On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I don't feel this very compelling.
> You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization.  

Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and
localization, which we do already.

> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption  
> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from our  
> direct experience.

Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?

> You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me  
> as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least  
> describe.

It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is
panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking
place at these microcosmic levels is nothing like what we, as a
conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to.
It's more like protopsychism.

> The link between both remains as unexplainable as before.

Mind would be a sensorimotive structure. The link between the
sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two.

> You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only  
> what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some  
> level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe when  
> we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three  
> metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to  
> notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).
> Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing  
> emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are  
> willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions  
> (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).

The "I" is always first person. The brain or body would be third
person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation?


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