Re: The consciousness singularity
On 12/10/2011 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do. Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand that you are the one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent extensions. But then starting from Philadelphia instead of Brussels "you" should end up in Washington - since it is much more similar to Philadelphia. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Fwd: Lack of L/M cone selectivity and the inverted qualia problem
Ooops -- Forwarded message -- From: Stephen Lin Date: Tue, May 31, 2011 at 3:59 PM Subject: Lack of L/M cone selectivity and the inverted qualia problem To: d...@u.washington.edu Dear Dr. Dacey, I wanted to introduce myself: I'm a longtime fan of your work, particularly in the problem of L/M cone selectivity (or lack thereof) by interneurons in the retina and its consequences for developmental and evolutionary neurobiology. My interest started about a decade ago, when I was in high school, and I completed a computational neuroscience project wherein I tried to show that the mixed L/M model of foveal midget ganglion cell surrounds was consistent with its observed behavior in response to various stimuli (I did this by basically implementing my own compartment-model based neural simulator framework in C++ and wiring up a small-scale model of the L/M pathway.) I fondly remember reading a few of your papers (collaborations with Dr. Lee, I think) as background research for my project. Anyway, I'm not sure what your feelings are about philosophy of mind questions, but I'm writing to you because I was hoping to get your opinion of a particular one I've had on my mind for quite some time, and which ultimately provided the impetus for my independent research back in high school. Basically, it seems to me that the lack of differential L/M selectivity in the retina implies that there can be no preferred orientation for the red/green qualia color axis, if such a thing exists. Therefore, at least in the case of red/green color vision, it seems that 1) red/green qualia may be arbitrarily inverted between different individuals or (more likely, from my perspective) 2) qualia don't really exist, and that, despite intuition, there is nothing unique about the subjective experience of "red" versus the subjective experience of "green", independent of the neurally coded information that the two form a color axis. Unfortunately, I have not seen this argument ever described anywhere, which has been nagging me for quite some time. Just to explain why I'm deciding to e-mail you know, this whole idea was re-prompted by a question that I read today in an online science forum: http://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/hnh4s/can_people_perceive_colors_differently_from_one/ to which I decided to respond (as the username "hoenikker") with a somewhat lengthy description of my argument, so I hope you can take a look at that if it's unclear what I mean. if you are able, please let me know if you have any thoughts on the matter. I was also thinking about contacting Dr. Daniel Dennet at Tufts and explaining my argument to him, and was wondering if you two may have ever corresponded about color vision: he's often used color vision as an example in his criticism of qualia, but doesn't seem to have ever picked up on this particular (possible) property of retinal wiring and its consequences. Thank you! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: More on the Kingdom of the Blind
"meticulously-crafted" and "consciousness singularity". Come on, you can get it, I promise! Just start from the end and go forward. Then do the same thing reversing itself in reverse. You'll get it ;-) On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Stephen Lin wrote: > Sorry, it was too easy at first so I had to make it harder. > > Anyway, just think about the "consciousness singularity" and enjoy my > meticulously-crafted twitter feed ;-) > > You'll get it EVENTUALLY. James Joyce might be a good place to start. Or > maybe Carl Gustav Jung. Or maybe Godel, Escher, and Bach ;-) > > Does anyone else here enjoy salvia? I just lied, I never use the stuff: it > destroys your brain. Just stay high on life ;-) > > On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 5:47 PM, Stephen Lin wrote: > >> https://twitter.com/#!/HoenikkerLin > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: More on the Kingdom of the Blind
Sorry, it was too easy at first so I had to make it harder. Anyway, just think about the "consciousness singularity" and enjoy my meticulously-crafted twitter feed ;-) You'll get it EVENTUALLY. James Joyce might be a good place to start. Or maybe Carl Gustav Jung. Or maybe Godel, Escher, and Bach ;-) Does anyone else here enjoy salvia? I just lied, I never use the stuff: it destroys your brain. Just stay high on life ;-) On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 5:47 PM, Stephen Lin wrote: > https://twitter.com/#!/HoenikkerLin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
More on the Kingdom of the Blind
https://twitter.com/#!/HoenikkerLin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The consciousness singularity
> >>> Brent > >>> You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict > >>> the world. Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both > >>> representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain > >>> functions? > >> Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by > >> rules of > >> inference that preserve "truth". We can use it to talk about all kinds of > >> things, both > >> real and fictional. We try to create mathematical models where possible > >> because then we > >> have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise. Where > >> our models are > >> not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly > >> what the model > >> predicts. > > >> I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains. See William S. > >> Coopers book > >> "The Evolution of Reason". > > >>> In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be > >>> further divided? > >> The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy > >> density and > >> curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole > >> and the Big > >> Bang. It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model > >> doesn't apply at > >> these extreme conditions. This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was > >> already known > >> that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is > >> expected to > >> breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances. > > >> Brent > > > Brent > > > I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see > > it. I will restate an abbreviated opinion: > > > Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental > > instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth abstract > > mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure > > and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages > > are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in > > descriptions and predictions of the universe. > > I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth. > Truth is an > attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact. Mathematics consists of > relations of > inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all > beyond the > relations. > > > > > Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1) > > representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well > > as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2) > > computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic. > > Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to > describe them. > Exactly, that is what I was attempting to state. You, and most other contributors to this list are very knowledgeable but I believe that some of the properties of numbers and mathematics may be overlooked as to their relevance, but I may be wrong as I have only been observing the “Everything” list for a short time. Ordinal numbers are “descriptive adjectives” as to relational position. The relative position of an event in order being 1st, 2nd, 3rd etc. has describable meaning. The representational description of mental events and external existent conditions are related as to their position in the sequence of time. Time and place both exude conditions that are describable and somewhat predictable. The representational and descriptive conditional position of the earth to the sun, moon and stars gives rise to conditions at a relational position in time. The point is that numbers represent computation (counting and arithmetic) and the ordinal attribute of numbers represent words that communicate descriptive relational meaning. This appears to give dual meaning to numbers that human brain/consciousness can distinguish, represent, organize and compute. An example: The mathematical “golden ratio” as observed in art and nature appears to be pleasant in a geometrically way to the human vision and brain/consciousness. > > > Your statement: I think the rules of inference are encoded in our > > brains , This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and > > languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can, > > *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules > > fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe. > > I don't think laws/rules are fundamental. They are compact models we make up > to explain > and predict facts. > > Brent > > > > > The > > role of human embodied consciousness in any theory of everything is > > established by this fact. > > > Mathematics may be a subset of language as you state or language > > could also be an extension or instantiation (as a concrete verbal > > idea) of what primitive mathematics represents (abstract rules/laws). > > In either case it becomes circular as to what is more relevant > > mathematics or the language to unde
I found the Kingdom of the Blind
In reference to my previous post. Just google for "hoenikker straight dope"! Maybe "hoenikker reddit" too! Sorry guys, it'll be better next time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On 10 Dec 2011, at 07:23, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Dec 09, 2011 at 12:47:32PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote (to Bruno): Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? It sounds like a qualm that I also have had, to an extent, with the MGA and also with Tim Maudlin's argument against supervenience -- the notion of "inertness" or "physical inactivity" seems to be fairly vague. I discuss this on page 76 of my book. AFAICT, Maudlin's argument only works in a single universe setting. What is inert in one universe, is alive and kicking in other universes for which the counterfactuals are true. If that was true, I am not sure a quantum computer could still be emulable by a classical computer, but QM contradicts this. Nowhere does Maudlin postulate a single universe. But he postulates that a computation can be done in one single universe (but that is correct, even a quantum computation can be done in a single universe). So it seems that COMP and single world, deterministic, materialism are incompatible, but COMP and many worlds materialism is not (ie supervenience across parallel worlds whose histories are compatible with our present). I am not sure about that. You might elaborate, or I might try to explain directly why "materialist many-worlds" cannot work, even in the case we have a quantum algorithm working in the brain. I mean, in a sense of making physics again fundamental/primary. I have to think about how to explain this. But then the UDA shows that parallel realities must occur, and consciousness must supervene across all consistent histories, and that the subjective future is indeterminate. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie Graph Argument
On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:47, Joseph Knight wrote: On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 06:30, Joseph Knight wrote: Hi Bruno I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF 1, PDF 2). I don't speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't find much.) Jean-Paul Delahaye was the director of my thesis, and in 2004, when I asked him why I did not get the gift (money, publication of the thesis, and promotion of it) of the price I got in Paris for my thesis, he told me that he has refuted it (!). I had to wait for more than six year to see that "refutation" which appears to be only a pack of crap. So you never got the money, publication, or promotion? I get only defamation. Most objection are either rhetorical tricks, or contains elementary logical errors. I will, or not, answer to those fake objections. I have no clue why Delahaye acts like that. I think that if he had a real objection he would have told me this in private first, and not under my back. He showed a lacking of elementary scientific deontology. He might have some pressure from Paris, who witnessed some pressure from Brussels to hide a belgo-french academical scandal, but of course he denies this. So Delahaye is that unique "scientist", that i have mentionned in some post, who pretend to refute my thesis. My director thesis! The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take... The heap argument was already done when I was working on the thesis, and I answered it by the stroboscopic argument, which he did understand without problem at that time. Such an argument is also answered by Chalmers fading qualia paper, and would introduce zombie in the mechanist picture. We can go through all of this if you are interested, but it would be simpler to study the MGA argument first, for example here: http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html There are many other errors in Delahaye's PDF, like saying that there is no uniform measure on N (but there are just non sigma- additive measures), and also that remark is without purpose because the measure bears on infinite histories, like the iterated self- duplication experience, which is part of the UD's work, already illustrates. All along its critics, he confuses truth and validity, practical and in principle, deduction and speculation, science and continental philosophy. He also adds assumptions, and talk like if I was defending the truth of comp, which I never did (that mistake is not unfrequent, and is made by people who does not take the time to read the argument, usually). I proposed him, in 2004, to make a public talk at Lille, so that he can make his objection publicly, but he did not answer. I have to insist to get those PDF. I did not expect him to make them public before I answered them, though, and the tone used does not invite me to answer them with serenity. He has not convinced me, nor anyone else, that he takes himself his argument seriously. The only remark which can perhaps be taken seriously about MGA is the same as the one by Jacques Mallah on this list: the idea that a physically inactive material piece of machine could have a physical activity relevant for a particular computation, that is the idea that comp does not entail what I call "the 323 principle". But as Stathis Papaioannou said, this does introduce a magic (non Turing emulable) role for matter in the computation, and that's against the comp hypothesis. No one seems to take the idea that comp does not entail 323 seriously in this list, but I am willing to clarify this. Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? With pleasure. Asap. It sounds like a qualm that I also have had, to an extent, with the MGA and also with Tim Maudlin's argument against supervenience -- the notion of "inertness" or "physical inactivity" seems to be fairly vague. I will explain why you can deduce something precise despite the vagueness of that notion. In fact that vagueness is more a problem fro a materialist than an immaterialist in fine. Indeed, it is not yet entirely clear for me if comp implies 323 *logically*, due to the ambiguity of the "qua computatio". In the worst c
Re: The consciousness singularity
On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:57, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Bruno, On 12/9/2011 11:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets). Are two Boolean algebras that have different propositional content one and the same? If this is true then there is no variation is algorithms, it is to say that all algorithms are identical in every way. Let me answer this differently. Does not the postulation of the primitive existence of numbers not equivalent to postulating an infinite set. Not at all. As I said we need to postulate 0 and the successor rules (and the + and * laws). Every "existing" object (that is the object that you can prove to exist) are finite. The set N is not part of arithmetic. Are not the Integers an (countable) infinite set? Yes, but that is not part of the theory. But you can prove in the theory that there is no biggest numbers, or that for all numbers n you can find a bigger one. You can also prove the existence of numbers who believes in infinite sets, but you cannot prove the existence of an infinite set in arithmetic. Arithmetic is the simplest (universal with respect to computations) theory. The one that Hillbert was hoping we could reduce all math to it, but since Gödel we know that we cannot even reduce arithmetical truth, or computer theoretical truth, to it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The consciousness singularity
On 09 Dec 2011, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] I take Occam to say "in any explanation do not multiply entities beyond necessity." See Brent's answer. Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor. Occam razor asks for the minimal number of assumption in a theory. It does not care about the cardinal of the models of the theory. That is why the many worlds is a product of occam principle. Sure, but the necessity of the plurality of "actual worlds" given that we can only observe one Nobody can observe one universe. Physicists measure numbers and relates those numbers by inductive inference on quantitative relations among them. requires additional evidence. "one physical universe" requires as much evidences and explanations than 0, 2, 3, infinity, ... The everything idea is that "all possible universes" is conceptually simpler than one real universe among all the possible one. Some say that the interference of particles "with themselves" in the two-slit experiment is amble evidence for these, but MWI does nothing to explain why we observe the particular universe that we do. Comp explains this completely, by explaining why you cannot understand that you are the one ending in Washington instead as the one ending in Moscow. It explains contingencies by consistent extensions. It has its basis problem as your result has its measure problem. I don't think there is any basis problem in the quantum MW, nor is there any "initial theory" problem in comp. And the mind-body problem is transformed into a body problem, itself becoming a measure problem, but that is what makes those theories interesting. I suspect that these two problems are in the same family. Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities, Which is indeed the case for the comp ontology, but the epistemology can and will be bigger. It is a sort of Skolem phenomenon, that I have often described. the need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist? Nobody can answer that. We cannot prove the existence of the numbers in a theory which do not assume them at the start, implicitly or explicitly. So it is OK to postulate that numbers exists We need only to postulate that zero (or one if you prefer) is a number, and that the successor of a number is a number. This is less than postulating sets or categories, as you need for talking about Stone duality. and from such argue that the physical world is unnecessary epiphenomena It is a phenomenon. Why would it be an epiphenomenon? I have argue that this does not make sense. and yet is required for your result to run. The phenomenon is required. Not its primitivity. All I ask is that you consider the world of numbers to not have an existence independent of the possibility of knowledge of it. In which sense. With comp, the numbers (N, +, *) entails the existence of the knowledge of the numbers by some universal numbers. The "Bp & p" concerns numbers relatively to universal numbers. I separate "existence" from "properties". Me too. Existence is handled by the quantifier "E", and properties are handled by arithmetical predicate. The mere existence of an object does not necessitate any propeties whatsoever. Numbers have properties, they have relative value... Where do those properties derive? From the (non trivial) additive and multiplicative properties, which are among the postulates (recursive laws of addition and multiplication). Why numbers and not Nothing? Because with Nothing in the ontology, you can't prove the existence of anything, not even illusion which needs some illusionned subject. That is why all fundamental theories assumes the numbers, (or equivalent) and with comp this can be shown to be enough. I merely start with the assumption that "existence exists" and go from there. We have discussed this. "existence exists" does not make sense for me. Existence of what? You are the one transforming existence into a property here. To postulate one particular type of entity and not any other requires special explanations. We assume simple principles and no more than what we need, and with comp we need only combinators, of lambda-terms, or natural numbers. What makes numbers special over spaces? They are conceptually far simpler. At least with the Stone-type dualism we have a way to show the necessity of numbers via bisimulations between different instances of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality between Stone spaces and thus do not violate Occam blindly. Assuming different instances of boolean algebra is assuming more than the natural numbers (like assuming finite and infinite sets).
Re: The consciousness singularity
On 09 Dec 2011, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 11:48 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 8, 12:20 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 10:18 AM, Pzomby wrote: On Dec 7, 10:31 am, meekerdbwrote: On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote: Most materialist just say: Well, the natural laws are just there, without any particular reason or meaning behind them, we have to take them for granted. But this is almost as unconvincing as saying "A creator God is just there, we have to take him for granted". It makes no sense (it would be a totally absurd universe), and there also is no evidence that natural laws are primary (we don't find laws to describe the Big Bang and very plausibly, there are none because it is a mathematical singularity). You are attributing a naive concept of physical laws to "we". Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. That's why they change when we get new information. Mathematical singularities are in the mathematics. Nobody supposes they are in the world. Brent Brent You state: Physical laws are models we make up to explain and predict the world. Are properties of mathematics then dual, being both representational (models) and encoded (rules) as instantiated brain functions? Mathematics is a subset of language in which propositions are related by rules of inference that preserve "truth". We can use it to talk about all kinds of things, both real and fictional. We try to create mathematical models where possible because then we have the rules of inference to make predictions that are precise. Where our models are not mathematical, e.g. in politics or psychology, it's never clear exactly what the model predicts. I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains. See William S. Coopers book "The Evolution of Reason". In other words could the singularity in mathematics you refer to be further divided? The singularity I was referring to is the hypersurface of infinite energy density and curvature which general relativity predicts at the center of a black hole and the Big Bang. It is in the mathematical model - which only shows that the model doesn't apply at these extreme conditions. This was not a surprise to anyone, since it was already known that general relativity isn't compatible with quantum mechanics and is expected to breakdown at extremely high energies and short distances. Brent Brent I was attempting to go down another layer of understanding as I see it. I will restate an abbreviated opinion: Numerals (mathematics) and languages are themselves fundamental instantiations of the laws/rules/inferences of truth… abstract mathematics representing the precise observed or discovered structure and order of the universe and the semantically less precise languages are used to interpret and communicate the mathematical models in descriptions and predictions of the universe. I think it's a mistake to think mathematics has something to do with truth. Truth is an attribute of a proposition that expresses a fact. Mathematics consists of relations of inference between propositions - which may or may not express anything at all beyond the relations. Mathematics concerned usually mathematical truth. You confuse mathematics and the inner working of mathematical theories or machines. Logic, that is metamathematics, studies both aspect (syntactical proof, and the mathematical models of the theories). Everything interesting in logic depends on the relation between those two aspects. for example you have the notion of semantical entialment: A -> B if all models satisfying A satisfy B, and syntactical entailment: you can derive B from A. logicians are happy when they have soundness and completeness theorems linking the two notions. Likewise, and simpler, you have the notion of tautology (true in all models of a theory) and proved proposition (syntactical notion). Bruno Mathematics...has multi faceted properties, being at least (1) representational numbers as in descriptively enumerated models as well as adjective position in spatiotemporal sequence (ordinals) and (2) computable numbers as in counting and arithmetic. Mathematics doesn't exist in space and time; although it may be used to describe them. Your statement: “I think the rules of inference are encoded in our brains”, This, I think, infers that primitive mathematics and languages are instantiated in the biological brain and can, *potentially*, represent or reflect any and all laws and rules fundamental to the real (even abstract) and fictional universe. I don't think laws/rules are fundamental. They are compact models we make up to explain and predict facts. Brent The role of human embodied consciousness in any “theory of everything” is established by this fact. Mathematics may be “a subset of language” as you state or language could also be an extension or instantiation (as a c
Re: The consciousness singularity
On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: To suppose computation requires a material process would be materialism, wouldn't it? Hi Craig, Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting computations from not having a physical component but would not specify which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems. True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't call a theory of mind which depends on material processes computationalism. You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists. In the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not. Brent Hi Brent, Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically "stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not" and "everything happens and exists" do not sleep together very well at all. The "everything happens and exists" hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the "Tom sees this and not that" from the " from "Dick sees this and not that" and "Jane sees this and not that", where as the "stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not" can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see. The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6- die. ... The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist "independent of physics"? Seriously!?! Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of "everything theories"; you did notice that this is called the "everything-list" didn't you? Brent HI Brent, I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg my question? How does immaterial based "everything theories" deal with this problem that I just outlined? You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as I understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically coherent. So Bruno backs off to an "everything" that is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is computable. Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we experience. Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in there somewhere. Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the relative way, by the universal numbers themselves. Hi Bruno and Brent, Sorry, I do not accept that as a "good answer" since it would be cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct contradiction to Occam's razor. I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor. Although Occam may have had physical objects in mind when he enunciated his principle, no one uses that razor any more. Occam's razor advises to make one's *theory* as simple as possible. For example the atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but it is a simple way to explain the existent of different materials, thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, bio-energetics,... Even when we reduce this
Re: The consciousness singularity
On 09 Dec 2011, at 23:50, benjayk wrote: Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it. I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, OK. but I still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism. In a classical (or intuitionist) proof, if you derived B from A, automatically you have derived B from A + assumption>. Also, I don't know what you mean by non-platonic-immaterialism. Comp needs arithmetical realism (the belief that the third excluded middle principle is valid in first order arithmetic). It does not exclude wider form of realism, but it recovers them in the machine epistemologies. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
