Re: Bruno List continued
On 28 Sep 2011, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 28, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Sep 2011, at 22:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 27, 9:20 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: N. Millions of neurons fire simultaneously in separate regions of the brain. Your assumptions about chain reactions being the only way that neurons fire is not correct. You owe the brain an apology. Digital machines can emulate parallelism. In all you answer to Stathis you elude the question by confusing levels of explanation. So either you postulate an infinitely low level (and thus infinities in the brain), or you are introducing the magic mentioned by Stathis. Yes, this is just a tangent, I'm trying to show that the model of the brain as a chain reaction is factually incorrect. I agree, parallelism says nothing about whether it's computational or not, it's just that Stathis is trying to actually claim that psychological processes cannot drive lower level neurology. In a sense I can follow you. If I feel in pain I can take a drug, and in this case a high level psychological process can change a lower level neuro process. But I am sure Stathis agree with this. That whole cycle can still be driven by still lower computable laws. A universal machine can emulate another self-transforming universal machine. That's the point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why UDA proves nothing
On 28 Sep 2011, at 15:53, Pierz wrote: At what point does mathematical truth stop? It seems to be the existence of some would imply the existence of all. Like I said, I need to let this marinate in my consciousness a while. I agree that all mathematical constructs must have the same kind of existence, the same ontological status. But I see a distinction between the type of existence pi has, and the type of existence that time, space and matter have. Well, obviously. The question is, are they prior to such instantiated entities, or emergent from them? Similar to the question, are physical laws objectively extant, or mere descriptions of 'habits'? Do you agree that at least something has to be primitively real? Well I can't really escape that, can I? :) I favour consciousness as a prior reality, a spiritual position I suppose, though I also believe these categories may well just be prejudices in our mental make-up. For physicists, it's the quantum field, for mathematicians it's number, for saints it is love. All perhaps faces of an unnameable prior something. I've read Bruno arguing for number's capacity to explain qualia, and I find it unconvincing. Do you mean by this that you think that we are not machine? Are you rejecting Theaetetus theory of knowledge (true opinion)? What is not convincing? Mathematics is pure structure and qualia are non structural, non quantifiable, not that they are 'uncomputable', but just don't fall into the computable/ uncomputable opposition at all. Modal logic is both mathematics, and it handle the non-computable, and the qualitative. In particular some of the variant of self-reference modal logic handle explicitly and in a formal way the knowledge that the machine itself is unable to formalise. It is (meta) formal logic of the non formalisable. If a person had no right brain at all, he might argue the way Bruno does on this point. (I'm worried about insulting him again now. I don't mean it's half brained. I mean it is blind to all but the quantifiable, and therefore will never satisfy an artist, for instance). Those who have the less problem with mechanism and its consequences are the artists and the engineers. So qualia make me prefer to seek my ontological roots in the notion of consciousness rather than number. This is frequent with mystically inclined people, but I think it is just due to a reductionist conception of numbers and machines, which is provably untenable since Gödel's discovery of incompleteness. You are the one dismissing qulaia for a vast type of entity, in case you use this to refute mechanism. We also are aware of every possible goodness or blessing. At a minimum, this realization should compel us to treat each other better. In the end, the conclusion is little different from the golden rule or the concept of karma. All the good things we do are experienced by others (ourselves), same with all the bad things. Yes, yes and double yes. I made the exact same point in that blog post I mentioned on the subject. If we knew this, truly believed in this unity of the observer, we would move quick smart to a society optimized for the benefit of all. We can never gain at another's expense. Not There but for the grace of God go I but simply There go I. OK. But this is non communicable by (sound) machines. In fact in the ethics of the ideally correct machine, asserting moral principle is immoral. We can only encourage people to understand or discover this by themselves. Bruno On Sep 28, 3:09 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:44 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible information states, and that the difference between that and the UD is the element of sequential computation. I can also see that my objection to infinite computational resources and state memory comes from the 1-p perspective. For me, in the physical universe, any computation is restricted by the laws of matter and must be embedded in that matter. Now one of the fascinating revelations of the computational approach to physics is the fact that a quantity such as position can only be defined to a certain level of precision by the universe itself because the universe has finite informational resources at its disposal. This was my objection to the UD. But I can see that this restriction need not necessarily apply at the 'higher' 3- p level of the UD's computations. What interests me is the question: does UDA predict that the 1-p observer will see a universe with such restrictions? If it explains why the 1-p observer seems to exist in a world where there is only a finite number of bits available, despite existing in a machine with an infinite level of bit resolution, then that
Re: Why UDA proves nothing
On 29 Sep 2011, at 04:11, Pierz wrote: Not at all. That would be a physicalist revisionist definition of numbers. You need to instantiate 17, in some way, to talk about 17, but 17 itself does not need instantiation. With or without any physical universe, 17 remain a prime number. With or without a mind too, I presume you believe. But this really is a metaphysical assumption, No, it is mathematical practice. When numbers are introduced in high school they are not defined by referring to mind or brain, which are more complex notion. not something that is provable. Axioms are never provable, except in redundant theories (for making them easier to use). I would say if you remove all minds, there is no 17, no primes, nothing, because the numbers are lent existence by the mind and/or the physical universe. Mechanism makes mind definable from numbers, but nobody has succeeded in defining numbers from mind, without using numbers. My preferred ontology is idealistic (in the philosophical sense) rather than mathematical. I tend to believe consciousness is prior. And you've agreed consciousness can't really be defined - and therefore dealt with explicitly in your theory. We cannot define consciousness, nor truth, etc. but we do have a good idea of what those things refer too. I believe there is a pure conscious state somewhere down there (in us) that comes before everything else, before the structure which is required to give form to mathematics. Buddhism, the void, all that. We might be close, we can equivocate numbers and consciousness in different ways. Do you say yes to the doctor? (It looks like entheogen.com is out of line currently. Hope it will coma back!). It seems to me I can grant 17 is prime, without granting this instantiation of everything. Well, that solves you of a very long and not so easy work. Haha. Well, thank god we don't have to prove everything we believe - unless, like you, we make a living out of it! Otherwise we'd have to prove our own arses before we could shit. But OK, this is profound stuff, so what seems to me may be way off, on deeper investigation. Arithmetical truth is full of currently non human provable truth (unless we have actual infinite brains, which I doubt). Now, an instanciation, or emulation, can be defined from the numbers alone I can believe that without the textbook. I'm just saying that the instantiated emulation and the definition of the emulation aren't the same. You can define emulation in arithmetic, that is one thing. But you can prove that arithmetic is full of instantiated emulations. That is the thing explained in textbook I was referring too. If comp is true, you are conscious here and now, because an infinity of number relation emulate your computational histories. But I do understand what you are arguing (I think). There's nothing intrinsically illogical about granting numbers an existence that is prior to the physical or the mental, but are you claiming it's *provable*? This is provable assuming you can survive with a material digital brain. That is comp, and comp is not provable. Recently I have updated my spectrum of Löbian machine to the octopus, and the jumping spider. I can argue that they have the cognitive ability to get UDA. I just find that quite funny. The socratic octopus. You can argue it in theory, but it's kind of meaningless I think, since psychology shows abstract reasoning is confined to humans above a certain age. Conscious high level abstract reasoning is such confined, but all brain of all animals does abstract reasoning all the time. Seeing the difference between vertical and horizontal line require complex computations in the brain. Still, I like the socratic octopus so much I'll believe you anyway. I love the way the jumping spider literally falls off its perch when there's no spider on the other side of the mirror. :) Yes, that shows she makes inductive inference, which requires her to be Löbian. Insects seems unable to do this. It is not a problem. It is an impossibility. You cannot prove that *I* am conscious, can you? No of course not, that's what I meant by a problem. A very big one! No, that is not a problem. Since Gödel we know that all machine are confronted with many unprovable truth. Finally, as for obscurity, I rejected obscurity treated as a virtue, not the necessary obscurity of certain difficult ideas - like QFT mathematics. I suppose jumping spiders can do QFT equations too, right? They don't have a sufficiently big brain to handle the motivations for it. But they can in principle. A bit like a baby, except that a baby can develop better its brain than such little animals. Bruno On Sep 29, 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Sep 2011, at 05:44, Pierz wrote: OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have brought me a lot closer
Re: Logics
On 28 Sep 2011, at 16:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/27/2011 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2011, at 13:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/26/2011 7:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
snip
For well-defined propositions regarding the numbers I think the
values are confined to true or false.
Jason
--
[SPK]
Not in general, unless one is only going to allow only Boolean
logics to exist. There have been proven to exist logics that have
truth values that range over any set of numbers, not just {0,1}.
Recall the requirement for a mathematical structure to exist: Self-
consistency.
Consistency is a notion applied usually to theories, or (chatty)
machines, not to mathematical structures.
A theory is consistent if it does not prove some proposition and
its negation. A machine is consistent if it does not assert a
proposition and its negation.
[SPK]
Is not a machine represented mathematically by some abstract
(mathematical ) structure? I am attempting to find clarity in the
ideas surrounding the notion of machine and how you arrive at the
idea that the abstract notion of implementation is sufficient to
derive the physical notion of implementation.
This follows from the UD Argument, in the digital mechanist theory. No
need of AUDA or complex math to understand the necessity of this, once
we accept that we can survive with (physical, material) digital
machines.
In first order logic we have Gödel-Henkin completeness theorem
which shows that a theory is consistent if and only if there is a
mathematical structure (called model) satisfying (in a sense which
can be made precise) the proposition proved in the theory.
[SPK]
What constraints are defined on the models by the Gödel-Henkin
completeness theorem? How do we separate out effective consistent
first-order theories that do not have computable models?
What do you mean by computable models?
Also, it is true that classical (Boolean) logic are not the only
logic. There are infinitely many logics, below and above classical
propositional logic. But this cannot be used to criticize the use
of classical logic in some domain.
[SPK]
OK. My thought here was to show that classical (Boolean) logic
is not unique and should not be taken as absolute. To do so would be
a mistake similar to Kant's claim that Euclidean logic was absolute.
OK, but then why to use that fact to criticize Jason's defense of
arithmetical truth independent of humans.
All treatises on any non classical logic used classical (or much
more rarely intuitionistic) logic at the meta-level. You will not
find a book on fuzzy logic having fuzzy theorems, for example. Non
classical logics have multiple use, which are not related with the
kind of ontic truth we are looking for when searching a TOE.
[SPK]
Of course fuzzy logic does not have fuzzy theorem, that could be
mistaking the meaning of the word fuzzy with the meaning of the
word ambiguous. I have been trying to establish the validity of
the idea that it is the rules (given as axioms, etc) that are used
to define a given mathematical structure, be it a model, or an
algebra, etc. But I think that one must be careful that the logical
structure that one uses of a means to define ontic truths is not
assumed to be absolute unless very strong reasons can be proven to
exist for such assumptions.
Usually non classical logic have epistemic or pragmatic classical
interpretations, or even classical formulation, like the classical
modal logic S4 which can emulate intuitionistic logic, or the
Brouwersche modal logic B, which can emulate weak quantum logic.
This corresponds to the fact that intuitionist logic might modelize
constructive provability, and quantum logic modelizes
observability, and not the usual notion of classical truth (as used
almost everywhere in mathematics).
[SPK]
I use the orthocomplete lattices as a representation of quantum
logic. My ideas are influenced by the work of Svozil, Calude and
von Benthem, and others on this. I am not sure of the definition of
weak quantum logic as you use it here.
Svozil, Calude and van Benthem thought on the subject are very good.
Weak quantum logic is the logic of sublattice of ortholattices, like
in the paper of Goldblatt that I have often refer to you. Basically it
is quantum logic without the orthomodularity axiom. It does not
distinguish finite dimensional pre-Hilbert space from Hilbert spave,
for example.
One question regarding the emulations. If one where considering
only finite emulations of a quantum logic (such as how a classical
approximation of a QM system could be considered), how might one
apply the Tychonoff, Heine–Borel definition or Bolzano–Weierstrass
criterion of compactness to be sure that compactness obtain for the
models? If we use these compactness criteria, is it necessary that
the collection
Re: Why UDA proves nothing
On 9/28/2011 10:11 PM, Pierz wrote: Not at all. That would be a physicalist revisionist definition of numbers. You need to instantiate 17, in some way, to talk about 17, but 17 itself does not need instantiation. With or without any physical universe, 17 remain a prime number. With or without a mind too, I presume you believe. But this really is a metaphysical assumption, not something that is provable. I would say if you remove all minds, there is no 17, no primes, nothing, because the numbers are lent existence by the mind and/or the physical universe. My preferred ontology is idealistic (in the philosophical sense) rather than mathematical. I tend to believe consciousness is prior. And you've agreed consciousness can't really be defined - and therefore dealt with explicitly in your theory. I believe there is a pure conscious state somewhere down there (in us) that comes before everything else, before the structure which is required to give form to mathematics. Buddhism, the void, all that. [SPK] I would disagree with this claim. There is a difference between the existence on an entity and its properties and the definiteness thereof. Existence and the property of having a definite set of properties (as opposed to having a spectrum of possible properties) should not be conflated. My reasoning is that if the existence of an entity where to depend on whether or not a mind has the object as a subject of perception or a physical entity has some other as a effective cause of some property of its own then existence would be a property that an object could have. Is existence a property that we measure, even in principle? No. Why is this conflation so rampant in thought? I have even seen instances of this kind of language in the work of the estimable David Deutsch! How is even the question of does the existence of an entity depend on its perception by some other entity not seen instantly as oxymoronic? It seems to me I can grant 17 is prime, without granting this instantiation of everything. Well, that solves you of a very long and not so easy work. Haha. Well, thank god we don't have to prove everything we believe - unless, like you, we make a living out of it! Otherwise we'd have to prove our own arses before we could shit. But OK, this is profound stuff, so what seems to me may be way off, on deeper investigation. [SPK] Could it be that the definiteness of properties of our arses, in this example, are something that is contingent on interactions but not the possibility of having properties is not? Now, an instanciation, or emulation, can be defined from the numbers alone I can believe that without the textbook. I'm just saying that the instantiated emulation and the definition of the emulation aren't the same. But I do understand what you are arguing (I think). There's nothing intrinsically illogical about granting numbers an existence that is prior to the physical or the mental, but are you claiming it's *provable*? [SPK] To elaborate on this question by Pierz, is not provability a property that must be demonstrated to occur for a given abstract entity? Recently I have updated my spectrum of Löbian machine to the octopus, and the jumping spider. I can argue that they have the cognitive ability to get UDA. I just find that quite funny. The socratic octopus. You can argue it in theory, but it's kind of meaningless I think, since psychology shows abstract reasoning is confined to humans above a certain age. Still, I like the socratic octopus so much I'll believe you anyway. I love the way the jumping spider literally falls off its perch when there's no spider on the other side of the mirror. :) [SPK] It would be interesting to see the experiment that would allow us to determine whether or not an octopus or spider can distinguish between a purely abstract concept and the actuality of a physical entity. How do we determine that a spider has thoughts about its percepts? It is not a problem. It is an impossibility. You cannot prove that *I* am conscious, can you? No of course not, that's what I meant by a problem. A very big one! Finally, as for obscurity, I rejected obscurity treated as a virtue, not the necessary obscurity of certain difficult ideas - like QFT mathematics. I suppose jumping spiders can do QFT equations too, right? [SPK] How could we determined If they can know that what they are doing is QFT even if they can solve QFT equations? Onward! Stephen On Sep 29, 2:07 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Sep 2011, at 05:44, Pierz wrote: OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible information states, and that the difference between that and the UD is the element of sequential computation. I can also see that my objection to infinite computational
Re: Bruno List continued
On Sep 29, 3:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Sep 2011, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 28, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Sep 2011, at 22:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 27, 9:20 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: N. Millions of neurons fire simultaneously in separate regions of the brain. Your assumptions about chain reactions being the only way that neurons fire is not correct. You owe the brain an apology. Digital machines can emulate parallelism. In all you answer to Stathis you elude the question by confusing levels of explanation. So either you postulate an infinitely low level (and thus infinities in the brain), or you are introducing the magic mentioned by Stathis. Yes, this is just a tangent, I'm trying to show that the model of the brain as a chain reaction is factually incorrect. I agree, parallelism says nothing about whether it's computational or not, it's just that Stathis is trying to actually claim that psychological processes cannot drive lower level neurology. In a sense I can follow you. If I feel in pain I can take a drug, and in this case a high level psychological process can change a lower level neuro process. But I am sure Stathis agree with this. That whole cycle can still be driven by still lower computable laws. A universal machine can emulate another self-transforming universal machine. That's the point. I would still say that at some point 'I' participates directly and non- deterministically in the process. Even if only to arbitrate between many conflicting subordinate senses and motives, all of which I suspect have more deterministic but still 'not-as-deterministic-as' processes such as those within inorganic molecules or atoms. The I herself may not be completely non-computational and indeterministic, but that doesn't mean that she has no control of her thoughts, opinions, and actions either. What my hypothesis offers though, is to make concrete the abstraction of 'lower computable laws' so that they are not metaphysical, but intraphysical. They are actual sensorimotive experiences localized in and through matter. Like the laws we follow as citizens, we are compelled to do so by the senses of social identification and motives of avoiding negative consequences. It's a subjective experience which can be abstracted into a formula with reasonable success, but the experience is not the same thing as the formula, the map is not the territory, etc. If we recognize that the example of how we as individuals follow 'laws', not because those laws are metaphysical programs which are deterministically executed on unwitting helpless voyeurs, but because the customs, practices, and expectations of our niche are recapitulated locally in the individual as sensorimotive dynamics. The actual literal process by which laws and customs are upheld is not though explicit codes, it's because we don't like the feeling of going against our conditioning. It makes us nervous and ashamed; fearful, etc. I'm not saying that atoms bond together because they are lonely or the Krebs cycle propagates because citric acid was raised to believe that it has a job to do, but that in each case there is likely a corresponding nano-sensorimotive experience going on. When you realize that the senses and motives which have grown great enough to catch the attention of the 'I', that they are trillions of times more saturated and nuanced than those sensorimotives arising from the individual cells and molecules, we can see that the proto-experience of an individual neuron-eukaryote need not be anthropomorphized to a large extent. It can be calculated as a history of action potentials, but that doesn't explain what the action potentials actually are. They are semi- voluntary (some more voluntary than others) participatory spasms. We are used to imagining these impulses like electric sparks or flashes of light inside the brain, but they only look like sparks when viewed through a device which records them that way. To the naked eye you won't see any sparks, and to the subject whose brain it is, there are only thoughts, images, and feelings. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it takes the brain 100 ms to compute a moment of awareness, then you can know you were not created 1 microsecond ago. Suppose your brain paused for 1 us every 99 ms. To an external observer you would be functioning normally; do you think you would be a philosophical zombie? We can change the thought experiment to make the pauses and the duration of consciousness between the pauses arbitrarily long, effectively cutting up consciousness however we want, even if a conscious moment is smeared out over time. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On Sep 29, 2011, at 8:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it takes the brain 100 ms to compute a moment of awareness, then you can know you were not created 1 microsecond ago. Suppose your brain paused for 1 us every 99 ms. To an external observer you would be functioning normally; do you think you would be a philosophical zombie? We can change the thought experiment to make the pauses and the duration of consciousness between the pauses arbitrarily long, effectively cutting up consciousness however we want, even if a conscious moment is smeared out over time. I think you missed what I was attempting to say. I agree that it would function normally with the introduction of pauses. Let's say the brain was uploaded and on a computer. The scheduler would do a context switch to let another process run. This would not affect the brain or create a zombie. We could even pause the brain, send it over the wire to another computer and execute it there, without a problem. What I think would be problematic is starting a brain simulation without any prior computational history. I think it might take some minimum amount of time (computation) before that brain could be aware of anything. Jason -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On 29 Sep 2011, at 14:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 29, 3:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Sep 2011, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 28, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Sep 2011, at 22:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 27, 9:20 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: N. Millions of neurons fire simultaneously in separate regions of the brain. Your assumptions about chain reactions being the only way that neurons fire is not correct. You owe the brain an apology. Digital machines can emulate parallelism. In all you answer to Stathis you elude the question by confusing levels of explanation. So either you postulate an infinitely low level (and thus infinities in the brain), or you are introducing the magic mentioned by Stathis. Yes, this is just a tangent, I'm trying to show that the model of the brain as a chain reaction is factually incorrect. I agree, parallelism says nothing about whether it's computational or not, it's just that Stathis is trying to actually claim that psychological processes cannot drive lower level neurology. In a sense I can follow you. If I feel in pain I can take a drug, and in this case a high level psychological process can change a lower level neuro process. But I am sure Stathis agree with this. That whole cycle can still be driven by still lower computable laws. A universal machine can emulate another self-transforming universal machine. That's the point. I would still say that at some point 'I' participates directly and non- deterministically in the process. Even if only to arbitrate between many conflicting subordinate senses and motives, all of which I suspect have more deterministic but still 'not-as-deterministic-as' processes such as those within inorganic molecules or atoms. The I herself may not be completely non-computational and indeterministic, but that doesn't mean that she has no control of her thoughts, opinions, and actions either. What my hypothesis offers though, is to make concrete the abstraction of 'lower computable laws' so that they are not metaphysical, but intraphysical. They are actual sensorimotive experiences localized in and through matter. Like the laws we follow as citizens, we are compelled to do so by the senses of social identification and motives of avoiding negative consequences. It's a subjective experience which can be abstracted into a formula with reasonable success, but the experience is not the same thing as the formula, the map is not the territory, etc. If we recognize that the example of how we as individuals follow 'laws', not because those laws are metaphysical programs which are deterministically executed on unwitting helpless voyeurs, but because the customs, practices, and expectations of our niche are recapitulated locally in the individual as sensorimotive dynamics. The actual literal process by which laws and customs are upheld is not though explicit codes, it's because we don't like the feeling of going against our conditioning. It makes us nervous and ashamed; fearful, etc. I'm not saying that atoms bond together because they are lonely or the Krebs cycle propagates because citric acid was raised to believe that it has a job to do, but that in each case there is likely a corresponding nano-sensorimotive experience going on. When you realize that the senses and motives which have grown great enough to catch the attention of the 'I', that they are trillions of times more saturated and nuanced than those sensorimotives arising from the individual cells and molecules, we can see that the proto-experience of an individual neuron-eukaryote need not be anthropomorphized to a large extent. It can be calculated as a history of action potentials, but that doesn't explain what the action potentials actually are. They are semi- voluntary (some more voluntary than others) participatory spasms. We are used to imagining these impulses like electric sparks or flashes of light inside the brain, but they only look like sparks when viewed through a device which records them that way. To the naked eye you won't see any sparks, and to the subject whose brain it is, there are only thoughts, images, and feelings. I don't feel this very compelling. You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization. This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from our direct experience. You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least describe. The link between both remains as unexplainable as before. You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe when we look at our bodies) obeys
Re: Bruno List continued
On Thu, Sep 29, 2011 at 1:45 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The neural processes and the thoughts are different views of the same thing. In the case of voluntarily imagining something, it is the subjective content of the experiences being imagined which makes sense and the neurological processes are the shadow. There is no strictly neurological reason for their behavior, let alone one that evokes 'tennis'. If it were something involuntary, like a fever coming on, then the neurological processes would be the active sensemaking agent and the experience of getting sick would be the shadow. It's bi- directional. I know that you won't admit that that could ever be the case, but I don't understand why. There *is* a strictly neurological reason for the 3-P observable behaviour. If we limit ourselves to talking about that, do you agree? If a thought can cause a movement in the absence of a physical event, for example if ligand-dependent ion channels open and trigger an action potential in the absence of the ligand, that would be observed as magical, like a table levitating. The thought *is* a physical event, it's just the subjective view of it. It's many physical events, each with a subjective view, but together, rather than forming a machine of objects related in space, the experiential side is experiences over time which are shared as a single, deeper, richer experience stream over time. But you can't see the thought. Restrict discussion for now to the 3-P observable behaviour of a neuron being investigated by a cell biologist. From the scientist's point of view, the neuron only fires in response to stimuli such as neurotransmitters at the synapse (depending on what sort of neuron it is). Do you see that if the thought makes the neuron do anything other than what the scientist expects it to do from consideration of its physical properties and the physical properties of the environment then it would be observed to be behaving magically? You are not answering my question. Why does there need to be 'understanding' at all? You are saying that neurology causes something to occur: understanding. What do you mean by that. What is it? Magic? Metaphysics? It's something which cannot be reduced to something simpler. Again I don't think you understand what would happen if you replaced part of your brain with a qualia-less component that had the same third person observable behaviour. Perhaps you could tell me in your own words if you do. What would really happen is that it could not have the same third person observable behavior. If someone is deaf, you cannot observe their lack of hearing by observing them, unless you intentionally try to test them. If you replace someones eyes with eyes which only see in the x-ray spectrum, then the visual cortex would pick it up in the familiar colors of the visible spectrum. If you replaced the visual cortex with something that processes optical stimulation in the eyes invisibly, then the patient would see nothing but would develop perceptual compensation from their other senses very rapidly compared with someone who went blind suddenly. They would have to learn to read their new optical capacity and it would not be visual, but it would enable them eventually to behave as a sighted person in most relevant ways. The replacement part reproduces the 3-P behaviour of the biological part. This means the rest of the brain also has the same 3-P behaviour, since it is subjected to the same 3-P environmental influences from the replacement part (that is what was reproduced, even if the qualia were not). So the subject behaves as if he has normal vision and hearing and believes that he has normal vision and hearing. You may object that the rest of the subject's brain does not behave normally since it lacks the input from the qualia. But if the qualia affect neurons directly, over and above what you would expect from the qualia-less physical activity, that would mean that magical events are observed. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Existence and Properties
On 9/29/2011 4:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Sep 2011, at 16:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/27/2011 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2011, at 13:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/26/2011 7:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
snip
For well-defined propositions regarding the numbers I think the
values are confined to true or false.
Jason
--
[SPK]
Not in general, unless one is only going to allow only Boolean
logics to exist. There have been proven to exist logics that have
truth values that range over any set of numbers, not just {0,1}.
Recall the requirement for a mathematical structure to exist:
Self-consistency.
Consistency is a notion applied usually to theories, or (chatty)
machines, not to mathematical structures.
A theory is consistent if it does not prove some proposition and its
negation. A machine is consistent if it does not assert a
proposition and its negation.
[SPK]
Is not a machine represented mathematically by some abstract
(mathematical ) structure? I am attempting to find clarity in the
ideas surrounding the notion of machine and how you arrive at the
idea that the abstract notion of implementation is sufficient to
derive the physical notion of implementation.
This follows from the UD Argument, in the digital mechanist theory. No
need of AUDA or complex math to understand the necessity of this, once
we accept that we can survive with (physical, material) digital machines.
[SPK]
Is the property of universality independent of whether or not a
machine has a set of properties? What is it that determines the
properties of a machine? I need to understand better your definition of
the word machine.
In first order logic we have Gödel-Henkin completeness theorem which
shows that a theory is consistent if and only if there is a
mathematical structure (called model) satisfying (in a sense which
can be made precise) the proposition proved in the theory.
[SPK]
What constraints are defined on the models by the Gödel-Henkin
completeness theorem? How do we separate out effective consistent
first-order theories that do not have computable models?
What do you mean by computable models?
[SPK]
Allow me to quote several definitions: computable functions are
exactly the functions that can be calculated using a mechanical
calculation device given unlimited amounts of time and storage space.
(from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function). a computable
model is one whose underlying set is decidable and whose functions and
relations are uniformly computable. (from
http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0602483).
A computable model, as I understand it, could be considered as a
representation of a system or structure whose properties can be
determined by some process that can itself be represented as a function
from the set of countable numbers to itself. This defintion seeks to
abstractly represent the way that we can determine the properties of a
physical system X or, equivalently, generate a finite list of operations
that will create an instance of X.
Also, it is true that classical (Boolean) logic are not the only
logic. There are infinitely many logics, below and above classical
propositional logic. But this cannot be used to criticize the use of
classical logic in some domain.
[SPK]
OK. My thought here was to show that classical (Boolean) logic is
not unique and should not be taken as absolute. To do so would be a
mistake similar to Kant's claim that Euclidean logic was absolute.
OK, but then why to use that fact to criticize Jason's defense of
arithmetical truth independent of humans.
[SPK]
I am claiming a distinction between the existence of a structure
and the definiteness of its properties. It is my claim that prior to the
establishment of whether or not a method of determining or deciding what
the properties of a structure or system are, one can only consider the
possibility of the structure or system. For example, say some
proposition or sentence of a language exists. Does that existence
determine the particulars of that proposition or sentence? If it can how
so? How do can we claim to be able to decide that P_i is true in the
absence of a means to determine or decide what P_i means?
How do you know the meaning of these word Unicorn? Is the meaning
of the word Unicorn something that that arises simply from the
existence of sequence of symbols? is not meaning not something like a
map between some set of properties instantiated entity and some set of
instances of those properties in other entities? Consider an entity X
that had a set of properties x_i that could not be related to those of
any other entity? Would this prevent the existence of X?
The existence of X is the necessary possibility of X, []X.
All treatises on any non classical logic used classical (or much
more rarely intuitionistic) logic at the meta-level. You will not
find a book on fuzzy
Re: Existence and Properties
On 9/29/2011 10:36 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/29/2011 4:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Sep 2011, at 16:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/27/2011 10:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2011, at 13:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/26/2011 7:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
snip
For well-defined propositions regarding the numbers I think the
values are confined to true or false.
Jason
--
[SPK]
Not in general, unless one is only going to allow only Boolean
logics to exist. There have been proven to exist logics that have
truth values that range over any set of numbers, not just {0,1}.
Recall the requirement for a mathematical structure to exist:
Self-consistency.
Consistency is a notion applied usually to theories, or (chatty)
machines, not to mathematical structures.
A theory is consistent if it does not prove some proposition and
its negation. A machine is consistent if it does not assert a
proposition and its negation.
[SPK]
Is not a machine represented mathematically by some abstract
(mathematical ) structure? I am attempting to find clarity in the
ideas surrounding the notion of machine and how you arrive at the
idea that the abstract notion of implementation is sufficient to
derive the physical notion of implementation.
This follows from the UD Argument, in the digital mechanist theory.
No need of AUDA or complex math to understand the necessity of this,
once we accept that we can survive with (physical, material) digital
machines.
[SPK]
Is the property of universality independent of whether or not a
machine has a set of properties? What is it that determines the
properties of a machine? I need to understand better your definition
of the word machine.
In first order logic we have Gödel-Henkin completeness theorem
which shows that a theory is consistent if and only if there is a
mathematical structure (called model) satisfying (in a sense which
can be made precise) the proposition proved in the theory.
[SPK]
What constraints are defined on the models by the Gödel-Henkin
completeness theorem? How do we separate out effective consistent
first-order theories that do not have computable models?
What do you mean by computable models?
[SPK]
Allow me to quote several definitions: computable functions are
exactly the functions that can be calculated using a mechanical
calculation device given unlimited amounts of time and storage space.
(from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function). a
computable model is one whose underlying set is decidable and whose
functions and relations are uniformly computable. (from
http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0602483).
A computable model, as I understand it, could be considered as a
representation of a system or structure whose properties can be
determined by some process that can itself be represented as a
function from the set of countable numbers to itself. This defintion
seeks to abstractly represent the way that we can determine the
properties of a physical system X or, equivalently, generate a finite
list of operations that will create an instance of X.
Also, it is true that classical (Boolean) logic are not the only
logic. There are infinitely many logics, below and above classical
propositional logic. But this cannot be used to criticize the use
of classical logic in some domain.
[SPK]
OK. My thought here was to show that classical (Boolean) logic
is not unique and should not be taken as absolute. To do so would be
a mistake similar to Kant's claim that Euclidean logic was absolute.
OK, but then why to use that fact to criticize Jason's defense of
arithmetical truth independent of humans.
[SPK]
I am claiming a distinction between the existence of a structure
and the definiteness of its properties. It is my claim that prior to
the establishment of whether or not a method of determining or
deciding what the properties of a structure or system are, one can
only consider the possibility of the structure or system. For example,
say some proposition or sentence of a language exists. Does that
existence determine the particulars of that proposition or sentence?
If it can how so? How do can we claim to be able to decide that P_i is
true in the absence of a means to determine or decide what P_i means?
How do you know the meaning of these word Unicorn? Is the
meaning of the word Unicorn something that that arises simply from
the existence of sequence of symbols? is not meaning not something
like a map between some set of properties instantiated entity and some
set of instances of those properties in other entities? Consider an
entity X that had a set of properties x_i that could not be related to
those of any other entity? Would this prevent the existence of X?
The existence of X is the necessary possibility of X, []X.
All treatises on any non classical logic used classical (or much
more rarely intuitionistic) logic at the
Re: Why UDA proves nothing
On 9/29/2011 12:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But this is non communicable by (sound) machines. In fact in the ethics of the ideally correct machine, asserting moral principle is immoral. We can only encourage people to understand or discover this by themselves. Bruno Several times you have made moral assertions (like the immoral one above :-) ), and I have agreed with them. But I don't see how they follow from the UDA. An objective basis of agreement on ethics and morals would be a great advance in world peace, so I'm very interested in how you derive these assertions (which you shouldn't make). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On 9/29/2011 6:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it takes the brain 100 ms to compute a moment of awareness, then you can know you were not created 1 microsecond ago. Suppose your brain paused for 1 us every 99 ms. To an external observer you would be functioning normally; do you think you would be a philosophical zombie? We can change the thought experiment to make the pauses and the duration of consciousness between the pauses arbitrarily long, effectively cutting up consciousness however we want, even if a conscious moment is smeared out over time. That's true, regarding the brain as a classical computer or as an abstract computation. But those are the points in question. I doubt that it is true regarding the brain as the quantum object it is. It's not clear to me what it would mean in the QM case; freezing the wave function? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On 29 Sep 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: On 9/29/2011 6:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it takes the brain 100 ms to compute a moment of awareness, then you can know you were not created 1 microsecond ago. Suppose your brain paused for 1 us every 99 ms. To an external observer you would be functioning normally; do you think you would be a philosophical zombie? We can change the thought experiment to make the pauses and the duration of consciousness between the pauses arbitrarily long, effectively cutting up consciousness however we want, even if a conscious moment is smeared out over time. That's true, regarding the brain as a classical computer or as an abstract computation. But those are the points in question. I doubt that it is true regarding the brain as the quantum object it is. It's not clear to me what it would mean in the QM case; freezing the wave function? Use the quantum Zeno effect. Observe its state repetitively. You will project it again and again in its original state. That is one method. Or, second method, emulate the quantum object evolution on a classical computer, and freeze the classical computer. The UD emulates also the quantum computations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why UDA proves nothing
On 29 Sep 2011, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote: On 9/29/2011 12:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But this is non communicable by (sound) machines. In fact in the ethics of the ideally correct machine, asserting moral principle is immoral. We can only encourage people to understand or discover this by themselves. Bruno Several times you have made moral assertions (like the immoral one above :-) ), and I have agreed with them. But I don't see how they follow from the UDA. An objective basis of agreement on ethics and morals would be a great advance in world peace, so I'm very interested in how you derive these assertions (which you shouldn't make). The ineffable is so much ineffable that even just writing one sentence on it can only completely miss the point. In fact, your very question answers it: we are near a diagonal self- defeating sentence. Those are the fixed point of p --- ~Bp, and are of type Dt. So they belong to G* minus G. They obey the laws Bx -- ~x. And so, if I was a wise guy, I should either shut my mouth, or explain that If moral makes sense, then we can't communicate that moral, or something like that. Moral is a bet in a better reality, and thus Dt, by completeness, for Löbian entity talking firs order logic. (~Bf - there is a model/ reality). That is another path for justifying that link. Lao Tseu, Plotinus, etc. All the mystic, capable if being a bit rationalist knows that they should better NOT talk. That is why the ideal machine keeps so much silence on the deep question. Thanks to G*, many no provable proposition (rationally communicable, justifiable) can be justified by assuming some reflexion principle, like Dt (Bf - f), or stronger. But it is here that the LUMs can easily fall in the pseudo-theological trap. Bruno PS This comes more from AUDA, than UDA. But UDA is enough to explain that if we are moral enough then we cannot enforce anyone in believing that he will survive, or just be satisfied, with an artificial brain (or even an aspirin). The truth of comp, or aspirin (btw), is in personal judgement, evaluation and possible (risky) experiences. That's number life! http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On 9/29/2011 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Sep 2011, at 19:24, meekerdb wrote: On 9/29/2011 6:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it takes the brain 100 ms to compute a moment of awareness, then you can know you were not created 1 microsecond ago. Suppose your brain paused for 1 us every 99 ms. To an external observer you would be functioning normally; do you think you would be a philosophical zombie? We can change the thought experiment to make the pauses and the duration of consciousness between the pauses arbitrarily long, effectively cutting up consciousness however we want, even if a conscious moment is smeared out over time. That's true, regarding the brain as a classical computer or as an abstract computation. But those are the points in question. I doubt that it is true regarding the brain as the quantum object it is. It's not clear to me what it would mean in the QM case; freezing the wave function? Use the quantum Zeno effect. Observe its state repetitively. You will project it again and again in its original state. That is one method. That requires constructing an observable that has brain states as its eigenstates. Such an observable is a quasi-classical interaction that entangles the state with the environment via decoherence. So whether consciousness would survive this, is already equivalent to the question of whether you should say 'yes' to the doctor who proposes to replace your brain with a classical computation. Or, second method, emulate the quantum object evolution on a classical computer, and freeze the classical computer. Does the classical computer obey the 323 principle? I think such computers don't exist (except in Platonia). The UD emulates also the quantum computations. Yes that's another formulation of the same proposition. But I wonder how it emulates the non-interaction experiments. The conventional computation assumes true randomness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't feel this very compelling. You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization. Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and localization, which we do already. This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from our direct experience. Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience? You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least describe. It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking place at these microcosmic levels is nothing like what we, as a conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to. It's more like protopsychism. The link between both remains as unexplainable as before. Mind would be a sensorimotive structure. The link between the sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two. You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe when we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive). Then you derive from this that the third person I is not Turing emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be). The I is always first person. The brain or body would be third person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Sep 29, 10:31 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: There *is* a strictly neurological reason for the 3-P observable behaviour. If we limit ourselves to talking about that, do you agree? I would say no, because I would not describe something like 'gambling' as strictly neurological reason in the sense that I think you intend it. Of course all of our feelings and perceptions are neurological experiences in the broad sense, but that's just because neurological structures feel and perceive. If a thought can cause a movement in the absence of a physical event, for example if ligand-dependent ion channels open and trigger an action potential in the absence of the ligand, that would be observed as magical, like a table levitating. The thought *is* a physical event, it's just the subjective view of it. It's many physical events, each with a subjective view, but together, rather than forming a machine of objects related in space, the experiential side is experiences over time which are shared as a single, deeper, richer experience stream over time. But you can't see the thought. Restrict discussion for now to the 3-P observable behaviour of a neuron being investigated by a cell biologist. From the scientist's point of view, the neuron only fires in response to stimuli such as neurotransmitters at the synapse (depending on what sort of neuron it is). No, you can see in that brain animation that the neuron fires whenever it needs to /wants to. It's actions aren't inevitable or scheduled in some way, it's responding directly to the overall perceptions and motives of the person as a whole as well as all of the congruences and conflicts amongst the subordinate neural pathways. Do you see that if the thought makes the neuron do anything other than what the scientist expects it to do from consideration of its physical properties and the physical properties of the environment then it would be observed to be behaving magically? Only if the scientist knew nothing about neurology. What the neurons do, collectively *is* thought. It's no different than how bacteria use quorum sensing to make collective decisions. I understand why you might assume that neurons are passive receptacles to some kind of neurological law, but that is not the case. They are living organisms. Look at how heart cells synchronize: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO4pAc21M24 They communicate with each other. They do things as a group. Neurons are much more complicated and unpredictable. They are able to do what they want to do, not just what they have to do. You are not answering my question. Why does there need to be 'understanding' at all? You are saying that neurology causes something to occur: understanding. What do you mean by that. What is it? Magic? Metaphysics? It's something which cannot be reduced to something simpler. Irreducibility is just a characteristic of it. Saying that doesn't explain what it is. Again I don't think you understand what would happen if you replaced part of your brain with a qualia-less component that had the same third person observable behaviour. Perhaps you could tell me in your own words if you do. What would really happen is that it could not have the same third person observable behavior. If someone is deaf, you cannot observe their lack of hearing by observing them, unless you intentionally try to test them. If you replace someones eyes with eyes which only see in the x-ray spectrum, then the visual cortex would pick it up in the familiar colors of the visible spectrum. If you replaced the visual cortex with something that processes optical stimulation in the eyes invisibly, then the patient would see nothing but would develop perceptual compensation from their other senses very rapidly compared with someone who went blind suddenly. They would have to learn to read their new optical capacity and it would not be visual, but it would enable them eventually to behave as a sighted person in most relevant ways. The replacement part reproduces the 3-P behaviour of the biological part. I think that's a mistake to begin with. Does a plastic plant reproduce the 3-P behavior of a biological plant? If you don't know what the behavior is, how do you know that it's possible to reproduce it by other means? You're just assuming that it is like a metal washer that can be replaced with a plastic one, but we have no reason to think that this is anything like that. This means the rest of the brain also has the same 3-P behaviour, since it is subjected to the same 3-P environmental influences from the replacement part (that is what was reproduced, even if the qualia were not). So the subject behaves as if he has normal vision and hearing and believes that he has normal vision and hearing. It's jumping to a conclusion based on an incorrect assumption. I've already outlined exactly what I think would happen in the
Re: Bruno List continued
Craig, do the neurons violate the conservation of energy and momentum? And if not, then how can they have any unexpected effects? Jason On Sep 29, 2011, at 6:43 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Sep 29, 10:31 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: There *is* a strictly neurological reason for the 3-P observable behaviour. If we limit ourselves to talking about that, do you agree? I would say no, because I would not describe something like 'gambling' as strictly neurological reason in the sense that I think you intend it. Of course all of our feelings and perceptions are neurological experiences in the broad sense, but that's just because neurological structures feel and perceive. If a thought can cause a movement in the absence of a physical event, for example if ligand-dependent ion channels open and trigger an action potential in the absence of the ligand, that would be observed as magical, like a table levitating. The thought *is* a physical event, it's just the subjective view of it. It's many physical events, each with a subjective view, but together, rather than forming a machine of objects related in space, the experiential side is experiences over time which are shared as a single, deeper, richer experience stream over time. But you can't see the thought. Restrict discussion for now to the 3-P observable behaviour of a neuron being investigated by a cell biologist. From the scientist's point of view, the neuron only fires in response to stimuli such as neurotransmitters at the synapse (depending on what sort of neuron it is). No, you can see in that brain animation that the neuron fires whenever it needs to /wants to. It's actions aren't inevitable or scheduled in some way, it's responding directly to the overall perceptions and motives of the person as a whole as well as all of the congruences and conflicts amongst the subordinate neural pathways. Do you see that if the thought makes the neuron do anything other than what the scientist expects it to do from consideration of its physical properties and the physical properties of the environment then it would be observed to be behaving magically? Only if the scientist knew nothing about neurology. What the neurons do, collectively *is* thought. It's no different than how bacteria use quorum sensing to make collective decisions. I understand why you might assume that neurons are passive receptacles to some kind of neurological law, but that is not the case. They are living organisms. Look at how heart cells synchronize: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO4pAc21M24 They communicate with each other. They do things as a group. Neurons are much more complicated and unpredictable. They are able to do what they want to do, not just what they have to do. You are not answering my question. Why does there need to be 'understanding' at all? You are saying that neurology causes something to occur: understanding. What do you mean by that. What is it? Magic? Metaphysics? It's something which cannot be reduced to something simpler. Irreducibility is just a characteristic of it. Saying that doesn't explain what it is. Again I don't think you understand what would happen if you replaced part of your brain with a qualia-less component that had the same third person observable behaviour. Perhaps you could tell me in your own words if you do. What would really happen is that it could not have the same third person observable behavior. If someone is deaf, you cannot observe their lack of hearing by observing them, unless you intentionally try to test them. If you replace someones eyes with eyes which only see in the x-ray spectrum, then the visual cortex would pick it up in the familiar colors of the visible spectrum. If you replaced the visual cortex with something that processes optical stimulation in the eyes invisibly, then the patient would see nothing but would develop perceptual compensation from their other senses very rapidly compared with someone who went blind suddenly. They would have to learn to read their new optical capacity and it would not be visual, but it would enable them eventually to behave as a sighted person in most relevant ways. The replacement part reproduces the 3-P behaviour of the biological part. I think that's a mistake to begin with. Does a plastic plant reproduce the 3-P behavior of a biological plant? If you don't know what the behavior is, how do you know that it's possible to reproduce it by other means? You're just assuming that it is like a metal washer that can be replaced with a plastic one, but we have no reason to think that this is anything like that. This means the rest of the brain also has the same 3-P behaviour, since it is subjected to the same 3-P environmental influences from the replacement part (that is what was reproduced, even if the qualia were not). So the subject behaves as if he has normal vision
