Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> > Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you >> > can >> > whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked >> > for >> > example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable >

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" a écrit : > > On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" a écrit : > >> > >> On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett > >> wrote: > >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> My

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" a écrit : >> >> On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett >> wrote: >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means >> >> personal

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 14:07, meekerdb wrote: >>> I can. It could include a predilection to learn this or ignore that, an >>> ability to follow logical argument or not, a tendency to whistle while >>> working,... >> >> Which I would also classify as mental contents. I did not mean to >> imply it wa

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" a écrit : > > On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> > >> > >> My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal > >> identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 13:20, meekerdb wrote: >> If I commit suicide but a duplicate survives with my memories at the >> time of suicide then I feel that I survive; this is what happens with >> destructive duplication. Another way to put it (in terminology which >> has been more commonly used on thi

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 8:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 13:13, meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a matter of fact, since that is wh

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 8:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 13:03, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: It's an illusion even in a dualist model,

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 13:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> I can't see how, logically, personal identity could be more than >> mental contents. > > > So if I cut off a few of your external limbs, take your house, your wife, > your children, and, to cap it all, your dog,

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 13:13, meekerdb wrote: > On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 13:03, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett >> wrote: >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because du

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a question as to whether we could do it with a computer o

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I can't see how, logically, personal identity could be more than mental contents. So if I cut off a few of your external limbs, take your house, your wife, your children, and, to cap it all, your dog, you would be OK with this because you still have your memories o

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is that

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a >> matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a >> question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, but >> that does not have

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett >> wrote: >> It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is that I a

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 7:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual replacement of the cells

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That is what I feel to be "pers

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual replacement of the cells in one's body. The problems arise when the

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not >> logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is >> that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That is what I feel >> to be "personal identity" at

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could be for example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is necessary (why not...) for being that par

Re: The MGA revisited

On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett > wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the abso

Re: Life in the Islamic State for women

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 LizR wrote: >> Andrew Carnegie gave away most of his money, and Bill Gates has already >> given away more money than anyone in human history, most of to the third >> world. Bill Gates has saved many orders of magnitude more people than >> Mother Teresa ever did. And Sam Walt

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word "illusion" but the underlying fact is unchanged. I

Re: For Bruce

"This makes quanta into a particular case of qualia, being somehow sharable, and making physical reality a first person plural reality" So what would happen if everyone died in some cataclysm, except for one person? Or if one person travelled through a wormhole to some distant region of space? Or

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 09:47, Bruce Kellett wrote: That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual replacement of the cells in one's body. The problems

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 10:39, meekerdb wrote: > On 4/13/2015 2:08 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal >> identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word "illusion" >> but the underlying fact is unchanged. > > > I think all

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 09:47, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou > Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body >> is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were >> created, both woul

Re: Life in the Islamic State for women

On 13 April 2015 at 15:35, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 John Mikes wrote: > > >> > I never dreamed of wealthy people giving up their wealth. Not to >> general welfare, not to any other worthy goal. >> > > Andrew Carnegie gave away most of his money, and Bill Gates has already > given

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux > wrote: 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou >: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux > wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 St

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 2:08 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux > wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou >: On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List > wrote:

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: if the resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the "original" that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same person... but that is not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word "illusion" but the underlying fact is unchanged. I think all you are saying is that you don't believe in Cartesian duality --

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were created, both would think they were me. It would, if functionalism/computationa

Re: The MGA revisited

LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett > wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is th

Re: Klara and Olimpia!

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 10:41:33AM +1200, LizR wrote: > http://www.lostateminor.com/2015/04/10/these-18th-century-dolls-may-be-the-worlds-oldest-examples-of-the-modern-computer/ > > Not sure if they're really computers in the modern sense, as claimed. Any > thoughts? > Having seen these "in the

Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought

I have been given the impression that the universe is "flat" - I assume this means in the sense of having no (or at least too small to measure) overall curvature. Hence, if there is no acceleration, whether it's open or closed is, as it were, an open question! On 14 April 2015 at 10:42, spudboy100

Re: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought

Or not powerful enough to keep the universe expanding unto dissipation? -Original Message- From: LizR To: everything-list Sent: Mon, Apr 13, 2015 6:40 pm Subject: It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought ...or maybe nonexistent, even??? http://mothe

Klara and Olimpia!

http://www.lostateminor.com/2015/04/10/these-18th-century-dolls-may-be-the-worlds-oldest-examples-of-the-modern-computer/ Not sure if they're really computers in the modern sense, as claimed. Any thoughts? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything

It's possible dark energy isn't as powerful as we thought

...or maybe nonexistent, even??? http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-universe-might-be-expanding-a-lot-slower-than-we-thought -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 14 April 2015 at 08:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a >> matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. > > No that's not what happen, you're not duplicated in everyday life. Unde MWI > maybe, under a certain view

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 10:16 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain, maybe > the whole body or the entire planet. The duplication machines assume the > body, but then this restriction is removed. > >

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 11:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : >> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stath

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Le 13 avr. 2015 23:56, "Stathis Papaioannou" a écrit : > > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis

Re: The MGA revisited

On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: > LizR wrote: > >> On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett > > wrote: >> >> LizR wrote: >> >> Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any >> given measurement? I'm not sure (fro

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou >: > >> >> >> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux > > wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Mo

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : >> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < >>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou >: > >> >> >> On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < >> everything-list@googlegroups.com >> > >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* everything-list@googlegrou

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain, maybe the whole body or the entire planet. The duplication machines assume the body, but then this restriction is removed. If no substitution level exists, then comp is false. What if

Re: Life in the Islamic State for women

Liz: "UK, or Sweden"? Not only have they the different tempers - (Italians would 'react' differently) but try to be a pauper in Britain, or Sweden yourself and 'love' the system. (English story: Girly asks - 'Mummy, why is that gentleman lying on the curb?' Mummy: ' Honey, do not get involved in af

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou : > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto: >> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Telmo Menez

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > > *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com > > [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com > ] *On > Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes > *Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM > *To:* everyt

RE: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes Sent: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kelle

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, John Clark wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Bruce Kellett > wrote: > > > I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, >> with "X is an illusion." > > > Yes, I could not agree more! If X is an illusion you've got to spell out > exactly how that

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Bruce Kellett wrote: > I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, with > "X is an illusion." Yes, I could not agree more! If X is an illusion you've got to spell out exactly how that illusion works or you're not saying anything. > > Be X conscio

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Monday, April 13, 2015, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, >>> and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and >>> duplicating machines

Re: Mathematical Self-Reproduction

I can say the same : your english is better than average. I heard a few minutes up to now. Unfortunately I have no time to hear it now. 2015-04-13 15:06 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes : > Thanks Telmo. I have looked only to the 1/3 video. >> I am shocked myself by my accent, and I have discovered that I

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, >>> and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and >>> duplicating ma

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 5:31 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > John Clark wrote: > >> On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes > te...@telmomenezes.com>> wrote: >> > >And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question >> that you dodged: Who is traveling through time in a forward

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: You cannot attack a result in science with philosophy. Of course you can. It happens all the time. True, many scientists (especially physicists) are dismissive of metaphysics. But it is usually those who are most dismissive

Re: Mathematical Self-Reproduction

> > Thanks Telmo. I have looked only to the 1/3 video. > I am shocked myself by my accent, and I have discovered that I do oral > "typos" now ... > I hate listening to my own voice recorded, I believe that's very common. I think it's easy to understand and gives you character. I have worked with m

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this, and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of personal identity.

Re: The MGA revisited

LizR wrote: On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett > wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as diffe

Re: The MGA revisited

On 13 Apr 2015, at 09:49, LizR wrote: On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum?

Re: The MGA revisited

On 13 Apr 2015, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: > wrote: If we compare this to FPI in the MW Interpretation of quantum mechanics we see that this is just a branch counting account of quantum probabilities. Now it is well-known that this fai

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 13 Apr 2015, at 08:29, Bruce Kellett wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Thanks Bruce, that was quite illuminating. I know Bruno will say that these other notions of personal identity contradict COMP - and I can see that considering the original copy as dead, and two new persons being created di

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: John Clark wrote: On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com >> wrote: > >And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question that you dodged: Who is traveling through time in a forward dir

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 13 Apr 2015, at 00:06, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Apr 12, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You have already ans unambiguously agree that the Moscow Man is the same person than the Helsinki Man, in the same sense than in step 1. As I said before the relationship is not symmetrical. Cats ar

Re: Mathematical Self-Reproduction

Hi Telmo, On 12 Apr 2015, at 17:16, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi everyone, Mysteriously, I came across the videos of a very recent talk by Bruno entitled "Mathematical Self-Reproduction". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATl86jBfwqI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76iuXcVOAuc https://www.yout

Re: The MGA revisited

On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: > LizR wrote: > >> Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given >> measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, >> so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on >> this.