Dear Mike!
You insist that it doesn't matter what prefer means and simultaneously define
this:
> Definition of sincere voting:
>
> A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a preference, or fail to
> vote every preference that the balloting system in use would have allowed
> him/her to
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
> This from Warren Smith (Tue.Oct.4):
>
>> Robla failed to mention that range voting *does* obey a weakened form of
>> the majority-winner criterion (call it "WMW"). Specifically:
>>"If a strict majority of the voters regard X as their unique
>> favorite, then
>> the
Dear Kevin!
You wrote:
> SFC talks about situations with a *sincere* CW.
I thought the example you gave was the sincere preferences. If not, what
were the sincere preferences in that example and which was the sincere
CW in that example?
> Unfortunately, I don't believe SFC is worded as "the maj
Dear Mike!
You wrote:
> FBC. That's the important one for public political elections. But SFC
> would be good too, and also the other majority defensive strategy
> criteria--GSFC, WDSC, & SDSC.
I'm not a particular expert in these criteria. Forest is discussing FBC
and DMC in detail in some of hi
Dear folks!
Here's some remarkable observations from today's elections for German
parliament.
- Both major factions (Social Democrats SPD vs. Christian Democrats CDU
+ Christian Socialists CSU) have lost many votes compared to the 2002
elections and are now, according to the last prognoses, very
Dear Andrew and Stephane!
Andrew wrote:
> Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
> following election with 100 voters:
>
> 23 A>B>C
> 25 A>C>B
> 3 B>A>C
> 26 B>C>A
> 3 C>A>B
> 20 C>B>A
>
> Therefore we have A preferred to B 51-49, A preferred to C 51-49, a
Dear Kevin!
Does the CDTT have any other significance than the connection with Minimal
Defense? In other words, what would you think of a method satisfying minimal
defense but not CDTT?
Yours, Jobst
Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> schrieb am 13.09.05 06:31:34:
>
> Rob,
>
> --- Rob Lanphie
Dear Adam!
> That is one possibility, but another is that the A>>B>C voters are simply
> unwilling to cast a "dishonest" vote. They have a clear favorite, and a
> "lesser of two evils", and they want to cast a vote that reflects precisely
> that set of preferences.
Right. They must decide w
Dear Adam!
In both your examples,
> 9% C>>B>A
> 15% C>>A>B
> 25% C>A>>B
> 12% B>C>>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 17% A>B>>C
> 10% A>>B>C
and
> 5% C>>B>A
> 5% C>>A>B
> 39% C>A>>B
> 12% B>C>>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 25% A>B>>C
> 2% A>>B>C
in which the C-voters insincerely buried the sincere Condorcet Wi
Dear Adam!
You wrote:
> imagine many of the CBA voters have strategically upranked A (with some of
> them approving A as well) in order to create a cycle. Here is the "concrete
> example":
>
> 10% C>>B>A (the "honest" ones)
> 23% C>>A>B
> 18% C>A>>B
> 12% B>C>>A
> 12% B>>A>C
> 17% A>B
Kevin,
> Yes. He means that if you do not approve B, the strength of the B>C win will
> be inadequate to prevent C from winning.
...
> Because in the scenario, A can't win. So you are trying to reverse or weaken
> the A>B pairwise win in order to move the win from C to B.
...
> If you don't place B
Dear Adam!
You wrote:
> Say your sincere ranking was A>B>cutoff>C. Furthermore,
> assume that your approval of B is important to maintaining the strength
> of the B>C defeat.
What do you mean by this? That when you don't approve of B, C will win?
> If it was necessary to reduce the strength of
Dear Rob!
>From the following natural example, it seems to me DMC and wv are more
truncation resistant than margins:
Sincere:
46 A>C>>B
05 C
49 B>C>>A
C is Condorcet Winner.
Truncation:
46 A>C>>B
05 C
49 B
C still wins in DMC and wv, but B wins in margins.
Furthermore, also Smith//A
Warren. It's enough now. Stop insulting me immediately.
Warren Smith wrote:
>>>--aha. So by "median candidate" you do not mean what I thought you meant
>>
>>(namely, in an N-canddt election, the top-quality floor(N/2) are above median)
>>but rather median in the prior distribution of probabilitie
Dear Abd ulRahman!
You wrote:
> I'll disagree that "only randomized methods can do so," since there are
> other alternatives that are neither deterministic or randomized,
> beginning with the simple one of holding some kind of runoff.
Assume there is no sincere CW. Then each candidate is defeated
Dear Warren!
You wrote:
> Re your "Weinstein" idea that you would vote for candidates above the median
> with
> approval voting, since you do not believe in utility, I ask you to consider
> A. Josef Stalin
> B. Adolf Hitler
> C. Genghis Khan
> D. Jacques Chirac
> where (say) A Re your
Dear Ken!
You wrote:
> But why should approval be included on the ballot in the first place?
> Doesn't it just create another opportunity for strategy? What's the
> gain? (Other than paving the way for DMC)
The gain is that voters can thus express which there most important preferences
are.
Hello Warren again.
You wrote:
> **First, I hear Jobst Heitzig himself (DMC's inventor)
Sorry for the misunderstanding. I understand my support of DMC led you to think
I discovered that method, but that's not at all true.
To my knowledge Forest, Russ and Ted had the largest
Dear Warren!
> cloneproof[strat2-revote]
>
> A voting method hereby is "cloneproof[strat2-revote]" if W'=W when:
> 1. We hold an election with strategic voters, electing winner W.
> 2. we add clones (perhaps multiple clones) of some subset of the candidates.
> 3. The voters re-vote in the new el
Hi again, Warren.
You wrote:
> Incidentlally, since you claim because you cannot explain the precise meaning
> of a range vote
> of 64 versus 65, therefore range voting is somehow horribel and
> inexplicable...
> and you like DMC... I ask "explain to me the precise meaning of
> `I approve of Bu
Dear Warren!
You wrote:
> In particular, since this thread came from a discussion of the DMC
> condorcet-approval hybrid
> voting method, I point out that I do not believe DMC is
> cloneproof[strat2-revote] either!
What, exactly, is the definition of cloneproof[strat2-revote]?
> --They und
Warren,
you wrote:
>
> I regard A=B as a declaration of knowledge on the part of the voter.
> he is saying "I understand A and B and I think they have the same utility."
>
> I regard A?B as a declaration of ignorance from the voter. he is saying
> "I do not know whether A>B or B>A, I really am
Hello Warren again.
You wrote:
> >Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
> candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
> new election because of lack of approved candidates. (I certainly don't
> agree to that.)
>
> --yes I do. The job of
Dear Dave!
You wrote:
> > Absolutely! I have often argued here that preferences are not linear and
> > that we should allow voters to express undecidedness when one of their
> > criteria says A>B and the other says B>A, instead of forcing them to
> > either vote A=B or weigh their criteria in thi
Dear Warren!
You wrote:
> but in range's case it is particularly self-evident.
Right, I could have seen that myself, sorry.
> --Also, now that I understand DMC has two kinds of monotonicity property, I
> must report my admiration.
Why? Many Approval/Condorcet-hybrids are monotonic in both
Dear Warren!
> voters A points B points
> 60 6040
> 400 100
>
> then B wins although she is obviously defeated by A, the obvious 2nd
> place winner.
>
> ---I'm sorry but YOU are wrong here. Your precise wording was
> "always defeats the candidate which wo
Dear Kevin!
You wrote, answering Warren:
>>here is another: consider the horrible "DH3 pathology" described at
>>http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html
>>
>>which afflicts Borda and many Condorcet methods... does it also afflict
>>DMC? Again answering this requires some understanding of voti
Hello Warren, again.
You wrote:
> --well, I really dislike that gimmick. It seems to me not to solve anything.
Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
new election because of lack of approved can
Dear Warren!
You wrote:
>>1. Allows to distinguish important from minor preferences.
> --range does too, only better.
OK.
>>2. Immunity from second place complaints. Unlike in MinMax and
>>Beatpath, the DMC winner always defeats the candidate which would win
>> if the winner were not present.
Dear Warren!
You wrote on approval cutoffs:
> This extra info may have nothing to do with how satisfied the voter
> is with any candidate.
Just as an expressed preference X>Y may have nothing to do with which of
X and Y is preferred by the voter. Of course that is so since voters are
free to vote
ir in the list.
All three methods give the same winner (except in the very rare case of
ties for which we must yet agree on some tie-breaking technique).
There is also an Elektowiki page on DMC.
Jobst
Anthony Duff wrote:
> It is a pity that you didn't say what DMC is.
>
>
>
Sorry for the typo: I wrote
> This will make it easier for voters to give full rankings instead of
> ballot-voting.
but meant bullet-voting of course...
_
Mit der Gruppen-SMS von WEB.DE FreeMail können Sie eine SMS an alle
15 reasons to support DMC
1. Allows to distinguish important from minor preferences.
Unlike rankings-only methods like Beatpath or MinMax, DMC allows voters to give
a full ranking and still make clear where their most important preferences are
by specifying
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> Let x, y, and z be positive integers such that x+y+z=N, and max(x,y,z) where N is the number of some large population of voters, and the ordinal
> preferences are divided into three factions: x: A>B>C y: B>C>A z: C>A>B
> Further assume that the cardinal ratings
Hi again.
Back to the question of when we can assume convergence in case of
repeated approval polls, I found out the following:
Let me first recall that when voters use 0-info strategy (to maximize
expected utility) or Weinstein's strategy (to maximize median utility)
and adjust their priors by m
Dear James and Paul,
James:
>>2. Does the Condorcet criterion plus the independence of
>>clones criterion imply the Smith criterion?
Paul:
> 2.) Does the Smith criterion imply the Condorcet and independence of clones
> criteria?
Neither is true:
Rule a: Picks the Condorcet Winner if it exists,
Hello,
some days ago I wrote:
> A point which troubles me is this: The justification of placing the
> approval cutoff at the expected or median utility according to the
> current priors is based upon the two assumptions that (1) given a top
> tie between two candidates, the events "x is among the
Dear Forest,
I'm not sure what you mean by the red marble thing or how it clarifies
the meaning of the priors in zero-info strategy.
Over the weekend, I did some calculations with different probabilistic
models whose sometimes confusing results I will post in a few hours...
Yours, Jobst
Simmon
Dear Forest,
you wrote:
> Here's a two line description of the simplest method that Jobst's proof
> applies to:
> 1. Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs.
> 2. In each round (and on each ballot) the approval cutoff is adjusted by
> moving it next to
> (without moving past) the approval wi
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> At each successive stage we would base the new lottery calculation on a
> weighted average of all the old cutoffs. In other words, the cutoff on
> each ballot is adjusted slightly towards the most recent lottery
> expected value before calculating the new lottery probabi
A small addition: Also approval strategy "A" can be thought of as an
adjustment of 0-info priors: If w(t) and w2(t) are the winner and
2nd place candidate of the poll at time t, strategy "A" is equivalent
to using 0-info strategy with the adjusted priors
p(x,i,t+1) = (1-epsilon-epsilon^2)
Dear folks!
Forest's suggestion to perform an approval poll and use it to determine
a default lottery for use in the actual election made me think about
what happens in approval polls in the first place, especially when there
are repeated polls.
In the following thoughts, I assume that (i) there
Dear Ralph!
DFC means "Democratic Fair Choice (in contrast to DMC, meaning
"Definitive Majority Choice").
Shortest accurate definition of DFC: Strike out all candidates which are
defeated by a more-approved candidate, then apply Random Ballot to the rest.
(This rest is what Forest called the set
Dear Forest!
My suggestion is to use the small group version of DFC (raise hands for
approval, let a random person (or the chair) propose a candidate,
validate by raising hands that the proposed candidate is not beaten by
any more approved. If so, let a different candidate be proposed until
one is
Can anybody cite a study showing cycles would be rare in "real"
elections with many candidates and truely ranked ballots (not 90% bullet
votes because of lazy voters)? This claim comes up again and again and
it seems to me that there is no evidence for this. At least my
simulations showed that when
Dear folks!
Some time ago I reported here upon the "Condorcet Lottery", a method
which determines the winner by drawing from a special probability
distribution (=lottery) among a special subset of the candidates (the
so-called Bipartisan set). The special property of that method was that
for every
Dear Forest,
you wrote:
> Suppose that ratings are between zero and 100.
>
> On each ballot normalize these ratings by shifting to the left by its
> mean rating and then dividing by the root mean square of those
> ratings.
>
> This ballot contributes its normalized ratings to the respective
> cand
Dear folks!
Although I don't believe that all voters are utility maximizers, I still
think that voters who *are* utility maximizers should be encouraged by
the election method to vote sincerely. Hence I started studying the
following minimal criterion:
Def. 0-INFO MEAN CONSISTENCY (0IMC).
Under
Dear Clark!
>>May I remind you that this is neither a list for discussing politics nor
>>for comments about persons may they be members of the list or
>>ex-presidents. To me, it becomes more and more difficult to find
>>valuable contributions to the study and understanding of election
>>methods he
May I remind you that this is neither a list for discussing politics nor
for comments about persons may they be members of the list or
ex-presidents. To me, it becomes more and more difficult to find
valuable contributions to the study and understanding of election
methods here these months.
Russ
Dear Mike!
Thank you for taking the time to have a look at the questionaire and
for your comments.
You wrote:
> It asked if a method should force people to vote honestly. I answered
> "--" because the freedom to vote honestly is important, rather than
> being forced to.
I did not meant "force" w
Dear Folks!
Abd ulRahman has suggested recently to put up a wiki in which we
could try to reach consensus about elementary aspects of voting
systems.
I consider this a nice idea and have as a first step started a wiki
page on which we could collect essential questions about what
single-winner ele
Dear Russ!
You wrote:
> You make an excellent point. Rather than defending Approval, Approval
> advocates should go on the offensive and let the opponents explain why
> the voter *shouldn't* be allowed to approve more than one candidate.
>
> Having said that, let me play devil's advocate and give
Dear Abd ulRahman!
you wrote:
> I can see only one argument for the practice of discarding
> multiply-marked ballots, and it is singularly weak. A corrupt election
> worker could weaken votes by adding extra marks. But this is truly weak
> because in the event that this occurred, it would be close
Hello folks!
I have thought some time about how to visualize voting situations
graphically and came about the following model:
Candidates and voters are represented by points in some metric
space, preferences are according to distance, and a candidate is
approved iff s/he is at most 1 unit apart.
Welcome to the list, Ken!
You wrote:
> the fundamental problem with
> plain Condorcet is that it doesn't directly take into consideration which
> position candidates are ranked in.
Well, I would rather say that this is the main *advantage* of methods
which consider pairwise preferences and/or ap
Candidates and final score:
a 230 greece
b 192 malta
c 158 romania
d 154 israel
e 153 latvia
f 148 moldova
g 137 serbia & montenegro
h 128 switzerland
k 125 norway
l 125 denmark
m 115 croat
Hi folks!
Here's some fun example showing that, even with a 2-dimensional model
and only 4 candidates, classical voting methods can give completely
different winners and orders...
In the example, 100 voters from all over the globe elect the earth's
capital from the following candidates (which bui
Dear Abd ulRahman!
Welcome to the list from me, too.
What do you think about the following story (leading to a group decision
method somewhat similar to DMC):
Consider a group of people having to decide for one out of a number of
options.
At first, they may think that deciding by a "simple vo
Eric Gorr wrote:
> I would recommend doing what I have done and just simply deleting
> everything they choose to post.
This is what I do, too.
> Personally, I am simply not interested in spending time finding the many
> worthwhile comments through the garbage.
I agree completely.
Jobst
El
Dear Kevin!
You wrote:
> Can ATLO make it so that given the following sincere preferences, the
> B>C faction has no incentive to bullet vote?
>
> 49 A
> 24 B>C
> 27 C>B
>
> Under WV, the B>C voters can get B elected if they vote only for B, whereas
> they give the election to C if they give C a
Dear Forest!
I like your idea very much!
And I think we should also try to more often consider statistical
methods to *analyse* election methods, for example to assess their
anti-strategic properties or to define some kind of "robustness"
measures for methods.
Yours, Jobst
PS: My DFC-WAP-site i
Dear Juho and Kevin!
Juho answered to Kevin:
>> Is the "ability to defend against changing candidate X to some other
>> candidate Y" really a consideration in a strategy-free setting?
>
>
> Good question. I was afraid you would ask this :-). But yes, I think
> using this kind of arguments is ok
Dear James!
You wrote:
> I agree with those who consider "approval" (score of 1 or 0) to be a
> kind
> of cardinal information.
That's a strange understanding of "cardinality", don't you agree? There
is nothing to be counted in a yes-no-question. It's only the question
whether I find that
Dear Kevin!
You replied to Russ:
> I would also like to hear again the benefit *inherent* to combining ordinal
> and cardinal information. It seems to me that you, Jobst, and James all have
> different purposes in doing this.
I have to correct you: I don't think at all that we should base a meth
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> I suggest picking the winning alternative by random ballot from BP,
> rather than from P when there is serious potential for something like
> the
>
> 49 C
> 24 B (sincere B>A)
> 27 A>B
>
> scenario.
I guess you assume that all ranked candidates are approved, righ
Dear Folks!
The following comment of Juho's made me think about the concepts of
"best canidate" and "Social Ordering" again.
Juho Laatu wrote:
> If the "god" that elects the best winner would be one
> individual, then we could expect him to give a linear order to the
> candidates. And in this cas
Some correction.
I wrote:
> In the sincere situation
> x A>>D>B>C
> y B>>D>C>A
> z C>>D>A>B
> the winner should be one of A,B,C, with probability x/n, y/n, z/n,
> respectively, since D is not approved by anyone.
>
> DFC (Democratic Fair Choice) gives this result!
The last is wrong, of course.
Dear Curt!
You wrote:
> 1) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the
> Schwartz set to be the proper winner?
> 2) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the
> Smith set to be the proper winner?
Yes, definitely: When x,y,z>D>B>C
y B>>D>C>A
z C>>D>A>B
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
> your Approval Margins method:
>
> 1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at
> the top of the list.
>
> 2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairw
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> Chris & Jobst: Please take careful note -- the DMC defeat strength
> assertion has not been proved rigorously, to my knowledge! It is
> worth a very careful look before basing any other assumptions on it.
The following proves that the only immune candidate is the least
app
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
> Jobst,
> You and Marcus are (often) very quick responders!
> Unfortunately "Democratic Fair Choice" incorporates
> more than one feature to which I'm allergic.
Sorry to hear of your allergies...
> I am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
> the result of the e
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
> I like this table.
Thanks.
> Doesn't AM look like the most "natural" and "balanced"?
Yes, but that's only an aesthetical judgement...
> I was wondering if it is possible in AM for a
> candidate who is both the sincere CW and sincere AW to
> successfully Buried, and I'
Dear Folks!
Under the working title "Democratic Fair Choice", I described on our
Wiki a detailed voting procedure composed from ideas by Forest (most)
and me (some):
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Imagine_Democratic_Fair_Choice
I tried to make it more interesting by writing it as a fictitious
tel
Dear Folks!
Let me summarize before giving a new argument in favor of the median:
After Mike brought up the term "social utility" and seemed to identify
it with "sum of individual utilities", I wrote:
> The median is a simpler, more accurate, and more robust measure
> of social utility than th
Dear Mike!
Although I don't believe in measurable individual utilities in the first
place, here's some thoughts on the even more questionable notion of
"social utility":
In replying to Andrew, you stated a seemingly trivial truth:
> That's CR. If voters have no wish to maximize their own utility
Forest, you wrote:
> Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
> ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
> In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
> B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They have no incentive whatsoever t
Dear Chris!
First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM can be thought of as
being essentially the same method with only different definition of
defeat strength, so it seems quite natural to compare them in detail as
you started.
Recall that the DMC winner is the unique immune candidate w
Dear James!
I'm very confused about CWO. If I understand it correctly, it will not
at all help avoiding strategic voting but will rather introduce a new
and very drastic way to strategically alter the outcome! Assume there's
a cycle, like
x A>B>C
y B>C>A
z C>A>B
with x,y,z < n/2, and assume
Dear Andrew and Juho!
You seem to agree that...
> ...if votes are sincere, the best voting method would
> not be Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a
> number of points to each candidate representing the utility they
> ascribe to that candidate. The candidate with the largest t
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
>> The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
>> strategies, there is never as group strategy equilibrium unless a
>> sincere CW exists. My question here was: Is there such an equilibrium
>> with Approval Voting when only ballots with sinc
Hello Forest!
Yesterday I wondered whether under Approval Voting there
would always be some equilibrium of the following kind:
All voters specify "sincere" approvals in the sense that when they prefer X to
Y
they do not approve of Y without approving of X; and no group of voters can
improve
th
Dear James!
I tried your example with "Random Ballot from Forest's P":
> 3 candidates: Kerry, Dean, and Bush. 100 voters.
> Sincere preferences
> 19: K>D>>B
> 5: K>>D>B
> 4: K>>B>D
> 18: D>K>>B
> 5: D>>K>B
> 1: D>>B>K
> 25: B>>K>D
> 23: B>>D>K
> Kerry is a Condorcet winner.
>
>
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> First point: High Approval score indicates broad consent that the
> candidate is minimally acceptable. But it doesn't indicate highest
> preference.
Agreed.
> The main effect of Approval in DMC is to use it to discount the
> pairwise defeats of candidates with less widespr
Dear Chris and James!
James answered to Chris:
>> 46 abc
>> 44 bca (sincere is bac)
>> 05 cab
>> 05 cba
>>
>> So the obvious question I ask you is this: Why then do you
>> reccomend methods that elect B?
>
> Do I? First of all, my recommendation of winning votes methods is
> tenuous. Second,
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
> an "ideal" election
> method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
> cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each
> candidate).
I would even go so far to claim that the i
Hi Forest!
> Before I read your post I proposed a Madison Avenue style name of
> "Majority Fair Chance."
That's OK but only when we use majority-strength defeats!
> It's not very scientific.
No problem, as long as we know what it is and can justify the name.
> Perhaps, "Fair Chance Democrati
Dear Forest!
I consider your post, in which you argue in favour of using Random
Ballot among the set P of candidates which are not strongly beaten by
any other, to be perhaps the most valuable post in the last weeks!
I like that method VERY much: It is quite easily described and
motivated, does n
Dear Russ!
ARC (aka RAV) cannot elect the Approval winner when s/he beats
no other candidate since the method is Smith-consistent!
Yours, Jobst
__
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Dear Russ!
You wrote:
> I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic. Barring
> actual numerical ties, why should the selection of the winner depend in
> any way on some random event?
Well, in my opinion election methods should be democratic, and that is not
the same as "maj
Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names in
the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to study its
properties, especially its anti-strategy properties.
I agree with Russ that it is perhaps a very nice first public proposal,
es
Dear Dave!
You wrote:
> Agreed you do not need (n-1)*n/2 pairwise comparisons BUT, seems to me
> ROWS went too far:
> It will happily and efficiently return the CW if there is one.
> It does not know if there is a cycle, though the winner of the n-1
> comparisons will, at least, be a cyc
Dear Alex!
You wrote:
> Naming something after a theorist is
> fine in academic circles,
There is disagreement about this since it leads too often to the wrong
person getting the credit...
> Then somebody wrote:
>> I'm not so sure, Jan, since many Condorcet-efficient methods do not
>> require
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> Thanks to both of your responses, I have an idea now that I think will work,
> and it should have (my) desired quality of encouraging generous approval
> cutoff and ranking of candidates below the cutoff.
>
> Basically, the idea is simply Beatpath: Break each cycle at the
Hi Jan!
You wrote:
> I strongly urge everyone to get into the habit of calling Condorcet
> methods Instand Round Robin (IRR) methods. The Instant Round Robin
> name is far more descriptive than "Condorcet".
I'm not so sure, Jan, since many Condorcet-efficient methods do not
require all (n-1)*n
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> At first, I didn't understand what Frest meant by 'transitive, but I gather
> what he mans is, start a chain by adding the first candidate from the sorted
> list (Call that candidate A_i), to the new chain (call that B_j). When adding
> a new candidate, start at the winning
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> I explored TACC with some enthusiasm over the last couple of days.
It's astonishing that a method that simple could give such nice results,
isn't it? That was a fabulous idea by Forest to construct chains in
order of approval! I still want to explore his Needle method in
Dear James!
Llull designed election methods under the assumption that there is a
best candidate which only has to be found. Obviously he implicitly
assumed that the voters vote not in their personal interest but in the
general interest to find the best candidate.
As Pukelsheim writes in the text
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> Unfortunately, reverse TACC is not monotonic with respect to approval.
> If the winner moves up to the top approval slot without also becoming
> the CW, she will turn into a loser.
That's right.
You continued:
> However, the following "chain filling" method is monotoni
Dear Kevin!
you wrote:
> Suppose we're using a method that satisfies Clone-Winner:
>
> 51 A 49 B
>
> A wins. Now replace A with two clones, so
>
> 25 A1>A2 26 A2>A1 49 B
>
> A1 or A2 will win, but only assuming this is how A voters really vote
> after the cloning operation. In real life I sus
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