Joel Dobrzelewski wrote:
I do understand all universal computers are
equivalent. But again: What program are these machines running? It is
becoming clear to me - that is the real question.
They are running COBOL version 5.3. This language has been, and will remain with
us for ever. ;-)
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote:
Jacques:
You guys are going about it all wrong. Sure, some computers seem
simpler than others. But there's no one way to pick the simplest.
I agree with Jacques that trying to define a computer is ridiculous. But
if we must choose one, there is a way to pick
More on White Rabbits.
Here is a thought experiment which attempts to prove the non existence of
White Rabbits and of Black Rabbits.
Definitions:
1) White Rabbits: phenomena that we cannot understand. Their existence
indicates that the set of physical phenomena is larger than the set of ideas
is the hunt
for, and extermination of, all white rabbits...
I think, they are in for a big surprise the mother of all white rabbits
is just around the cornerand she is morphing into a lion.
George Levy
Marchal wrote:
Do you think the dream and awake state are symmetrical?
I am not sure. It seems to me that in the dream state you can realise
you are dreaming, but that in the "awake" state you can never realise
you are awake. "awakenings" go from more relative inconsistencies to
less relative
This is a continuation of Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...+ White Rabbits
Some more thoughts about dreaming.
I wrote:
To summarize:
White rabbits are inconsistent by definition. The issue is inconsistent with
respect which frame of reference?
If we dream of a real world white
Marchal wrote
Ok. Physics is pattern of laws perceived by the consciousness observing
the plenitude. The consistency filter that restricts consciousness is the
same filter that restrict the world that consciousness observes. This is
why the world is understandable and this is why there are
Wei Dai wrote:
I've changed the max submission size to 60 KB.
Thanks Wei
George
John and Hal, Bruno and all everythingers, sorry for the delay guys, I
was travelling and had lots of work. Bruno, I just scanned your post quickly.
It seems to me we are going in the right direction but I shall need time
to digest what you wrote. I shall reply to you later
Let me first reply to
jamikes wrote:
George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
Saturday, May 05, 2001 :
(SNIP Jurgen's remark about such a universe whatever, my remark is not
topical, rather principle:)
Such a universe would violate Bell' inequality theorem. Quantum randomness
cannot be simulated by hidden
Hi Marchal
Your expose in a "nutshell" is far too technical to convince me... unfortunately
I believe I would have to obtain a post grad education in logic to appreciate
your position as you state it. Yet I believe that what you are saying
sounds valid. So even though I would like to give you
Marchal wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Would Descartes' statement be written as :
(c - -[]c) - c
How would you prove it? As it stands it appears to be a third person
statement. How would you make it a first person statement with Kripke's
logic?
About your formula ( c
Hi Marchal,
This is a reply to your last two posts. I hope other everythingers beside
myself are attempting to follow this adventure in logic. It appears to be
really worth the effort. Please feel free to contribute to this exchange.
Marchal wrote:
And we have as results (including the
Reflexive, Transitive and Symmetric applies only to the relation R that define
accessibility. So:
Reflexive:
W |
--|
Transitive:
W1 -- W2 W3
Symmetric
W1 - W2
And the Goedel-like formula
p -- -[]p
means: if p is true in at least one world accessed from w,
,* it seems so impossible to me, that, I believe the
prize should be given by a prestidigitation organization. :-). It will
certainly be instructive to go through that process.
George
Marchal wrote:
George Levy wrote:
With my background in electronic engineering, I am moderately versed in
logic
The following post was returned to me I'll try to send it again
Marchal wrote:
But perhaps there is something more I should ask you before. You said
in response to some post of me, in some preceeding dialog:
I smell a whiff of third person thinking.
Well, I know you are not stuck
Sorry guys I am running behind in my replies
Stephen Paul King wrote:
[SPK]
It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple
reason that consciousness is not pre-specifiable in its behaviour. Have you read
Peter Wegner's papers about this?
I just got
Hi Hal
The purpose of my post of september 99 was to clarify some of these issues and
terminologies. I am still not an expert except for my own position... I certainly
could not speak for others.
A possible method for performing the tasks I outlined below may be to
decentralized them... In
Stephen Paul King wrote:[SPK]
It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple
reason that consciousness is not pre-specifiable in its behaviour. Have you read
Peter Wegner's papers about this?
and from a previous post:
[SPK]
I agree. But could you get
James Higgo wrote:
Bravo, George. This is a derivation of Liebnitz's point.
How many more ingenious 'solutions' will there be to the paradoxes that
belief in a 'first person' leads to? Quite a few I imagine, as nobody can
countenance for a split-second that they don't exist as a
Marchal wrote:
But the entire UDA TE shows that the mind-body problem is
reduced to extracting the physical laws for the measure
on that indeterminacy. This explain at least the philosophical
shape of QM.
OK
[BM] And it shows that COMP entails SE is SE is correct.
It shows that COMP
Russell Standish wrote:
...The plenitude would include all
sets that don't contain themselves, as well as sets that do. We know
the plenitude contains itself. However, since the set of all sets that
don't contain themselves is a logical contradiction, it is presumably
excluded from the
Marchal wrote:
..Positive integers exists. Nothing else.
This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. And Kroenecker was an old
fuddy daddy. If I was a negative number I would be deepely offended! Why not say
negative number exist and nothing else? In fact all you need is the null set
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
George Levy wrote:
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am suggesting that *all* objects are either an observer or a part of an
observer. I am
attacking the anthrocentrist definition of observer. I am suggesting that any
object that can have
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am considering the idea that each
observer (consciousness point) has its own set of a priori probable observations, it
is when we
introduce the possibility of communication between observers that these sets alter...
I hope you are not suggesting that
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Logic just like phycical laws is not abolute. It only exists in the mind of
the beholder. So a transition is logical only if it makes sense for the
consciousness which experiences it. And a consciousness experiences such a
transition only if it makes or can
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Umm, let me break this down into chucks and try to see if we are
understanding
each other. My notion of a previous time was couched within a notion that is
similar
to J. A. Wheeler's notion of a Surprise 20 Questions Game and I did not state so
Brent Meeker wrote:
On 03-Mar-01, George Levy wrote:
I do not view these so called parallel universes as *separate*. It's
really one single multiverse and the wave function exists in the
multiverse
How can this multiverse have a single wave function when it is supposed
to have
Brent Meeker wrote:
A transition from one conscious point
(observer moment) to the next must be logical at the conscious level
and simultaneously at the physical law level.
I'm not sure what you mean by logical transition - entailed by the
previous theorems plus rules of inference
Marchal wrote:
The difference between the first person and the third person is
basically the same as the difference between having an headache and
having a friend having an headhache.
True, but I believe of much greater importance for this discussion is the
difference in the obervations
Wei Dai wrote:
The paradox is what happens if we run Alice and Bob's minds on different
substrates, so that Bob's mind has a much higher measure than Alice's.
I fail to understand the paradox. In the case where they are on the same
substrate, they are more likely to push button 2. OK
In the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sun Feb 18 01:16:16 2001
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and
constructive as it forces them to refine their positions.
Where did I have to refine mine?
JS
That' right I guess. You didn't have to refine
jamikes wrote:
George, ... I have only some remarks: I I think (not a Cartesian wordageG)
the first step would be:
0.1: Causality IS,
then you may introduce your points.
The whole point of starting with I is to avoid starting with a *bare*
assumption such as the one you suggest
The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive
as it forces them to refine their positions. However, while there is a need for
some formalism, too much formalism gets in the way. As Einstein said, Imagination
is more important than knowledge.
Juergens'
is. The conventional approach of regarding
consciousness as discrete and well separated entities obviously does not
work.
George Levy
Thanks to Bruno, I am experiencing a kind of nomenclatorial fusion with Gilles
Henri. I have become Gille Levy. I wonder who George Henri is. :-)
George Levy
Marchal wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Are you saying that you support the 2/3 view, meaning that the probability
of my next moment
On Thu Dec 28 05:19:13 2000 Wei Dai wrote:
Even within classic models of computation, there seem to be
significant
variations in speed. As far as I can tell from my theory of
computation
book, moving from a multi-tape TM to a single-tape TM can cause a
squaring
of running time for some problems,
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