Juho Laatu wrote:
A = 1000
B = 200
max_support = 100
C = 50
approval = 30
D = 1
min_support = 0
E = 0
F = -100
max_preference_strength = 10
Approval interpretation is A=B=CD=E=F.
Range interpretation is A=B=100, C=50, D=1, E=F=0.
Rankings interpretation is ABCDEF.
Rankings interpretation with
--- On Wed, 28/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
A = 1000
B = 200
max_support = 100
C = 50
approval = 30
D = 1
min_support = 0
E = 0
F = -100
max_preference_strength = 10
Approval interpretation is A=B=CD=E=F.
Range
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, January 26, 2009 12:29 AM
What I mean is that decision making
is such a natural part of everyday
life that people are very used to
that. Often they even enjoy making
decisions (e.g. when
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Juho Laatu
juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Another approach to offering more
flexibility (maybe not needed) and
more strategy options (maybe not
wanted) is to allow the voter to
fill the pairwise
Yes, cyclic votes are not very rational
nor required. Also some preference
strengths may be illogical (e.g. when
opinion AC is weaker than either of
AB and BC).
In competitive elections weak opinions
may often not be needed in general.
Juho
--- On Tue, 27/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
I had written:
I do not even think about putting all the
remaining options into any
order of preference, much less attempt it.
Juho Laatu Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2009 7:24 PM
Same with me. It is however probably not
a big problem for you to pick some other
product if your favourite
On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Another approach to offering more
flexibility (maybe not needed) and
more strategy options (maybe not
wanted) is to allow the voter to
fill the pairwise matrix entries
in whatever way. This means that
also cycles can
Jonathan Lundell Sent: Monday, January 26, 2009 12:02 AM
I'm not making a particularly important point here, only that if a
voter can pick a favorite (as required for plurality), then a voter
can build an ordered list.
I know it is straying from single-office single-winner elections in
OK. Then the model is one where the
voters may have various opinions on
various matters but that doesn't
necessarily mean that they would
have a complete ordering of the
candidates.
I can imagine that I could have e.g.
cyclic opinions on food when there
are three alternatives and three
properties
Juho Laatu wrote:
OK. Then the model is one where the
voters may have various opinions on
various matters but that doesn't
necessarily mean that they would
have a complete ordering of the
candidates.
I can imagine that I could have e.g.
cyclic opinions on food when there
are three alternatives
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
If we regard the preference order as list of contingent choices (this
view has come up in
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
How can any such coercion be compatible with participation in a democracy? It
is
On Jan 25, 2009, at 3:50 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
Jonathan Lundell Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 10:21 PM
If we regard the preference order as list of contingent choices (this
view has come up in IRV discussions), then the ability to vote in a
plurality election implies the ability to
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
... if a voter can pick a favorite (as required for plurality),
then a voter can build an ordered list.
Only if abstention is an option beginning at any iteration. In other
words, the voter has to have the option of saying, I will stay home
rather than vote for any
On Jan 25, 2009, at 4:18 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
... if a voter can pick a favorite (as required for plurality),
then a voter can build an ordered list.
Only if abstention is an option beginning at any iteration. In other
words, the voter has to have the option of
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
If we regard the
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What I mean is that it may quite OK
to assume that people are able to
find some preference order when
voting. And therefore we can force
them to do so.
How can
At 09:51 AM 1/23/2009, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
I did not mean to say the voter has no opinion. He may well hold the
opinion that, say, A is much better than B in some respect, and B is
much better than A in another respect, so that neither is A
preferable to B nor B to A nor are they equivalent
OK. I interpret this to mean that sincerity
referred to the sincere opinion that might
not even exist. And that this makes it a
difficult term to define (for all methods).
Or maybe it in this case would be just a
difficult term to use (not necessarily to
define).
For a voter that doesn't have a
--- On Fri, 16/1/09, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
To determine how I should vote, is that quite complicated
or does it depend on what I think how others will vote?
Or is my optimal way of voting both sufficiently easy to
determine from my preferences and independent of the other
--- On Fri, 9/1/09, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
The whole concept of strategic voting is flawed when
applied to Range. Voters place vote strength where they
think it will do the most good -- if they think.
Words where they think it will do the most
good sound like
At 06:50 PM 12/14/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Plurality voters have to be strategic all of the time because
Plurality is a bad voting method.
Well, isn't it totally strange that such a bad voting method is so
widely used? Isn't that just a tad suspicious? Are people really that
At 01:38 PM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Ballots do not ask for the voter's sincere opinion. They ask voters
to make a choice or choices.
I think that is incorrect. Ranked methods ask for the sincere opinion of
the voter, and that opinion can be well
At 06:04 PM 12/6/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
The problem here, Juho, is that sincere opinion
is not the basis for voting,..
What is the alternative basis?
The basis is choice. I can drop a marble in this bucket, or that
bucket. Maybe I can drop a marble in each one I choose of many
buckets.
At 01:38 PM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Ballots do not ask for the voter's sincere opinion. They ask voters
to make a choice or choices.
I think that is incorrect. Ranked methods ask for the sincere opinion of
the voter, and that opinion can be well
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One approach to sincerity is to compare
voter
behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval
if the
request is to mark all candidates that one
approves then
placing the cutoff between two main candidates is
At 12:35 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
Approval is a special case since the votes are so
simple that it is hard to tell when one votes in
line with one's sincere opinion and when not.
Rational Approval votes are never out of line with one's sincere
opinion. In Approval, equal ranking, when
At 12:34 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
request is to mark all candidates that one approves then
placing the cutoff
At 06:25 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is
used by some methods to denote the candidates above are those I can
accept; those below, I really don't like. At least that's what I
understand, though some methods may
At 12:31 PM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Are there any other ways of defining a sincere and non-strategic
ratings ballot? Direct external reference of the sort I'd pay
amount Z to have X elected fails because of income differences and
the nonlinearity of money. Definitions based on
At 01:32 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Good point; you're quite right. My claim might be right in the context
of zero polling knowledge, but not otherwise.
Which is all the worse for Approval.
I responded to Mr. Bouricius. His example was misleading, in fact,
because the illogical
At 04:47 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Dec 2, 2008, at 1:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes. Preference can be determined, generally, rather easily, by one
of two methods. The first method is pairwise comparison. With a
series of pairwise comparisons, we can construct a rank
-Original Message- From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 07:19 PM 12/1/2008, Paul Kislanko wrote:
PS. This is what I don't like about approval. In my generalized
voter-friendly ballot, Approval requires me to vote A=B=C=D... when I
really
like A a lot better than the others. But that method
Paul Kislanko wrote:
I agree with almost all of what Jonathan says except that as a voter (and
that's my main perspective) I _CAN_ see a need for equal rankings in a
method that requests my ordinal list of alternatives.
AB=C=D=...VW=...X=Y=Z
fairly precisely expresses what I was thinking when
On Dec 2, 2008, at 3:25 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Paul Kislanko wrote:
I agree with almost all of what Jonathan says except that as a
voter (and
that's my main perspective) I _CAN_ see a need for equal rankings
in a
method that requests my ordinal list of alternatives.
Jonathan Lundell wrote regarding Approval voting strategy:
It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for candidate X, I
should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X.
I note that Jonathan said the voter should, rather than would, which
is an important distinction...
That
On Dec 2, 2008, at 10:11 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote regarding Approval voting strategy:
It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for
candidate X, I
should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X.
I note that Jonathan said the voter should, rather
At 08:03 AM 11/26/2008, Michael Poole wrote:
(I may not have separated this out correctly, attribution may be
incorrect. Paragraphing and quotations were largely lost, somewhere
in email formatting.)
Jonathan Lundell writes:
Sincere is a term of art in this context, not a
value
At 12:40 PM 11/26/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I want to add to this by saying that if Approval is about approval,
well, then discussions about frontrunner plus strategies won't
capture the intent or point of the method. If the statement for
Approval voting is vote for those you like,
At 04:50 PM 11/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
I think it depends on the society and its rules (and the method and
election in question) if insincere voting is considered to be
wrong or not. In many cases the society will benefit if insincere
voting is generally not accepted. (Strategic voting can
At 02:47 PM 11/27/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For ordinal systems, it's pretty easy to consider what a honest
ballot would be, assuming a transitive individual preference. If A
is better than B, A should be higher ranked than B. It's not so
obvious for cardinal systems. What do the
On Dec 2, 2008, at 1:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes. Preference can be determined, generally, rather easily, by one
of two methods. The first method is pairwise comparison. With a
series of pairwise comparisons, we can construct a rank order.
Usually. It's possible, because
At 03:34 AM 12/1/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Range and Approval might not be insincere (if we accept your
definition), but they still require voters to use strategy - that
is, to keep the votes of others in mind when they're voting. In
Approval in particular, this is very important
At 06:30 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't really see a need for equal-ranking in a single-winner
election. As a voter, I'm answering the question if you were
dictator, of this set of candidates, who would you choose?. I don't
really need the option of naming two candidates to the
On Dec 2, 2008, at 5:55 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:30 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't really see a need for equal-ranking in a single-winner
election. As a voter, I'm answering the question if you were
dictator, of this set of candidates, who would you choose?. I don't
At 07:19 PM 12/1/2008, Paul Kislanko wrote:
PS. This is what I don't like about approval. In my generalized
voter-friendly ballot, Approval requires me to vote A=B=C=D... when I really
like A a lot better than the others. But that method doesn't have any way
for me (the voter) to tell it that I
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
request is to mark all candidates that one approves then
placing the cutoff between two main candidates is often
--- On Tue, 2/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think it depends on the society and its rules (and
the method and election in question) if insincere voting is
considered to be wrong or not. In many cases the
society will benefit if insincere voting is generally not
On Nov 27, 2008, at 11:47 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
It's a reason that (in)sincere isn't very good terminology for
everyday use; likewise manipulation. They're fine terms when well-
defined and used in the context of social choice theory, but they
carry a
At 01:46 AM 11/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
In the EM discussions people seem to assume
that at least one should put the cutoff between
some leading candidates. People seldom talk
about marking those candidates that one approves
(I have seen this approach however in some
mechanically generated
At 01:52 AM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 8:45 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
What Approval sincerely represents from a voter is a
*decision* as to where to place an Approval cutoff.
But is it
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
It's a reason that (in)sincere isn't very good terminology for
everyday use; likewise manipulation. They're fine terms when
well-defined and used in the context of social choice theory, but they
carry a lot of baggage. A voter is, in my view, completely justified in
Jonathan Lundell writes:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 8:45 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
What Approval sincerely represents from a voter is a
*decision* as to where to place an Approval cutoff.
But is it not true that what
It seems that voting method Approval has cut its
ties to English term approval (at least at the EM
list).
In ranking based methods EM people seem to assume
that voters have some easy to identify transitive
order of the candidates in their mind (=sincere
opinion).
I find it revealing that there
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
context.
I think it would be better not to
- Yes, I agree with most of this
- Voters should be made aware of the different approaches so that they can use
the intended one (or the one that suits them better)
- Computerized methods could add something (e.g. more sincere input data,
possibility of loops in the strategy changes) to the
On Nov 26, 2008, at 1:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
Yes, one could use also some more neutral terms than
(in)sincere and manipulation (or falsify).
Terms like personal opinion based or personal
utility based would be quite neutral (but longer).
If one wants to replace also strategic one could
try something like optimized or tactically best.
(I'm
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
It is also far from obvious to me that Approval
uniquely
requires a strategic decision.
In the EM discussions people seem to assume
that at least one should put the cutoff between
some leading candidates.
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 3:25 AM
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu
And now that rarity from me, an original post
Approval Voting is a special case of Range, with
rating values restricted to 0 and 1. When Brams
proposed Approval, it was as a method free of
vulnerability to tactical or strategic
voting, i.e., voting with reversed preference in
order to
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
And now that rarity from me, an original post
Approval Voting is a special case of Range, with rating values
restricted to 0 and 1. When Brams proposed Approval, it was as a
method free of vulnerability to tactical or strategic voting,
i.e., voting with
At 02:58 PM 11/25/2008, Michael Poole wrote:
Your definition is wrong. A strategic vote is one that is not
representative of the voter's honest views or ideal outcome. When
using strictly ranked systems (where no ties are allowed), the only
possible form of insincerity is order reversal. When
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
One approach to sincerity is to compare voter behaviour to
the requested behaviour. In Approval if the request is to
mark all candidates that one approves then placing the
cutoff between two main candidates is
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