goodness ensures that the relevant
program structure is preserved between state transitions and thus
maintains a stable goal system.
Cheers
--
Abram Demski
http://dragonlogic-ai.blogspot.com/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you
...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Hi Abram,
On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I know just a little about the curry-howard isomorphism... I looked
into it somewhat, because I was thinking about the possibility of
representing programs as proof methods (so that a single run of the
program would
invoked to justify the motto programs are proofs, but it doesn't
seem like it does any such thing.
--Abram
On Tue, May 19, 2009 at 11:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Abram,
On 18 May 2009, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I know just a little about the curry-howard
.
John M
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Abram,
On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:
I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
here might be interested.
http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic
this.
--Abram
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Abram,
On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:
I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
here might be interested.
http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic
not appearing so I'm manually posting
it.
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com
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You received this message because you
quantum histories realized in the multiverse?
Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a
fantastically large and growing number?
I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no.
THANKS!
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http
quantum histories realized in the multiverse?
Is the number of possible histories infinite, or merely a
fantastically large and growing number?
I don't like infinity so I'm hoping you say no.
THANKS!
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http
as a magical requirement for you, though.
--Abram
On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 8:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one
more general notion of
dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In
physics metrics play always some role somewhere though.
Bruno
Le 06-janv.-09, à 02:59, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Abram Demski wrote:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do
, right). Memory is then nothing but marks in the
brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more
complex.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem
of inconsistency driven traces. I had not considered this
before.
Yours
Hal
-Original Message-
From: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Abram Demski
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2008 12:59 AM
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re
? In other words, is the hole that
Godel pointed out flexible enough to fill in any hole eventually if we
keep adding con(x), or are there non-godelian holes?
--Abram
On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 02 Jan 2009, at 16:01, Abram Demski wrote:
Hal,
I went
Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group
/descriptions.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 26, 2008 at 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:27, Kim Jones wrote:
On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine
Bruno,
Thanks for the reference. That book sounds very interesting...
unfortunately it is also very expensive.
--Abram
On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types
...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
On 26/12/2008, at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Dec 2008, at 08:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
I agree with Gunther about the two types of machine. The broader
machine is any system that can be logically described-- a system that
is governed by rules and has
/
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything
Here is a fun article about possible worlds, for those of us who are
logically inclined.
http://consequently.org/news/2008/12/09/always_more/#more
--Abram
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address
is the
assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in
teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self-
multiplication).
(I know you are playing the role of the time person skeptic).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem
it is not the
only possible way of defining things.
--Abram
On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 12:24 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Abram Demski wrote:
Brent,
It sounds like you are saying that probability is useful because it
allows us to predict things-- we convert (past) relative
, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA
reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy,
and the definition of (relatively) normal machine.
On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived
the only concept of sticking
together I can imagine.
So anything with a topology counts as time?? That doesn't sound right.
Or are you saying it is necessary, rather then sufficient?
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 20, 2008 at 12:54 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Abram Demski wrote:
Brent
the probable paths, does this
make it more probable that I experience the more probable result? What
would that mean?)
--Abram
On Thu, Dec 18, 2008 at 7:21 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Abram Demski wrote:
[Sorry if this is a duplicate, I think that I did not send correctly
Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Abram,
I agree mostly with Brent's reply. Other precision should appear in my
explanation of the UDA to Kim, and in my answer to Ronald (Sunday).
I will just add general remarks to Brent's reply.
Le 19-déc.-08, à 00:18, Abram Demski a écrit :
[Sorry
be more or less accurate if all possible next
moments do in fact occur?
Hope that sparks some thought...
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com
2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more
detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be
opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might
not be good at all pedagogically...
I
Stathis,
Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view
is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just
asserting my intuitions nonetheless.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
2008/12/6 Abram Demski
).
Of course, as you say, you'd be in a hard spot if you were required to
deal with every various intuition that anybody had... but, for what
it's worth, that is mine.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 05-déc.-08, à 22:11, Abram Demski a écrit :
Bruno
Bruno,
Thanks, I will look up those names. If you have the time to reference
specific papers, I would be grateful.
--Abram
On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit :
Bruno,
Are you asserting this based
, 2008 at 3:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
2008/12/1 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation
needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how
could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order
Bruno,
Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning
provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If
not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). That is, if you
can show that huge amounts of set theory beyond ZFC emerge from
provability logic in
consciousness when the first correction occurred, though
that is silly upon reflection.)
How does that sound?
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 7:58 PM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
2008/12/6 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Stathis,
I think I can get around your objection by pointing out
Bruno,
Could you possibly link to the conversation with George Levy you refer
to? I did not find it looking on my own.
--Abram
On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM
PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your
(difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :)
A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point
may be halfway between pedagogical and serious...
What I am saying is that people will
mentioned SMAT, which actually sounds like the CMAT
I proposed... so I'll refer to it as SMAT from now on.
--Abram
On Tue, Dec 2, 2008 at 12:18 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 02 Dec 2008, at 01:05, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
It sounds like what you are saying in this reply
Günther,
Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent?
The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does
not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure
(or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior).
--Abram
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53
,
On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those
Bruno,
No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this
case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as
if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if
someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the
recording
Bruno,
The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and
unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's
consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution
level. You are
, 2008 at 3:12 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and
unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no
perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole
Hi Bruno,
So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
argument against materialism, correct?
It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in
*either* direction (physical reality / mathematical
Bruno,
I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last
step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so
I provide two refutations.
1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in
a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down
Bruno,
It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
definition of time...
Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal
in the
probability distribution?
--Abram Demski
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:18 AM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 02:55:08PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
Russel,
I do not see why some appropriately modified version of that theorem
couldn't be proven for other
:02, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the
definition of time...
Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it.
Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie
billboards next to the train track
whether it applies to even more general models (like
priors based on arithmetic describability or analytic describability).
--Abram
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 5:22 PM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 02:40:04PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
Russel,
Hmm, can't we
Russel,
The paper does indeed showcase one example of a universal prior that
includes non-computable universes... Theorem 4.1. So it's *possible*.
Of course it then proceeds to dash hopes for a universal prior over a
broader domain, defined by GTMs. So, it would be interesting to know
more about
PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 04:58:41PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
Russel,
Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
universality goes away, and what crucially depends means, et cetera.
-Abram Demski
This is sort of discussed in my book Theory
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Abram,
On 26 Nov 2008, at 00:01, Abram Demski wrote:
Bruno,
Yes, I have encountered the provability logics before, but I am no
expert.
We will perhaps have opportunity to talk about this.
In any given
generation, the entity who can represent the truth
Russel,
Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
universality goes away, and what crucially depends means, et cetera.
-Abram Demski
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 5:44 AM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 11:52:55AM -0500, Abram Demski wrote
-meaningless and 4-meaningless
and finitely-meaningless and countably-meaningless and so on.
--Abram
On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 5:03 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 24 Nov 2008, at 21:52, Abram Demski wrote:
Hi Bruno,
I am not sure I follow you here. All what Godel's incompleteness
Hi everyone!
My name is Abram Demski. My interest, when it comes to this list, is:
what is the correct logic, the logic that can refer to (and reason
about) any mathematical structure? The logic that can define
everything definable? If every possible universe exists, then of
course we've got
numbers, which is impossible. Of
course, this gives rise to an outlandish number of truth-values (one
for each ordinal number), when normally any more than 2 is considered
questionable.
--Abram Demski
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