Re: What day is it?

On 7 October 2015 at 07:51, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 6 Oct 2015, at

Re: What day is it?

On 7/10/2015 3:58 pm, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote: Is a particular mind a natural type? Or is it only the generic 'mind' that is a natural type? Maybe the particular mind is only a token

Re: What day is it?

On 10/6/2015 8:11 PM, smitra wrote: On 07-10-2015 02:04, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 4:35 PM, smitra wrote: On 07-10-2015 00:06, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are

Re: What day is it?

On 7/10/2015 3:58 pm, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote: They do affect you, because identical conscious states are, (by definition), indistinguishable from that point of view. So when

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 16:23 GMT+02:00 John Clark : > > On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > ​> ​ >> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a >> physical notion, > > > ​No, John Clark does not agree with that.​ > > > >> ​> ​ >>

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: ​ >> ​>> ​ >> Because John Clark can find no evidence that ​ >> computation *NOT* done in physics exists, ​and INTEL can't find any >> evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about " >> physical

Re: What day is it?

On 07-10-2015 02:04, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 4:35 PM, smitra wrote: On 07-10-2015 00:06, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the normal

Re: What day is it?

On 7/10/2015 12:38 pm, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 6:49 PM, Bruce Kellett > wrote: On 6/10/2015 9:54 am, Brent Meeker wrote: It's not clear to me who is arguing for what. Stathis may think that

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

> On 6 Oct 2015, at 8:34 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation > is not a physical notion, because he defines physical computation by a > computation done in physics. So he lost the point. Unfortunately we

Re: What day is it?

On 06 Oct 2015, at 02:04, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 5, 2015, Bruce Kellett wrote: ​> ​The type of random uniformity typified by a normal number is quite hard to achieve, ​Randomness of any sort is impossible to achieve by a deterministic algorithm,

Re: What day is it?

On 06 Oct 2015, at 13:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 6/10/2015 8:15 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2015, at 23:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/10/2015 2:49 am, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: ​ > ​ But you're assuming the copy

Re: What day is it?

> On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > >> On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Re: What day is it?

On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 6 Oct 2015, at 2:45 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/5/2015 6:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 6 Oct 2015, at 11:29 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/5/2015 5:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou

Re: What day is it?

On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding mental states m1-m2-m3 and s2 is omitted, there is nothing in m3 to

Re: What day is it?

On 04 Oct 2015, at 23:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/10/2015 2:49 am, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: ​ > ​ But you're assuming the copy is in an evironment equivalent this world. ​If the universe is infinite and not just huge

Re: What day is it?

On 06 Oct 2015, at 01:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 6/10/2015 9:54 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/5/2015 3:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: This, of course, is the heart of our disagreement. Your identity is a lot more than your thoughts and feelings because those thoughts and feelings only have

Re: What day is it?

On 10/6/2015 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It's not clear to me who is arguing for what. Stathis may think that consciousness is independent of it's physical substrate, but I don't see that he's arguing that here. He's arguing that there can be more that one instance of "the same"

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On 06 Oct 2015, at 04:29, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have​ ​ grave​ ​doubts​ ​about​ ​the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly​ ​nobody has ever seen​ ​even a hint of​ ​such a

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, > ​But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing!​ ​No proof can.​ > ​> ​ > the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by >

Re: What day is it?

On 10/6/2015 4:35 PM, smitra wrote: On 07-10-2015 00:06, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with

Re: What day is it?

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 6:49 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 6/10/2015 9:54 am, Brent Meeker wrote: > > On 10/5/2015 3:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > This, of course, is the heart of our disagreement. Your identity is a lot > more than your thoughts and feelings because

Re: What day is it?

On 04 Oct 2015, at 23:46, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/4/2015 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2015, at 02:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/2/2015 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: So much the worse for the computationalist doctrine! It becomes a matter of unverifiable faith, I think

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote: On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: When I say "physical computation" ​ and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then

Re: What day is it?

On 10/6/2015 3:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding mental states m1-m2-m3

Re: What day is it?

On 07-10-2015 00:06, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 7/10/2015 7:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/6/2015 1:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at. I meant that if the normal sequence of brain states is s1-s2-s3 with corresponding mental states m1-m2-m3 and

Re: What day is it?

On 6/10/2015 8:15 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2015, at 23:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/10/2015 2:49 am, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 3, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: ​ > ​ But you're assuming the copy is in an

Re: What day is it?

On 06 Oct 2015, at 00:54, Brent Meeker wrote: On 10/5/2015 3:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 6/10/2015 12:29 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2015 at 22:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/10/2015 7:46 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 October 2015 at

Re: What day is it?

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruce Kellett wrote: ​> ​ > If there are, by chance, other persons who happen to have, > instantaneously, the same brain configuration as you do, > ​Then they're identical to you, at least for that instant.​ ​> ​ > then there are simply two

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a > physical notion, ​No, John Clark does not agree with that.​ > ​> ​ > because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics.