y, October 31, 2008 5:54 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
I think Hutter is being modest.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Fri, 10/31/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razo
I think Hutter is being modest.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Fri, 10/31/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
> To: agi@v2.listbox.com
> Date: Friday, October
am's razor a necessary assumption and bases that upon a
*belief*.
= = = = = =
Where do you believe that he proves Occam's razor?
- Original Message -
From: "Matt Mahoney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 10:46 PM
Subject: Re: [agi]
--- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hutter *defined* the measure of correctness using
> simplicity as a component.
> Of course, they're correlated when you do such a thing.
> That's not a proof,
> that's an assumption.
Hutter defined the measure of correctness as the
--- On Tue, 10/28/08, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Whenever someone "prove" something outside mathematics, it is always
> based on certain assumptions. If the assumptions are not well
> justified, there is no strong reason for people to accept the
> conclusion, even though the proof proce
Ben,
It goes back to what "justification" we are talking about. "To prove
it" is a strong version, and "to show supporting evidence" is a weak
version. Hume pointed out that induction cannot be justified in the
sense that there is no way to guarantee that all inductive conclusions
will be confirme
> However, it does not mean that all assumptions are equally acceptable,
> or as soon as something is called a "assumption", the author will be
> released from the duty of justifying it.
Hume argued that at the basis of any approach to induction, there will
necessarily lie some assumption that i
>> representation it often will. It seems to me that Occam's Razor is
>> >> more oriented to deriving meaningful generalizations that it is exact
>> >> descriptions of anything.
>> >>
>> >> Furthermore, it would seem to me that a more simple
n you reason from data, you often want the
> > ability to extrapolate, which requires some sort of assumptions about the
> > type of mathematical model to be used. How do you deal with that in
> NARS?
> >
> > Ed Porter
> >
> > -----Original Message-
> >
type selection.
>>
>> The are the musings of an untrained mind, since I have not spent much
>> time studying philosophy, because such a high percent of it was so
>> obviously stupid (such as what was commonly said when I was young,
>> that you can't have intelligen
PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 9:40 PM
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
Ed,
Since NARS doesn't follow the Bayesian approach, there is no initial priors
to be assumed. If we use a more general term, such as "initial knowledge"
honey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2008 11:11 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
--- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> (1) Simplicity (in conclusions, hypothesis, theories,
> etc.) is preferred.
>
--- On Wed, 10/29/08, Mark Waser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > (1) Simplicity (in conclusions, hypothesis, theories,
> > etc.) is preferred.
> > (2) The preference to simplicity does not need a
> > reason or justification.
> > (3) Simplicity is preferred because it is correlated
> > with correctn
) Simplicity is preferred because it is
correlated with correctness *of implementation* (or ease of implementation
correctly :-)
- Original Message -
From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 10:15 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and
If not verify, what about falsify? To me Occam's Razor has always been
seen as a tool for selecting the first argument to attempt to falsify.
If you can't, or haven't, falsified it, then it's usually the best
assumption to go on (presuming that the costs of failing are evenly
distributed).
Eric,
I highly respect your work, though we clearly have different opinions
on what intelligence is, as well as on how to achieve it. For example,
though learning and generalization play central roles in my theory
about intelligence, I don't think PAC learning (or the other learning
algorithms pro
that of many on this list. But none the less I think much of what I
> have said above is true.
>
> I think its gist is not totally dissimilar to what Abram has said.
>
> Ed Porter
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Pei Wang [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
Eric:The core problem of GI is generalization: you want to be able to
figure out new problems as they come along that you haven't seen
before. In order to do that, you basically must implicitly or
explicitly employ some version
of Occam's Razor
It all depends on the subject matter of the generali
t you don't
need any specific pre-selected set of priors.
Ed Porter
-Original Message-
From: Ben Goertzel [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 5:50 PM
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
Au contraire, I suspect tha
Pei> Triggered by several recent discussions, I'd like to make the
Pei> following position statement, though won't commit myself to long
Pei> debate on it. ;-)
Pei> Occam's Razor, in its original form, goes like "entities must not
Pei> be multiplied beyond necessity", and it is often stated as "A
--- On Tue, 10/28/08, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What Hutter proved is (very roughly) that given massive computational
> resources, following Occam's Razor will be -- within some possibly quite
> large constant -- the best way to achieve goals in a computable environment...
>
> Tha
nd we always are because AIXI is not
> computable), then we may choose a different explanation than the simplest
> one. However this does not make the alternative correct.
>
> -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
> --- On Tue, 10/28/08, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
en I was young, that you can't
> have
> intelligence without language) and my understanding of math is much less
> than that of many on this list. But none the less I think much of what I
> have said above is true.
>
> I think its gist is not totally dissimilar to what Abram h
then we may choose a different explanation than the
> simplest one. However this does not make the alternative correct.
>
> -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
> --- On Tue, 10/28/08, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > From: Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
what Abram has said.
Ed Porter
-Original Message-
From: Pei Wang [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2008 3:05 PM
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Subject: Re: [agi] Occam's Razor and its abuse
Abram,
I agree with your basic idea in the following, though I usually put
ose a different explanation than the simplest one.
However this does not make the alternative correct.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Tue, 10/28/08, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [agi] Occam's Razor and its
2008/10/28 Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> On the other hand, I just want to point out that to get around Hume's
> complaint you do need to make *some* kind of assumption about the regularity
> of the world. What kind of assumption of this nature underlies your work on
> NARS (if any)?
Not
Abram,
I agree with your basic idea in the following, though I usually put it
in different form.
Pei
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:52 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Ben,
>
> You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the
> regulatiry of the world to justify adaptation.
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:01 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I believe I could prove that *mathematically*, in order for a NARS system to
> consistently, successfully achieve goals in an environment, that environment
> would need to have some Occam-prior-like property.
Maybe you ca
We can say the same thing for the human mind, right?
Pei
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:54 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Sure ... but my point is that unless the environment satisfies a certain
> Occam-prior-like property, NARS will be useless...
>
> ben
>
> On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 1
Most certainly ... and the human mind seems to make a lot of other, more
specialized assumptions about the environment also ... so that unless the
environment satisfies a bunch of these other more specialized assumptions,
its adaptation will be very slow and resource-inefficient...
ben g
On Tue,
I believe I could prove that *mathematically*, in order for a NARS system to
consistently, successfully achieve goals in an environment, that environment
would need to have some Occam-prior-like property.
However, even if so, that doesn't mean such is the best way to think about
NARS ... that's a
Ben,
It seems that you agree the issue I pointed out really exists, but
just take it as a necessary evil. Furthermore, you think I also
assumed the same thing, though I failed to see it. I won't argue
against the "necessary evil" part --- as far as you agree that those
"postulates" (such as "the u
Sure ... but my point is that unless the environment satisfies a certain
Occam-prior-like property, NARS will be useless...
ben
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
> Ben,
>
> You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the
> regulatiry of the wo
Ben,
You assert that Pei is forced to make an assumption about the
regulatiry of the world to justify adaptation. Pei could also take a
different argument. He could try to show that *if* a strategy exists
that can be implemented given the finite resources, NARS will
eventually find it. Thus, adapt
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Ben,
>
> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man.
>
> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded
> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction a
Ben,
Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man.
My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded
semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as
adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my
other pu
Hi Pei,
This is an interesting perspective; I just want to clarify for others on the
list that it is a particular and controversial perspective, and contradicts
the perspectives of many other well-informed research professionals and deep
thinkers on relevant topics.
Many serious thinkers in the a
Triggered by several recent discussions, I'd like to make the
following position statement, though won't commit myself to long
debate on it. ;-)
Occam's Razor, in its original form, goes like "entities must not be
multiplied beyond necessity", and it is often stated as "All other
things being equa
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