On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > I don't feel this very compelling. > You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization.
Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and localization, which we do already. > This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption > which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from our > direct experience. Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience? > You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me > as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least > describe. It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking place at these microcosmic levels is nothing like what we, as a conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to. It's more like protopsychism. > The link between both remains as unexplainable as before. Mind would be a sensorimotive structure. The link between the sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two. > > You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only > what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some > level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe when > we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three > metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to > notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive). > > Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing > emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are > willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions > (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be). The "I" is always first person. The brain or body would be third person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
