much to the current popular trends, and
avoid humanization of the story (well, humanization sells better ;-).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ers and will take also their viewpoint into account as needed.
Having lots of trust among different players may also be a
competitive advantage at national level. But of course there is no
point in using voting methods that don't work (for the purpose and
environment in question).
Juho
On Dec 25, 2007, at 17:55 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Juho!
>
> You wrote:
>
>> I could imagine a voting system that might address this issue for
>> larger groups, but it isn't Range.
>>
>> One could have elections that take into account e.g.
>>
Maybe the new proposal of the locksmith would have been to install
new apartment specific locks on the inner doors of the vestibules.
That would leave the vestibules open for more balanced and more
voluntary social trials. :-)
Juho
On Dec 26, 2007, at 8:35 , rob brown wrote:
> I deci
Ok, probably the guild was right in maintaining citizens' trust on
the system. People may do whatever they wish with their apartments
but locksmiths should gain trust by staying neutral.
Juho
On Dec 26, 2007, at 22:48 , rob brown wrote:
On Dec 26, 2007 12:03 PM, Juho <[EMAIL P
candidates in
the final election do have impact on how the system works.
Condorcet should work ok in all phases (I don't expect strategic
votes to be a major problem).
Juho Laatu
They would be the following (assuming the Primary Election matches
the Dec. Polls):
Edwards (would
mments on this list.
I'll come back if I find some example scenarios that would be more
natural and useful than the pizza examples and other regular stuff.
Juho
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t would also do good to the experts to be forced to agree
what joint targets to promote.
Juho
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the benefits of each. Too often I have
seen approaches where people pick e.g. only the best parts of both
approaches (and forget the non-working cases) and assume that they
all are valid simultaneously.
Juho
_
h sense
to switch to ratings style.
People also tend to have their own understanding on what is best for
the society. Actually all depend on that and nobody knows the
"absolute"/"idealistic" social utility. (This makes my first bullet
point above quite irrelevant from ind
hat is
quite simple and understandable and works in most situations for the
benefit of the voter.
So, is Condorcet strategy more straight forward than Approval
strategy? Approval strategy (e.g. "vote one of the frontrunners and
candidates that are better") requ
that regular voters use will probably also rely on generalizations
like identifying who are the "frontrunners" and making one's decision
based on this. So, I was trying to compare an incomplete Condorcet
strategy to an incomplete Approval strategy.
Juho
On Dec 30, 2007,
could be something different than
with pure ranking based ballots.
Although I have some opinions on Condorcet completion I agree with
Rob that too much energy is spent on the Condorcet completion
debates. All methods that are Condorcet compliant are already quite
good methods.
Juho
the results become
more important than trying to find all the remaining theoretical
strategic cases and trying to find treatment for them. At this point
the changes may cause more harm (in other areas) than benefit (in the
intended areas).
Juho
___
equires the voters to estimate the
opinions of other voters while the described Condorcet strategy does
not.
that's because you described honest condorcet voting and strategic
approval voting. apples and oranges. you could rectify that by going
back and either describing the burial aspect
verage of personal utilities then the statement is
not correct. It is valid if the overall social utility is seen as a
theoretical ideal. And if we talk about the personal _understanding_
of the overall utili
; http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
I guess this is again a simulation where the distribution of
strategic voters is assumed to be equal at both sides. What will
happen if one party is more strategic than the other?
Juho
rstanding of the method to all voters.
I just picked two strategies that have been often recommended and
that are simple.
what you described for condorcet was not a "strategy" -- it was a
sincerity! :D
That's the good part in Condo
ast they had the
option.
What do you think of this? Is it a good approach to use this type of
means to reduce the strategic threats in Condorcet based systems? Can
they offer an adjustable level defence mechanism against strategic
environments/elections?
Juho
On Jan 1, 2008, at 17:24 ,
Yes, this approach nicely follows the original idea of the method.
Just make small random differences if there are none.
Juho
On Jan 1, 2008, at 19:43 , Diego Santos wrote:
2008/1/1, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
I think the method Diego Santos is considering can elect outsi
life (with incomplete information and
incomplete control of the voters).
Juho
On Jan 2, 2008, at 17:58 , James Gilmour wrote:
> Jobst had written:
>>> Also, it seems difficult to sell a method when you must admit that
>>> advancing an option X may actually redu
t can handle numerous candidates. (Having too many candidates may
however also make the election worse since then it is more confusing
and based on less good analysis of the candidates by the voters.
Allowing e.g. two candidates from the major parties and one from some
smaller ones (and mayb
what one wants.
Juho
On Jan 10, 2008, at 5:09 , daniel radetsky wrote:
On Jan 1, 2008 1:15 PM, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Are monotonic methods less manipulable than non-monotonic methods?
I've
never heard any evidence of that.
I'm going to assume that yo
nal methods have some
interesting characteristics my guess is that they will not offer any
clear shortcuts.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Z).
I find the proposed method interesting since it seems to aim at
electing good winners (using a function minimizes the problems caused
to the voters, from one point of view).
Juho
On Mar 2, 2008, at 22:20 , <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Just an addendum from previous post (Minimum
n't necessarily mean that parties
would be evil as such, or that political systems without parties
would automatically perform better. Thorough understanding of the
dynamics of the political system is needed to make its operation
better (in small or
r public elections also the complexity of the ballots might
be a show stopper.)
(If different ballots have different complexity that might be a risk
to voter privacy (you would cast a complex vote while most other
votes would be simpler).)
Juho
> -- Andrew
>
>
sal
is of course huge. But one must start somewhere. Making people aware
of the problems and offering them also good solutions to the problems
may some day lead to small steps forward.
Juho
On Mar 4, 2008, at 23:54 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
When you say, about changing th
mall vote
fragments and drop them into the box. And if this is done by the
machine there would again be no compelling need to allow circular
votes (hard enough to guess the original linear votes from the
fragments). One could in this case as well allow only linear votes
but still break t
elections should be made "good enough to be trusted enough".)
Juho
On Mar 6, 2008, at 8:30 , Juho wrote:
Thanks. I missed the part of breaking the ballot into pieces already
before counting it.
I know one example where at least people claimed that one person
monitoring the elec
to win them both in order
to become a Condorcet winner. What is the "shortest distance (sum of
individual ranges)" for C in this example and how do you count it?
Juho
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es and total lack of parties.
Juho
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On Mar 7, 2008, at 0:03 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
(I just noticed that I have another message from you, in another area.
I will copy it and respond as quickly as I can, probably tomorrow.
I'm
inexpert at navigating this site, but learning. flg)
In the messag
On Mar 7, 2008, at 16:40 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Morning, Juho
>
> re: "... not having parties or other groupings may also cause problems
> to the voters since they have hard time finding out what each
> individual
> candidate stands for."
>
> The purpose o
mselves?
Yes. Unfortunately the system often drives people thinking so that
the "known experts" (or incumbent leaders) have the wisdom. In some
complex areas it is true that one needs to be an expert to
understand. But on the other hand the very basic assumption and
requirement of
amilies
etc. in addition to politics). We have some old ones like "The
Emperor's New Clothes" by Hans Christian Andersen, but maybe we need
also new ones.
Once understood people are less likely to make the same mistakes
again. If people do not get the picture same mistakes
w the method makes
the comparisons based on individual pairwise comparisons in
individual votes, but it could also look at the damage e.g. at a per
voter level.
Juho
On Mar 9, 2008, at 3:40 , <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> Snipping the message:
>
&
er than the "individual level understanding of
these concepts and their impact on one's life". This would be
unfortunate (if true for our time) since it would e.g. weaken the
basis of democracy, voters that have sufficient understanding to
steer the society.
Juho
al level understanding of
these concepts and their impact on one's life'."
Not, "It may be", IT IS!!! When marketing can persuade people to
buy Pet
Rocks for their home, it is no longer a question. It is a fact.
One new formulation of Descartes' famous "I thi
some extent between the two parties of the
two-party system) so it may not be seen to be that critical. Don't
know about privacy since people anyway do register as supporters of
one party. The new set-up brings new challenges in the area of
privacy though (like the drug dealers).
Juho
vs. Clinton).
(The Nader case was easier since the voters could maybe quite safely
assume that Nader will not win in any case. In the latter case there
were three potential winners.)
Juho
How could the 5 Nader voters suddenly have a different utility for
Gore? In reality, the rating
dn't make either A1 or A2 the winner
But isn't the method vulnerable to cloning when there is a loop of
three (A>B>C>A), C wins, B is second, but then B is cloned to B1 and B2?
Juho
___
All New Yahoo! M
king parties dominant but I find it
natural (and to some extent even unavoidable) that people do group
together with other similar minded people. Also voters may prefer to
see some structure in the potentially vast array of candidates that
they need to choose from.
Juho
On Mar 17, 2008, at 19:49 , Greg Dennis wrote:
Excellent points, Juho. I'll just add a few more.
- You're right, Nader supporters could learn that it's in their best
interest to give Gore a '10'. Under plurality, they could also learn
that it's in their best int
On Mar 29, 2008, at 5:05 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Morning, Juho
>
> Very well said. I hope you're right. I hope we can improve our
> political systems in less than 200 years. But, as you point out, "...
> the current establishment always has clear reasons to opp
volved, as in
the discussion on how to make the financial situation of the
representatives safe enough, in political campaigning etc.)
Juho
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ed strategy (who approves whom) determines the
winner. It is just that the voters themselves have to guess and
decide on the election day what might be the best strategy for them.)
Juho
___
Al
good examples. I hope I
didn't make too many mistakes above and the descriptions were clear.
The algorithms where not very simple (the (uncommon) ties were the
most complex part), but I guess the basic idea of allowing voters to
compromise and give support also to their second preferences
On Apr 5, 2008, at 19:55 , Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote:
"I presented only some positive examples. Also various bad failure
cases would be appreciated if you can find good examples."
Juho,
31: A>B
32: B>C
37: C
C is clearly the strongest candidate, having both more first
vironments so that it
could be used as it is. But if there is a risk of widespread burial
then countermeasures (as studied in the mail) to stop that could be
useful. For me that should be enough since use of counter-strategies
would already be too much. That could already make any method
so too
(=best without need for comparisons). This attitude may help keeping
the moral high, but it may also delay the changes when they would be
needed (together with the large size, strong economy, no close same
size neighbours that could be seen as examples etc).
Juho
On Apr 10, 2008, at 5:24 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
> Good Evening, Juho
>
> I, too, believe in the power of understanding. It is the basis for
> everything I write; seeking guidance and instruction wherever I can
> find
> it and explaining as thoroughly as I'm able, when a
ld make some clear change to better may not be much bigger than
usual. One might try to make some steps e.g. on the war related
aspects (wider than just concerning one of the wars) now when that
topic is hot.
Juho
___
may materialize.
The key point was that naming clone candidates (several candidates of
one party) doesn't seem to be sensible in Approval and (competitive)
Range. And that also having having several politically related (non-
insignificant) parties seems to cause similar weakening of
in cabinets. In real life many decisions may happen in cabinets after
the election (e.g. in many systems the formation of the government).
I however prefer to try to make the system such that the voters would
be in charge.
Sorry about not being more formal, but maybe this is (long) enough
ow the campaigns at least seem to
be a bit too much based on marketing skills and yellow press. Well,
maybe I must also repeat the famous rule that the citizens will get
as good government as they deserve => some citizen activity / better
participation / better understanding needed if one
1D spectrum,
> I'd say
> that's ok. The first problem is self-correcting, and the second one
> shouldn't be all that common.
The next common candidate opinion space could be one with two
dimensions. One dimension may be enough to cover most basic
minor preference
Also a methods where one could give several candidates full points
but would still be able to set a preference order between these
candidates is possible. Actually some Condorcet+Approval methods
could be said to do this (Approval = simple Range).
Juho
"second
best candidate" is from another party. Now these voters fail to
indicate preference and the "second best candidate" might win because
of this.
But I admit that this threat of not ranking sufficiently many
candidates of one's own party is not one of the most
ould
not withdraw although after the election it may be obvious that he/
she should have withdrawn.
Juho
On Apr 19, 2008, at 18:49 , Steve Eppley wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I agree with Mr. Lomax that parties' main purpose is to coordinate
> campaigns, if he means coordinating the *votes*
oters
(as well as the opponents) can formulate and justify their proposals.
(I also note again that people will roughly get the kind of system
that they deserve. Maybe one could consider better education etc. to
achieve better results.)
Juho
__
bility of getting rid of the parties
altogether in all forms (and the mapping most of the blame on them)
may be a factor that turns people away from the proposal.
> If not, are they worthy of considerable intellectual effort to correct
> their i
best place to start and fix first. Four candidates may add
some interesting scenarios to this (e.g. the diamond case above,
smith set + 1, impact of two clones within a party, two loops).
Having more than four might already typically mean studies of
multiple clones or situations with l
ction and 3)
influence the surrounding society jointly based on the current
consensus on the best way forward.
Maybe it is not always the "ignorant citizens", "power hungry
politicians" and "businessmen with money" that are stopping the
pr
m
> to follow. These things do not flow from passivity, they flow from
> conscious effort. Lamenting darkness does not bring forth light.
I agree that people need to assume many kind of roles to achieve the
target together. Some will find the path, some advertise it to
others, some
ance between political and regional
proportionality. Strong emphasis on the regional representation and
close contacts between the representatives and voters may to some
extent also reduce the need to offer full political proportionality.
It is also possible to try to satisfy both needs
How about using STV or some other proportional method to select the
n-1 worst candidates and then elect the remaining one?
Juho
On Apr 28, 2008, at 20:58 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Hello folks,
>
> over the last months I have again and again tried to find a
> solution to
> a s
tes would be elected
- I didn't use any lotteries => C will be elected with certainty
Juho
On May 2, 2008, at 22:29 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Juho,
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by
>> How about using STV or some other proportional method to select
>> the n-1 w
best proportionality (when looking at the worst
candidates to be eliminated from the race).
Juho
On May 2, 2008, at 23:59 , Juho wrote:
> Here's an example on how the proposed method might work.
>
> I'll use your set of votes but only the rankings.
> 51: A>C>
On May 4, 2008, at 19:10 , Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: "... I'm more inclined to see the parties still as units that
still get their strength and mandate to rule from the citizens
themselves (and from their lack of interest to make the parties
better and control t
life elections (not necessarily for
the challenge of Jobst)). One approach would be to count all the
candidates that are ranked above the planned winner and share the
support of the voter between all of them.
Juho
On May 3, 2008, at 11:22 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Juho,
this sounds nice -- the crucial point is that we'll have to analyse
what strategic voters will vote under that method! Obviously, it
makes no sense to the A voters to reverse their C>B preference
since that would eli
igher level) in a group of three is so small
that in the next higher level the number of small party supporters is
probably lower than at this level.)
Juho
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line with these thoughts, but not today. (Just to show that rankings
and clones may also live happily together :-).)
Juho
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input.
Juho
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lest for the pair A1,A2.
Yes, this is one possible definition (that can be used to formulate
the clone criterion).
Juho
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ing for. Both probability based and "deterministic"
methods are needed.
Juho
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Election-
cording to some criterion) is more
accurate.
Juho
Yours, Jobst
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On May 9, 2008, at 13:39 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Juho,
you wrote:
(Roughly the question is if one wants to
give Stalin and other unwanted fellows a small probability to become
elected or a zero probability.)
I don't think this is the point. To the contrary, bringing up such
exa
On May 9, 2008, at 20:27 , Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Juho,
you wrote:
Yes, but as I see it the reasons are different. In a typical non-
deterministic method like random ballot I think it is the intention
to give all candidates with some support also some probability of
becoming elected.
Not
r. If IRV will face
these problems (and people will recognize them as problems instead of
just as "some interesting randomness in the competition") then
further transition to Condorcet is an option.
In USA it would make most sense to join forces and promote transitio
nt and disengagement), and this may mean different
things in different environments, and there may be many alternative
working ways to achieve this.
Juho
___
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lection methods/systems typically
provide regional proportional automatically (e.g. in the form of
single seat districts and forcing all voters to vote at their home
region, without asking about the opinion of the voter).
Juho
__
idates that have
strong local support and that together cover most part of the opinion
space.
Juho
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fortunately way too common in many election method
related discussions.
---
, and it encourages positive
issue-oriented campaigns instead of mudslinging opponent-attacking
campaigns.
Probably better than plurality here but not as good argument against
other methods.
Again, Juho swallows the
st need
to work all the time to keep the system sound and well working. It's
a living process.
Juho
___
All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and eas
group although the candidates are different at different districts.
It is thus possible to implement both regional and political
proportionality at the same time. And that is possible even if the
voters (of small parties/groupings) would be "forced" to vote
candidates of their own d
On May 19, 2008, at 1:46 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho > Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2008 10:31 PM
Single-seat districts (the usual ones) provide very tight regional
representation / proportionality.
True, if you are prepared to accept that you have "regional
representation"
when
candidates. And it
is reasonably fair towards minorities.
(There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up
oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.)
Juho
___
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c"
method.
Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can
become DP beyond the secret ballot level.
What property makes Asset Voting be better here? (DP and many methods
may have problems when votes become public, but why does Ass
izens can be uniquely identified with good enough
probability (in unclear cases the previous ten elected citizens may
interpret the intended meaning of the vote) there may be no need for
a formal nomination process.
This method is q
the tricks of the new systems. For this reason it is good
to keep one's eyes open and monitor the behaviour of the system
continuously, and not become complacent and see the current rules as
"our perfect system". Better to have an attitude of "continuous
improvem
On May 27, 2008, at 1:29 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote:
On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple.
Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago.
I didn't include Asset Voti
nking hated enemies at
the end.
Random ballot based methods were addressed to offer solutions to
(what I thought to be) the requirements of Mr Gohlke. From this
perspective random ballots can be used to open up the possibility to
elect also some regular citizens in addition to (or instead of) th
On May 28, 2008, at 1:24 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 27 May 2008 19:33:29 +0300 Juho wrote:
On May 27, 2008, at 18:52 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
> In summary, yes, that is what the rules could look like. I'm very
> flexible to what kind of set of rules each user would adopt.
The r
h) to eliminate candidates that they like least.
If one follows this idea, then the 33 B supporters of this example do
form a big enough group to have the right to eliminate A (that they
all consider to be the worst candidate).
Juho
On May 28, 2008, at 0:19 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jobst,
pose ... and
that should be the absolute limit of their interaction with our
elected representatives.
I think Montesquieu's separation of powers was a good idea and he
could have continued to propose also separation of political decision
making from money and other potentially bi
t a firm proposal for an electoral method. If it
is, please let me know and I'll post it again so we can work on
providing a rationale for each of its elements.
Yes, it was a list of possible options rather than a complete proposal.
Juho
__
od will obviously create strong
"local representation".
Juho
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e methods and opinions may be too wide to get
any good grip of the topic.)
Juho
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