RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually come up with a solution to this in order to account for what we experience. For that matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around in the course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of femtosecond duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as part of the calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like this, technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, if the computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right answer and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you believe that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond slice that binds them all together? No, this is irrelevant. The calculation example is disanalogous, because what is relevant to this is simply the 3-person process that results in the right answer: this *entirely constitutes* the calculation. We don't seek to make claims about any putative 'temporally-extended pov' that the computer might possess while performing it. What is at issue in these thought experiments, by contrast, is *precisely* the pov - of apparently real temporal dimension and dynamic character - that we wish to claim would be experienced from the perspective of a given 'time-slice', however arbitrarily fine-grained. I don't see why the calculation example should be different. We could either go with saying that the calculation mysteriously supervenes on the physical activity of the computer, or we could go with saying that the physical activity of the brain entirely constitutes the mental activity. I know people who find computers at least as mysterious as brains. It takes many time slices of computer activity to make up a period that would be recognised by an external observer as part of a particular calculation, and in a similar fashion it takes many slices of brain activity to make up a period that would be recognised by an external or the internal observer as a coherent thought or part of a thought. 1) It is supported and constrained *entirely* by whatever structure and information is to be found within an individual time-slice (i.e. the 'time capsule'). 2) Structure and information external to the individual time-slice is in fact required to generate it (i.e. the individual slice is not a 'time capsule'). Per alternative 1), any slice containing the requisite structure and information content can potentially support a coherent 'temporally extended' conscious experience. Per alternative 2) AFAICS this can't be the case. I'm not sure that you're seeing my point here. I'm not denying that the pov is maintained in the chopped-up version, I'm supporting this view. But given the information constraint, I'm saying that any mechanisms that produce conscious experiences of apparent temporal duration *must* consequently (and counter-intuitively) depend on *instantaneously* present structure and information. These non-sequential issues are not relevant for 'calculation', hence the disanalogy. This leads to an empirical claim about brain mechanism, driven by the analysis. If we don't concede this, then AFAICS we're left with the alternative of giving up the information constraint. That is, the apparent temporal extension available in experience *from the pov of an individual infinitessimal time-slice* must somehow depend on information to be found only in other time-slices. But this then renders any notion of slicing irrelevant and the thought experiment collapses. I'd say that it takes as many time slices as it takes to generate a coherent conscious experience. You could have a strict 1:1 mapping from physical activity to mental activity. An infinitesimal slice of physical activity is no easier to stomach than an infinitesimal slice of mental activity, given that we already accept that the physical generates the mental, which seems to be a minimal empirical observation whatever subsequent claims are made about the true nature of physical reality and the possibility than the mental may additionally be generated by non-physical processes. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 28-oct.-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit : Stathis: and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence one, two, three may involve millions of slices of brain activity or computer emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it may take many of these slices to form a moment of consciousness just as it takes many milliseconds of normal brain activity to form a moment of consciousness, but the feeling of continuity should be preserved. Why? Maybe it supervenes on whatever propels one physical state to evolve into another. That answer would work if that whatever was NOT turing emulable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit : If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality (ITSIAR). You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real does not entails that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical real. I didn't say numbers are not PHYSICALLY real, I said real at all. Are you seriously suggesting that numbers are not real *at all*? That would clarify a lot of misunderstandings indeed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit : If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality (ITSIAR). You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real does not entails that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define real by physical real. I didn't say numbers are not PHYSICALLY real, I said real at all. Yes, yes yes! 'If mathematical objects do no exist at all there is no dualism'. 'I don't see why the mathematical realism needs to be true. The difference between mathematical existence and physical existence could consist in physical things exisitng, and mathematical objects not exisiting'. 'Epistemic objectivity of maths means every competent mathematician gets the same answer to a given problem. It doesn't say anything about the existence of anything (except possibly mathematicians)'. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit : Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's what exists)? Bruno, aren't you making essentially the same claim for AUDA, in attempting to derive all properties from it? P. Jones posit a primary matter having no properties, and he does not explain how things with properties can emerge from that. I posit numbers (not AUDA which is just an acronym for the Arithmetical translation of the Universal Dovetailer Argument). And numbers have well know properties of their own (they can be even, odd, prime, godel-number, etc.). And from those number properties I explain the possible n-person discourses. And from UDA one of them is the physical discourse, so it is easy to test comp through empiry. In your schema, if AUDA isn't RITSIAR (even if you'd rather define 1-ritsiar or 3-ritsiar separately), then is anything? I don't understand really what you mean by AUDA is not RITSIAR. AUDA is just the lobian interview, or if you prefer the complete mathematical formalization of the UDA reasoning. In some sense you can interpret it as the eventual elimination of the yes doctor hypothesis in the UDA argument (but here I do simplify a little bit). Are these two views commensurable at all? Or are you saying that we can only maintain a Wittgensteinian silence on such questions? Wittgenstein said to much, or not enough. He felt in the trap he was describing. The difference between G and G* can be used to make this transparently clear, and can even be used to argue that eventually Wittgenstein realize the point in his last writings (on certainty). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): A computationalist would add that a computer analogue of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more controversial. Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't know people who object to comp. Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most functionalist. Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating not-comp you have to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the brain/body. In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever proposed in physics and cognitive science. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Le 30-oct.-06, à 00:40, David Nyman wrote (to Peter Jones (1Z)): Name your turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no agreement is ever reached on this? Peter, I think that David is right. We are in a loop. On the FOR list we would have been moderated out a long time ago :). Tell us your theory please. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): A computationalist would add that a computer analogue of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more controversial. Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't know people who object to comp. Hardly anyone thinks it is a good explanation of phenomenality/qualia. Computationalists tend to be people who care a lot more about thinking than feeeling. Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most functionalist. Another staunch opponent is Edelmann. http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178 'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes, that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. I claim, he writes, that the entire structure on which the cognitivist enterprise is based is incoherent and not borne out by the facts.' Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating not-comp you have to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the brain/body. No you don't. You can posit that phenomenality inheres directly in matter, or that matter otherwise pins downs an absolute level of simulation. In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever proposed in physics and cognitive science. No theory of physics entails that simulations will have all the features -- other than functional/structural ones -- of the systems simulated. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit : Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a 'bare substrate' to which are attached whatever properties theory or experiment may suggest. Consequently, isn't it the case that you are defining this 'bare substrate' (which by posit has no properties of its own) as whatever-it-is that is RITSIAR (i.e. you might say that it's what exists)? Bruno, aren't you making essentially the same claim for AUDA, in attempting to derive all properties from it? P. Jones posit a primary matter having no properties, and he does not explain how things with properties can emerge from that. I don't explain *rationalistically* -- that is I do not show how properties are entailed by inevitable logic from the posit of matter -- because I am not in the business of rationalism. That matter has the properties it has is an contingent fact which is known empirically. (Of course everyone is a contingentists to some extent, since no-one can show that the non-existence of matter of contingency is itself necessary). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): A computationalist would add that a computer analogue of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more controversial. Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't know people who object to comp. Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most functionalist. Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating not-comp you have to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the brain/body. In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever proposed in physics and cognitive science. Most people I know accept that consciousness is due entirely to physical processes in the brain. I think that this should commit them to this minimal functionalism: that a perfect copy of a person, as in quantum teleportation, should have the same kinds of conscious experiences as the original and should feel himself to be continuous with the original. However, many do not accept this conclusion, and even more puzzling, some accept but still claim that the copy won't really be me and that therefore teleportation = suicide. On the other hand, there is nothing contradictory in believing that consciousness is due to physical processes but only the kind of hardware we carry in our heads will provide the correct sort of physical processes. A computer may or may not be able to copy the behaviour of a person, but it won't have the same experiences as the person, or it won't have any experiences at all. It is even possible to come up with a non-computationalist theory of computer consciousness: two computers apparently carrying out the same computation may differ in their conscious experience if their case is a different shape or the insulation on their wiring a different colour. It isn't very plausible, but it isn't logically contradictory. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: Another staunch opponent is Edelmann. http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178 'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes, that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. I claim, he writes, that the entire structure on which the cognitivist enterprise is based is incoherent and not borne out by the facts.' Edelmann's dispute does not seem to be with computationalism per se, but with the particular models which many cognitive scientists use in an attempt to emulate brain function. For example, he argues that neural networks as used in computer science are not really much like biological neural networks and therefore will not be able to yield brain-like results. But this does not mean that no computer model model would be able to emulate the behaviour of biological neural networks, even if such a model would be very difficult to implement. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
