RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman): The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? How can I fail to have similar information content to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own consciousness? Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: A consciousness spread across time. if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is. But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't it apply across time. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. There is no logical distinction between the two cases, unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no other means of differentiation. Which is precisely my point. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. I think it is simpler to go back to your own clones-in-the-next-room example rather than introducing the complication of neurophysiology (or indeed physics). You are informed that your current stream of consciousness is either being generated by (a) a temporal sequence of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is instantly killed, and replaced by the next one in the series a microsecond later or (b) a spatial series of clones, each of which lives for a second, then is instantly killed, such that the whole experiment goes for a second but uses multiple adjacent rooms You have to guess whether you are in experiment (a) or (b). If appropriate care is taken to provide you with no external clues do you think you would be able to guess the right answer with greater than 1/2 probability? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? How can I fail to have similar information content to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own consciousness? What I mean by 'closed' is that not merely the objects of perception, but the means of acquisition of perceptual content (i.e. the dyad), are alike constrained by the information content - or structure - of the OM itself. There isn't a further 'sympathetic' - or whatever - access to information due to 'similarity' - by what process could this occur? As to each neuron having its own 'consciousness', this is neither here nor there - whatever could the *content* of such consciousness be? The very point is that there must be a complex interaction, seamlessly relating perceiver-process with percept-process (e.g. constructing memory, representation, etc.), in order for the 'I' to emerge and coherently assert itself. We know this from the way such processes fragment and break down under the impact of Alzheimers and short-term memory disfunction. Self-referential consciousness can only be sustained through a highly organised *process*, not merely an inherent undifferentiated quality. So of course 'you' have similar information content 'five minutes from now'. This is how you (and we) make the identification that this particular 'I' is 'you' - the persistency of information through which 'you' can be tracked. It's also the only distinction between 'you' and 'me'. So for this reason there would be exactly the same argument for (or against) 'sympathetic overlap' between OMs containing you, and those containing me. And, interesting though this might be, personally I fail to experience any such communion, short of this particular channel of information that (literally) connects our respective OMs. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point. Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not. The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? How can I fail to have similar information content to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own consciousness? Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: A consciousness spread across time. if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is. But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't it apply across time. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. There is no logical distinction between the two cases, unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no other means of differentiation. Which is precisely my point. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov. Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit : Brent Meeker wrote: It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems. For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form. And that is why the doctrine of formalism in mathematics (or just number theory) is dead since Godel has proved his incompleteness theorem. We definitely know today that number theoretical truth escapes all formal theories. Physicists can still dream today about a formal and complete theory of everything-physical, but number scientist knows that the number realm is not completely formally unifiable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give. However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of 'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or 'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present? This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual OMs. But then what would coordinate them? Any thoughts? David Peter Jones writes: I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate rooms, to be separate. I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all mathematical structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till 1 second ago) + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never seen one is evidence against a mathematical multiverse. That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. Not as much. It depends on how constrained they are. Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. If a physical MV exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second. With a very low measure. The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that is basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or contingnet in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than every possible universe. If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every configuration of matter. (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where I'm in Washington, configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in Narnia. There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me in Moscow, 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in Platonia. (That's the mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse is an entirely different matter). Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to experience in the next moment? (a) nothing (b) everything (c) something (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit : Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for qualia than physicalism. Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia. It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural). If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta, then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta, and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without yes doctor). Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or formulating the the qualia problem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit : Brent Meeker wrote: It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems. For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form. And that is why the doctrine of formalism in mathematics (or just number theory) is dead since Godel has proved his incompleteness theorem. We definitely know today that number theoretical truth escapes all formal theories. Physicists can still dream today about a formal and complete theory of everything-physical, but number scientist knows that the number realm is not completely formally unifiable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give. However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of 'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or 'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present? This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual OMs. But then what would coordinate them? Any thoughts? It's certainly possible to have a very fragmented stream of consciousness. While fortunately rare these days, the most extreme forms of disorganised schizophrenia are from the patient's point of view something like having random, disconnected thoughts and perceptions without even a sense that they belong to a single enduring individual to bind them together. I think of an OM as the shortest possible period of conscious experience, which would make its apparent duration many milliseconds. Much of the discussion in which the term OM is used could as easily (and less ambiguously) use observer-second or observer-minute without loss of the general point. Of course, hours of real time physical activity might have to occur for each subjective moment of consciousness, and those hours may be divided up into infinitesimals in a block universe, or whatever the underlying physics dictates. The OM concept has analogies with block universe models, but it is philosophically useful regardless of what the actual nature of time is. As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary complication. As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information content. If the seconds of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:10:02 PM of 10/10/06 would still subjectively follow (t2) 3:10:01 PM of 10/10/06 even though there is no connection or flow of information between them. If you look at how t1 and t2 are generated, then yes, there is a connection - they both come out of your head - but once generated, they form a natural sequence which cannot be disrupted. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate rooms, to be separate. I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all mathematical structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till 1 second ago) + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never seen one is evidence against a mathematical multiverse. That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. Not as much. It depends on how constrained they are. Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. If a physical MV exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second. With a very low measure. The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that is basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or contingnet in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than every possible universe. If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every configuration of matter. (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where I'm in Washington, configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in Narnia. There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me in Moscow, 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in Platonia. (That's the mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse is an entirely different matter). Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to experience in the next moment? (a) nothing (b) everything (c) something (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain conscious. (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still counts as an individual with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience of everything simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - is different to no experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information than a blank page. Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is it that you might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you experience if no measure is defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure? But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary complication. As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information content. If the seconds of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:10:02 PM of 10/10/06 would still subjectively follow (t2) 3:10:01 PM of 10/10/06 even though there is no connection or flow of information between them. If you look at how t1 and t2 are generated, then yes, there is a connection - they both come out of your head - but once generated, they form a natural sequence which cannot be disrupted. But my point about the 'coherence' of consciousness is that it seems (especially from what occurs, or fails to occur, when it deteriorates) that complex representation and processing of *temporally extended* information sequences (e.g. grasp of the entirety of the content and meaning of a sentence or proposition) is necessary for one to experience and act as a fully-functioning conscious individual. Consequently, it seems to me that such processes must converge on OMs in which all the necessary information is fully encoded and expressed (which is essentially what Barbour seems to be claiming for his 'time capsules' - e.g. his 'flight of the kingfisher' example). Without this, the alternative seems to be that the individual random, wind-blown seconds of your metaphor would need to be totalised in some additional non-information-based manner in order to coordinate an ensemble of informationally incomplete, discrete elements into coherent experiences. AFAICS they only 'form a natural sequence' from the quasi-objective perspective of our philosophical stance. And such coordination is in any case what we were assuring Peter was both unnecessary and impossible. The 'snapshot with memory' view of things is surely only viable if each snapshot can be shown to be fully efficacious in reconstituting what we do in fact experience - and this, short of magic, surely requires the discrete presence within each snapshot of all the necessary process and information. It seems to me that this might be a productive slant on what work the brain might actually be doing in constructing the sort of spatio-temporally dimensioned experiences we encounter. IOW, it isn't just 'recording and replaying', but creating and continually updating a coherent informational construct, centred on an embedded 'I', that reads-out 'self-referentially' as a 4D world. Any given OM would represent the state-of-update of this construct, with consequent full access to its resources at that particular state-of-update. David David Nyman writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give. However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of 'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or 'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present? This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual OMs. But then what would coordinate them? Any thoughts? It's certainly possible to have a very fragmented stream of consciousness. While fortunately rare these days, the most extreme forms of disorganised schizophrenia are from the patient's point of view something like having random, disconnected thoughts and perceptions without even a sense that they belong to a single enduring individual to bind them together. I think of an OM as the shortest possible period of conscious experience, which would make its apparent duration many milliseconds. Much of the discussion in which the term OM is used could as easily (and less ambiguously) use observer-second or observer-minute without loss of the general point. Of course, hours of real time physical activity might have to occur for each subjective moment of consciousness, and those hours may be divided up into infinitesimals in a block universe, or whatever the underlying physics dictates. The OM concept has analogies with block
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? How can I fail to have similar information content to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own consciousness? What I mean by 'closed' is that not merely the objects of perception, but the means of acquisition of perceptual content (i.e. the dyad), are alike constrained by the information content - or structure - of the OM itself. There isn't a further 'sympathetic' - or whatever - access to information due to 'similarity' - by what process could this occur? Yes -- in terms of causality, process, dynamic time, counterfactuals, etc. In terms of Platonia and block universes, informational similarity becomes more important because process and causation are less important. As to each neuron having its own 'consciousness', this is neither here nor there - whatever could the *content* of such consciousness be? The molecule-by-molecule information content of a neuron would be quite complex. The very point is that there must be a complex interaction, seamlessly relating perceiver-process with percept-process (e.g. constructing memory, representation, etc.), in order for the 'I' to emerge and coherently assert itself. We know this from the way such processes fragment and break down under the impact of Alzheimers and short-term memory disfunction. Self-referential consciousness can only be sustained through a highly organised *process*, not merely an inherent undifferentiated quality. Is there process in a BU? So of course 'you' have similar information content 'five minutes from now'. This is how you (and we) make the identification that this particular 'I' is 'you' - the persistency of information through which 'you' can be tracked. It's also the only distinction between 'you' and 'me'. So for this reason there would be exactly the same argument for (or against) 'sympathetic overlap' between OMs containing you, and those containing me. And, interesting though this might be, personally I fail to experience any such communion, short of this particular channel of information that (literally) connects our respective OMs. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point. Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not. The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed even if their information content is similar? Why should that be? How can I fail to have similar information content to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own consciousness? Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: A consciousness spread across time. if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or There is *a* process which links spatially separated neurons into a single consciousness. I don't claim to know what it is. But if time is just like space, as the BU theory has it, why doesn't it apply across time. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. There is no logical distinction between the two cases, unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no other means of differentiation. Which is precisely my point. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary complication. As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information content. If the seconds of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:10:02 PM of 10/10/06 would still subjectively follow (t2) 3:10:01 PM of 10/10/06 even though there is no connection or flow of information between them. If you look at how t1 and t2 are generated, then yes, there is a connection - they both come out of your head - but once generated, they form a natural sequence which cannot be disrupted. But my point about the 'coherence' of consciousness is that it seems (especially from what occurs, or fails to occur, when it deteriorates) that complex representation and processing of *temporally extended* information sequences (e.g. grasp of the entirety of the content and meaning of a sentence or proposition) is necessary for one to experience and act as a fully-functioning conscious individual. Consequently, it seems to me that such processes must converge on OMs in which all the necessary information is fully encoded and expressed (which is essentially what Barbour seems to be claiming for his 'time capsules' - e.g. his 'flight of the kingfisher' example). Without this, the alternative seems to be that the individual random, wind-blown seconds of your metaphor would need to be totalised in some additional non-information-based manner in order to coordinate an ensemble of informationally incomplete, discrete elements into coherent experiences. AFAICS they only 'form a natural sequence' from the quasi-objective perspective of our philosophical stance. What is our philosophical stance? And such coordination is in any case what we were assuring Peter was both unnecessary and impossible. What coordination? External time parameters, or internal time capsules? The 'snapshot with memory' view of things is surely only viable if each snapshot can be shown to be fully efficacious in reconstituting what we do in fact experience - and this, short of magic, surely requires the discrete presence within each snapshot of all the necessary process and information. It seems to me that this might be a productive slant on what work the brain might actually be doing in constructing the sort of spatio-temporally dimensioned experiences we encounter. IOW, it isn't just 'recording and replaying', but creating and continually updating a coherent informational construct, centred on an embedded 'I', that reads-out 'self-referentially' as a 4D world. A 4D block world? Any given OM would represent the state-of-update of this construct, with consequent full access to its resources at that particular state-of-update. David David Nyman writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give. However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of 'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or 'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present? This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual OMs. But then what would coordinate them? Any thoughts? It's certainly possible to have a very fragmented stream of consciousness. While fortunately rare these days, the most extreme forms of disorganised schizophrenia are from the patient's point of view something like having random, disconnected thoughts and perceptions without even a sense that they belong to a single enduring individual to bind them together. I think of an OM as the shortest possible period of conscious experience, which would make its apparent duration many milliseconds. Much of the discussion in which the term OM is used could as easily (and less ambiguously) use observer-second or observer-minute without loss of the general point. Of course, hours of real time physical
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit : As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. So where is the UD running? If Platonia doesn't exist, how can I be in it? You miss the point. For asserting that the UD exists, I don't even need to use the non-constructive OR. The UD exists for an intuitionist as well. (exists in the same sense that it exists a number which is not the sum of three squares (x = 7 for example). I think that in many of your last posts you are begging the point. You seem to assume the existence of a physical universe, then you define existence by existing in the physical universe. I don't assume a physical universe. I define existence by the arithmetical truth of existential sentences. Then I explain in all (technical thus) details why immaterial machines/numbers come to feel, perceive, know, believe in sharable quanta and unsharable qualia. You say somewhere that we see matter. I think that this is the main difference between you and me, and I would say between Aristotle and Plato: Aristotle (like St-Thomas) argues indeed in his metaphysics that what we see and measure is what really exist (so that we can sleep in peace). Plato and actually most (rational) mystics (from Pythagorus to St-Augustin) try to explain that what we see could as well be only the shadows of the shadows of the shadows of the shadows ... of what perhaps is (so that we have to keep our vigilance and our skepticism or our doubting abilities in front of *all* theories (especially including those who could have been built in by long evolutionary processes). All what I say is that (standard) computationalism is epistemologically incompatible with materialism. It *is* a necessary-redundancy argument: even if matter exists, standard comp makes it impossible to use for justifying any stable belief. That is the conclusion of the UDA. The AUDA makes it constructive and can generate the physical laws completely (making comp or acomp 100% scientific (popper-testable). It remain possible that the translation of UDA in arithmetic is to rough, and that is why I say comp or acomp. But until now, empirical physics seems to confirm all the weird prediction of (a)comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 23-oct.-06, à 14:29, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit : As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not prove Platonism. By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements. So where is the UD running? If Platonia doesn't exist, how can I be in it? You miss the point. For asserting that the UD exists, I don't even need to use the non-constructive OR. The UD exists for an intuitionist as well. (exists in the same sense that it exists a number which is not the sum of three squares (x = 7 for example). That doesn't answer the question. I am not saying mathematical statements asserting the mathemtical existence of a UD, or the number 7, are false. I am asking what mathematical existence means. Where do mathematical objects exist? In the physical world? In Platonia? In mathematicians minds? Nowhere? I think that in many of your last posts you are begging the point. You seem to assume the existence of a physical universe, then you define existence by existing in the physical universe. No, I am just asking. I have even come up with formulations like real in the sense that I am real which avoid begging any questions about what kind of reality I have. I don't assume a physical universe. I define existence by the arithmetical truth of (mathematical) existential sentences. But for anti-Platonists the truth of mathematical statements has no existential consequences. Then I explain in all (technical thus) details why immaterial machines/numbers come to feel, perceive, know, believe in sharable quanta and unsharable qualia. Assuming immaterial machines exist. You say somewhere that we see matter. I think that this is the main difference between you and me, and I would say between Aristotle and Plato: Aristotle (like St-Thomas) argues indeed in his metaphysics that what we see and measure is what really exist (so that we can sleep in peace). Plato and actually most (rational) mystics (from Pythagorus to St-Augustin) try to explain that what we see could as well be only the shadows of the shadows of the shadows of the shadows ... of what perhaps is (so that we have to keep our vigilance and our skepticism or our doubting abilities in front of *all* theories (especially including those who could have been built in by long evolutionary processes). Matter can only be a shadow of something that exists. All what I say is that (standard) computationalism is epistemologically incompatible with materialism. It *is* a necessary-redundancy argument: even if matter exists, standard comp makes it impossible to use for justifying any stable belief. But that isn't true. Matter can only be made redundant by some form of immaterial existence. However immaterial existence, is *not* implied by *standard* computationalism. Claims that computationalism necessitates the truth of mathematical existence claims does not prove immaterial existence, unless you can refute the anti-Platonists argument that mathematical existence is non-existence ontologically. That is the conclusion of the UDA. The UDA has to assume the existence of a UD, and that is not given by standard computationalism. It is given by Platonism. The AUDA makes it constructive and can generate the physical laws completely (making comp or acomp 100% scientific (popper-testable). It remain possible that the translation of UDA in arithmetic is to rough, and that is why I say comp or acomp. But until now, empirical physics seems to confirm all the weird prediction of (a)comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Quentin Anciaux wrote: But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this... I could have experienced periods of causal stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during one of the stable periods. and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at least one) of you will experience it. Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW --. not physical MW. Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW. Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have a solution? Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please explain how... Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW. Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this... 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts. 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that everything is necessary...so there is still at least one contingent fact. 3. You can't avoid contingency. Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to experience in the next moment? (a) nothing (b) everything (c) something (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain conscious. (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still counts as an individual with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience of everything simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - is different to no experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information than a blank page. Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is it that you might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you experience if no measure is defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure? I'd expect to experience just one consistent actuallity - just like I do now when one of two possibilities in my modest universe is realized. I never find myself in a linear superposition of states and my coins never come up both heads and tails at the same time. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit : Brent Meeker wrote: It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems. For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form. And that is why the doctrine of formalism in mathematics (or just number theory) is dead since Godel has proved his incompleteness theorem. We definitely know today that number theoretical truth escapes all formal theories. Physicists can still dream today about a formal and complete theory of everything-physical, but number scientist knows that the number realm is not completely formally unifiable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: David Nyman writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give. However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of 'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or 'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present? This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual OMs. But then what would coordinate them? Any thoughts? It's certainly possible to have a very fragmented stream of consciousness. While fortunately rare these days, the most extreme forms of disorganised schizophrenia are from the patient's point of view something like having random, disconnected thoughts and perceptions without even a sense that they belong to a single enduring individual to bind them together. I think of an OM as the shortest possible period of conscious experience, which would make its apparent duration many milliseconds. Much of the discussion in which the term OM is used could as easily (and less ambiguously) use observer-second or observer-minute without loss of the general point. Of course, hours of real time physical activity might have to occur for each subjective moment of consciousness, and those hours may be divided up into infinitesimals in a block universe, or whatever the underlying physics dictates. The OM concept has analogies with block universe models, but it is philosophically useful regardless of what the actual nature of time is. As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary complication. As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information content. If the seconds of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:10:02 PM of 10/10/06 would still subjectively follow (t2) 3:10:01 PM of 10/10/06 even though there is no connection or flow of information between them. If you look at how t1 and t2 are generated, then yes, there is a connection - they both come out of your head - but once generated, they form a natural sequence which cannot be disrupted. Stathis Papaioannou That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of content in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the order of a second or longer, I think the order could be reconstructed from the content. But I also think there would be exceptions. For example if I'm startled by a loud noise this switches my consciousness on a time scale much shorter than 1sec to What was that!? and then, deciding it was not important, I switch back to what I was thinking of before. These thoughts are connected by *memory* but not by conscious content of OMs. Maybe there is a feeling of continuity in consciousness which doesn't survive chopping it up into OMs, i.e. each conscious thought has duration and overlaps preceding and suceding thoughts. But I think that either some such overlap or access to memory must be invoked to ensure that OMs can be ordered. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? That's *mathematical* truth. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this... I could have experienced periods of causal stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during one of the stable periods. Well in typical Everett MWI you also could... and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at least one) of you will experience it. Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW --. not physical MW. But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In any case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of what happens at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability is instantiated with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW. Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have a solution? Several ways of defining one has been discussed on this list for a long time now see ASSA vs RSSA, see the Universal Distribution, etc. Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please explain how... Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW. Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this... 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts. 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that everything is necessary...so there is still at least one contingent fact. 3. You can't avoid contingency. I don't understand what you mean by this, I apology. Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this... I could have experienced periods of causal stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during one of the stable periods. Well in typical Everett MWI you also could... Mixtures of stability and craziness are mathematically necessary. and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at least one) of you will experience it. Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW --. not physical MW. But why ? It doesn't exlain my expreience. consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! No they are not. In PMW you can choose measure to match observation. In any case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of what happens at the time a choice is made. In an MMW, measure cannot be chosen to match experience, empirically, it has to be deduced apriori. Even an infinitesimal probability is instantiated with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... MMW may not be able to give strange events a lower probability than everyday ones. PMW can do this because it leans on the SWE, but that is arrived at empirically. Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW. Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have a solution? Several ways of defining one has been discussed on this list for a long time now see ASSA vs RSSA, see the Universal Distribution, etc. I know attempts have been made. But it is more difficult if everything has to be done apriori. Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please explain how... Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW. Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this... 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts. 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that everything is necessary...so there is still at least one contingent fact. 3. You can't avoid contingency. I don't understand what you mean by this, I apology. The ultimate explanation for why the real is only composed of that and not this... is contingency. Contingency isn't a very satisfactory explanation to the rationalist mind...but contingency is very hard to avoid entirely. Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? That's *mathematical* truth. Mathematical logic is richer than that. This is what Bruno is saying, that the math path points toward Rome. And it is no more scary (a la possible spirits lurking under/in every rock) than the matter path. Limiting math as you are doing, and as Brent Meeker does in his response to my (X and not-X) note, is ignoring such evidence as the proofs of Godel and Tarski's Indefinability Theorem. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: 1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? That's *mathematical* truth. Mathematical logic is richer than that. Mathematical logic can't conjure up existential conclusions without making existential assumptions. This is what Bruno is saying, that the math path points toward Rome. And it is no more scary (a la possible spirits lurking under/in every rock) than the matter path. Limiting math as you are doing, and as Brent Meeker does in his response to my (X and not-X) note, is ignoring such evidence as the proofs of Godel and Tarski's Indefinability Theorem. They do not disprove formalism, as I have explained. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this... I could have experienced periods of causal stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during one of the stable periods. Well in typical Everett MWI you also could... and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at least one) of you will experience it. Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW --. not physical MW. But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In any case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of what happens at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability is instantiated with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... No they are not the same. QM rules out lots of things - anything that doesn't conserve 4-momentum for example. Even more to the point QM rules out any future that doesn't evolve from the present in accordance with the Hamiltonian of the universe. It also rules out any universe that doesn't conform to quantum mechanics, e.g. a Newtonian universe. The measure of QM universes relative to mathematically consistent universes is essentially zero. I put mathematically consistent universes in scare quotes because I understand what it means for statements and propositions to be consistent, but I'm not sure what it means for universes, simpliciter, to be consistent. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: 1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? That's *mathematical* truth. Mathematical logic is richer than that. Mathematical logic can't conjure up existential conclusions without making existential assumptions. True. ;) This is what Bruno is saying, that the math path points toward Rome. And it is no more scary (a la possible spirits lurking under/in every rock) than the matter path. Limiting math as you are doing, and as Brent Meeker does in his response to my (X and not-X) note, is ignoring such evidence as the proofs of Godel and Tarski's Indefinability Theorem. They do not disprove formalism, as I have explained. True. Formalism is an existential assumption. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: 1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: Again, the kind of formalism that says everything can be brought under a single formal scheme (the Hilbertian programme) is different from the kind that says mathematical truths are dependent on axioms, and different truths will be arrived at under different axioms. Of course the key point here is different truths. Tom is not entitled to assume that all roads lead to Rome. If your definition of truth is limited to logical inference given a certain set of axioms and inference rules, then what are we trying to do on the Everything List? That's *mathematical* truth. Mathematical logic is richer than that. This is what Bruno is saying, that the math path points toward Rome. And it is no more scary (a la possible spirits lurking under/in every rock) than the matter path. Limiting math as you are doing, and as Brent Meeker does in his response to my (X and not-X) note, is ignoring such evidence as the proofs of Godel and Tarski's Indefinability Theorem. Tom But as I understand it, Bruno wants to identify mathematical existence with true existence statements about mathematical objects. Some of these are unprovable. They can be consistently added to the axioms. But also their negation can be consistently added to the axioms. But not both. So there are disjoint realms of consistent mathematics - some are Rome, some are Athens, some are Tuva, most are Harry Potter's home town. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy harry Potter stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this... I could have experienced periods of causal stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during one of the stable periods. Well in typical Everett MWI you also could... and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at least one) of you will experience it. Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW --. not physical MW. But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In any case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of what happens at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability is instantiated with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins... No they are not the same. QM rules out lots of things - anything that doesn't conserve 4-momentum for example. That is true. Even more to the point QM rules out any future that doesn't evolve from the present in accordance with the Hamiltonian of the universe. It also rules out any universe that doesn't conform to quantum mechanics, e.g. a Newtonian universe. The measure of QM universes relative to mathematically consistent universes is essentially zero. I put mathematically consistent universes in scare quotes because I understand what it means for statements and propositions to be consistent, but I'm not sure what it means for universes, simpliciter, to be consistent. That is true to. Consistency is a property of (sets of) propositions, not of structures. But if you Platonise all of current mathematics, it will divide into incompatible regions due to incompatible axioms. Brent Meeker Bruno has tried to introduce us before to the concept of universes or worlds made from logic, bottom up (a la constructing elephants). These universes can be consistent or inconsistent. But approaching it from the empirical side (top down rather bottom up), here is an example of a consistent structure: I think you assume that you as a person are a structure, or that you can assume that temporarily for the purpose of argument. You as a person can be consistent in what you say, can you not? Given certain assumptions (axioms) and inference rules you can be consistent or inconsistent in what you say. I'm not saying the what you say is all there is to who you are. Actually this illustrates what I was saying before about the need for a reference frame to talk about consistency, e.g. what you say, given your currently held axioms and rules. Another example would be an electric circuit: Given the structure of an electric circuit, and axioms and rules about electricity, we can predict what the output of the circuit will be. If we go through a different sequence of contortions/calculations with that same structure, axioms and rules, and get a different output value, then the axioms, rules *together with the structure* are inconsistent. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
