On Fri, 02 Feb 2007 22:01:34 -0500, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In Novamente, we use entities called indefinite probabilities, which
are described in a paper to appear in the AGIRI Workshop Proceedings
later this year...
Roughly speaking an indefinite probability is a quadruple
On Fri, 02 Feb 2007 22:01:34 -0500, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
In Novamente, we use entities called indefinite probabilities,
which are described in a paper to appear in the AGIRI Workshop
Proceedings later this year...
Roughly speaking an indefinite probability is a
Actually, b and N are parameters. However you set them, you can get
an answer in the form of an [L,U] interval. Theoretically.
In a practical AGi system, in most cases you need to fix b and N and
do probabilistic inference in this context, due to memory and
processing time
On Thu, 01 Feb 2007 14:00:06 -0500, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Discussing Cox's work is on-topic for this list...
Okay, I'll get a copy and read it.
Let me tell you one research project that interests me re Cox and
subjective probability:
Justifying Probability Theory as
I don't know of any work explicitly addressing this sort of issue, do
you?
No, none that address Cox and AI directly, but I suspect one is
forthcoming perhaps from you. Yes? :)
There is a literature on Cox and AI. For example,
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/halpern/papers/cox1.pdf
Pei
Interpretation-wise, Cox followed Keynes pretty closely. Keynes had
his own eccentric view of probability, which held among other things
that a single number was not enough information to capture a judgment
of uncertainty (and I agree with this). However, even so, Cox's
Theorem does
On Fri, 02 Feb 2007 15:57:24 -0500, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Interpretation-wise, Cox followed Keynes pretty closely. Keynes had his
own eccentric view of probability...
Although I don't yet know much about Cox, (Amazon is shipping his book to
me), I have studied a bit about
In Novamente, we use entities called indefinite probabilities,
which are described in a paper to appear in the AGIRI Workshop
Proceedings later this year...
Roughly speaking an indefinite probability is a quadruple (L,U,b,N)
with interpretation
The probability is b that after I make N
Hi Ben,
Well, Jaynes showed that the PI can be derived from another assumption,
right?: That equivalent states of information yield equivalent
probabilities
Yes, as I understand it the principle of indifference is a special case of
Jaynes' principle of maximum entropy.
I have no
This seems to also be dealt with at the end of Cox's book...
Interesting. I'm tempted to read Cox's book so that you and I can
discuss his ideas in more detail here on your list. (I worry that
my enthusiasm for this subject is only annoying people on that
other discussion list.) Is that
On 1/29/07, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Pei Wang's uncertain logic is **not** probabilistic, though it uses
frequency calculations
IMO Pei's logic has some strong points, especially that it unifies fuzzy and
probabilistic truth values into one pair of values. I think in Pei's logic
HI,
Pei Wang's uncertain logic is **not** probabilistic, though it uses
frequency calculations
IMO Pei's logic has some strong points, especially that it unifies
fuzzy and probabilistic truth values into one pair of values. I
think in Pei's logic the frequency f is indeed a
gts wrote:
Hi Ben,
On Extropy-chat, you and I and others were discussing the foundations
of probability theory, in particular the philosophical controversy
surrounding the so-called Principle of Indifference. Probability
theory is of course relevant to AGI because of its bearing on decision
Ben,
Is the probabilistic logic you use in Novamente the same as Pei Wang's
version? If not, why do you use your version?
YKY
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To avoid confusion, I never refer to my multi-valued logic as a
version of probabilistic logic, though it has some
similarity/relationship with it. My reasons have been explained in
several papers, like
http://nars.wang.googlepages.com/wang.confidence.pdf , as well as my
book.
Pei
On 1/28/07,
Pei Wang's uncertain logic is **not** probabilistic, though it uses
frequency calculations
We have our own probabilistic logic theory called Probabilistic Logic
Networks (PLN), which will be described in a book to be released
toward the end of this year or the start of 2008.
The
Hi,
Well, Jaynes showed that the PI can be derived from another
assumption, right?: That equivalent states of information yield
equivalent probabilities
This seems to also be dealt with at the end of Cox's book The
Algebra of Probable Inference where he derives the standard entropy
This is a rather interesting technical paper, which may be of interest to
those on this list who believe that probability theory is useful for AI...
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0403031
It's a generalization of Cox's important classical work on the logical
foundations of probability theory --
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