On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Physical time, on the contrary is most plausibly a quantum notion,
and should normally emerge (assuming comp) from the interference of
all computations + the stable first person (plural) points of view.
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?
Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that
consciousness exists only in manifested form.
That's what I would say.
I
On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem (using the Dx = xx
trick, which I promised to do in term of
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
pronouns, based on Kleene's recursion theorem
On 04 Oct 2013, at 23:30, John Mikes wrote:
Richard:
I grew into denying probability in cases where not - ALL -
circumstances are known.
I agree with this. That is why there are many other attempt to study
ignorance and beliefs (like believability theories, which is like
probability,
On 05 Oct 2013, at 03:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 2:14 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 October 2013 06:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
He comes to this because he's *defined* Knightian uncertainty as
radical unpredictability without randomness.
I don't see why it doesn't entail
On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for
In case you are intersted, here is a link to my last publication:
Article title: The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body
problem
Reference: JPBM863
Journal title: Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology
Corresponding author: Dr. Bruno Marchal
First author: Dr. Bruno Marchal
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject
You may be absolutely correct, Professor, Standish, and likely are. But you
know, what I can say in response is that the programmer just is, which, of
course, bumps, what we know of causality. Or, more, precisely, a programmer
designs a program that creates a single hubble volume, or many,
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of
logic that demands every event have a cause.
The point is that in this case the
On 04 Oct 2013, at 21:10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2013, at 17:48, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Oh that's a typo, and I have never read the Many Forking Paths.
It is a very good one, quoted by Everett, if I remember well.
I think Liz thought on Tlon Uqbar Orbid Tertius. The first novel
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 5:05 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of
logic that
On 05 Oct 2013, at 17:05, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than
Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no
law of logic that demands every event
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Personal pronouns with no referent
You never made any assertion explicit. Quote a passage of me with a
personal pronoun without referent.
The following is far far from complete, this just gives a taste of the
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
you have agreed that all bruno marchal are the original one (a case
where Leibniz identity rule fails,
If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most
certainly has NOT failed. If the original and the
On 10/5/2013 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:40:18AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 01:16, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:51:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Read AUDA, where you can find the mathematical definition for each
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the
On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:34:11AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 10:05, Russell Standish wrote:
I get that Bp is the statement that I can prove p, and that Bp p is
the statement that I know p (assuming Theatetus, of course), but in
both cases, I would say the pronoun I
Sure, but a naked CA is far more probable than a Boltzmann brain that
in turn creates such a CA, ie more numerous in the Everything. So much
more so, that the BB idea would be negligible. An BBs creating BBs
would be even more exponentially suppressed.
Cheers
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 10:41:27AM
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went
unnoticed?
Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes
may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would
have to show
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can
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