David Deutsch interview

2011-09-26 Thread Pzomby
Interview of physicist David Deutsch by science journalist John Horgan

http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/3

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2011-09-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Sep 2011, at 08:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/24/2011 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


I said explicitly that exist means to be in the ontology of some  
model, and so it is always relative to that model (and similarly  
for nonexistent).



Bruno's shown how the physical world is part of the same model that  
includes the integers.


I don't think so. He has shown that computation with the integers is  
very rich and if you assume your thoughts are just instances of  
digital computation then the appearance of the physical world can be  
explained in terms of them.


I don't show this. I show that if we assume mechanism, then we have to  
explained the physical world in term of integers/combinators/universal  
machine. I submit a problem. In fact I show that with mechanism, the  
mind-body problem becomes an arithmetical body problem. The interview  
of the machine gives hints of the solution.


Bruno


But this is a rather weak sense of 'explain', since it can also  
explain completely different worlds.


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Sep 2011, at 01:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/25/2011 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
and would therefore create me and all my possible futures, but these
'pictures' would have no coherence, would immediately dissolve back
into the static they emerged from.


The point is that IF we are machine, then we have no choice other  
than extracting the physical laws from the UD.


Actually I think we do.  If what you write above is correct then you  
could infer a contradiction from assuming a primitive physics - but  
it seems you discard it as an application of Occam's razor, not as a  
contradictory concept.  Do you think you can prove a contradiction  
from assuming ur-matter?


I obtain an epistemological contradiction. You can still imagine that  
there is some matter, but it can't be related at all to your  
consciousness, so it is exactly like invisible horse (except that such  
invisible horse can be defined, and primitive matter is never  
defined). Such a matter has nothing to do with anything we observe.  
That is the point. We already reach it with just the seven first step,  
with a strong use of Occam razor. The step 8 just eliminates that  
strong use, for the weak use equivalent with the invisible horse.




 It seems to me that Peter Jones has given a convincing defense of  
that as a possible theory of the world.


I have criticized in detail. You can search my reply to Jones, and  
criticize it.






This is done in the mathematical part, where, contrary to all  
expectations (at least by some of my colleagues at the time) we get  
already quantum logics.





The UD, as a generator of static,
cannot explain coherence in my experience.


You need a theory of knowledge. I use the most classical theory of  
knowledge (the one by Theaetetus), and it is enough to cut any easy  
conclusion against mechanism.


This is unclear to me.  You use Bp  p to denote knowing p where p  
is some proposition.  But it seems that B is equivocally  
Believes and Proves (Beweisbar).  I don't see that these two are  
identical.


B = provable = rationally believable. What I say works for any belief  
notion for a machine (or a Recursively enumerable set of sentences)  
close for the modus ponens rules, and arithmetically sound. That is  
what I call the ideally self-referentially correct machine. They are  
example of what I call  Löbian machines. To extract physics, it would  
be useless to interview inconsistent or unsound machines.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2011-09-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Sep 2011, at 01:35, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/25/2011 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I mentioned QM only to mentioned a computer emulable theory of  
molecules.
I find quite possible that QM explains biochemistry, given the  
incredible theory of chemistry the SWE equation allow (molecules  
and the electronic shape of atoms is really what QM explains the  
most elegantly and successfully, but this is besides my point).


But you are coherent: if you want materialism, you will need a non  
turing emulable theory of matter, and of mind.
Good luck, because it needs already some amount of work to conceive  
something not Turing emulable in math, and in physics, it is even  
more difficult.


But QM is based on complex numbers over the reals, which are already  
not Turing emulable.


QM does not use non constructive or non computable numbers. The use of  
real numbers is just the usual simplification. In the application it  
does not matter if we use real or rational numbers (real numbers are  
not observed in nature, how could we?).


A non computable physical phenomena would be like e^iCt, with C a  
precise non computable numbers (like Chaitin's omega, for example). If  
we are machine, we cannot distinguish a non computable phenomena from  
a very complex (more complex than us) computable phenomena.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE

2011-09-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 7:45 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 An interesting talk relevant to what constitutes an observer moment.

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VQ1KI_Jh1QNR=1

Even if the experience is smeared out over time and has a complex
relationship to real world events it could still be the case that it
can be cut up arbitrarily. There is no way I can be sure the world was
not created a microsecond ago and there is no way I can be sure there
isn't a million year gap between subjective seconds.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:03 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 9/25/2011 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 9/25/2011 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I mentioned QM only to mentioned a computer emulable theory of molecules.
 I find quite possible that QM explains biochemistry, given the incredible
 theory of chemistry the SWE equation allow (molecules and the electronic
 shape of atoms is really what QM explains the most elegantly and
 successfully, but this is besides my point).

 But you are coherent: if you want materialism, you will need a non turing
 emulable theory of matter, and of mind.
 Good luck, because it needs already some amount of work to conceive
 something not Turing emulable in math, and in physics, it is even more
 difficult.


  But QM is based on complex numbers over the reals, which are already not
 Turing emulable.


 Has a real number ever been measured by any physicist?

 Jason


 Sure.  He measured one side of the right triangle to be 1cubit and the
 other side to be 1cubit and concluded that the third side was sqrt(2)cubit.


That's not an example of a physicist measuring a real number, nor is it a
real life example.

In real life the physicist would wonder to how many significant figures he
measured the sides of the triangle, and to how many significant figures he
measured the angle of the triangle.  Perhaps the physicist rounded to 1
cubit when in reality it was .9909012 cubits (or in constant flux as the
atoms jostle around).

Jason

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


 I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
 computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
 my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
 containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?


I think you are confusing a bit pattern for a computation.  A hard drive can
contain any possible bit pattern that will fit on its platter, but this bit
pattern won't contain consciousness.

Conversely, if the computer is powered up and running the appropriate
program, that program may be conscious.  This is the difference between the
UD, and the series of integers or the digits of Pi.  The UD executes all
possible programs, the set of Integers is equivalent to all possible bit
patterns.




 I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation produces
 more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
 possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at random some
 algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would be pretty
 much noise almost all the time.


I think you could say the program may be uninteresting, or not contain a
mind or minds.

Are you familiar with the Anthropic principle?  The idea that observers will
always find themselves in places where they can exist.  They perform the
selection by virtue of their existence and observation of their environment.

The vast majority of programs may not contain observers, but those few that
do will become environments for the minds they host.


 *Proving* it is noise is of course
 impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've selected
 out the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way,
 but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion more
 that perform this operation, but also add in various other quantities
 and computations that render the results useless from a physicist's
 point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing procedures and
 unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of algorithms,
 but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some other means
 (measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out which
 ones are signal and which ones noise.


We can ignore the computations which don't contain observers, and as far as
predicting your own future, we can ignore those that don't contain you.

You also asked about why not execute  them all in parallel.  Every program
does exist in math independetly of the UD.  I think the reason Bruno
described the UD was that it was a simple single program he could show
exists in math.  You also questioned whether the existence of the UD is
something really there or some mental construction of ours.  If you think
17 is prime is true independently of your knowledge of it, then the
statement the UD does not halt is also true independently of your
knowledge of it.

Jason

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com 
mailto:pier...@gmail.com wrote:



I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?


I think you are confusing a bit pattern for a computation.  A hard 
drive can contain any possible bit pattern that will fit on its 
platter, but this bit pattern won't contain consciousness.


Conversely, if the computer is powered up and running the appropriate 
program, that program may be conscious.  This is the difference 
between the UD, and the series of integers or the digits of Pi.  The 
UD executes all possible programs, the set of Integers is equivalent 
to all possible bit patterns.




I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation produces
more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at random some
algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would be pretty
much noise almost all the time. 



I think you could say the program may be uninteresting, or not contain 
a mind or minds.


Are you familiar with the Anthropic principle?  The idea that 
observers will always find themselves in places where they can exist.  
They perform the selection by virtue of their existence and 
observation of their environment.


The vast majority of programs may not contain observers, but those few 
that do will become environments for the minds they host.


*Proving* it is noise is of course
impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've selected
out the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way,
but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion more
that perform this operation, but also add in various other quantities
and computations that render the results useless from a physicist's
point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing procedures and
unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of algorithms,
but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some other means
(measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out which
ones are signal and which ones noise.


We can ignore the computations which don't contain observers, and as 
far as predicting your own future, we can ignore those that don't 
contain you.


You also asked about why not execute  them all in parallel.  Every 
program does exist in math independetly of the UD.  I think the reason 
Bruno described the UD was that it was a simple single program he 
could show exists in math.  You also questioned whether the existence 
of the UD is something really there or some mental construction of 
ours.  If you think 17 is prime is true independently of your 
knowledge of it, then the statement the UD does not halt is also 
true independently of your knowledge of it.


Jason


Jason,

I really would like to understand how it is that the truth 
valuation of a proposition is not dependent on our knowledge of it can 
be used to affirm the meaning of the referent of that proposition 
independent of us? How does the sentence 17 is prime is a true 
statement confer implicit meaning to its referent?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:

  On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


 I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
 computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
 my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
 containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?


 I think you are confusing a bit pattern for a computation.  A hard drive
 can contain any possible bit pattern that will fit on its platter, but this
 bit pattern won't contain consciousness.

 Conversely, if the computer is powered up and running the appropriate
 program, that program may be conscious.  This is the difference between the
 UD, and the series of integers or the digits of Pi.  The UD executes all
 possible programs, the set of Integers is equivalent to all possible bit
 patterns.




 I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation produces
 more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
 possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at random some
 algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would be pretty
 much noise almost all the time.


 I think you could say the program may be uninteresting, or not contain a
 mind or minds.

 Are you familiar with the Anthropic principle?  The idea that observers
 will always find themselves in places where they can exist.  They perform
 the selection by virtue of their existence and observation of their
 environment.

 The vast majority of programs may not contain observers, but those few that
 do will become environments for the minds they host.


 *Proving* it is noise is of course
 impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've selected
 out the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way,
 but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion more
 that perform this operation, but also add in various other quantities
 and computations that render the results useless from a physicist's
 point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing procedures and
 unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of algorithms,
 but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some other means
 (measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out which
 ones are signal and which ones noise.


 We can ignore the computations which don't contain observers, and as far as
 predicting your own future, we can ignore those that don't contain you.

 You also asked about why not execute  them all in parallel.  Every program
 does exist in math independetly of the UD.  I think the reason Bruno
 described the UD was that it was a simple single program he could show
 exists in math.  You also questioned whether the existence of the UD is
 something really there or some mental construction of ours.  If you think
 17 is prime is true independently of your knowledge of it, then the
 statement the UD does not halt is also true independently of your
 knowledge of it.

 Jason


 Jason,

 I really would like to understand how it is that the truth valuation of
 a proposition is not dependent on our knowledge of it can be used to affirm
 the meaning of the referent of that proposition independent of us?


That sentence was hard to parse!  If I understand it correctly, you are
asking how a truth, independent of our knowledge, can confer meaning to
something without us?

Things unknown to anyone can have consequences which are eventually do make
a difference to beings which are aware of the difference.  A comet colliding
with the Earth and hitting a pond of unicellular organisms may have
drastically altered the course of evolution on our planet.  That such a
comet impact ocurred is a fact which is either true or false, despite it
being independent of anyone's knowledge of it.  Yet it has perceptable
results.

Correspondingly, the existence of some mathematical truth (even if not
comprehended by anyone) can have effects for observers, in fact, it might
explain both the observers themselves and their experiences.


 How does the sentence 17 is prime is a true statement confer implicit
 meaning to its referent?


What is the referent in this case?  17?  And what do you mean by meaning?
17's primality is a fact of nature.  The statement's existence or
non-existence, comprehension or non-comprehension makes no difference to 17,
only what you could say we humans have discovered about 17.

Jason

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:


OK, well first of all let me retract any ad hominem remarks that may
have offended you. Call it a rhetorical flourish! I apologise. There
are clearly some theories which require a profound amount of dedicated
learning to understand - such as QFT. I majored in History and
Philosophy of Science and work as a programmer and a writer. I am not
a mathematician - the furthest I took it was first year uni, and I
couldn't integrate to save myself any more. Therefore if the truth of
an argument lies deep within a difficult mathematical proof, chances
are I won't be able to reach it.


That is the reason why I separate UDA from AUDA. Normally UDA can be  
understood without much math, which does not mean that it is simple,  
especially the step 8. (but the first seven step shows already the big  
picture).


AUDA, unfortunately, needs a familiarity with logic, which  
unfortunately is rather rare (only professional logicians seems to  
have it).






Then my ignorance would hardly
constitute a criticism, and so it may be with UDA and my complaint of
obscurity.


When I teach orally UDA. The first seven step are easily understood.  
This contains most of the key result (indeterminacy, non-locality, non  
cloning theorem, and the reversal physics/theology (say) in case the  
universe is robust.


The step 8 is intrinsicaly difficult, and can be done before. A long  
time ago, I always presented first the step 8 (the movie graph  
argument) and then the UDA1-7.


I am still not entirely satisfied myself by the step 8 pedagogy.




On the other hand, it seems to me that ideas about the core
nature of reality can and should be presented in the clearest, most
intelligible language possible.


I have 700 pages version, 300 pages version, 120 pages version, up to  
sane04 which about a 20 pages version. The long version have been  
ordered to me by french people, and are written in french.
The interdisciplinary nature of the subject makes it difficult to  
satisfied everybody. What is simple for a logician is terribly  
difficult for a physicist. What is obvious for philosphers of mind,  
can make no sense for a logician or a physicist, what is taken granted  
by physicists are total enigma for logicians, etc.





I can't solve QFT equations, but I can
grasp the fundamental ideas of the uncertainty principle, non-
locality, wave-particle duality, decoherence and so on. I'm not
arguing for dumbed-down philosophy, but maximal clarity.


OK. Note that my work has been peer reviewed, and is considered by  
many as being too much clear, which is a problem in a field (theology)  
which is still taboo (for some christian, and especially the atheist  
version of christianism). I can appear clear only to people capable of  
acknowledging that science has not yet decided between Aristotle and  
Plato reality view. So when I am clear, I can look too much  
provocative for some.





Having said
that, I'm prepared to put effort in to learn something new if I have
misunderstood something.


OK. Nice attitude.




You have misread my tone if you think it indicates bias against your
theory. I have read your paper (at least the UDA part, not the machine
interview) several times, carefully, and presented it to my (informal)
philosophy group, because I certainly find it intriguing.


OK. Nice.





I'll admit
that step 8 is where I struggle


Hmm, from your post, it seemed to me that there remains some problem  
in UDA1-7.





- it's not well explained in the paper
yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.


When I presented UDA at the ASSC meeting of 1995 (I think) a famous  
philosopher of mind left the room at step 3 (the duplication step). He  
pretended that we feel to be at both places at once after a self- 
duplication experience. It was the first time someone told me this. I  
don't know if he was sincere. It looks some people want to believe UDA  
wrong, and are able to dismiss any step.





The
argument about passive devices activated by counterfactual changes in
the environment is opaque to me and seems devious - probably defeated
in the details of implementation like Maxwell's demon - but that is
obviously not a rebuttal. I will take a look at the additional
information you've linked to.


OK. Maudlin has found a very close argument. Mine is simpler (and  
older).





I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random,


OK.



but I'm not sure that negates the core of
my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?


It generates old inputs of all programs, including infinite streams.  
Those can be considered as random. But what the program does with such  
input is not random.





I
am open to contradiction on this. If it doesn't, then it means it has
to be incapable of producing certain patterns of bits, but in
principle every 

Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/26/2011 11:52 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King 
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:


On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com
mailto:pier...@gmail.com wrote:


I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates
the core of
my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not
correct?


I think you are confusing a bit pattern for a computation.  A
hard drive can contain any possible bit pattern that will fit on
its platter, but this bit pattern won't contain consciousness.

Conversely, if the computer is powered up and running the
appropriate program, that program may be conscious.  This is the
difference between the UD, and the series of integers or the
digits of Pi.  The UD executes all possible programs, the set of
Integers is equivalent to all possible bit patterns.



I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation
produces
more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at
random some
algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would
be pretty
much noise almost all the time. 



I think you could say the program may be uninteresting, or not
contain a mind or minds.

Are you familiar with the Anthropic principle?  The idea that
observers will always find themselves in places where they can
exist.  They perform the selection by virtue of their existence
and observation of their environment.

The vast majority of programs may not contain observers, but
those few that do will become environments for the minds they host.

*Proving* it is noise is of course
impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've
selected
out the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky
Way,
but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion
more
that perform this operation, but also add in various other
quantities
and computations that render the results useless from a
physicist's
point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing
procedures and
unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of
algorithms,
but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some
other means
(measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out
which
ones are signal and which ones noise.


We can ignore the computations which don't contain observers, and
as far as predicting your own future, we can ignore those that
don't contain you.

You also asked about why not execute  them all in parallel. 
Every program does exist in math independetly of the UD.  I think

the reason Bruno described the UD was that it was a simple single
program he could show exists in math.  You also questioned
whether the existence of the UD is something really there or some
mental construction of ours.  If you think 17 is prime is true
independently of your knowledge of it, then the statement the UD
does not halt is also true independently of your knowledge of it.

Jason


Jason,

I really would like to understand how it is that the truth
valuation of a proposition is not dependent on our knowledge of it
can be used to affirm the meaning of the referent of that
proposition independent of us?


That sentence was hard to parse!  If I understand it correctly, you 
are asking how a truth, independent of our knowledge, can confer 
meaning to something without us?

[SPK]
Essentially, yes.



Things unknown to anyone can have consequences which are eventually do 
make a difference to beings which are aware of the difference.  A 
comet colliding with the Earth and hitting a pond of unicellular 
organisms may have drastically altered the course of evolution on our 
planet.  That such a comet impact ocurred is a fact which is either 
true or false, despite it being independent of anyone's knowledge of 
it.  Yet it has perceptable results.



[SPK]
The web of causes and effects is an aspect of the material 
universe. I am taking that concept into consideration.


Correspondingly, the existence of some mathematical truth (even if not 
comprehended by anyone) can have effects for observers, in fact, it 
might explain both the observers themselves and their experiences.

[SPK]
Slow down! existence of some mathematical truth??? Do you mean 
the truth value of some existing mathematical statement? That is what I 
mean in my question by the 

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2011-09-26 Thread meekerdb

On 9/26/2011 7:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:03 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 9/25/2011 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 9/25/2011 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I mentioned QM only to mentioned a computer emulable theory of 
molecules.
I find quite possible that QM explains biochemistry, given the 
incredible
theory of chemistry the SWE equation allow (molecules and the 
electronic
shape of atoms is really what QM explains the most elegantly and
successfully, but this is besides my point).

But you are coherent: if you want materialism, you will need a non 
turing
emulable theory of matter, and of mind.
Good luck, because it needs already some amount of work to conceive
something not Turing emulable in math, and in physics, it is even 
more
difficult.


But QM is based on complex numbers over the reals, which are already 
not Turing
emulable.


Has a real number ever been measured by any physicist?

Jason


Sure.  He measured one side of the right triangle to be 1cubit and the 
other side to
be 1cubit and concluded that the third side was sqrt(2)cubit.


That's not an example of a physicist measuring a real number, nor is it a real 
life example.

In real life the physicist would wonder to how many significant figures he measured the 
sides of the triangle, and to how many significant figures he measured the angle of the 
triangle.  Perhaps the physicist rounded to 1 cubit when in reality it was .9909012 
cubits (or in constant flux as the atoms jostle around).


So he gets sqrt (1.9909012).

Brent

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread meekerdb

On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp assumption). 


But what does you refer to?  The comp assumption seems ambiguous.  Is it the assumption 
that you are instantiated by a specific computation?  Or is it the assumption that your 
brain could be replaced, without you noticing, by a physically different computer, so long 
as it computed the same function (at some level).  These seem slightly different to me and 
are only identical if QM is false and the world is strictly classical and deterministic.  
At a practical level the brain is certainly mostly classical and so I might say 'yes' to 
the doctor even though my artificial brain will have slightly different behavoir because 
it has different counterfactual quantum behavior.  But this difference seems to present a 
problem when trying to identify you within the inifinite bundle of computations 
instantiating a particular state in the UD computations.


Of course if you replace the whole universe with an emulation, instead of just my brain, 
then my emulated brain in the emulated universe can have the same behavior as my natural 
brain in this universe.


The UD generates an infinity of computations going through that state. All what I say is 
that your future is determined by all those computations, and your self-referential 
abilities. If from this you can prove that your future is more random than the one 
observed, then you are beginning to refute rigorously comp. But the math part shows that 
this is not easy to do. In fact the random inputs confer stability for the programs 
which exploits that randomness, and again, this is the case for some formulation (à-la 
Feynman) of QM. 


How is this?

Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-09-26 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 25, 7:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sat, Sep 24, 2011 at 5:24 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
  Do you agree or don't you that the observable (or public, or third
  person) behaviour of neurons can be entirely explained in terms of a
  chain of physical events?

  No, nothing can be *entirely* explained in terms of a chain of
  physical events in the way that you assume physical events occur.
  Physical events are a shared experiences, dependent upon the
  perceptual capabilities and choices of the participants in them. That
  is not to say we that the behavior of neurons can't be *adequately*
  explained for specific purposes: medical, biochemical,
  electromagnetic, etc.

 OK, so you agree that the *observable* behaviour of neurons can be
 adequately explained in terms of a chain of physical events. The
 neurons won't do anything that is apparently magical, right?

Are not all of our observations observable behaviors of neurons?
You're not understanding how I think observation works. There is no
such thing as an observable behavior, it's always a matter of
observable how, and by who? If you limit your observation of how
neurons behave to what can be detected by a series of metal probes or
microscopic antenna, then you are getting a radically limited view of
what neurons are and what they do. You are asking a blind man what the
Mona Lisa looks like by having him touch the paint, then making a
careful impression of his fingers, and then announcing that the Mona
Lisa can only do what fingerpainting can do, and that inferring
anything beyond the nature of plain old paint to the Mona Lisa is
magical. No. It doesn't work that way. A universe where nothing more
than paint exists has no capacity to describe an intentional, higher
level representation through a medium of paint. The dynamics of paint
alone do not describe their important but largely irrelevant role to
creating the image.


  At times you have said that thoughts, over
  and above physical events, have an influence on neuronal behaviour.
  For an observer (who has no access to whatever subjectivity the
  neurons may have) that would mean that neurons sometimes fire
  apparently without any trigger, since if thoughts are the trigger this
  is not observable.

  No. Thoughts are not the trigger of physical events, they are the
  experiential correlate of the physical events. It is the sense that
  the two phenomenologies make together that is the trigger.

  If, on the other hand, neurons do not fire in the
  absence of physical stimuli (which may have associated with them
  subjectivity - the observer cannot know this)

  We know that for example, gambling affects the physical behavior of
  the amygdala. What physical force do you posit that emanates from
  'gambling' that penetrates the skull and blood brain barrier to
  mobilize those neurons?

 The skull has various holes in it (the foramen magnum, the orbits,
 foramina for the cranial nerves) through which sense data from the
 environment enters and, via a series of neural relays, reaches the
 amygdala and other parts of the brain.

What is 'sense data' made of and how does it get into 'gambling'?


  But if thoughts influence behaviour and thoughts are not observed,
  then observation of a brain would show things happening contrary to
  physical laws,

  No. Thought are not observed by an MRI. An MRI can only show the
  physical shadow of the experiences taking place.

 That's right, so everything that can be observed in the brain (or in
 the body in general) has an observable cause.

Not at all. The amygdala's response to gambling cannot be observed on
an MRI. We can only infer such a cause because we a priori understand
the experience of gambling. If we did not, of course we could not
infer any kind of association with neural patterns of firing with
something like 'winning a big pot in video poker'. That brain activity
is not a chain reaction from some other part of the brain. The brain
is actually responding to the sense that the mind is making of the
outside world and how it relates to the self. It is not going to be
predictable from whatever the amygala happens to be doing five seconds
or five hours before the win.


 such as neurons apparently firing for no reason, i.e.
  magically. You haven't clearly refuted this, perhaps because you can
  see it would result in a mechanistic brain.

  No, I have refuted it over and over and over and over and over. You
  aren't listening to me, you are stuck in your own cognitive loop.
  Please don't accuse me of this again until you have a better
  understanding of what I mean what I'm saying about the relationship
  between gambling and the amygdala.

  We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we
  created them - A. Einstein.

 You have not answered it. You have contradicted yourself by saying we
 *don't* observe the brain doing things contrary to physics and we *do*
 observe 

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 1:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 9/26/2011 7:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:03 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 9/25/2011 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:35 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 9/25/2011 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I mentioned QM only to mentioned a computer emulable theory of
 molecules.
 I find quite possible that QM explains biochemistry, given the
 incredible theory of chemistry the SWE equation allow (molecules and the
 electronic shape of atoms is really what QM explains the most elegantly and
 successfully, but this is besides my point).

 But you are coherent: if you want materialism, you will need a non
 turing emulable theory of matter, and of mind.
 Good luck, because it needs already some amount of work to conceive
 something not Turing emulable in math, and in physics, it is even more
 difficult.


  But QM is based on complex numbers over the reals, which are already not
 Turing emulable.


 Has a real number ever been measured by any physicist?

 Jason


  Sure.  He measured one side of the right triangle to be 1cubit and the
 other side to be 1cubit and concluded that the third side was sqrt(2)cubit.


 That's not an example of a physicist measuring a real number, nor is it a
 real life example.

 In real life the physicist would wonder to how many significant figures he
 measured the sides of the triangle, and to how many significant figures he
 measured the angle of the triangle.  Perhaps the physicist rounded to 1
 cubit when in reality it was .9909012 cubits (or in constant flux as the
 atoms jostle around).


 So he gets sqrt (1.9909012).


Assuming infinite significant figures.  If such a measurement could be made
then there wouldn't still be a debate about whether or not space is discrete
or continuous.

Jason

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Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 12:14 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:

  On 9/26/2011 11:52 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:

   On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:


 I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
 computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
 my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
 containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?


 I think you are confusing a bit pattern for a computation.  A hard drive
 can contain any possible bit pattern that will fit on its platter, but this
 bit pattern won't contain consciousness.

 Conversely, if the computer is powered up and running the appropriate
 program, that program may be conscious.  This is the difference between the
 UD, and the series of integers or the digits of Pi.  The UD executes all
 possible programs, the set of Integers is equivalent to all possible bit
 patterns.




 I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation produces
 more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
 possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at random some
 algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would be pretty
 much noise almost all the time.


 I think you could say the program may be uninteresting, or not contain a
 mind or minds.

 Are you familiar with the Anthropic principle?  The idea that observers
 will always find themselves in places where they can exist.  They perform
 the selection by virtue of their existence and observation of their
 environment.

 The vast majority of programs may not contain observers, but those few
 that do will become environments for the minds they host.


 *Proving* it is noise is of course
 impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've selected
 out the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way,
 but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion more
 that perform this operation, but also add in various other quantities
 and computations that render the results useless from a physicist's
 point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing procedures and
 unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of algorithms,
 but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some other means
 (measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out which
 ones are signal and which ones noise.


 We can ignore the computations which don't contain observers, and as far
 as predicting your own future, we can ignore those that don't contain you.

 You also asked about why not execute  them all in parallel.  Every program
 does exist in math independetly of the UD.  I think the reason Bruno
 described the UD was that it was a simple single program he could show
 exists in math.  You also questioned whether the existence of the UD is
 something really there or some mental construction of ours.  If you think
 17 is prime is true independently of your knowledge of it, then the
 statement the UD does not halt is also true independently of your
 knowledge of it.

 Jason


  Jason,

 I really would like to understand how it is that the truth valuation
 of a proposition is not dependent on our knowledge of it can be used to
 affirm the meaning of the referent of that proposition independent of us?


 That sentence was hard to parse!  If I understand it correctly, you are
 asking how a truth, independent of our knowledge, can confer meaning to
 something without us?

 [SPK]
 Essentially, yes.



 Things unknown to anyone can have consequences which are eventually do make
 a difference to beings which are aware of the difference.  A comet colliding
 with the Earth and hitting a pond of unicellular organisms may have
 drastically altered the course of evolution on our planet.  That such a
 comet impact ocurred is a fact which is either true or false, despite it
 being independent of anyone's knowledge of it.  Yet it has perceptable
 results.

   [SPK]
 The web of causes and effects is an aspect of the material universe. I
 am taking that concept into consideration.


  Correspondingly, the existence of some mathematical truth (even if not
 comprehended by anyone) can have effects for observers, in fact, it might
 explain both the observers themselves and their experiences.


 [SPK]
 Slow down! existence of some mathematical truth??? Do you mean the
 truth value of some existing mathematical statement? That is what I mean in
 my question by the phrase truth valuation of a proposition. Is a truth
 value something that exists or does not exist?


I am not sure what you mean by exists in this case so let me say this, the
state of being true, or the state of being false, for the proposition in
question, was settled before a human made a determination regarding that

Re: Why UDA proves nothing

2011-09-26 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:

  - it's not well explained in the paper
 yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.


 When I presented UDA at the ASSC meeting of 1995 (I think) a famous
 philosopher of mind left the room at step 3 (the duplication step). He
 pretended that we feel to be at both places at once after a self-duplication
 experience. It was the first time someone told me this. I don't know if he
 was sincere. It looks some people want to believe UDA wrong, and are able to
 dismiss any step.



Was this Chalmers?  You mentioned to me at one point that he believed a
duplicated person experiences both perspectives.  This is a view I can
sympathize with, in the sense that we are part of a universal person who
experiences all perspectives.  A person who steps into a duplicator does
experience both Washington and Moscow, but at either position, does not have
the memories of the other, and thus so cannot talk about those experiences.
It is similar to a person who is tortured, then given a drug to cause total
amnesia.  Is it not the same person who experienced being tortured?

Jason

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Dennett on neurons

2011-09-26 Thread meekerdb

Craig will like part 6 of Dan Dennett's Harvard lectures

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnbSj1OMA8wfeature=related

Brent

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Re: Bruno List continued

2011-09-26 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 25, 7:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

  But if thoughts influence behaviour and thoughts are not observed,
  then observation of a brain would show things happening contrary to
  physical laws,

This image illustrates how bottom-up and top-down processing co-exist:
http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_ls5o3ngv0f1qa4itpo1_500.jpg

If you only look at the leaves and horses, nothing unusual is going
on. It is not physics that makes consciousness invisible, it is our
desire to use physics to insist that reality fit into our narrowest
expectations.

Craig

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Joining Post

2011-09-26 Thread nihil0
It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.

I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm
studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.

The main questions I've been researching are the following:

1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite
the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?

2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an
infinite number of times. Does this imply that I can't make a
difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics.

3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know
something without knowing it for certain?

4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they
merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed?

I would be grateful if anyone could shed some light on any of these
questions. I'm very impressed with what I've read so far from people.

Glad to be here,

Jon

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