to the object, and of course given the equally enormously greater amount of inference involved in the one case than in the other when we move from understanding the perceived object to be a burning building to the compared case of understanding the perceived object to be, say, a quark doing its thing under this and those conditions. Exactly the same sort of gross macro description of it applies as semiotically construed: an object is perceived as manifesting this or that, which, semiotically, is talked about in the same terms regardless of the difference between being an object with manifest qualities functioning as representations interpreted as being a burning fire or quark doing whatever quarks do. JR: So I just don't get it, Ben. Of course there is much of philosophical interest, at a specialized level, if one wants to deal with highly complex experiences instead of simple ones. I am not denying that. I assumed that you would understand that. You say: BU: One might make similar remarks on abductive inference, which is belief-laden and context-sensitive and would require getting into lots of details and variation case by case. Note that the kind of hypotheses which inferential statistics characteristically produces are "statistical hypotheses" rather than explanatory ones, and it is not as if statisticians never had an interest in the subject; a few years ago one statistician wrote here at peirce-l about being interested in general approaches to the production of the content of hypotheses which go beyond the usual statistical kind. Statistics deals with phenomena in general and, though often applied in idioscopy, is not itself about any special class of phenomena. Yet one does, in at least some philosophy, attempt and pursue general characterizations _of_ abductive inference and this is because abductive inference is a logical process of a general kind and is therefore part of philosophy's subject matter. JR: Yes, of course, but why would I deny any of that? You then say: BU: Verification is also a logical process of a general kind. The question is, is it some kind of interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof? Or is it something else? JR: Now that baffles me. Of course it is some kind of "interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof." Why would you even say such a thing? Is it something else? Well, it is supposed to be all of that considered as occurring subsequent to some prior instance of "interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof", relating to that prior instance as sufficient like it (or in some other way relevant to it) to count as something that might verify or disverify a claim made that cited the prior instance as evidential relative to that claim. Yes, it is one thing to be a verification and quite another to be that which is verified. But what is all of this talk about the one being a mere sign and interpretant whereas the latter is an experience? Both are equally describable in sem
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
I forgot that I had wanted to make a remark on the Pragmatic Maxim in the
present connection.
>[Joe] I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of
distinguishing sense from nonsense. That's what the pragmatic maxim is all
about, isn't it?
The Pragmatic Maxim is all about distinguishing sense from nonsense, given
a healthy inquirial setting. By itself, it is about the clarification of
conceptions. It is not about actually checking them, which also is important in
order _soundly_ to distinguish sense from nonsense. I think that,
as a practical matter, the result of semiotics' more or less stopping at the
stage of clarification, is that degenerate forms of pragmatism, feeling the
importance of practical, actual verification and consequences, have
emphasized actual outcomes ("cash value") at the expense of the conception of
the interpretant, an expense exacted through persistent misreadings of the
Pragmatic Maxim as meaning that the meaning of an idea is in its
actual observed consequences "period, full stop."
Yet the Pragmatic Maxim provides a basis for saying that _the
interpretant is addressed to the recognizant_. The interpretant, the
clarification, is in terms of conceivable experience having conceivable
practical bearing. It is a narrowing down of the universe represented by the
sign -- it picks out some ramifications of value or interest under the standards
of the interpreter. As an appeal to possible relevant experience, _it
is an appeal to possible recognizants_. As experiences, the
recognizants are not merely "specialized" down from the sign's represented
universe; instead they are downright singularized, insofar as experience is
singular. For instance, a prediction based on a hypothesis is a
potential recognizant, or a step in the formation of an actual recognizant. It
tends to be a prediction which is, itself, crucial-testable, and whose
confirmation lends support to the hypothesis, while its disconfirmation
disconfirms the hypothesis. The less crucial-testable a prediction is, the more
it is like a hypothesis itself if it is testable at all.
Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, list, (continued, 3rd part) >[Gary] Again, you maintain that the "logically determinational role" of "such recognition" cannot be denied and yet I can't even find it! For me it is less a matter of its being denied than my not even missing it (clearly you've fixed your own ideas in this matter quite differently). Your arguments around the interpretant seem absolutely convincing to you, but I have not been able to fully comprehend your argument regarding the logical necessity of this fourth "intuition" of the object as a proxy for the it. Perhaps this originates in my not being able to find it unmediated in my experience (as phenomenologist, as semeiotician, as ordinary "muser" etc.) But you say you cannot see how it is possible to argue logically for anything except a categorial schema which includes this putatively necessary fourth element that is so obvious to you, but a mystery to me. You're mixing the proxy up with the recognition and misattributing to me the view that experience is unmediated. You seem to have forgotten the difference between "direct" and "unmediated." The logically determinational role is that of (dis-)confirmatory experience. I look and see that person X is wearing a hat as I expected. I see X wearing the hat as I expected. Now, it's confirmatory in regard to my interpretive expectation based on signs, confirmatory in logical virtue of what the contents of the sign, interpretant, and object-as-represented were and in logical virtue of what the object now shows itself to be and indeed what the object, sign, and interpretant now all show themselves to be. It is indeed confirmatory of a massive amount of prior semiosis without which I couldn't make enough sense of what I was seeing in order to think or say "looka there, he's wearing a hat!" In that sense, the experience is indeed logically mediated and logically determined. There was even a logically determined need for such a confirmation. My further stream of interpretation and verification will be decisively determined logically by the fact that I have confirmed that X is indeed wearing a hat just as I expected on the basis of earlier signs and interpretants. The confirmation touches not only on the question of whether X is wearing a hat and the ramifications regarding X, but also on the validity and soundness of the whole semiosis leading up to the confirmation, ultimately on the whole mind as an inference process. In sum: If the experience is formed *_as_* collateral to sign & interpretant in respect of the obect, then object, sign, and interpretant logically determine it in its collaterality. And it in turn logically determines semiosis going forward. It really should be setting off one's philosophical alarm bells if one finds oneself denying that experience, recognition, verification, have a logically determinational role. I don't understand how anybody could argue that a claim does not logically determine the character of its verification (in the sense that, e.g., a claim that a horse is on the hill determines a verification consisting in looking for a horse on the hill) or that the claim's verification does not logically determine further inference involving the claim (e.g., a horse was confirmed to be on the hill, and it's good news that a horse is nearby, and it's also good news that the semiosis leading up to the verification was faring quite well, and Joey the horse-spotter was right again, and so forth, and all those items factor determinatively into semiosis going forward, a semiosis which would go _very differently_ if it had been dis-confirmed that a horse was on the hill). I don't understand how anybody could argue such, but I'm willing to examine such an argument if one is offered. So, the semiosis can't be diagrammed in its logical determination without lines representing relationships of experience to object. You could draw little dots in the line to show that the experiential relationship is, from another viewpoint, interpretively mediated. But that doesn't stop the line from being an experience line, any more than breaking a representation line into atoms and their motions turns the representation line into a mere mechanics or matter line. If you insist on showing the experience line as a mere interpretation line, then you have no way to display experience of the object such that the experience is "outside" the interpretant and sign of the object. That's part of why nobody has sat down and drawn a diagram showing how recognition or verification is merely interpretation. Another seemingly open door gets closed when an intended signhood turns out to be the mind's experience's serving as a sign of some other object than the object of which it is the mind's experience. Of course one experiences things as being signs of still more things. Now, the following seems simple to me: __The object does not, of itself, convey ex
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Joe, Gary, Jim, list, >[Joe] Ben Says: >>[Ben] I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. >[Joe] REPLY: >[Joe] I don't think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce's approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn't mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do what one can describe as "verifying" them. That would involve discussing such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather obvious implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don't think there would be anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. One might make similar remarks on abductive inference, which is belief-laden and context-sensitive and would require getting into lots of details and variation case by case. Note that the kind of hypotheses which inferential statistics characteristically produces are "statistical hypotheses" rather than explanatory ones, and it is not as if statisticians never had an interest in the subject; a few years ago one statistician wrote here at peirce-l about being interested in general approaches to the production of the content of hypotheses which go beyond the usual statistical kind. Statistics deals with phenomena in general and, though often applied in idioscopy, is not itself about any special class of phenomena. Yet one does, in at least some philosophy, attempt and pursue general characterizations _of_ abductive inference and this is because abductive inference is a logical process of a general kind and is therefore part of philosophy's subject matter. Verification is also a logical process of a general kind. The question is, is it some kind of interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof? Or is it something else? Now there are two more questions here: Did Peirce think that verification was important and determinational in inquiry? (Yes). Did Peirce think that verification is a distinctive formal element in semiosis? (No.) Your discussion of an emphasis on verification as reflecting a pathology of skepticism, a search for infallible truth, etc., goes too far in de-valorizing verification, certainly to the extent that you may be ascribing such a view to Peirce. From the Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce Vol. I, I. General Historical Orientation, 1. Lessons from the History of Philosophy, Section 3. The Spirit of Scholasticism, Paragraph 34, http://www.textlog.de/4220.html 66~~~ 34. Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the true cause of the success of modern science when he has said that it was *_verification_*. I should express it in this way: modern students of science have been successful because they have spent their lives not in their libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the field; and while in their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by thought, but have been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories. The cause of their success has been that the motive which has carried them to the laboratory and the field has been a craving to know how things really were, and an interest in finding out whether or not general propositions actually held good -- which has overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all passion. Now it is plainly not an essential part of this method in general that the tests were made by the observation of natural objects. For the immense progress which modern mathematics has made is also to be explained by the same intense interest in testing general propositions by particular cases -- only the tests were applied by means of par
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben: I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of distinguishing sense from nonsense. That's what the pragmatic maxim is all about, isn't it? Tom' Short's take on this has to do with Peirce's supposed failure to realize that his view of infinite interpretability entailed an infinite deferral of sense being given to the initially senseless symbol. In my view Tom doesn't understand what Peirce's view in the work of the late 1860's actually is. I think I can establish pretty persuasively that Peirce was, to put it mildly, a bit more sophisticated than Tom credits him with being. It is really just a matter of understanding what he meant by an "imputed quality" in defining the symbol in the New List, which Tom finds too distastefully Lockean to be taken seriously; but it has to be laid out and tediously tracked through text after text in order to put an end to the sort of misreading of Peirce that Tom gives, which is what I am currently completing. I don't see that it has anything to do with verification, though. It is just a question of what his theory of meaning is. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 1:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Ben Says: I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. REPLY: I don't think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce's approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn't mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do what one can describe as "verifying" them. That would involve discussing such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather obvious implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don't think there would be anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. Take a common sense case of that. You tell me that you observed something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . . Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) The question is, why have philosophers of science so often gotten all agitated about the problem of verification as if something really important hinged on giving an exact account of what does or ought to count as such? You tell me, but my guess is that it is just the age old and seemingly insatiable but really just misguided quest for absolute and authoritative certainty. Why this shows up in the form of a major philosophical industry devoted to the production of theories of verification is another matter, and I suppose that must be explained in terms of some natural confusion of thought like those which make it seem so implausible at first that we can get better control over our car when it
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben Says: I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. REPLY: I don't think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce's approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn't mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do what one can describe as "verifying" them. That would involve discussing such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather obvious implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don't think there would be anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. Take a common sense case of that. You tell me that you observed something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . . Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) The question is, why have philosophers of science so often gotten all agitated about the problem of verification as if something really important hinged on giving an exact account of what does or ought to count as such? You tell me, but my guess is that it is just the age old and seemingly insatiable but really just misguided quest for absolute and authoritative certainty. Why this shows up in the form of a major philosophical industry devoted to the production of theories of verification is another matter, and I suppose that must be explained in terms of some natural confusion of thought like those which make it seem so implausible at first that we can get better control over our car when it goes into a skid if we turn the car in the direction of the skid instead of by responding in the instinctively reasonable way of trying to turn it in opposition to going in that unwanted direction. Okay, not a very good example, but you know what I mean: something can seem at first completely obvious in its reasonableness that is actually quite unreasonable when all relevant considerations are taken duly into account. some of which are simply too subtle to be detected as relevant at first. Thus people argue interminably over no real problem. It happens a lot, I should think. In any case, a will-of-the-wisp is all that there is in the supposed need for some general theory of verification. There is none to be given nor is there any need for one. People make claims. Other people doubt them or accept them but want to be sure and so they do something that satisfies them, and others, noting this, are satisfied that the matter is settled and they just move on. Of maybe nobody is ever satisfied. That's life. Of course it can turn out at times that it is not easy to get the sort of satisfacion that counts for us as what we call a verification because it settles the matter in one way, or a dissatisfaction because it settles it in a contrary way. But that is all there is to it. Maybe there are fields or types of problems or issues in which the course of experience of inquiry about them has resulted in the development and elaboration of procedures that are regarded as having verification or disverification as their normal result, but
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben Udell wrote: >>Anyway, my semiotic four are, instead, object, sign, interpretant, recognizant. I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively.>> Dear Ben, Folks-- Thanks, Ben, for your earlier helpful clarifications of my previous questions. Sorry I've taken so long to get back. I see that I did misunderstand some of your ideas. No doubt I've done so again in some of my remarks below. Though hopefully not in the same ways as before. Seems to me that your "semioic four" are all included in Peirce's third category of representation. In particular I think verification is a matter of comparing one sign with another in order to develop a coherent, predictable account of the world we experience. Those signs that predict and cohere we count as moving toward truth. Those that do not we tend to discard as misinterpretations. Much as we might wish I don't think we have access to a non representational standard against which we can verify our representations of reality. Kicking a table or being poked in the ribs may convince one that there is a world beyond his own will, but that is not the same as proving we have non representational verification or awareness of these experiences. What, after all, does verification mean other than some correspondence between expectation and perceived outcome -- both instances of representation. Verification is one of many useful things that can be done with signs. Signs can also be used for planning, communicating and so on. These are all important and useful functions of signs but this does not, in my opinion, make them fundamental or distinct modes of being which is, IMHO, the level of analysis Peirce was trying to address with his categories. I think Peirce was trying to answer the question -- what are the minimally adequate set of basic modes of being that are required to account for all experience. I believe he would say that verification is one use or example of representation. IOWs verification is made possible by and is an instance of representation but is not itself a fundamental mode of being or pole of representation (as are quality, reaction and representation itself). OTOH one might argue that the Peircean category of secondness (or otherness) might be construed as a kind of objective verification of the interpretive pole of representation. Ben, can you give me an example of verification that does not involve signs or requires some action or experience that can not be achieved by signs alone? Maybe that would help me to better understand what you mean by verification as a fundamental category of being that goes beyond Peirce's three. I'm not trying to say verification is not important. In fact I think that verification is the crux of the scientific method that Peirce so extolled. But I also believe that Peirce excluded verification (in the categorical sense that you seem to be recommending) as a fundamental building block of experience. In part I think he did so in his criticism of positivism. And I certaintly don't agree that Peirce failed to recognized or address the problem of sense vs nonsense. What is the goal of logic and science if not to address this issue? Rather I'd say that he offered an alternative triadic analysis of this traditional duality. Seems to me many folks are are attracted to the definitive (and self serving) appeal of dualistic categories such as sense vs nonsense, good vs evil, us vs them and the like -- but for Peirce experience was fundamentally triadic, continuous and a matter of interpretation. To say that Peirce missed the importance of distinguishing between sense and nonsense (or any other duality) is in my view to miss a major point Peirce was trying to make. The answer is not either/or but both. Verification can not be divorced from purpose or POV and non of us has as yet achieved God's point of view. We are all captives of our individual point of view and the only path to freedom is community. Maybe. Ah, another thought -- there is perhaps a sense in which representation (or continuity) may be synonymous with verification. Continuity in the Peircean sense implies a circularity in which begining and end are inextricably joined or mediated in what one might call an expanding, evolving verification of nature's inherent purpose. In any case I've enjoyed your comments,
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, list, (continued, 2rd part) >[Gary] It does seem most likely and natural that there are a number of corrections and additions to be made in regard to Peirce's theories. For example, Ben points to the need for contemporary research fields to find their places within Peirce's classification of the sciences. But first folk have got to see the power of such an approach to classification, a matter which Kelly Parker admirably discusses at length in relation to continuity/triadicity in one of the early chapters of his book (the revisions that Ben has suggested to Peirce's classification seem to me idiosyncratic; and certainly any such revision of the classification ought not be one person's "take" on the matter anyhow). That last remark sets up a strawman. To the contrary of course I'm not suggesting that people ought to embrace my revision even when they disagree with it and when I'm the only one in favor of it. Any revision of the classification ought not to be decided by a poll of whether one person supports it or dozens of people support it, etc. If, nevertheless, numbers are worth mentioning when I'm in the minority of one, let's remember that -- in numbers of supporters among philosophers -- Peirceanism itself comes in far behind linguistic analysis & phenomenological/existential philosophy. Now, if we want to rephrase "minority of one" into "thinks he's right and whole rest of the world is wrong," that's merely self-inflammatory rhetoric, especially when the whole philosophical world is far from agreement among its constituents about the subject in question. Now, I don't see why _more_ folks have to first see the power of an approach to classification. What is needed is for the people most interested in the subject to actually attempt it -- just _do_ it, engage the issues, and get productive inquiry rolling. The commencing to appear of some sort of interesting questions and first fruitful results along the way will be the strongest persuader that the approach could be more generally fruitful and that the subject is even worth pursuing at all. Birger Hjørland http://www.db.dk/bh/home_uk.htm has written http://www.db.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/articles%20a-z/classification_of_the_sciences.htm "There is not today (2005), to my knowledge, any organized research program about the classification of the sciences in any discipline or in any country. As Miksa (1998) writes, the interest for this question largely died in the beginning of the 20th century." And the would-be classifier is up against a lot more than that. It seems that not a few researchers believe that classification of research is an unredeemable bane. Of course, I do think that the reason that Peirceans haven't attempted incorporations of contemporary fields into the Peircean classification, is that it's rather difficult. For instance, statistics seems to belong in cenoscopy, but it doesn't seem to belong within philosophy in any traditional sense. And what of information theory and its various areas? The problems involved are philosophical problems -- I think that they're to be solved philosophically. I doubt that stirring interest in people from various fields will do much to help various research fields "find their places" in the Peircean classification when those most familiar with the classification can't figure out how to place such well established and much written-about fields as probability theory, statistical theory, information theory, etc. within it. Of course I'm not against trying to stir other people's interest. But I think that it's just delaying the grappling with the philosophical problems. Regarding idiosyncrasy. You think my classification is idiosyncratic. I think that a side-by-side comparison of my classification with Peirce's would show that mine is not idiosyncratic and is actually more regular and systematic. With each of four major families of research, I associate a category -- Peirce doesn't do that at all -- a referential scope or 'quantity' -- Peirce doesn't do that -- and a typical inferential mode of conclusion -- Peirce does that only for mathematics. Crossing the families are inter-family bands of 'friendly cousins' based ultimately on such general and systematizable conceptions as those of relationships of 'one-to-one,' 'many-to-one,' 'one-to-many,' and 'many-to-many'. What those abtract and colorless characterizations amount to or correlate with, I try to sketch along the first column at the relevant rows. Meanwhile the attempt to trace out implicit Peircean inter-family and inter-subfamily bands or patterns leads to that which Joe Ransdell has called the appearance of "derangement" in Peircean classification. Now, one can certainly believe that my classification is wrong, and some years ago I put it through enough changes that the possibility of revising it again is quite real to me, and, one way or another,
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, Joe, Jim, List Benjamin Udell wrote: I don't see how the logically determinational role of such recognition [as represented by a fourth proxy element] can be arguably denied and so I will stop trying to so argue. But I don't see it. Let me at least give an attempt at a definitive parting _expression_ of my position in this matter. I'll begin by saying that it seems peculiar to me that in his voluminous work on logic as semeiotic that Peirce would have missed exactly the *logical* element (see 4. proxy -- logic, substantiation, etc. in Ben's schema below) and notably exactly at the place Ben finds it, in relation to collateral knowledge (not forgetting that Peirce makes quite a bit of the distinction of collateral knowledge from the system of signs itself as Ben correctly noted). My modus operandi in consideration of a personal "economy of research" has been centered around my sense that as an increasing number of folk are beginning to see the power of Peirce's triadic and trichotomic philosophy and wish to further it (for example, as opposed to the dyadic semiotic which has until recently dominated even computer semiotics) it would be best to emphasize its strengths and powers first before entertaining more complex hypotheses (such as Ben's). Yet, and not denying the need for a critical stance in all these matters, Ben seems to have suggested recently that in the light of his understanding, which cannot be "arguably denied", that this kind of triadic and trichotomic thinking represents some sort of blindness or, perhaps, group-think. It does seem most likely and natural that there are a number of corrections and additions to be made in regard to Peirce's theories. For example, Ben points to the need for contemporary research fields to find their places within Peirce's classification of the sciences. But first folk have got to see the power of such an approach to classification, a matter which Kelly Parker admirably discusses at length in relation to continuity/triadicity in one of the early chapters of his book (the revisions that Ben has suggested to Peirce's classification seem to me idiosyncratic; and certainly any such revision of the classification ought not be one person's "take" on the matter anyhow). A powerful idea is (paraphrasing Peirce) like a child--it needs care and nurturing. With friends suggesting the child is a kind of partially formed monster, who needs enemies? Certainly were I ever to become convinced that there were indeed other than three universes of experience, three categories, three semeiotic elements I would immediately be forced on pragmatic principles to modify my view radically. But that has not happened, and the 3 universes, categories, and semeiotic elements continue to be confirmed in my own experience and thinking. As regards Ben's thinking in this matter, I have not yet been convinced by his arguments that, say, collateral experience on the one hand, or coding/decoding on the other, necessitate adding a fourth semeiotic element or analog. Until that happens I personally will concentrate on promoting the healthy growth of a *child* who seems to me most remarkable, most promising, who continuously inspires my own creative work, etc. But moving along, as you've written before, Ben, your 1st is a kind of 2nd, and your fourth is in a sense another form of the object. Here you give your semeiotic four in outline form. 1. index -- extremality, force, shortest distance, etc. ~ ~ ~ 3. symbol -- information, coding, importance, etc. 2. icon -- probability, likelihood, etc. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. proxy -- logic, substantiation, legitimacy, etc. Besides the probably insignificant point that commencing with a kind of secondness, and having two object-like elements seems to me to weight your four-fold structure with too much secondness, as well as my sense (from studying your Tetrast diagrams) that index, icon, and symbol in your system represent some aspects of Peirce's categories, but also much else which seems alien to Peirce's understanding of these three (so that they are really not the same animals), I again just ask: how could Peirce--and many brilliant interpreters--have missed the 4th, the proxy, your "logic itself" (as in your schema above--there the symbol seems reduced to mere coding of information and to have no inferential or generative power of its own vs Peirce where "symbols grow")? Again, you maintain that the "logically determinational role" of "such recognition" cannot be denied and yet I can't even find it! For me it is less a matter of its being denied than my not even missing it (clearly you've fixed your own ideas in this matter quite differently). Your arguments around the interpretant seem absolutely convincing to you, but I have not been able to fully comprehend your argument regarding the logical necessity of this fourth "intuition" of the object as a proxy for the it. Perhaps this originates in my not be
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, list, Gary's written me off-list to say that, while he agrees with some things that I say, a lot of the other stuff doesn't make sense to him and that we seem to be talking past each other. Joe, too, said (a few months ago) that he didn't understand what I was getting at. Maybe that's why my writing is developing a "hammering" sound. "There is no basis..." over and over again! as if I were trying to challenge all serious Peirceans within hearing distance (which of course is just what I've been trying to do); I mean, occasionally Gary and I sit down to lunch or dinner, you think I hammer away like I did in the post below? No way! (I couldn't even if I wanted to, I can't talk like I write.) And, to me, the philosophical issues seem clearer than they used to seem, no doubt because I've been increasingly repeating myself. My "hammering" sound, plus the fact that the list has been otherwise somewhat quiet lately, make me feel that I'm dominating the list (even though I don't post thrice daily or anything like that), and that feeling, plus the fact that I have to think more seriously about getting regular work, makes me think that it might be best if I go quiet for a while, though Gary says that he's started on a response which he hopes to send in the next few days. Take it slow, if you prefer, Gary! I speak of going quiet, however I won't "resist" responding to his response. Gary sent me a book _Global Semiotics_ by Sebeok. Probably I should read that and some others by contemporary Peirce philosophers & scholars. (I've gone easy on reading during the past few years because of an eye condition, which is a good partial excuse, and the rest is of course that the dog ate my homework.) Then I can return, issuing broadsides and challenges more specifically framed in contemporary Peircean terms, and demanding to know _where_ is a Peircean-style classification of contemporary research fields, where are the tables and charts, where do probability & statistics & info theory & cybernetics fit in, were there _any_ ideas about such things at Nubiola's conference?; and challenging the validity of all interpretant/decoding analogies in the absence of a semiotic analog (the "recognizant," the verifier) to the info-theoretic recipient; and so on with old and new arguments, unless of course I change my mind in general. Anyway, soon, I'm a-going quiet for a while. Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ ----- Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 3:22 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Gary, Joe, Jim, List, I'm back! >[Gary] I've begun to reread and in some cases read for the first time Christopher Hookway's papers as he is to be an invited speaker at ICCS07 at Sheffield University where he is a member of the faculty. There's an interesting and valuable paper of his in the Winter/Spring 2002 Transactions titled " '. . . a sort of composite photograph': Pragmatism, Ideas, and Schematism." Hookway argues that the metaphor of an idea being a kind of "composite photograph" (which has a general character since composed of many particulars) is an important one which Peirce seems to value. He uses it many times and in various ways ways over lengthy period beginning in the 90's and extending into the 20th century. I won't attempt to summarize his complex argument and will only now comment that the metaphor suggests the way in which an idea is something like a photographic iteration of the many subjective experiences of the object of any idea (perhaps the ground?). Hookway argues that fully comprehended the metaphor is both integral to Peirce's architectonic science (as, for example, outlined in his classification of the sciences) as well as possibly proving key to a coherentist defense of his pragmatism.>[Gary] The composite image is a kind of "stereotype" (Hookway's _expression_) of all the particular images so that it somehow captures their common feature. This seems to me a notion which also relates to the formation of "collateral knowledge," but not as a semeiotic or logical element (in effect, a fourth category), but as a psychological event which impacts the logical only in a given moment of semiosis. This is also why, I believe, that Peirce can say that collateral observation is not a part of any given sign, but that this composite representation of the object (held in memory I would hold--again pointing to its psychological structuring across time) is a precondition to recognizing a given sign at all. This occurs out of the depth of an interlocutor's collateral associations concerning an _e
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, List, I'm back! >[Gary] I've begun to reread and in some cases read for the first time Christopher Hookway's papers as he is to be an invited speaker at ICCS07 at Sheffield University where he is a member of the faculty. There's an interesting and valuable paper of his in the Winter/Spring 2002 Transactions titled " '. . . a sort of composite photograph': Pragmatism, Ideas, and Schematism." Hookway argues that the metaphor of an idea being a kind of "composite photograph" (which has a general character since composed of many particulars) is an important one which Peirce seems to value. He uses it many times and in various ways ways over lengthy period beginning in the 90's and extending into the 20th century. I won't attempt to summarize his complex argument and will only now comment that the metaphor suggests the way in which an idea is something like a photographic iteration of the many subjective experiences of the object of any idea (perhaps the ground?). Hookway argues that fully comprehended the metaphor is both integral to Peirce's architectonic science (as, for example, outlined in his classification of the sciences) as well as possibly proving key to a coherentist defense of his pragmatism.>[Gary] The composite image is a kind of "stereotype" (Hookway's _expression_) of all the particular images so that it somehow captures their common feature. This seems to me a notion which also relates to the formation of "collateral knowledge," but not as a semeiotic or logical element (in effect, a fourth category), but as a psychological event which impacts the logical only in a given moment of semiosis. This is also why, I believe, that Peirce can say that collateral observation is not a part of any given sign, but that this composite representation of the object (held in memory I would hold--again pointing to its psychological structuring across time) is a precondition to recognizing a given sign at all. This occurs out of the depth of an interlocutor's collateral associations concerning an _expression_, say since I've just returned from Denmark, "viking", stimulating a composite notion which is the idea of "viking" for him, so that a conversation, for example, may proceed as both parties enter into a commens, or commind concerning the "viking" concept. There is no mystery here, and no need for a fourth category or fourth semiotic element as I see it. If nobody wanted to do more than study people's common conceptions and stereotypes about the Viking, then the relevance of collateral experience and observation would be less prominent, though the question of verifying claims _about_ people's conceptions _qua_ conceptions would remain, unless the inquiry were to lapse even at that level into the kind of seminarianism which Peirce opposed in his pragmaticism. But sometimes some people want to learn about the Vikings themselves, and this involves forming interpretations, deducing consequences, and seeking and examining evidence against which the interpretations themselves will be tested. (The predictions are the potential recognitions, the potential (dis-)confirmations.) I haven't read Hookway, but the reference to the composite of many signs as a "stereotype" is quite telling. A kind of coherentism is in fact the pitfall of Peircean semiotics and is a shoe too small for Peircean pragmaticism, which has only a coherentist aspect (the importance of the validity/cogency of inference) and which certainly emphasizes the importance of combining, distinguishing, abstracting, generalizing, etc., but which is ultimately experimentalist rather than coherentist in the usual sense. There is no basis for saying that the formation of such a kinetic composite sign relates to -- in the sense of underlying -- the formation of collateral knowledge, in such a way as to suggest that that's all that the formation of collateral knowledge really is. Peirce repeatedly gives examples of actual experience with the object of the signs & interpretants in question. Furthermore Peirce said not that collateral observation is "not part of _any given sign_" but instead that it is not part of the sign and is collateral to the sign and _to the given system of signs_, which means also to a kinetic composite sign . There is also no basis for a case that collateral observation is collateral to "signs in general" as opposed to being collateral to particular signs, and Peirce's own examples point this out quite clearly. This also is the ordinary meaning of the word "collateral" in regard to information and confirmation; one speaks of collateral information about a specific object, collateral confirmation of specific claims about a specific object, etc. Furthermore, such a case would reduce the Pragmatic Maxim to nonsense. Any conceivable experience with conceivable practical bearing would be just as good for the clarification of a given conception as any other
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, This looks interesting. For my part, I have to put off responding for some days, as I'm taking an opportunity to flee into Manhattan for the approaching heat wave for the next few days and won't have my own computer. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, July 31, 2006 5:03 PM Subject: [peirce-l] The "composite photograph" metaphor Joe, Ben, Jim, List,I've begun to reread and in some cases read for the first time Christopher Hookway's papers as he is to be an invited speaker at ICCS07 at Sheffield University where he is a member of the faculty. There's an interesting and valuable paper of his in the Winter/Spring 2002 Transactions titled " '. . . a sort of composite photograph': Pragmatism, Ideas, and Schematism." Hookway argues that the metaphor of an idea being a kind of "composite photograph" (which has a general character since composed of many particulars) is an important one which Peirce seems to value. He uses it many times and in various ways ways over lengthy period beginning in the 90's and extending into the 20th century. I won't attempt to summarize his complex argument and will only now comment that the metaphor suggests the way in which an idea is something like a photographic iteration of the many subjective experiences of the object of any idea (perhaps the ground?). Hookway argues that fully comprehended the metaphor is both integral to Peirce's architectonic science (as, for example, outlined in his classification of the sciences) as well as possibly proving key to a coherentist defense of his pragmatism.The composite image is a kind of "stereotype" (Hookway's _expression_) of all the particular images so that it somehow captures their common feature. This seems to me a notion which also relates to the formation of "collateral knowledge," but not as a semeiotic or logical element (in effect, a fourth category), but as a psychological event which impacts the logical only in a given moment of semiosis. This is also why, I believe, that Peirce can say that collateral observation is not a part of any given sign, but that this composite representation of the object (held in memory I would hold--again pointing to its psychological structuring across time) is a precondition to recognizing a given sign at all. This occurs out of the depth of an interlocutor's collateral associations concerning an _expression_, say since I've just returned from Denmark, "viking", stimulating a composite notion which is the idea of "viking" for him, so that a conversation, for example, may proceed as both parties enter into a commens, or commind concerning the "viking" concept. There is no mystery here, and no need for a fourth category or fourth semiotic element as I see it.Of course this is yet very complex as every proposition (let alone a book or a court case!) involves not one index but a whole set of them. 2.439 In order properly to exhibit the relation between premisses and conclusion of mathematical reasonings, it is necessary to recognize that in most cases the subject-index is compound, and consists of a set of indices. Thus, in the proposition, "A sells B to C for the price D," A, B, C, D form a set of four indices. The symbol "--sells--to--for the price--" refers to a mental icon, or idea of the act of sale, and declares that this image represents the set A, B, C, D, considered as attached to that icon, A as seller, C as buyer, B as object sold, and D as price. If we call A, B, C, D four subjects of the proposition and "--sells--to--for the price--" a predicate, we represent the logical relation well enough, but we abandon the Aryan syntax.Hookway argues (although I will only present the conclusions here) that there are "some features of ideas that are to be explained by the metaphor" and although he does not explicitly do so, I would further associate these three "features" a, b, c with the categories, with firstness, secondness, and thirdness respectively.a) Ideas are iconic signs (their content can by "judged")|> c) Ideas are general (so they can be applied to new, unfamiliar cases)b) Ideas are composed from cases experienced (or through testimony)(cf p. 35 op cit)Peirce applies this notion not just to sensory experience, but also to disciplines as varied as mathematics on the one hand and ethics on the other.Finally, there are two directions, two "vectors" possible here. Moving one way (towards the formation of collateral knowledge), a number of particular experiential representations (each one formed semiotically) are "fused" into a single representation. Moving the other way (that is, in consideration of the need to confirm, etc.), the single representation calls up what Hookway calls "a sequence of shades, a sequence of particular images." This proves crucial to the final portion of his argument, connecting the metaphor
