Re: Platonia
On Feb 23, 9:46 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: > Molecules and Cells are formal things. Form is matter, in *some* > sense. Form is not *primary* matter in any sense. > People having problem with numbers have been victim of a traumatic > teaching of math. > The philosophical question of the existence of any thing, except > consciousness here and now, is desperately complex. > That is why I like comp, because it allows (and forces) to derive the > psychological existence, the theological existence, the physical, > existence, and the sensible existence from the classical existence of > numbers, which is simple by definition, if you agree with the use of > classical logic in number theory. What is classical existence? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: How embryogenesis fits in the mind-body problem?
Dear Evgenii & Bruno, Half tongue in cheek, in: Tuszynski, J.A. & R. Gordon (2008). A mean field Ising model for cortical rotation in amphibian one cell stage embryos. In. Eds. Toronto, Society for Mathematical Biology Conference, July 30 - August 2, 2008. I used the following reasoning: IF microtubules in the brain have coherence properties that equate to consciousness GIVEN that those microtubules map in the sense of a fate map from the cortex of the one cell (amphibian) embryo to the brain THEN we ought to be able to investigate those coherence properties (consciousness?) in the one cell embryo. Fits nicely with your thoughts on Paramecium, which has a cortex with microtubules. Yours, -Dick Gordon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Now, just recall that "Platonia" is based on classical logic where the falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to say that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of dollars, and that you should prepare the check. You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another question. It may simply mean "I want to play a joke on you". All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can avoid that entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are less vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level (even though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying "S afs fdsLfs", which is just expressing that something exists). We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule. Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on any interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the axioms and the derivations thereof "really" mean is open to interpretation. Otherwise we would have no discussion about "Do numbers exist?". I don't think we can understand "1+1=2" without some amount of interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the same kind, for example. Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they mean. I am not sure. We want avoid the "philosophical discussion", which can be endless and obstructive. So instead of trying to find the ultimate interpretation on which everybody would agree, we try, in a spirit of respect of all interpretation, to find our common agreement. Is 0 a number? OK, we agree that 0 is a number, and from that, agreeing with classical logic, we already agree that at least one number exist, 0. And the existence case is closed. OK? Next question, do we agree that numbers have a successor? Yes, that is the point, if x is a number, we want it having a successor, and successors , 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... In this manner, we don't throw away, any interpretation of the numbers, but we are able to derive many things from what we agree on. The question of the relation between human and numbers is very interesting, but has to be addressed at some other levels, with some supplementary hypotheses. If not we mix unrelated difficulties. I have to admit I'm not sure if it is valuable to make everything as formal as possible, if we want to find a mistake. My intuition says it is not, at least not always. It might to lead into a loop, where we formalize everything as much as possible and make very little progress in what we really want to achieve. I agree. Only, when it is hard to find the mistake, we do get more formal or we become the victim of that mistake. If in our informal communication we want to find where we disagree (which seems to be an important function of communication), we should formalize our natural language, too. I think that this is just impossible. To formalize a natural language, or a person, would kill it. It would be like pretending we can know our level, or that we trust blindly the doctor in case he would contend himself to send your Gödel number to the museum. Natural language are of the type "alive", they changed, get new words from other languages, etc. I think it has been tried, but I'm not sure whether there is much value in doing that. No value, unless the natural language is perishing, because only known by few old people. Then it might be nice to formalize it to keep its memory in the natural languages museum indeed. It might lead to a language that is too difficult, too little flexible and too much restricting for almost all purposes. Not really. Formal can be very flexible, like the programming languages, but natural language are "naturally" self-transforming, and have to adapt. I'm not sure, either, if it is - even just in science - always a good approach to try to find mistakes. Maybe there are none and we never really know and trying to do will lead nowhere or there always some mistakes and trying to eliminate them will just spawn new ones. Maybe both are true in some way. Mistakes are what make us progress. Beware the fatal mistake, like flying a plane with a bug in the altimeter. I guess both sides are important: We have to formalize, to establish structures, that give us some frame of reasoning and we have to break formalities (which might manifest as some kind of behavior that appears very mad, if not evil, like denying God in the middle ages) in order to discover new structures. This m
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 23, 3:02 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z wrote: > > > On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > Peter, > > > > > > Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things > > we > > > > > agree on: > > > > > > Consciousness is informational > > > > No > > > > > > There are more ways to have disorder than order > > > > > Yes > > > > > > Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth > > > > > The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of > > telling > > > > > Sort of. > > > > > > White rabbits are not commonly seen > > > > > Yes > > > > > > This universe appears to follow laws having a short description > > > > > Yes > > > > > > Evolution requires non-chaotic universes > > > > > > Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a > > > > > universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws. I agree there > > are > > > > very > > > > > many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, > > yet > > > > of > > > > > all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often > > > > surprise, > > > > > laws seem to be obeyed. It is as if there is some equation balancing > > two > > > > > extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple > > laws > > > > (few > > > > > possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs. > > > > > universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with > > > > ordered > > > > > initial conditions (few possibilities). > > > > > > Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white > > > > > rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving. However as > > you > > > > > mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a > > > > > universe. > > > > > "initial conditions" only come into where you have a temporal > > > > structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia > > > > Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal > > > structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is > > feasible. > > > Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter > > Are you suggesting some form > ofhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism? > > In any case, it seems there are two ways a line of questioning could end: > > What is life made out of? Cells. What are cells made out of? Chemicals. > What are chemicals made out of? Atoms. What are atoms made out of? > Quarks. What are Quarks made out of? Vibrating strings. What are strings > made out of? > > 1. We don't know and can't say. > 2. They are mathematical objects. > > If matter is required for life how do you know matter isn't composed of > something more fundamental? How do you know that "primary matter" doesn't label whatever is fundamental whether currently understood or not. > > > > > > There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities > > > > > for the initial conditions. > > > > > > Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack > > of > > > > > white rabbits. Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to > > evolve > > > > from > > > > > initial conditions for which there could have been many > > possibilities. > > > > > > The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most > > > > often? > > > > > Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for > > which > > > > > there are many possibilities. The two must be considered together. > > For > > > > > this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but > > the > > > > > laws were simple. You propose that universes with chaotic laws are > > more > > > > > likely. The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic > > > > initial > > > > > conditions, > > > > > Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't > > > > even a distinction between initial conditions and laws. > > > > How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all? > > > Why is that important? There are an awful lot of such universes, after > > all, > > so the chance of glimpsing one should be high > > The question is what is bigger: > (Number of orderly universes * Expected number of observers in such a > universe) vs. (Number of chaotic universes * Number of observers in such a > universe) > Based on observations I have concluded the terms on the left must be > larger. Well...it's not a black-and-white distinction between order and chaos. There are more completely chaotic universes than ordered ones, and there are almost as many almost chaotic universes as completely chaotic ones. Let's split a universe into an ordered part and a chaotic part (either of which can be null to preserve generality). Then we can match up 1 oberserver observing order against 1 observer observing chaos 2 oberserver
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > Then God does not exist as an actor in the world, but God does still exists > as an idea. > > 1Z wrote: > > >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >>"something existing" or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful > >> >> >> to use the word "not", "something that does not exist" or absence > >> >> exist > >> >> >> (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to > >> something > >> >> >> else) > >> >> >> and if if it is meaningful to use the word "two", "two of > >> something" > >> >> or > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> number 2 exists. > > >> >> > Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists. > > >> >> OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so. > > >> >> Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you > >> >> don't > >> >> call them "one, two, three,..." but "one of something, two of > >> something, > >> >> three of something,...". > > >> > I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis > >> > for mathematics. But its an asbtract structure that doesn't exist. > > >> But if "one of something" doesn't exist "one stone" doesn't exist, > >> because a > >> stone clearly is something. > > > And if one stone exists, a stone exist, not "one" > > If one stone exists "one ..." exists because one stone IS "one ...". > One really means just "thing" or "one thing" or "one of one thing" or "one > of one of one of one of one thing". And there I was thinking it was the successor of zero, or cardinality of a set whose only member is the empty set. > If we use more than one "one" there is > the convention that they both refer to the same thing, otherwise it might be > said that 1+1=3, because the second "1" may be another thing that is twice > as numerous - which we obviously want to avoid for the sake of clarity. > > 1Z wrote: > > >> If one of something doesn't exist you have to conclude that all things > >> (including all material things like atoms) fail to exist. Which is quite > >> a > >> strange conclusion. > > >> Furthermore you just said it IS an abstract structure, > > > Sure. But not an existing abstract structure. Just like > > the unicorn isn't an existing mythological animal. > > But "is" expresses existence. That was the "is" of identity. > Or what does "is" express else? It has at least three meanings. > The point is not that we can't deny existence in a particular context. We > may say numbers do not exist as material things (though even this is > debatable, because we can regard all material objects as instantiations of > numbers). > The point is that if we *completely* deny existence of numbers, "completely" > can just mean some restricted realm, because the usage of the words "one", > "two", "three",... already implies a kind of existence. No it doesn't. Use of words does not imply existence, otherwise "God does not exist" would imply "God exists". >All things we can > talk of do exist in some sense even if just a weak sense of "existence as > ideas" or "existence of possibility". That is false. If the thing X we are talking of is not defined as an idea, then the existence of an idea-of-the-thing-X, is not the existence of X itself. A thing can only exist as the kind of thing it is supposed to be. >It is trivial, really. It is trivially wrong. > But this trivial existence together with the axioms of arithmetics, "Yes, > doctor." and Church's thesis is all that is needed for Bruno's argument. It is useless for Bruno's argument because he needs minds to come from numbers, and that cannot work if numbers exist only *in* minds. > It > doesn't require numbers to be existent in any specific sense that you seem > to have in mind. Yes it does: it requires numbers to be primary compared to minds. It may require nothing more than that, but so what? > As soon as you use numbers you establish the necessary existence. > > 1Z wrote: > > > The abstract/concrete distinction needs an explanation. The Platonist > > explanation is that abstracta are invisible entities existing in a > > special > > realm. The formalist explanation is that concreta exist and abstracta > > donn't. > > The problem is that concreta are abstracta. My horse Tom at this wednesday > 12:30 is my horse Tom is a horse is is a mammal is an animal is something. > If something doesn't exist, my horse Tom can't either. You mean if nothing exists, your horse can't. However, that does not prove that concreta are abstracta > Furthermore we don't find absolute concreta anywhere. Who said we should? I clearly said the are disjoint categories. Concreta exist, abstracta don't > At the bottom we can > just find some probabilities of measuring something and not some ultimate > concrete thing. I didn't say "ultimately concrete" > The distinction between abstract/concrete is not difficult to explain. We > create all kinds of categories so why not a category that distinguishes > between specific things and less specific t
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk wrote: > >> 1Z wrote: > > >> > On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk wrote: > >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> > On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk > >> wrote: > >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot > >> interfer > >> >> at > >> >> >> all > >> >> >> >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct > >> physics > >> >> has > >> >> >> to > >> >> >> >> be > >> >> >> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an > >> >> >> invisible > >> >> >> >> >> >> epiphenomena. > > >> >> >> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent > >> >> numbers. > >> >> >> >> >> > Numbers > >> >> >> >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow > > >> >> >> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is > >> explained > >> >> >> from > > >> >> >> >> >> something non physical. > > >> >> >> >> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some > >> existing > >> >> non- > >> >> >> >> > physical > >> >> >> >> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all. > > >> >> >> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems > >> >> very > >> >> >> much > >> >> >> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" > >> >> mean? > > >> >> >> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers. > > >> >> >> You can't have one without the other. > >> >> >> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the > >> >> number > >> >> >> 2) > >> >> >> exists. > > >> >> > The idea that "2 hands exist" implies that 2 exists implies that 3 > >> >> > things exist (the left hand, the right hand and "two") > > >> >> Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you > >> have a > >> >> problem with that? > > >> > It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum > > >> That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the > >> conclusion. > >> What's absurd with all numbers existing? > > > What's absurd is the 2=3 > > That 2 exists implies that 3 things exists does not mean 2=3. And 2=3 is not > necessarily absurd, just an unusual expression. It might mean "2*...=3*..." Anything might mean anything if the symbols are reinterpreted arbitrarily. However, one must assume that the speaker does not intend such an interpretation > > 1Z wrote: > > >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >> >> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't > >> have > >> >> >> two > >> >> >> >> of > >> >> >> >> something, right? > > >> >> >> > And if you have none of something, none exists. > > >> >> >> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that. > > >> >> >> 1Z wrote: > > >> >> >> >> Or is it a fictional statement? > > >> >> >> > Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must > >> >> >> > have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc > >> >> >> > do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a > >> >> >> > whole* > >> >> >> > to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement. > > >> >> >> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word > >> implies > >> >> >> the > >> >> >> existence of an object that is connected to the word. > > >> >> > That's a straight contradiction. > > >> >> I expressed myself badly here... > > >> >> I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct > >> referent > >> >> in > >> >> the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and > >> >> then > >> >> they do have a referent. > > >> > What is objectify ? > > >> In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word > >> into > >> a noun that expresses the same concept. > >> I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the > >> word that came to my mind. > > > Why should something have necessary and eternal existence > > just because someone rephrased a sentence? > > That's not the reason that it has existence. So what is? > The rephrasing is only intended > to make it more clear that a referent exists, because it is easier to think > of a referent as an object that is lingustically expressed as a noun. > 1Z wrote: > > >> >> Probably I should just say that every word has a referent. > > >> > Clearly not, e.g unicorn. > > >> Of course it has a referent. If you say "unicorn" this refers to ideas > >> about > >> an mythological creature. > > > An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type , Unicorns > > do not exist because ideas about them do. > > But unicorns *themselves* can also be conceived of ideas. What does "conceived of ideas" mean? > I have no problem of saying unicorns don't exist, but this only means "not > existing in the same sense as horses do" and doesn't exclude the existence > of unicorns in some more general sense. You have the theory that they exist in
To extract physics, you need only the self-referential invariant?
Dear Bruno, Could you explain this a bit more? “The ideally correct machine is to the human what a material point is to the sun. My answer tries only to help you to understand what I mean by a knowing machine, not really a knowing human. Human have non-monotonic layers, they can update beliefs. The logic G and G*, and the six intensional variants can be seen as the tangential theology, but we are variable machine. G and G* remains invariant, but get each nanosecond (say) a different arithmetical interpretations. To extract physics, you need only the self-referential invariant.” How does one define a self-referential invariant? What might be an example of this? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: How embryogenesis fits in the mind-body problem?
On 22 Feb 2011, at 19:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Thank you for your answers. I have still a coupled of questions.
> But with computer science, intuition can be misleading.
Intuition could be misleading not only in computer science. I know.
>> Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others
>> first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my
>> daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my
>> daughter has been formed according to your theory.
>
> Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could
> manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia,
they
> only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul
> falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think
> that making love is a sin, to be clear!).
I am fine that souls live in Platonia. Let me put the question this
way. If I have understood you correctly, "I" is a combination of the
first person view and the diary.
Precisely, I "define" the first person "I", 1-I, by the "knower", and
I define the knower, following Theaetetus, by the combination
(conjunction) of the "Bp" (I believe p, I assert p, I prove p,
equivalent in the toy theology of the ideally correct machine) and
"p". So I know p = I believe p & p is true.
So, the question is when the first person view of my daughter has
started her diary? In other words, how her diary is related to her
birth?
Well, the problem is that we can not know that. For many reasons.
First we cannot know our substitution level. If the level is very low,
she might have start the diary before the big bang. If the level is
very low but not that low, she might have start the diary at the
moment of fecundation, like if her DNA is part of the diary. If the
level is high, she might start it when she get enough stable neuronal
connection, etc.
We cannot know that (assuming comp), but that is a good thing. It
makes her a respectable person who is the only judge in the matter,
but even herself cannot know when the diary started, and if it started
at all.
>> Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my
>> current first person view with that before conceiving the
>> daughter?
>
> I am not sure I understand the question.
I am fine that the third person view is related to numbers and not
to physics. Let me put this question this way. My first person view
has diary
Hmm... careful, it is when the content of the diary is true. The worst
case (total delusion) is when that truth coincide only with
consciousness, and all the rest (described in the diary) is a dream.
The first person is the "dreamer of reality". By definition it is when
her beliefs are correct. With "truth" = "God/One", the first person is
the believer (Bp) when and if, or in the circumstance that p is the
case (only "God knows" that).
and the question is what is the different with the third person view
now and then when in my diary has appeared a record about the birth
of my daughter?
"You" go from the state "Peano-arithmetic" to "Peano-arithmetic + I
have a daughter". You can say: I believe I have a daughter. If it is
the case that you have a daughter, then you know you have daughter,
because it happens that your belief is true.
But this is bit stretching the "theory". The ideally correct machine
is to the human what a material point is to the sun. My answer tries
only to help you to understand what I mean by a knowing machine, not
really a knowing human. Human have non-monotonic layers, they can
update beliefs. The logic G and G*, and the six intensional variants
can be seen as the tangential theology, but we are variable machine. G
and G* remains invariant, but get each nanosecond (say) a different
arithmetical interpretations. To extract physics, you need only the
self-referential invariant.
You see, my goal is just to translate some typical statements of my
first person view to your language.
Which is what I try to do with the language of the "chatty" universal
machine, like (a theorem prover for) Peano arithmetic (remember that
by Bp I mean Gödel's Peano arithmetical (or any Löbian machine)
provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical
proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like
BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the Gödel number of a
sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
The (Gödelian) surprise about the ideally correct universal Löbian
machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of self-
reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities. Platonia
is definitely not the same before and after Gödel, we know now that
universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is now, a bit
more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect circle, it is
all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time, look at this
video which illus
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
1Z wrote: > > > > On Feb 18, 4:00 pm, benjayk wrote: >> 1Z wrote: >> >> > On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk wrote: >> >> Brent Meeker-2 wrote: >> >> >> > On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote: >> >> >> >> Brent Meeker-2 wrote: >> >> >> >>> On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer >> at >> >> >> all >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics >> >> has >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an >> >> >> invisible >> >> >> epiphenomena. >> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent >> numbers. >> >> > Numbers >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow >> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is >> explained >> >> from >> >> >> something non physical. >> >> >> >>> The anti realist position is not that numbers are some >> existing >> >> non- >> >> >>> physical >> >> >>> thing: it is that they are not existent at all. >> >> >> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems >> >> very >> >> >> much >> >> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two >> hands" >> >> >> mean? >> >> >> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers. >> >> >> You can't have one without the other. >> >> >> > Sure you can. You can have an apple and an orange. Whether they >> >> > constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as >> fruits. >> >> >> I don't think you can conceive of "an apple and and orange" without >> them >> >> constituting two things. >> >> > That doesn't mean "two" is a third thing with a separate exisence. >> >> It doesn't have to have "seperate" existence. >> The parts of my body exist, even though they have no seperate existence >> from >> my body. > > If you are saying that "two" is not separate from the apple and the > orange...that > is Aristoteleanism, not Platonism > I'm not necessarily defending Platonism (with the implication that numbers are *more real* than material things or even the only real thing), only the reality of numbers. Numbers and material things might be co-dependent. In my mind there can be no animal if there is no particular animal. Because in this case, animal doesn't mean animal, but means anything. So equally there are no two thing if there are no *particular* two things. Because to count something, it must have particularity. "Nothing in particular" can't be counted, or it can be counted as every number which really makes counting meaningless. -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-false-before-its-false--tp30792507p30997236.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Platonia
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>
>> The easy way is to assume inconsistent descriptions are merely an
>> arbitrary
>> combination of symbols that fail to describe something in
>> particular and
>> thus have only the "content" that every utterance has by virtue of
>> being
>> uttered: There exists ... (something).
>>
>
> But we need utterances that *don't* entail existence.
If we find something that doesn't entail existence, it still entails
existence because every utterance is proof that existence IS.
We need only utterances that entail relative non-existence or that
don't
entail existence in a particular way in a particular context.
>>>
>>> You need some non relative absolute base to define relative
>>> existence.
>> The absolute base is the undeniable reality of there being experience.
>
> But this one is not communicable. It does play a role in comp, though.
But we can say "there is an undeniable reality of there being experience".
Isn't this communicating that there is the undeniable reality of there being
experience?
We merely communicate something that everbody already fundamentally knows.
Though some like to deny what they already know.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> But it is not enough. usually people agree with the axiom of Peano
> Arithmetic, or the initial part of some set theory.
But Peano Arithmetics is not a non relative absolute base. It is relative to
the meaning we give it and to the existence of some reality. 1+1=2 can have
infinite meanings, that all are relative to our interpretation ("If I lay
another apple into the bowl with one apple in it there are two apples" is
one of them) and there being meaning in the first place.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>
> So we can say
> things like, "Sherlock Holmes lived at 10 Baker Street" are true,
> even
> though Sherlock Holmes never existed.
Whether Sherlock Holmes existed is not a trivial question. He didn't
exist
like me and you, but he did exist as an idea.
>>>
>>>
>>> Even if you met *a* Sherlock Holmes in Platonia, you have no cirteria
>>> to say it is the usual fictive person created by Conan Doyle,
>>> because,
>>> in Platonia, he is not created by Conan Doyle, ...
>> In Platonia he is not created by Conan Doyle, which makes sense,
>> given the
>> possible that other people use the same fictional character, so he is
>> essentially discovered, not created.
>>
>> But I don't know what you want to imply with that.
>
> Just that fictionism, the idea that numbers are fiction of the same
> type as fictive personage from novels does not make sense, except to
> confuse matter.
Well I didn't want to imply that. Fictionage personage usually refer to some
relative manifestation of an idea, while numbers are a more general and
abstract notion.
And if they are fiction, they are very prevalent fiction (not just among
people but among nature), which makes them basically non-fiction.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
>
>> So they don't add anything to platonia because they merely assert
>> the
>> existence of existence, which leaves platonia as described by
>> consistent
>> theories.
>>
>> I think the paradox is a linguistic paradox and it poses really no
>> problem.
>> Ultimately all descriptions refer to an existing object, but some
>> are too
>> broad or "explosive" or vague to be of any (formal) use.
>>
>> I may describe a system that is equal to standard arithmetics but
>> also
>> has
>> 1=2 as an axiom. This makes it useless practically (or so I
>> guess...) but
>> it
>> may still be interpreted in a way that it makes sense. 1=2 may
>> mean that
>> there is 1 object that is 2 two objects, so it simply asserts the
>> existence
>> of the one number "two". 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects
>> that are 7
>> objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of
>> (for
>> example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3.
>>
>
> The problem is not that there is no possible true interpretation of
> 1=2;
> the problem is that in standard logic a falsity allows you to prove
> anything.
Yes, so we can prove anything. This simply begs the question what
the
anything is. All sentences we derive from the inconsistency would
mean the
same (even though we don't know what exactly it is).
We could just write "1=1" instead and we would have expressed the
same, but
in a way that is easier to make sense of.
This is not problematic, it only makes the proofs in the inconsisten
system
worthless (at least in a formal context were we assume classical
logic).
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
1Z wrote: > > > > On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk wrote: >> 1Z wrote: >> >> > On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk wrote: >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> > On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk >> wrote: >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot >> interfer >> >> at >> >> >> all >> >> >> >> >> >> with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct >> physics >> >> has >> >> >> to >> >> >> >> be >> >> >> >> >> >> reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an >> >> >> invisible >> >> >> >> >> >> epiphenomena. >> >> >> >> >> >> > Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent >> >> numbers. >> >> >> >> >> > Numbers >> >> >> >> >> > have to exist for the conclusion to follow >> >> >> >> >> >> Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is >> explained >> >> >> from >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> something non physical. >> >> >> >> >> > The anti realist position is not that numbers are some >> existing >> >> non- >> >> >> >> > physical >> >> >> >> > thing: it is that they are not existent at all. >> >> >> >> >> If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems >> >> very >> >> >> much >> >> >> >> like a non-fictional and true statement, like "I have two hands" >> >> mean? >> >> >> >> > It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers. >> >> >> >> You can't have one without the other. >> >> >> The statement "2 hands exists" requires that "2 of something" (the >> >> number >> >> >> 2) >> >> >> exists. >> >> >> > The idea that "2 hands exist" implies that 2 exists implies that 3 >> >> > things exist (the left hand, the right hand and "two") >> >> >> Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you >> have a >> >> problem with that? >> >> > It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum >> >> That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the >> conclusion. >> What's absurd with all numbers existing? > > What's absurd is the 2=3 That 2 exists implies that 3 things exists does not mean 2=3. And 2=3 is not necessarily absurd, just an unusual expression. It might mean "2*...=3*..." . 1Z wrote: > >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't >> have >> >> >> two >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> something, right? >> >> >> >> > And if you have none of something, none exists. >> >> >> >> Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that. >> >> >> >> 1Z wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Or is it a fictional statement? >> >> >> >> > Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must >> >> >> > have a separate referent. However, "and", "or", "is", "not" etc >> >> >> > do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a >> >> >> > whole* >> >> >> > to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement. >> >> >> >> Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word >> implies >> >> >> the >> >> >> existence of an object that is connected to the word. >> >> >> > That's a straight contradiction. >> >> >> I expressed myself badly here... >> >> >> I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct >> referent >> >> in >> >> the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and >> >> then >> >> they do have a referent. >> >> > What is objectify ? >> >> In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word >> into >> a noun that expresses the same concept. >> I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the >> word that came to my mind. > > > Why should something have necessary and eternal existence > just because someone rephrased a sentence? That's not the reason that it has existence. The rephrasing is only intended to make it more clear that a referent exists, because it is easier to think of a referent as an object that is lingustically expressed as a noun. 1Z wrote: > >> >> Probably I should just say that every word has a referent. >> >> > Clearly not, e.g unicorn. >> >> Of course it has a referent. If you say "unicorn" this refers to ideas >> about >> an mythological creature. > > An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type , Unicorns > do not exist because ideas about them do. But unicorns *themselves* can also be conceived of ideas. I have no problem of saying unicorns don't exist, but this only means "not existing in the same sense as horses do" and doesn't exclude the existence of unicorns in some more general sense. 1Z wrote: > > The Sense of a term is an idea in any case. There is no reason > why the Reference should bend back on itself an be an idea > as well. (Except for a few exceptions such as the referent > of "concept", "idea", etc). > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference The distinction between sense and reference makes sense on some level, but ultimately it still makes sense to conceive of the object that is referred to as the internal r
Re: Observers Class Hypothesis
Hi! On Feb 22, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 22 Feb 2011, at 07:58, Russell Standish wrote: > snip > > > When observing data, it is important that observers are relatively > > insensitive to error. It does not help to not recognise a lion in the > > African savannah, just because it is partically obscured by a > > tree. Computers used to be terrible at just this sort of problem - you > > needed the exact key to extract a record from a database - now various > > sorts of fuzzy techniques, particularly ones inspired by the neural > > structure in the brain - mean computers are much better at dealing > > wiuth noisy data. With this observation, it becomes clear that the > > myriad of nearby histories that differ only in a few bits are not > > recognised as different from the original observation. These are not > > white rabbits. It requires many bits to make a white rabbit, and this, > > as you eloquently point out, is doubly exponentially suppressed. > > > Bruno will probably still comment that this does not dispose of all > > the 1st person white rabbits, but I fail to see what other ones > > could exist. > > You might be on the right track. Assuming an 'energetical' or > thermodynamical universe, isotropic, bottom linear, sufficiently > symmetrical, such form of white rabbit elimination can work for > collectivity of interacting observers. That would eliminate the first > person plural WRs. But that assumes a lot on the physical part, which > should be extracted from all computations, where we still don't know > if a notion of normal world emerge at all. Meaning that we have not > yet successfully hunt the third person WRs. [SPK] This is a crucial part of my thinking. What if the "physical part" is how we make sense of the "interface" (if I am allowed to borrow that word from computer science) between interacting observers?! > > First person white rabbits crop up due to the fact that, although a > longstanding gentle white rabbit does consume *many* bits, it happens > nevertheless easily in the relative way, as dreams confirms, and they > are easily builded from our relative computational states in UD* (at > all levels), and we have to exclude them only on a priori grounds (by > UDA). Due to its peculiar dumbness, the UD generates them all. Their > "high cost" is relatively high, in deep computational histories, but > the first person cannot know that, and below her substitution level > she might jump as well on an infinities of aberrant stories. > [SPK] What if what each person defines as 'time' is just a local measure of the change that they witness between their own rendition by the UD* and that of another via the interface of the physical? If many observers happen to have synchronizations at a common level of substitution then a global concept of time would obtain for them that can be use to parametrize their records and narratives. > Neurophysiology makes the problem even more complex, because it seems > the brain extracts already information from noise, so we can easily > see lions where there are not. We have to explain why the UD does not > make them even more frequent from the point of view of the first > person. Their high cost in first person plural situation (the > physical) will not been lifted automatically on the first person > points of view. But I don't exclude that OCCAM can get rid of them. > UDA just shows that this would be ultimately equivalent with a > derivation of the physical laws, including isotropic condition, > geometrical homogeneity, linearity and symmetries, from the digital > structure and its digital observers, (keeping in mind this defines > only a flux of consciousness which differentiates on the limit (the > first person is distributed on the limit of the "UD work")). The > derivation of physics from addition and multiplication, should be > equivalent with the elimination of the first person plural white > rabbits. If Bp & Dp (& p) gives the right logic of observation, it > will remains hard to eliminate the 3-WR properly. The measure one has > to be extended to the whole probability calculus, and even if we > extract the quantum calculus, we have to get the right corresponding > part on the qualia to handle the 1-rabbit. > Interviewing the universal machine is probably not the shorter way to > figure out the reason of quanta, but I think it might be the only way > to handle the qualia, and so to handle the (pure, singular) first > person WRs. > > The quantum shadow of the bodies appears also in pure number theory, > with the Riemann zeta function, and with the positive integer > partition function (where even gravity seems to emerge), but if we > extract the body without the whole theology, we might eliminate the > person for even more than one millennium. [SPK] What if this quantum shadow is just the dual that we would expect from the Stone duality? A quantum physical wor
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z wrote: > > > On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > Peter, > > > > > > Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things > we > > > > agree on: > > > > > > Consciousness is informational > > > No > > > > > > There are more ways to have disorder than order > > > > > Yes > > > > > > Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth > > > > The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of > telling > > > > > Sort of. > > > > > > White rabbits are not commonly seen > > > > > Yes > > > > > > This universe appears to follow laws having a short description > > > > > Yes > > > > > > Evolution requires non-chaotic universes > > > > > > Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a > > > > universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws. I agree there > are > > > very > > > > many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, > yet > > > of > > > > all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often > > > surprise, > > > > laws seem to be obeyed. It is as if there is some equation balancing > two > > > > extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple > laws > > > (few > > > > possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs. > > > > universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with > > > ordered > > > > initial conditions (few possibilities). > > > > > > Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white > > > > rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving. However as > you > > > > mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a > > > > universe. > > > > > "initial conditions" only come into where you have a temporal > > > structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia > > > > Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal > > structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is > feasible. > > Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter > Are you suggesting some form of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism ? In any case, it seems there are two ways a line of questioning could end: What is life made out of? Cells. What are cells made out of? Chemicals. What are chemicals made out of? Atoms. What are atoms made out of? Quarks. What are Quarks made out of? Vibrating strings. What are strings made out of? 1. We don't know and can't say. 2. They are mathematical objects. If matter is required for life how do you know matter isn't composed of something more fundamental? > > > > > There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities > > > > for the initial conditions. > > > > > > Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack > of > > > > white rabbits. Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to > evolve > > > from > > > > initial conditions for which there could have been many > possibilities. > > > > > > The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most > > > often? > > > > Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for > which > > > > there are many possibilities. The two must be considered together. > For > > > > this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but > the > > > > laws were simple. You propose that universes with chaotic laws are > more > > > > likely. The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic > > > initial > > > > conditions, > > > > > Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't > > > even a distinction between initial conditions and laws. > > > > How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all? > > Why is that important? There are an awful lot of such universes, after > all, > so the chance of glimpsing one should be high > The question is what is bigger: (Number of orderly universes * Expected number of observers in such a universe) vs. (Number of chaotic universes * Number of observers in such a universe) Based on observations I have concluded the terms on the left must be larger. You have concluded the terms on the right must be larger and then made other conclusions based on that. I think any determination as to which is larger would require evaluating the UDA very deeply, and having an understanding of exactly what information patterns lead to conscious observers (or something to that effect). We are very far (technology wise) from running the UDA that deeply, I think. > > > > >but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise > > > > in this case, > > > > > I keep pointing out that "it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist" > > > doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there. > > > Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence. > > > > Perhaps y
