On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> I don't feel this very compelling.
> You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization.
Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and
localization, which we do already.
> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption
> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from our
> direct experience.
Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?
> You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me
> as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least
It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is
panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking
place at these microcosmic levels is nothing like what we, as a
conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to.
It's more like protopsychism.
> The link between both remains as unexplainable as before.
Mind would be a sensorimotive structure. The link between the
sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two.
> You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only
> what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some
> level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe when
> we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three
> metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to
> notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).
> Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing
> emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are
> willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions
> (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).
The "I" is always first person. The brain or body would be third
person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation?
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