Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Parfit's token and type
Brent Meeker writes: > Russell Standish wrote: > > The NS article is > > > > issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 > > > > the actual published work is > > > > Cell, vol 122, p 133 > > > > What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny > > fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you > > are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". > > > > Cheers > > I wonder what part of neuron remains over a long period time. I can well > understand > the electrolytes and other components that are part of the metabolic cycle > turning > over fairly quickly. But what about the structural protiens that give shape > to the > axons? What about the myline sheath? Do they really turn over quickly too? All cellular components are continuously being repaired and replaced, including structural ones. I am not sure of the actual figures for individual components in human brains but probably protein turnover has a haf-life of days. For example, experiments with radiolabeled tyrosine suggest that half the protein in a mouse brain turns over every ten days: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1164796 Jesse Mazer quoted a study a while ago suggesting that turnover of synaptic structures was even more rapid, a matter of minutes, but I cannot find the reference. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Brent Meeker writes: > > I did put in parentheses "this of course assumes a robot can have > > experiences". > > We can't know that this is so, but it seems a reasonable assumption to me. > > If we > > had evolution with digital processors rather than biological processors do > > you think > > it would have been possible for animals with similar behaviours to those > > with which > > we are familiar to have developed? If so, do you think these animals would > > not > > really have "experiences" despite behaving as if they did? Since evolution > > can only > > work on behaviour, if zombie animals were possible why did we not evolve to > > be > > zombie animals? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > Of course evolution is not some perfectly efficient optimizer. Julian Jaynes > idea > the consciousness arises from internalizing speech perception would make > consciousness a round-about way of recalling complex practical instructions - > one > that from a final design standpoint could have been done without the > consciousness > but from an evolutionary standpoint might have been almost inevitable. I > don't know > that I buy Jaynes explanation - but it shows that there might well be > consciousness > even if zombie animals would have done just as well. That's strictly true. It's also possible that consciousness is a byproduct of biological brains but not digital computers performing the same functions, to the point of passing the Turing Test. We'll never know. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish writes: > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > For how would a1/a1b1 > > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of > > the multiverse? > > > > Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more > absurd than saying recordings can be conscious. Perhaps you are right, but the simplest position seems to me to be that if a machine is conscious with all its fellows in the multiverse implementing the counterfactuals, it should also be conscious if all the other machines did not exist. What you have argued is that a mechanism for handling counterfactuals which is apparently inert and irrelevant on a particular run is actually neither if the MWI is true, because the presence of the mechanism ensures that the counterfactuals are realised in other branches. This means that a machine with such a mechanism in place (i.e., a machine that is not a recording) has a varied and first person indeterminate future ahead of it. However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual reality replay of something recorded yesterday? I could try to confound the simulation by performing an unpredictable act, but no matter how hard I tried I could not surprise an external observer in the know any more than I could surprise my reflection in the mirrror with a sudden unexpected movement. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>Brent Meeker writes: >>> >>> >>> >It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on >no >physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is >also consistent >to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and >that >perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum >state >there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant >compared to >the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to >eliminate it >completely. >>> >>> But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. >>> >>> >>>I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the >>>counterfactuals are >>>always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the >>>counterfactuals >>>are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I >>>don't see that >>>it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI >>>case. A machine >>>is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular >>>time and b1 >>>comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a >>>counterfactual is >>>realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some >>>physical >>>activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not >>>realised) but not >>>conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it >>>seems no less >>>absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine >>>next to it, a2b2, >>>in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For >>>how would a1/a1b1 >>>know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of >>>the multiverse? >> >>It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it >>wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on >>what >>could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for >>"interaction free measurment". > > > Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be > the distinction between > a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum > world? > > Stathis Papaioannou Yes, it does depend on quantum interference. But a "classical computer" in this quantum world can only be *approximately* classical. So I'm wondering how that affects Maudlin's argument and others that depend on counterfactuals making no difference. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
Russell Standish wrote: > The NS article is > > issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 > > the actual published work is > > Cell, vol 122, p 133 > > What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny > fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you > are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". > > Cheers I wonder what part of neuron remains over a long period time. I can well understand the electrolytes and other components that are part of the metabolic cycle turning over fairly quickly. But what about the structural protiens that give shape to the axons? What about the myline sheath? Do they really turn over quickly too? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
The NS article is issue 2556 of New Scientist magazine, 19 June 2006, page 50 the actual published work is Cell, vol 122, p 133 What he measured was the age of carbon in DNA, which is only a tiny fraction of the total number of atoms making up a cell. So I guess you are right in your more restricted meaning of "same". Cheers On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 11:52:49AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Russell Standish writes: > > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > This is > > > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > > > teleportation > > > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time > > > none of the > > > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that > > > some of the > > > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference > > > to your > > > conscious experience. > > > > > > > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests > > prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that > > allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out > > that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in > > particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years > > less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are > > born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two > > years of life. > > > > This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more > > relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. > > > > I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I > > can dig out the reference if people are interested. > > I'd be interested in the reference. However, I wasn't referring to turnover > of cells, but > to turnover of components of cells. Water and electrolytes are freely and > continuously > turned over while proteins and other structural components are continuously > breaking > down and being replaced. I'm not sure of the numbers but I would guess that > only a tiny > percentage of the matter in a neuron would be the same years later. If there > are trillions > of radioactive atoms to begin with then by chance some of them will persist > in a particular > cell provided it does not die. What is actually preserved in a neuron which > survives over > the course of a person's life is a rough template and physical continuity, > not the matter it > is comprised of. But for a few lucky atoms, ordinary living is equivalent to > destructive > teleportation. > > Stathis Papaiaonnou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d > -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > John Mikes writes: > > >>Stathis, your post is 'logical', 'professional', 'smart', - good. >>It shows why we have so many posts on this list and why we get nowhere. >>You handle an assumption (robot) - its qualia, characteristics, make up a >>"thought-situation" and ASK about its annexed details. Now, your style is >>such that one cannot just disregard the irrelevance. So someone (many, me >>included) respond with similar mindtwists and it goes on and on. \ >>Have you ever ps-analyzed a robot? Professionally, I mean. >>If it is a simple digital computer, it certainly has a memory, the one fixed >>into chips as this PC I am using. Your and MY memory is quite different, I >>wish somebody could tell me acceptably, HOW???, but it is plastic, >>approximate, mixed with emotional changes, short and in cases false. I would >>throw out a robot with such memory. > > > I did put in parentheses "this of course assumes a robot can have > experiences". > We can't know that this is so, but it seems a reasonable assumption to me. If > we > had evolution with digital processors rather than biological processors do > you think > it would have been possible for animals with similar behaviours to those with > which > we are familiar to have developed? If so, do you think these animals would > not > really have "experiences" despite behaving as if they did? Since evolution > can only > work on behaviour, if zombie animals were possible why did we not evolve to > be > zombie animals? > > Stathis Papaioannou Of course evolution is not some perfectly efficient optimizer. Julian Jaynes idea the consciousness arises from internalizing speech perception would make consciousness a round-about way of recalling complex practical instructions - one that from a final design standpoint could have been done without the consciousness but from an evolutionary standpoint might have been almost inevitable. I don't know that I buy Jaynes explanation - but it shows that there might well be consciousness even if zombie animals would have done just as well. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Parfit's token and type
Russell Standish writes: > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > This is > > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > > teleportation > > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none > > of the > > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that some > > of the > > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference to > > your > > conscious experience. > > > > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests > prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that > allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out > that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in > particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years > less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are > born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two > years of life. > > This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more > relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. > > I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I > can dig out the reference if people are interested. I'd be interested in the reference. However, I wasn't referring to turnover of cells, but to turnover of components of cells. Water and electrolytes are freely and continuously turned over while proteins and other structural components are continuously breaking down and being replaced. I'm not sure of the numbers but I would guess that only a tiny percentage of the matter in a neuron would be the same years later. If there are trillions of radioactive atoms to begin with then by chance some of them will persist in a particular cell provided it does not die. What is actually preserved in a neuron which survives over the course of a person's life is a rough template and physical continuity, not the matter it is comprised of. But for a few lucky atoms, ordinary living is equivalent to destructive teleportation. Stathis Papaiaonnou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sat, Oct 07, 2006 at 02:25:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The quantum > > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with > > some probability. > > > And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type > of argument could be just an argument in favor or the (physical) > multiverse (like UDA could be as well in that case). But this does not > follow because if the counterfactuals are needed to be simulated, it > would just mean, assuming comp, that the level of emulation has not > been correctly chosen. Just redo Maudlin's thought experiment with his > program PI being a quantum program simulated by a classical Olympia if > you want to be sure of this. > > Bruno > It doesn't really work, because the Multiverse is too simple an object. We would never say your universal dovetailer was conscious for example, so doing the Maudlin on it will not tell us anything interesting. We can conclude that consciousness must appear as an internal POV phenomenon (assuming a MV type structure, or equivalently COMP which implies the latter via the UDA). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > For how would a1/a1b1 > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the > multiverse? > Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more absurd than saying recordings can be conscious. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:35:44AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > This is > literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of > teleportation > etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none of > the > matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that some of > the > matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference to > your > conscious experience. > We _really_ need to dispell this myth. It turns out that A bomb tests prior to the partial test ban treaty provides a unique clock that allows one to measure when a particular cell was born. It turns out that whilst this statement is true of various organs (eg the gut in particular), neurons turn out to have an average age just two years less than the age of the person (as measured in cadavers), ie most are born during the rapid brain expansion that occurs during the first two years of life. This is crucial, because I would suspect that neurons have far more relevance to one's person, than do gut cells. I posted on this before - it was reported in a recent New Scientist. I can dig out the reference if people are interested. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on > >>>no > >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is > >>>also consistent > >>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > >>>that > >>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > >>>state > >>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > >>>compared to > >>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > >>>eliminate it > >>>completely. > > > > > >>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. > >>The quantum > >>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > >>probability. > > > > > > I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the > > counterfactuals are > > always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the > > counterfactuals > > are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I > > don't see that > > it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI > > case. A machine > > is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular > > time and b1 > > comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a > > counterfactual is > > realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes > > some physical > > activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is > > not realised) but not > > conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it > > seems no less > > absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine > > next to it, a2b2, > > in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. > > For how would a1/a1b1 > > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of > > the multiverse? > > It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it > wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on > what > could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for > "interaction free measurment". Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be the distinction between a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum world? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
John Mikes writes: > Stathis, your post is 'logical', 'professional', 'smart', - good. > It shows why we have so many posts on this list and why we get nowhere. > You handle an assumption (robot) - its qualia, characteristics, make up a > "thought-situation" and ASK about its annexed details. Now, your style is > such that one cannot just disregard the irrelevance. So someone (many, me > included) respond with similar mindtwists and it goes on and on. \ > Have you ever ps-analyzed a robot? Professionally, I mean. > If it is a simple digital computer, it certainly has a memory, the one fixed > into chips as this PC I am using. Your and MY memory is quite different, I > wish somebody could tell me acceptably, HOW???, but it is plastic, > approximate, mixed with emotional changes, short and in cases false. I would > throw out a robot with such memory. I did put in parentheses "this of course assumes a robot can have experiences". We can't know that this is so, but it seems a reasonable assumption to me. If we had evolution with digital processors rather than biological processors do you think it would have been possible for animals with similar behaviours to those with which we are familiar to have developed? If so, do you think these animals would not really have "experiences" despite behaving as if they did? Since evolution can only work on behaviour, if zombie animals were possible why did we not evolve to be zombie animals? Stathis Papaioannou > John, > > I should have been more precise with the terms "copy" and "emulate". > What I was asking is whether a robot which experiences something while > it is shovelling coal (this of course assumes that a robot can have > experiences) > would experience the same thing if it were fed input to all its sensors > exactly > the same as if it were doing its job normally, such that it was not aware > the > inputs were in fact a sham. It seems to me that if the answer is "no" the > robot > would need to have some mysterious extra-computational knowledge of the > world, which I find very difficult to conceptualise if we are talking about > a standard > digital computer. It is easier to conceptualise that such non-computational > effects > may be at play in a biological brain, which would then be an argument > against > computationalism. > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > Stathis: > > let me skip the quoted texts and ask a particular question. > > - Original Message - > > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:41 PM > > Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument) > > You wrote: > > Do you believe it is possible to copy a particular consciousness by > > emulating it, along > > with sham inputs (i.e. in virtual reality), on a general purpose computer? > > Or do you believe > > a coal-shovelling robot could only have the coal-shovelling experience by > > actually shovelling > > coal? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > - > > My question is about 'copy' and 'emulate'. > > > > Are we considering 'copying' the model and its content (in which case the > > coal shoveling robot last sentence applies) or do we include the > > interconnections unlimited in "experience", beyond the particular model we > > talk about? > > If we go "all the way" and include all input from the unlimited totality > > that may 'format' or 'complete' the model-experience, then we re-create > the > > 'real thing' and it is not a copy. If we restrict our copying to the > aspect > > in question (model) then we copy only that aspect and should not draw > > conclusions on the total. > > > > Can we 'emulate' totality? I don't think so. Can we copy the total, > > unlimited wholeness? I don't think so. > > What I feel is a restriction to "think" within a model and draw > conclusions > > from it towards beyond it. > > Which looks to me like a category-mistake. > > > > John Mikes > > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 > 1fb2b2e6d > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.0/465 - Release Date: 10/06/06 > > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
> The debate, for example, over whether the > computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or > computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory > commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and > relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data at our disposal? > > David > I got overwhelmed by work and dropped the other thread... apologies... I have realised I have a fundamentally different view to 'computational' and 'physical' and 'number'. On reflection it seems to be that when most of the folk on this list think of 'number' they think of it as the idealised numbers - numbers that are perfect. There are no fuzzy edges or 'remainders' in these numbers. We can use them to represent quantities of notional objects and the behaviour of the objects follows the rules of the idealised numbers. All good. But what numbers are used in the construction of the 'physical'? My particular ontic prejudice :-) all along has been that the physical is simply a reified computation, but not on idealised numbers. I suppose all number comes down to logical operations whetween types... but the 'numbers' underlying the mathematics can be any arbitrary event( as a type) any instance(s) of a type. A collection of such instances operating together literally become the mathematics. In this approach the 'chair', to me, literally is a computational outcome. The 'proof' process has no end and the mathematics automatically enacts proofs (this is the 2nd law of thermodynamics at work). The chair is a continually unfolding proof within the mathematics of these 'numbers_that_are_not'. The fact that we are also proofs within the same mathematics means that we, in having perceptual faculties, get to label whatever it is we are in as 'physical'. This does not mean that there is no such thing as 'real'. What it means is that the computation that we are is the only reified computation. That computation is just not one done on the idealised numbers. To me, saying that computation on idealised numbers is the only 'real computation' ( = distingishing between chair and math) is like choosing one isotope of carbon and declaring it to be the 'real' carbon (mathematics)...When in fact all the isotopes are carbon(mathematics), just on different bases. Or perhaps that the only 'real' colour representation is RGB, not CMYK or any of the others equivalents. Choosing a perfect number set to perform mathematics and do computing and formal proofs works really well and we have been able to use it to great effect. However, I find I cannot distinguish between a 'chair' and a 'mathematical concep' and a 'mathematical proof' and a 'computation' and 'the physical' and the 'real'. They are all the same thing. In fact in this particular case it's a damned nuiscance we have different words forcing us to make the distinction and have predispositions to regard them as such. I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I seemed to have reached it naturally and only recently realised that I was thinking very diffrerently to everyone else... or maybe I'm not, but just misunderstand... hard for me to tell. Perhaps you can help! regards Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also >>>consistent >>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and >>>that >>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum >>>state >>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared >>>to >>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate >>>it >>>completely. > > >>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The >>quantum >>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some >>probability. > > > I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the > counterfactuals are > always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the > counterfactuals > are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I > don't see that > it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI > case. A machine > is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular > time and b1 > comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a > counterfactual is > realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some > physical > activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not > realised) but not > conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it > seems no less > absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine > next to it, a2b2, > in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For > how would a1/a1b1 > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the > multiverse? It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on what could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for "interaction free measurment". Brent Meeker What is particularly curious about quantum theory is that there can be actual physical effects arising from what philosophers refer to as counterfactuals – that is, things that might have happened, although they did not happened. --- Roger Penrose --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Please see some remarks interleft between -lines. John M - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 9:43 AM Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument) Le 05-oct.-06, à 13:55, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Can we 'emulate' totality? I don't think so. I don't always insist on that but with just the "Church thesis" part of comp, it can be argued that we can emulate the third person describable totality, and indeed this is what the Universal Dovetailer do. The key thing, but technical (I was beginning to explain Tom and George), is that such an emulation can be shown to destroy any reductionist account of that totality, and still better, make the first person totality (George's first person plenitude perhaps) infinitely bigger (even non computably bigger, even unameable) than the 3 person totality. There is a Skolem-Carroll phenomena: the first person "inside" view of the 3-totality is infinitely bigger than the 3-totality, like in the "Wonderland" where a tree can hide a palace ... JM: "my" reductionism is simple: we have a circle of knowledge base and view the world as limited INTO such model. Well, it is not. The reductionist view enabled homo to step up into technological prowess but did not support an extension of understanding BEYOND the (so far) acquired knowledge-base. We simply cannot FIND OUT what we don't know of the world. Sciences are reductionistic, logic can try to step out, but that is simple sci-fi, use fantasy (imagination?) to bridge ignorance. I am stubborn in "I don't know what I don't know". -- > Can we copy the total, > unlimited wholeness? Not really. It is like the quantum states. No clonable, but if known, preparable in many quantities. At this stage it is only an analogy. > I don't think so. > What I feel is a restriction to "think" within a model and draw > conclusions from it towards beyond it. Mmmh... It is here that logician have made progress the last century, but nobody (except the experts) knows about those progress. JM: Those "experts" must know that it is not confirmable even true. That is why 'they' keep it to themselves. > Which looks to me like a category-mistake. It looks, but perhaps it isn't. I agree it seems unbelievable, but somehow,we (the machine) can jump outside ourself ... (with some risk, though). - JM: Jump outside our knowledge? it is not 'ourselves', it is ALL we know and outside this is NOTHINGNESS for the mind to consider. Blank. This is how most of the religions came about. Provide a belief. - Bruno PS Er..., to Markpeaty and other readers of Parfit: I think that his use of the term "reductionist" is misleading, and due in part to his lack of clearcut distinction between the person points of view. - John - http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Stathis, your post is 'logical', 'professional', 'smart', - good. It shows why we have so many posts on this list and why we get nowhere. You handle an assumption (robot) - its qualia, characteristics, make up a "thought-situation" and ASK about its annexed details. Now, your style is such that one cannot just disregard the irrelevance. So someone (many, me included) respond with similar mindtwists and it goes on and on. \ Have you ever ps-analyzed a robot? Professionally, I mean. If it is a simple digital computer, it certainly has a memory, the one fixed into chips as this PC I am using. Your and MY memory is quite different, I wish somebody could tell me acceptably, HOW???, but it is plastic, approximate, mixed with emotional changes, short and in cases false. I would throw out a robot with such memory. Best regards John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 8:09 AM Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument) John, I should have been more precise with the terms "copy" and "emulate". What I was asking is whether a robot which experiences something while it is shovelling coal (this of course assumes that a robot can have experiences) would experience the same thing if it were fed input to all its sensors exactly the same as if it were doing its job normally, such that it was not aware the inputs were in fact a sham. It seems to me that if the answer is "no" the robot would need to have some mysterious extra-computational knowledge of the world, which I find very difficult to conceptualise if we are talking about a standard digital computer. It is easier to conceptualise that such non-computational effects may be at play in a biological brain, which would then be an argument against computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou > Stathis: > let me skip the quoted texts and ask a particular question. > - Original Message - > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 11:41 PM > Subject: RE: Maudlin's Demon (Argument) > You wrote: > Do you believe it is possible to copy a particular consciousness by > emulating it, along > with sham inputs (i.e. in virtual reality), on a general purpose computer? > Or do you believe > a coal-shovelling robot could only have the coal-shovelling experience by > actually shovelling > coal? > > Stathis Papaioannou > - > My question is about 'copy' and 'emulate'. > > Are we considering 'copying' the model and its content (in which case the > coal shoveling robot last sentence applies) or do we include the > interconnections unlimited in "experience", beyond the particular model we > talk about? > If we go "all the way" and include all input from the unlimited totality > that may 'format' or 'complete' the model-experience, then we re-create the > 'real thing' and it is not a copy. If we restrict our copying to the aspect > in question (model) then we copy only that aspect and should not draw > conclusions on the total. > > Can we 'emulate' totality? I don't think so. Can we copy the total, > unlimited wholeness? I don't think so. > What I feel is a restriction to "think" within a model and draw conclusions > from it towards beyond it. > Which looks to me like a category-mistake. > > John Mikes _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-491 1fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.0/465 - Release Date: 10/06/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
> >> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
> >> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
> >
> > That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*]
> >
> > But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are
> > supposed
> > to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists,
> > and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in
> > immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist.
>
>
>
> So we agree on this since the beginning!!!
> I was just referring to a nuance you did introduce between believing
> that the number 5 exist (say), and believing in the independent truth
> of the proposition "It exist a number which is equal to 5".
The difference is reification, or Platonism, about numbers.
Which you claim not to
need.
> I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is
> *arithmetical* platonist,
That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists,
structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not
Platonists.
>with the exception of the ultra-intuitionist
> (who does not believe in number which are too much big (yet finite). I
> am certainly an arithmetical realist (platonist), but I would not
> assert that I am a set-theoretical platonist. (Note that I would not
> necessarily deny it, I'm just currently agnostic on big sets).
>
> Note that by using godel's arithmetization device, it can be shown that
> the UD exists in exactly the same sense than saying that 5 exists.
Which of course is not any real existence at
all for the anti-Platonist, although he agees with
the truth of all the same mathematical propositions as the Platonist.
But you think the UD does things and behaves in certain
ways and generates certain appearances. So you think it
exists. So you are Platonising and reifying, although you claim
not to be.
> And I am not willing to defend the idea that "5 exists", just that
> comp ("yes doctor" + Church Thesis + "5 exists" (say)) entails that
> physics is a branch of number theory (including recursion theory like
> in Yuri Manin's book), and constructively so.
>
> My personal opinion if comp is true or false is ... personal. Ok I let
> you know that I have no doubt that "5 exists", few doubt that CT is
> true, some doubt that "yes doctor" is true.
And many doubt "5 exists" in a "real" sense of existence -- many
doubt Platonism.
>My point is that comp, made
> precise enough, is empirically refutable.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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RE: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no > > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also > > consistent > > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > > that > > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > > state > > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > > compared to > > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > > eliminate it > > completely. > But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The > quantum > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > probability. I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the counterfactuals are always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the counterfactuals are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I don't see that it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI case. A machine is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular time and b1 comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a counterfactual is realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some physical activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not realised) but not conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it seems no less absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine next to it, a2b2, in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For how would a1/a1b1 know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the multiverse? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Parfit's token and type
Bruno marchal writes: > Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit : > > > > > Bruno, > > I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of > > Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly > > very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons > > and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but > > mostly very well worth the effort of ploughing through it. > > Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are token. > I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. Can you explain the disagreement with Parfit? My reading of chapter 99 of R & P is that a "token" is a particular instantiation of a person while a "type" is the ensemble of related instantiations. "Mary Smith" is a type, "Mary Smith coming out of replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM" is a token. It appears that in this terminology (actually due to Bernard Williams, not Parfit) once generated a token remains the same token until there is another branching, but my preference is to generalise the term and say that a token has only transient existence, which then makes "token" equivalent to "observer moment". This is literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of teleportation etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none of the matter in your body is the "same", and before this time the fact that some of the matter in your body is the "same" is accidental and makes no difference to your conscious experience. As to whether I am token or type: obviously, literally, I-who-write-this-now am a token. My present token is included in the set of related tokens in the past, future, other branches of the multiverse, surreptitious emulations of my mind made by aliens, and so on: the type. Note that the definition of a particular token (especially in my generalised sense, fixed to a specific and unique position in the multiverse) can be made completely unambiguous, while the definition of a type is necessarily vague and fuzzy arround the edges. For example, if a being exists somewhere with 70% of my memories and 30% of your memories, should he be included in my type, your type, a new type, or some combination of these? It is only because we experience a linear existence from birth to death, so that only a single token is extant at a time and there is clear physical continuity from one token to the next, that we can ignore the distinction between token and type and consider the definition of a particular type to be unambiguous. As for what matters in survival, that is a contingent fact of the way our brains have evolved. It isn't as simple as saying that survival of type is what matters, except in the abovementioned linear existence with which we are familiar. One concise way to put it is that what matters in survival is that there should exist at least one token (or observer moment, or instantiation) which has my present token's memories in its past. Moreover, it is important that where several such tokens exist, as I may feel myself "becoming" any one of them with equal probability, as many as possible should have good experiences. This works for simple branchings, but it becomes complicated when we consider mergings and partial memory loss. Another problem is tokens in parallel worlds: I could say I don't survive if no future tokens exist who have my present memories, even though other tokens exist in the multiverse who branched off some time ago, but then that would be like saying I don't survive if I experience any memory loss at all, for example due to medications like midazolam. It could be that every second, tokens are finding themselves in hellish multiverse branches where they suffer horribly then die, which is equivalent to suffering horribly then having the memory of the experience erased. We can describe exactly what happens in each of these cases using the token or observer moment terminology, but reconciling this with psychological survival is problematic because our brains did not evolve to cope with these sorts of situations. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Johnathan, Nice one! :-) As far as I can see there is nothing a-priori which would make these two hypotheses mutually exclusive; one 'cause' is predator related, the other is resource related. I await with interest, but not bated breath, for an ecologist to tell us of any empirical evidence supporting or refuting either. Of equal interest is the question of how the creatures keep count of the passing years and 'know' when their species's lucky number has come up! Presumably *something* grows a bit with each passing year and reaches a threshold size/shape/consentration at the right time. Alternatively something is formed in the first year, which could be the overall size/volume of the grub or the total amount of stored energy, and this thing or substance decreases with each passing year so that emergence is triggered by that key feature or substance reaching its minimum amount needed for survival in the next life stage. Upon reflection I think the latter mechanism is more likely. I can see more easily how it could evolve from a system under a selfective pressure which extended the dormancy period but originally allowed a significant spread of the dormancy period over several years. Cheers, Mark --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Maudlin's argument
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 7 oktober 2006 14:50 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Maudlin's argument Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit : > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > "It exist a number which is equal to 5". I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is *arithmetical* platonist--~~~~--~~--~--~--- Not me... LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth, and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs. In achieving these results, AFAICS, no claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the normal way. The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we go about our daily affairs is of course another issue. It may of course eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition. But as Bruno is again at pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will always entail some 'act of faith'. To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult, and perhaps at root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data at our disposal? David > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] > > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view) > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been > > reified in any sense, > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
>> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
>> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
>
> That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*]
>
> But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are
> supposed
> to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists,
> and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in
> immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist.
So we agree on this since the beginning!!!
I was just referring to a nuance you did introduce between believing
that the number 5 exist (say), and believing in the independent truth
of the proposition "It exist a number which is equal to 5".
I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is
*arithmetical* platonist, with the exception of the ultra-intuitionist
(who does not believe in number which are too much big (yet finite). I
am certainly an arithmetical realist (platonist), but I would not
assert that I am a set-theoretical platonist. (Note that I would not
necessarily deny it, I'm just currently agnostic on big sets).
Note that by using godel's arithmetization device, it can be shown that
the UD exists in exactly the same sense than saying that 5 exists.
And I am not willing to defend the idea that "5 exists", just that
comp ("yes doctor" + Church Thesis + "5 exists" (say)) entails that
physics is a branch of number theory (including recursion theory like
in Yuri Manin's book), and constructively so.
My personal opinion if comp is true or false is ... personal. Ok I let
you know that I have no doubt that "5 exists", few doubt that CT is
true, some doubt that "yes doctor" is true. My point is that comp, made
precise enough, is empirically refutable.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 06-oct.-06, à 19:51, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Bruno Marchal writes: >> >> >>> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >>> >>> Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a recording, a machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. He then proposes a second machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that the second machine comes into play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The system as a whole now handles counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually arise, the second machine just sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say that when the first machine goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing a recording and could not possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc with the second machine sitting inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to contravene the supervenience thesis which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes on physical activity, and further that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental activity. For it seems in the example that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second machine does nothing), yet in the first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it can. >>> >>> >>> This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. >>> >>> >>> There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is that computationalism is wrong. Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does not supervene on the physical (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). Yet another response is that the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the relationship between physical activity and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical process may implement any computation including any conscious computation. >>> >>> Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation >>> would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. >>> This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum >>> vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene >>> on >>> no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp >>> assumption, >>> to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical >>> computations. >>> This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the >>> "physical stuff". >> >> >> It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes >> on no >> physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it >> is also consistent >> to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical >> activity, and that >> perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single >> quantum state >> there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant >> compared to >> the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to >> eliminate it >> completely. >> >> Stathis Papaioannou > > But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. I don't see this. Maudlin's assumes only that consciousness can be attributed to a "classical" computation. Its reasoning would work even in the case the brain would be a quantum computer. The reason for that is that quantum computations are classically turing emulable. Church thesis has not been violated by the rise of the quantum turing machine, as David Deutsch already explained in his seminal paper on quantum computation. > The quantum > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with > some probability. And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type of argument could be just an argument in favor or the (physical) multiverse (like UDA could be as well in that case). But this does not follow because if the counterfactuals are needed to be simulated, it would just mean, assuming comp, that the level of emulation has not been correctly chosen. Just redo Maudlin's thought experiment with his program PI being a quantum program simulated by a classical Olympia if you want to be sure of this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more opti
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > There is no need to reify the numbers. [...] > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view) > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality > and in a unnameable first person reality etc. Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal writes: > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes > > on no > > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - > > > I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be > careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we > are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. This would be a mistake > only second to Aristotle reification of the notion of matter > > > > but it is also consistent > > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, > > and that > > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single > > quantum state > > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > > compared to > > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > > eliminate it > > completely. > > I think you are right, but it seems to me that at that point (still > more after the translation of the UDA in arithmetic) to really believe > that a recording can have all consciousness experiences would be like > to believe that, despite the thermodynamical explanation, cars are > still pull by (invisible) horses. In any *applied* math there is an > unavoidable use of Ockham razor. The movie graph or Maudlin's Olympia > makes it as minimal as possible. It seems there is a contest of absurdities: that consciousness can supervene on a recording, or any physical process, or no physical process. Maudlin apparently thinks all of these are absurd, you think the first two are absurd but not the last, I think all three are equally... a little bit absurd, but not absurd enough to knock off computationalism as the best theory of consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote: > I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be > careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we > are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*] But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are supposed to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists, and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist. [*] http://www.maa.org/reviews/whatis.html There were three major points of view in the debate about the nature of mathematics. The formalists argued (roughly: the short summaries that follow are really caricatures) that mathematics was really simply the formal manipulation of symbols based on arbitrarily-chosen axioms. The Platonists saw mathematics as almost an experimental science, studying objects that really exist (in some sense), though they clearly don't exist in a physical or material sense. The intuitionists had the most radical point of view; essentially, they saw all mathematics as a human creation and therefore as essentially finite. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1 Platonism is the view that there exist abstract objects, and again, an object is abstract just in case it is non-spatiotemporal, i.e., does not exist in space or time. [ ... ] Three examples of things that are often taken to be abstract are (a) mathematical objects (most notably, numbers), (b) properties, and (c) propositions. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are about abstract objects (i.e., that their singular terms denote abstract objects and their existential quantifiers range over abstract objects). The philosophy of Plato, or an approach to philosophy resembling his. For example, someone who asserts that numbers exist independently of the things they number could be called a Platonist. http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/enm3.html# The view that mathematical concepts could exist in such a timeless,ethereal sense was put forward in ancient times (c.360 BC) by the great Greek philosopher Plato.Consequently,this view is frequently referred to as mathematical Platonism --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
