On 05 Oct 2013, at 17:05, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> the coin throw was random so you ended up in Moscow rather than Washington for no reason at all, but that's OK because there is no law of logic that demands every event have a cause.

> The point is that in this case the randomness is know to be due to the lack of precision in the data

Exactly, lack of precision in the data. In the Many Worlds interpretation, and in all the duplicating chamber thought experiments I have see on this list, probability is not a property of the thing itself but just a measure of a lack of information.

> Not something like the self-duplication.

What randomness is there in that?

The randomness is well described in the diaries of those doing the experience.

> we know in advance that each copies can only see one city,


> and not both

Yes, Bruno Marchal the Washington Man will not see Moscow, and Bruno Marchal the Moscow Man will not see Washington, and Bruno Marchal the Helsinki Man will not see Moscow or Washington; and of course Bruno Marchal will turn into things (PLURAL because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated) that see all 3 cities.

But you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one (a case where Leibniz identity rule fails, like in modal logics), so why don't you listen to him, and indeed all of him.

If in Helsinki he predicted {W & M}, the "bruno marchal" in W will see that his prediction failed, as he must admit that he is not seeing M.

If in Helsinki he predicted W, then the "bruno marchal" in M will see that the prediction failed. And, with comp, we accept that both the people in W and in M are equal in "bruno marchalness".

If in Helsinki he predicted (W or M), and that means he write "W or M" in his diary (which will be destroyed and recreated in two copies, then both "bruno marchal" will look at the diary, which assert "W v M", and both will see that indeed one disjunct have been realized, and so both prediction win.

In UDA, first and third person are entirely described in term of annihilation and reconstitution. The notion of first person plural is defined similarly in term of duplication of entire population, and this can already provide a definition of entanglement in classical computer science term (but that is premature here).

> and so the immediate result of the self-localization cannot be predicted by the guy in Helsinki.

Without using personal pronouns please tell John K Clark the precise question to ask "the guy in Helsinki" that has a indeterminate answer, and just as important please make clear exactly who Bruno Marchal is asking the question to.

The question is "what do you expect to live or feel, as a comp believer" when experiencing the step 3 protocol. More precisely, it concerns the seeing of the cities involved: do you expect W, M, both, etc.

The question is used in the traditional sense of "you", before the duplication. I just ask you the question, about what experience you can expect (as you will not die, and not feel to be in both cities at once).

The guy reason in comp, and knows already many things: that he will survive (you have agreed on that), that he will not feel the split, that he will see only city among W and M, that the experience will be smooth, etc.

He knows that from his first person perspective he will feel nothing, and find itself in one city, and that he could not have been sure about which one.

In the 2^<big n> movie experience, a simple calculus shows that "white noise" is the most reasonable answer.

> You are playing with words

Words are the only way we have to communicate and I am not playing and this is not a game. I have no doubt that if duplicating chambers were in common use in Shakespeare's day by now the English language would be very different, particularly in regard to personal pronouns; but that didn't happen so we are left with a very imperfect instrument to discuss these matters. Thus when talking philosophically about duplicating chambers personal pronouns must be used sparingly and with great care even if that results in inelegant prose.

That is why I make it clear, and give precise definition, and notably use the duplication experience to distinguish clearly the 1-I from the 3-I, and all this in a traditional third person discourse. The first person discourse being here mainly the history of the experiences described in the diaries.

I do the same later, in arithmetic, by showing that the oldest definition of knowledge, when applied in arithmetic, introduce a similar distinction between third and first person discourse.

You have usually mocked away all those precisions.

> I have no clue, and I think that nobody has any clue about what you fail to understand.

I no longer think there is anything there to understand.
> You oscillate between "not new and trivial", and "wrong",

Yes, because your statements oscillate between not new, trivial, hopelessly vague, and just wrong.

My statement does not oscillate except for pedagogical improvement.

Again, you assert depreciative facts without any quotes.

Those are grave affirmations, which can rise doubt in the mind of other people.
Please, prove your statement.
Show one oscillation that I would have done.

I said a long time ago that no philosopher in the last 200 years has said something that was clear, deep, non-obvious, and true that a scientist or mathematician hadn't said long before, and you are continuing in that grand tradition.

On the contrary, I illustrate that when we assume computationalism, then, thanks to computer science and mathematical logic, and thanks to our intuition of finiteness, we can reason mathematically in that domain, without abandoning the scientific (doubting) attitude, by making precise all our assumptions.

Are you aware that it is a thesis in computer science, and it has intersection with philosophy, theology, physics, biology, arithmetic.

You stop at step 3, which has never been problematical, as it *is* really obvious, but it changes also everything in the sense that it brought quickly a model for another rational way to conceive reality. In my mind UDA was only remind that science has NOT decided between Aristotle and Plato. AUDA is the "real stuff", even if the hard work has been done by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Visser and many others. But it leads to a transparent interpretations of all terms used.

So I recommend you to buy the book by Mendelson on Logic,


and the books by Boolos (1979, 1993) on "Bp", which contains a chapter on "Bp & p",

and then study AUDA, and then come back to UDA.
You might eventually laugh at yourself, and that's the best I wish to you.

From now on, I will answer only specific critics and precise question, and skip the rhetorical prose.



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