George, great. - Absolute measures?
So you want to supersede the Archimede-Einstein wisdom ('gimme a fixed
point...to: total relativity) - which is OK with me. I like the way you
approach questions (big deal for youG).
Main topic: Reverse Hubble? do we go towards a ;Big Bang', which is indeed
a
On Oct 31, 7:40 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Decisions require some value structure. To get values from an ontology you'd
have to get around the Naturalistic fallacy.
Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
Decision theory has this same problem. Decision
Le 26-oct.-07, à 20:18, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Is God good? Well, according to Plato, accepting the rather natural
theological interpretation of the Parmenides (like Plotinus), there
is a sense to say that God is good, but probably not in the
Christian
sense
In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic complexity.
I should have said that in (3) our decisions don't have any consequences, so
we disregard them even if we do care what happens in them. The end result is
the same: I'll act as if I only live in (2).
In the (3) I gave, you're
Wei Dai wrote:
Rolf Nelson wrote:
In the (3) I gave, you're indexed so that the thermal fluctuation
doesn't dissolve until November 1, so your actions still have
consequences.
Still not a problem: the space-time region that I can affect in (3) is too
small (i.e., its measure is too
Rolf Nelson wrote:
In the (3) I gave, you're indexed so that the thermal fluctuation
doesn't dissolve until November 1, so your actions still have
consequences.
Still not a problem: the space-time region that I can affect in (3) is too
small (i.e., its measure is too small, complexity too
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible
decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as
illustration of how far away we still are from that goal.
Heh. Yes, very interesting indeed.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Oct 31, 3:28 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
4. For someone on a practical mission to write an AI that makes sensible
decisions, perhaps the model can serve as a starting point and as
illustration of how far away we still are from that goal.
Heh.
How do the UDASSA, or the UDISTASSA, people take the difference
between first person and third person into account? Do they?
With the RSSA (through the use of the UD) it should be clear that THIRD
person determinism and computability entails FIRST person indeterminacy
and observable non
On Oct 25, 7:59 am, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't care
about (1) and (3) because those universes are too arbitrary or random, and I
can defend that by pointing to their high algorithmic complexities.
In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic complexity.
Any theory that
However, to demonstrate would probably
be difficult, and if we had something powerful enough to do this, we
might have a theory that allows UDASSA to make novel predictions about
the observed Universe.
To give examples of how hard this is:
1. What is the probability that our Universe has
Rolf Nelson wrote:
On Oct 25, 7:59 am, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't care
about (1) and (3) because those universes are too arbitrary or random,
and I
can defend that by pointing to their high algorithmic complexities.
In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic
Wei, your examples are convincing, although other decision models have
similar problems. If your two examples were the only problems that
UDASSA had, I would have few qualms about adopting it over the other
decision models I've seen. Note that even if you adopt a decision
model, you still in
To put it more generally, thinking in terms of how much you care about the
consequences of your actions *allows* you to have an overall preference
about A and B that can be expressed as an expected utility:
P(A) * U(A) + P(B) * U(B)
since P(A) and P(B) can denote how much you care about
Hi all,
One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense exactly is the Measure
Problem a problem? Why isn't it good enough to say that everything exists,
therefore we (i.e. people living in a lawful universe) must exist, and
therefore we shouldn't be surprised that we exist. If the
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi all,
One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense exactly is the Measure
Problem a problem? Why isn't it good enough to say that everything exists,
therefore we (i.e. people living in a lawful universe) must exist, and
therefore we shouldn't be
Rolf Nelson wrote:
Wei, your examples are convincing, although other decision models have
similar problems. If your two examples were the only problems that
UDASSA had, I would have few qualms about adopting it over the other
decision models I've seen. Note that even if you adopt a decision
Brent Meeker wrote:
That's a good argument assuming some laws of physics. But as I understood
it, the measure problem was to explain the law-like evolution of the
universe as a opposed to a chaotic/random/white-rabbit universe. Is it
your interpretation that, among all possible worlds,
Le 25-oct.-07, à 18:22, Tom Caylor a écrit :
How about SAI (Super Intelligence)? Or God? Seriously, of course.
The problem with generic SAI is the one you brought up: how do you
know the SAI is good? This problem does not exist with a good God.
Also the problem of what is the arrow, how
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Is God good? Well, according to Plato, accepting the rather natural
theological interpretation of the Parmenides (like Plotinus), there
is a sense to say that God is good, but probably not in the Christian
sense (if that can be made precise). Indeed, Plato's God
Rolf Nelson wrote:
In standard decision theory, odds (subjective probabilities) are
separated from utilities. Is how much you care about the consequences
of your actions isomorphic to odds, or is there some subtlety I'm
missing here?
Your question shows that someone finally understand what
Le 25-oct.-07, à 03:25, Wei Dai a écrit :
Rolf Nelson wrote:
1. Provides a possible explanation for the Measure Problem of why we
shouldn't be extremely surprised to find we live in a lawful
universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous
cloud of gas.
One thing I
Rolf Nelson wrote:
Your observations to date are consistent with all three models. What
are the odds that you live in (2) but not (1) or (3)? Surely the
answer is extremely high, but how do we justify it *mathematically*
(and philosophically)?
My current position is, forget the odds. Let's
On Oct 25, 3:25 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 25-oct.-07, à 03:25, Wei Dai a écrit :
Rolf Nelson wrote:
An example
that Yudowsky gave: you might spend resources on constructing a unique
arrow pointing at yourself, in order to increase your measure by
making it easier
Le 21-oct.-07, à 20:33, Rolf Nelson a écrit :
(Warning: This post assumes an familiarity with UD+ASSA and with the
cosmological Measure Problem.)
I am afraid you should say a little more on UD + ASSA. to make your
points below clearer. I guess by UD you mean UDist (the universal
Rolf Nelson wrote:
1. Provides a possible explanation for the Measure Problem of why we
shouldn't be extremely surprised to find we live in a lawful
universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous
cloud of gas.
One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense
On Oct 24, 9:25 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rolf Nelson wrote:
1. Provides a possible explanation for the Measure Problem of why we
shouldn't be extremely surprised to find we live in a lawful
universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous
cloud of gas.
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