Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes  
easily

phonetical when I type too fast.


It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)


Which illustrates that my pronunciation, which you cannot know (lucky  
you), is worse than my spelling!


Bruno

PS Heavy day. I will comment other posts asap.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: One subject

[Pierz]

On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: 
>
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI   
> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a   
> > new topic. 
> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality   
> > (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible   
> > experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned   
> > about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only   
> > solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the   
> > idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering   
> > how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being   
> > resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as   
> > the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new   
> > subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear   
> > they are you), or is the new subject really you? 
> > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself   
> > the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected   
> > should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might   
> > have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my   
> > memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes   
> > even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain   
> > atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- 
> > dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity   
> > of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since   
> > there is no physical continuity at all. 
> > But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly,   
> > resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all   
> > memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and   
> > reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the   
> > future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain   
> > is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following   
> > this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the   
> > division between subjects is not absolute. What separates   
> > subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the   
> > computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious   
> > 'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to   
> > one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner   
> > of a specific physical brain). 
> > I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's   
> > like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must   
> > ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every   
> > manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the   
> > UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of   
> > morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they   
> > *are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge   
> > of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change   
> > the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact,   
> > wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since 
> > everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of   
> > every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can   
> > only steal from yourself. 
>
> I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong   
> to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition   
> true but capable of becoming false if justified  "too much", like all   
> protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness,   
> etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions". 
>
> Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which,   
> BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others   
> what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others   
> what *the others* don't want you do to them". 
> In fact, unless you defend your life,  just respect the possible adult   
> "No Thanks".  (It is more complex with the children, you must add   
> nuances like "as far as possible"). 
>
>
> I don't know what G* and G are, but I get the gist, and I agree. In fact, 
questions like how to deal with punishment become interesting when 
considered through this 'one subject' lens. When 'I' am the offender, I 
don't want to be punished for my crimes, but 'I' as the victim and the 
broader community think the offender should be. We have to balance 
competing views. Also, there is sense in looking after oneself ahead of 
others to the extent that I of all people am best equipped to look after my 
own needs, and I have the same rights to happiness, material wellbeing etc 
as others. The question is, what co

Re: Autonomy?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:06 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
> Stathis:
> in my simplicity: "free is free" and "pseudo" means "not really". So:
> pseudo-free will is not free (will), only something similar. Restricted by
> circumstances. Or so.
> I allow into my 'deterministically' constrained free will(!) a free
> choice from available variants. I know nothing about how to apply it: how
> the unknowable (hidden? not yet disclosed?) factors incluence my decision,
> so I say "I have a choice. Same way the less agnostics say: free will.
> Please correct me if you know more.
> Thanx
> John M

I think it's a matter of semantics. I could say I still have a choice
even if my actions are determined by my brain and my environment. If
my brain and/or my environment had been different, I could have chosen
differently. That is compatibilism. The incompatibilists would say
that I don't have a choice if my actions are thus determined. But the
incompatibilists still live their life making decisions like everyone
else.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: modal logic's meta axiom

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 01:33:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> In fact we have p/p for any p. If you were correct we would have []p
> for any p.

This is what I thought you said the "meta-axiom" stated?

How else do we get p/[]p for Kripke semantics?

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Re: free will and mathematics

[RMahoney]

On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:45:16 AM UTC-5, RAM wrote: 
>
>  But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, 
> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine 
> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we 
> could have done otherwise. Or something equivalent, if we were put again in 
> exactly the same subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think 
> so, but If yes, why?
>
 
 
I'm assuming you mean by exactly the same situation, every atom in it's 
exact same physical state. You might think the next moment in time would be 
exactly the same, but at the quantum level the next physical state in time 
could be different at the quantum level, and if one was truly on the fence 
in making a decision, the decision could possibly fall to the other side of 
the fence. The two different futures both exist but do not interact. Any 
moment in time has multiple futures and multiple histories.
 
Now the question that came up, is this person not responsible for his/her 
actions if only at the mercy of the physical laws of the universe (no free 
will). The answers I've been hearing that suggest she/he may not be 
responsible miss the point. The measure of wrongness was defined by 
society. If history and experience yields a member of society that does a 
horrendous wrong, he/she is a defect of society and needs to be removed, 
rehabilitated, or whatever society dictates. Here's where I don't agree 
with aquitting someone due to mental defect. If the defect is there, the 
result is the same. Fix it if it's fixable or if it's not fixable remove 
them from society.
 
- Roy

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Re: inside vs outside

[Abram Demski]

On Sun, Jun 10, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 09 Jun 2012, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Bruno, Wei,
>
> I've been reading the book "saving truth from paradox" on and off, and it
> has convinced me of the importance of the "inside view" way of doing
> foundations research as opposed to the "outside view".
>
> At first, I simply understood Field to be referring to the language vs
> meta-language distinction. He criticises other researchers for taking the
> "outside view" of the system they are describing, meaning that they are
> describing the theory from a meta-language which must necessarily exist
> outside the theory.
>
>
> Since Gödel we know that for "rich" theory we can embed the metatheory in
> the theory. That is what Gödel's provability predicate does, and what
> Kleene predicate does for embedding the reasoning on the Turing machines,
> and the phi_i, in terms of number relations.
>
> Arithmetic contains its own interpreter(s).
>
>
>
>
Hm, well, such is not the case for Truth. According to Tarski, we are
forbidden from embedding the metalanguage in the language. This follows
from simple, intuitive assumptions, showing that the Liar paradox will
spring up in any 'reasonable' theory of truth. Kripke showed how to weaken
our notion of truth to the point where the truth predicate could be within
the language, but his theory does not allow is to say everything which
seems natural to assert about truth, so many more theories have been
created after. Every theory seems to suffer from the "revenge problem": in
order to define a notion of truth which can fit into the language, a more
complicated semantics for that truth predicate must be described. The
Strengthened Liar Paradox is then describable in that semantics, if we try
to fit it within the same language. So, we are again forced to create a
meta-language outside of our language to describe its semantics. (But who
describes the semantics of the meta-language?)

So, the cases for syntactic meta-theories and semantic meta-theories
diverge widely.


>
>
> I thought that his complaint was frivolous; of course you need to describe
> a theory of truth via a meta-language. That is part of the structure of the
> problem. Yes, it makes the entire theory dubious; but without a concrete
> alternative, the only reply to this is "such is life!". So I was confused
> when he refused to take other logicians literally (accepting the logic
> which they put forward as the logic which they put forward), and instead
> claimed that their logic corresponded to the 1-higher theory (the
> metalanguage in which they describe their theory).
>
> At some point, though, the technique "clicked" for me, and I understood
> that he was saying something very different. For example, the outside view
> of Kripke's theory of truth says that truth is a 'partial' notion, with an
> extension and an anti-extension, but also a 'gap' between the two where it
> is undefined. (It is a "gap theory".)
>
>
> I am not sure I understand well.
>
>
I hope the previous explanation helped. Field claims to get around the
revenge problem by not really providing a meta-language to give a semantics
to the truth predicate. He does provide something similar, but it is really
a semantics for a restricted domain, to give an intuition for the working
of the theory. (He argues that Kripke's semantics must be viewed in this
way, too.)


>
>
> On the inside view, however, it does not make this kind of commitment; it
> does not claim there is a gap. What the theory says about itself makes no
> commitment about the status of the (would-be) gap sentences; they could
> well be both true and false. The "outside view" will insist on giving a
> semantic status to these, but this is pathological; we cannot develop a
> theory of truth in this way (we know that it leads to paradox).
>
> Instead, we need to take the inside view seriously, and develop theories
> from that perspective.
>
> This generally means taking the truth predicate as basic, and looking for
> deduction rules about it which capture what we want, rather than trying to
> define its semantics in a set-theoretic or otherwise external way.
>
> I don't feel that I have an excellent grasp of this technique, though. So,
> I'm looking for feedback. Do you have any thoughts or advice here?
>
>
> Better! A theory. Not mine, but the one by the "rich" universal machine
> itself (that I call Löbian). Basically a machine is Löbian if it is
> universal (in Church Turing sense) and can prove (in a technical weak
> sense) that she is universal. Basically it is a universal system + an
> induction axiom (or axiom scheme). Examples are Peano Arithmetic, ZF, etc.
>

Yes, I should finally buy a book on this. :)


> The machine's inside view is already unameable by the machine, it is a
> "time" creator, (in some semantics), a kind of intuitionist knower. Yes, it
> is important to take its view too.
>
> All löbian machines are able to distinguish two forms of se

Re: free will and mathematics

[meekerdb]

On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:
But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about the 
subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves in exactly the 
same subjective situation and still think that we could have done otherwise. 


I can certainly imagine that.  But I wonder if your use of "subjective situation" is 
ambiguous.  Do you mean exactly the same state, including memory, conscious and 
unconscious thoughts..., or do you just mean satisfying the same subjective description?


Brent

Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same subjective situation, 
would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but If yes, why?


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Re: free will and mathematics

[R AM]

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 7:34 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
>>
> The answer must be relative to our (imperfect) knowledge.  Since that
> knowledge is not sufficient to predict what he would do, we say "Yes, he
> could have done otherwise."  In the same way we may say, "I know him well
> and he's not a person to rob a bank."  We may believe the world is
> deterministic and yet still unpredictable, so when you ask "could" we need
> to think in what sense it is meant.
>
>
I completely agree. It's not clear what we mean by "could" in this case (in
the same sense that it's not clear what is meant by free-will). That is why
I'm trying to reformulate the question as "if you were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation, do you think you would do otherwise?"


Brent
>
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Re: free will and mathematics

[R AM]

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti
> because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have
> done otherwise?
>
> Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after considering all
> his options. Later he might be judged and told that "he could have done
> otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?
>
>
> At the level of the arithmetical laws, or physical laws, the answer is no.
> But we don't live at that level, so at the level of its first person
> impression the answer is yes.
>

OK. So that means that if you (or the ganster) were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation (same beliefs, likings, emotions, intentions,
memories, same everything) you could do otherwise?

More specifically. You are in a situation where you crave for spaghetti,
you haven't had spaghetti in the last month, you know spaghetti is good for
er ... whatever. You therefore make the decision to eat spaghetti. Now, you
are put again in exactly the same situation and ... do you really think you
could choose strawberries instead? would you choose strawberries?


> A guy rapes and tortures 10 children, could he have done otherwise? Well,
> there is a sense for some medical expert to say that he could have done
> otherwise, for the guy is judged responsible and not under some mental
> disease (for example). Now, if the guy defends himself in saying that he
> was just obeying to the physical laws, he will convince nobody, and rightly
> so.
>

He will convince nobody  because we all believe that he (and all of us)
could have done otherwise. And we all believe that because, for some
reason, we believe it is unfair to punish someone if he cannot do
otherwise. What I'm saying is that belief in free-will is just a
justification for punishing people.

But in fact, we punish people, not because "he could have done otherwise"
but because next time, he will think twice. Next time, he will not be in
the same subjective situation: he will have the memories of his punishment
and he will take that into account.

If next time he is in exactly the same subjective situation, he will do
exactly the same. Why would he do otherwise? Why didn't he already?

Let's suppose that a person forgets everything every morning. Would it make
any sense to punish someone like that, because he just could have done
otherwise?


> We are determinate, but we cannot known completely our determination, so
> from our point of view there is a genuine spectrum of different
> possibilities and we can choose "freely" among them. It does not matter
> that a God, or a Laplacean daemon can predict our actions, for *we* can't,
> and have no other choice than choosing without complete information, and in
> some case it makes sense that we could have made a different choice (even
> if that is senseless at the basic ontological level, for the choice is made
> at another level, from an internal first person perspectives.
>

But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about
the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves
in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we could have
done otherwise. Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but
If yes, why?



> To justify our acts by God Will or by Physical Laws (or Arithmetical laws)
> is the same type of level confusion, or perspective confusion, mistake. I
> would say.
>



> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: QTI and eternal torment

[David Nyman]

On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb  wrote:

That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
> If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
> of the theory.
>

Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces such a
knower.  But in any case it is a metaphor for the consciousness that
supervenes on those states, as opposed to being, in an eliminative sense,
merely "identical" with them.  As to "losing" the explanatory power of the
theory, the argument, assuming it has any cogency, is designed precisely to
test the limits of the explanatory adequacy of the theory in its bare form.

David

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Re: QTI and eternal torment

[Stephen P. King]

On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:


On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to 
say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time", and 
can

only be used as a metaphor.


I agree with almost everything you say.  I would say also that the
moments of experience, considered as a class, are themselves out of
time.  What it takes to "create (experiential) time" - the notorious
"illusion" - is whatever is held to be responsible for the irreducible
mutual-exclusivity of such moments, from the perspective of the
(universal) knower.  Hoyle does us the service of making this
mutual-exclusivity explicit by invoking his "light beam" to illuminate
the pigeon holes at hazard; those who conclude that this function is
redundant, and that the structure of pigeon holes itself somehow does
the work of "creating personal history", owe us an alternative
explanation of the role of Hoyle's beam.

I understand, of course, that these are just ways of thinking about a
state of affairs that is ultimately not finitely conceivable, but all
the same, I think there is something that cries out for explanation
here and Hoyle is one of the few to have explicitly attempted to
address it.


David, I can't see the role of Hoyles' beam. The reason of the mutual 
exclusivity of moments seems to me to be explained (in comp) by the 
fact that a machine cannot address the memory of another machine, or 
of itself at another moment (except trough memory). Hoyles' beam seem 
to reintroduce a sort of  external reality, which does not solve 
anything, it seems to me, and introduces more complex events in the 
picture.


Dear Bruno,

Here we seem to be synchronized in our ideas!

This "cannot access the memory of another machine" and "(cannot 
access memory ) of itself at another moment" is exactly the way that the 
concurrency problem of computer science is related to space and time! 
But now I am confused as you seem to recognize that a machine has and 
needs the resource of memory; it was my (mis)understanding that machines 
are purely immaterial, existing a a priori given strings of integers. 
How does memory non-access become encoded in a string? Is it the 
non-existence of a particular Godelization within a particular string 
that would relate to some other portion of a string?





Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not 
enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any 
universal machine, it will look like a special moment is chosen out of 
the others, for the elementary reason that such a state individuates 
the "present moment here and now" from her point of view.


How is the index establish a form of sameness? It seems to me that 
one needs at least bisimilarity 
 to establish the connectivity.




Of course, the idea that some time exists is very deep in us, and I 
understand that the big comp picture is very counter-intuitive, but in 
this case, it is a kind of difficulty already present in any atemporal 
"static" view of everything, which already appears with general 
relativity for example.


It is a bit subtle. "To be conscious here and now" is not an illusion. 
"To be conscious of "here and now" " is an illusion. The "here and 
now" is part of the brain (actually the infinities of arithmetical 
relations) construction.


The content of "to be conscious here and now" is exactly what Craig 
is discussing with "sense"! I see it as a form of fixed point considered 
in a computational sense, similar to what Wolfram pointed out in his 
Computational Intractibility in physics: the best possible simulation of 
a physical system is the system itself. You seem to say that this is a 
relation between an infinite number of arithmetical relations. Could you 
elaborate more on this?




Feel free to criticize my perhaps too much simple mind view on this, I 
might miss your point,


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/






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Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[meekerdb]

On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and 
physics?


You can say that.

Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience 
for the delays, you have to take into account all computations accessing to your 
3-actual computational states (in comp).


This will include some computation made by some universal number (computer) u, but also 
the computation made by the universal number j when simulating u, and then those made by 
the universal number k simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an 
infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics. Physics does not 
really relies on any particular computations a priori, but on *all* computations, as 
defined by the UD processing (or equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by 
their proofs). 


But that seems to invoke realizes, not just potential, infinities.

Brent

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Re: QTI and eternal torment

[meekerdb]

On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
elementary reason that such a state individuates the "present moment here
and now" from her point of view.

Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
particular machine.  Hoyle on the other hand is considering a
*universal state of attention* and hence needs to make such isolation
of particulars *explicit*.  The beam stands for the unique, momentary
isolation in experience of that single state from the class of all
possible states (of all possible machines).  Thus, momentarily, the
*single* universal knower can be in possession of a *single* focus of
attention, to the exclusion of all others.  This is the only
intelligible meaning of mutually-exclusive, considered at the
*universal level*.

If you remove such a principle of isolation, how can the state of
knowledge of the universal knower ever be anything other than a sum
over all experiences, which can never be the state of any single mind?
  Sure, the states are "all there at once", but what principle allows
"you", in the person of the universal knower, to restrict your
attention to any one of them?


That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states. If you 
introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function of the theory.


Brent


It seems to me that, if one wants to
make sense of the notion of a *universal* locus of experience, with
personal identity emerging only as a secondary phenomenon, you are
bound in the first place to consider matters from that universal point
of view.  And then you must not forget that this point of view, *as a
knower*, is also *your* point of view.  Hence to the extent that you,
*as a merely subsidiary characteristic of such a universal point of
view*, are restricted to "one place, one time", so must it be equally
restricted.

Do remember that I accept that this is a heuristic, or way of
thinking; I do not know how, or if, it corresponds to any fundamental
principle of reality.  But I think that if one purges one's mind of
the implicit assumptions I mention above, one can see that the notions
of "a single universal point of view" and "everything considered
together" are actually mutually exclusive.  So pick one or the other,
but not both together.

David



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Jun 2012, at 10:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.06.2012 18:49 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and
b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)
leads to

arithmetic -> mind -> physics

That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in
simulation is possible.


Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.

Let me explain why.

Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of
life, arithmetic, S & K, etc.

Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called
phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable
functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra.
We can associate a number to each partial computable functions.

A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =
phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In
that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first
approximation of a definition to be sure).

Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function,
so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With
this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by
yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the
universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of
simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical
relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We
cannot avoid them in the measure problem.

The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities
computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above
the substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never
know our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a
matter of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion,
something like that.

In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic, there are a lot of even
infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with
variants etc.


Bruno,

I do not completely understand consequences from your theorem, sorry.

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind  
and physics?


You can say that.

Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first  
person experience for the delays, you have to take into account all  
computations accessing to your 3-actual computational states (in comp).


This will include some computation made by some universal number  
(computer) u, but also the computation made by the universal number j  
when simulating u, and then those made by the universal number k  
simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an  
infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics.  
Physics does not really relies on any particular computations a  
priori, but on *all* computations, as defined by the UD processing (or  
equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by their proofs).






arithmetic -> mind -> physics -> mind -> physics -> ...


It is more like:

arithmetic -> mind -> mind -> mind -> mind ->   ...   -> (at the limit  
viewed from inside)  physics.


(of course it is not that linear, given that it bifurcates and fuses,  
and the topology of the local first person neighborhood are  
constrained by relatively correct self-reference).






For example, does it imply that my 1st person view can make a  
supercomputer and then instantiate itself in that supercomputer?


Only bodies, even if dreamed or relatively virtual, can make other  
bodies, like the body of a supercomputer. But that is something that  
you can do, by definition of comp. But you cannot do it in a provable  
way, so you have to bet on the level, and take your risk and  
responsibility. If the doctor says something like "science has proved  
that you will survive", without mentioning the theory/hypotheses, it  
is better to run away.




Then there should be two my 1st person views and we seem to come to  
what you have referred to as first person indeterminacy.


OK. And that happens "naturally" in the realm of the arithmetical  
relations. If you accept that truth like "24 is composite" does not  
depend on your consciousness, then the whole arithmetical pattern on  
which consciousness can differentiated is well defined (through comp).






Could you please relate simulation in simulation with what you are  
saying about first person indeterminacy?



It is not really related. I will try. I start from arithmetic, which  
contains all computations.


A computation is what universal machine does. Universal machines  
emulates other machines. OK?


In particular, a universal machine can emulate another universal  
machine. Actually, a universal machine can emulate herself, and even  
plays with the levels. This belongs to its 'natural imagination'  
capacity.


Consider U1

Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[David Nyman]

On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes easily
> phonetical when I type too fast.

It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)

David

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Re: QTI and eternal torment

[David Nyman]

On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
> seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
> will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
> elementary reason that such a state individuates the "present moment here
> and now" from her point of view.

Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
particular machine.  Hoyle on the other hand is considering a
*universal state of attention* and hence needs to make such isolation
of particulars *explicit*.  The beam stands for the unique, momentary
isolation in experience of that single state from the class of all
possible states (of all possible machines).  Thus, momentarily, the
*single* universal knower can be in possession of a *single* focus of
attention, to the exclusion of all others.  This is the only
intelligible meaning of mutually-exclusive, considered at the
*universal level*.

If you remove such a principle of isolation, how can the state of
knowledge of the universal knower ever be anything other than a sum
over all experiences, which can never be the state of any single mind?
 Sure, the states are "all there at once", but what principle allows
"you", in the person of the universal knower, to restrict your
attention to any one of them?  It seems to me that, if one wants to
make sense of the notion of a *universal* locus of experience, with
personal identity emerging only as a secondary phenomenon, you are
bound in the first place to consider matters from that universal point
of view.  And then you must not forget that this point of view, *as a
knower*, is also *your* point of view.  Hence to the extent that you,
*as a merely subsidiary characteristic of such a universal point of
view*, are restricted to "one place, one time", so must it be equally
restricted.

Do remember that I accept that this is a heuristic, or way of
thinking; I do not know how, or if, it corresponds to any fundamental
principle of reality.  But I think that if one purges one's mind of
the implicit assumptions I mention above, one can see that the notions
of "a single universal point of view" and "everything considered
together" are actually mutually exclusive.  So pick one or the other,
but not both together.

David

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Re: One subject

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote:

I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI  
and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a  
new topic.
It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality  
(3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible  
experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned  
about comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only  
solution to a paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the  
idea of cryogenic freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering  
how I could know whether the consciousness of the person being  
resuscitated was the 'same consciousness' (whatever that means) as  
the consciousness of the person who was frozen. That is, is a new  
subject created with all your memories (who will of course swear  
they are you), or is the new subject really you?
This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself  
the question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected  
should I be scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might  
have?" Will they be happening to *me*, or to some person with my  
memories and personality I don't have to worry about? It becomes  
even clearer if you imagine dismantling and reassembling the brain  
atom by atom. What then provides the continuity between the pre- 
dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can only be the continuity  
of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 'me' me, since  
there is no physical continuity at all.
But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly,  
resulting in a slight personality change or the loss of some or all  
memories. Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and  
reassembly, be worried about experiences of this person in the  
future who is now not quite me? What then if the reassembled brain  
is changed enough that I am no longer recognizable as me? Following  
this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that the  
division between subjects is not absolute. What separates  
subjectivities is the contents of consciousness (comp would say the  
computations being performed), not some kind of other mysterious  
'label' or identifier that marks certain experiences as belonging to  
one subject and not another (such as, for instance, being the owner  
of a specific physical brain).
I find this conclusion irresistible - and frankly terrifying. It's  
like reincarnation expanded to the infinite degree, where 'I' must  
ultimately experience every subjective experience (or at least every  
manifested subjective experience, if I stop short of comp and the  
UD). What it does provide is a rationale for the Golden Rule of  
morality. Treat others as I would have them treat me because they  
*are* me, there is no other! If we really lived with the knowledge  
of this unity, if we grokked it deep down, surely it would change  
the way we relate to others. And if it were widely accepted as fact,  
wouldn't it lead to the optimal society, since
everyone would know that they will be/are on the receiving end of  
every action they commit? Exploitation is impossible since you can  
only steal from yourself.


I can agree, but it is not clear if it is assertable (it might belong  
to variant of G*, and not of G making that kind of moral proposition  
true but capable of becoming false if justified  "too much", like all  
protagorean virtues (happiness, free-exam, intelligence, goodness,  
etc.). Cf "hell is paved with good intentions".


Also, a masochist might become a sadist by the same reasoning, which,  
BTW, illustrates that the (comp) moral is not "don't do to the others  
what you don't want the others do to you", but "don't do to the others  
what *the others* don't want you do to them".
In fact, unless you defend your life,  just respect the possible adult  
"No Thanks".  (It is more complex with the children, you must add  
nuances like "as far as possible").





 Of course, if comp is true, moral action becomes meaningless in one  
sense since everything happens anyway, so you will be on the  
receiving end of all actions, both good and bad.


This is true from outside, but not from inside, where the good/bad is  
relative to you, and you can change the proportion of good and bad in  
your accessible neighborhoods. And it is obligatory like that by comp,  
making moral locally sense-full.


Looking at the big picture for the moral is as much senseless as  
justifying a murder by referring to the obedience to the physical  
laws. It does not work because we precisely don't usually live in the  
big picture. We are locally embed in it, and that plays the key local  
role for any practical matter.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jun 2012, at 23:00, David Nyman wrote:


On 10 June 2012 17:49, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.


worse?


Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes  
easily phonetical when I type too fast.


Sorry again,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QTI and eternal torment

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:


On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to  
say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time",  
and can

only be used as a metaphor.


I agree with almost everything you say.  I would say also that the
moments of experience, considered as a class, are themselves out of
time.  What it takes to "create (experiential) time" - the notorious
"illusion" - is whatever is held to be responsible for the irreducible
mutual-exclusivity of such moments, from the perspective of the
(universal) knower.  Hoyle does us the service of making this
mutual-exclusivity explicit by invoking his "light beam" to illuminate
the pigeon holes at hazard; those who conclude that this function is
redundant, and that the structure of pigeon holes itself somehow does
the work of "creating personal history", owe us an alternative
explanation of the role of Hoyle's beam.

I understand, of course, that these are just ways of thinking about a
state of affairs that is ultimately not finitely conceivable, but all
the same, I think there is something that cries out for explanation
here and Hoyle is one of the few to have explicitly attempted to
address it.


David, I can't see the role of Hoyles' beam. The reason of the mutual  
exclusivity of moments seems to me to be explained (in comp) by the  
fact that a machine cannot address the memory of another machine, or  
of itself at another moment (except trough memory). Hoyles' beam seem  
to reintroduce a sort of  external reality, which does not solve  
anything, it seems to me, and introduces more complex events in the  
picture.


Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not  
enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any  
universal machine, it will look like a special moment is chosen out of  
the others, for the elementary reason that such a state individuates  
the "present moment here and now" from her point of view.


Of course, the idea that some time exists is very deep in us, and I  
understand that the big comp picture is very counter-intuitive, but in  
this case, it is a kind of difficulty already present in any atemporal  
"static" view of everything, which already appears with general  
relativity for example.


It is a bit subtle. "To be conscious here and now" is not an illusion.  
"To be conscious of "here and now" " is an illusion. The "here and  
now" is part of the brain (actually the infinities of arithmetical  
relations) construction.


Feel free to criticize my perhaps too much simple mind view on this, I  
might miss your point,


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: One subject

[Pierz]

Wonderful, thank you for the link.

On Monday, June 11, 2012 6:18:57 PM UTC+10, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
> On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following: 
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI 
> > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a 
> > new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is 
> > in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes 
> > all possible experiences. 
>
> You may want to read Erwin Schr�dinger, Mind and Matter 
> Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind 
>
> "The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical 
> fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the 
> singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one 
> consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of 
> this ever happening anywhere in the world." 
>
> Evgenii 
> -- 
>
>
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/03/the-arithmetical-paradox-the-oneness-of-mind.html
>  
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: One subject

[Pierz]

On Monday, June 11, 2012 12:20:06 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 6/10/2012 6:12 PM, Pierz wrote: 
> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI and 
> eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a new topic. 
> > It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is in reality 
> (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes all possible 
> experiences. In a blog post I wrote a while back (before I learned about 
> comp) I put forward this 'one observer' notion as the only solution to a 
> paradox that occurred to me when thinking about the idea of cryogenic 
> freezing and resuscitation. I started wondering how I could know whether 
> the consciousness of the person being resuscitated was the 'same 
> consciousness' (whatever that means) as the consciousness of the person who 
> was frozen. That is, is a new subject created with all your memories (who 
> will of course swear they are you), or is the new subject really you? 
> > This seems like a silly or meaningless point until you ask yourself the 
> question, "If I am frozen and then cryogenicaly resurrected should I be 
> scared of bad experiences the resurrected person might have?" Will they be 
> happening to *me*, or to some person with my memories and personality I 
> don't have to worry about? It becomes even clearer if you imagine 
> dismantling and reassembling the brain atom by atom. What then provides the 
> continuity between the pre-dismantled and the reassembled brain? It can 
> only be the continuity of self-reference (the comp assumption) that makes 
> 'me' me, since there is no physical continuity at all. 
>
> There's continuity of physical structure (I think that's what 
> 'reassembled' means).  I 
> don't know what 'continuity of self-reference' means?  Anyway this is not 
> a thought 
> experiment.  The atoms in your body get replaced as you live, it is only 
> the structure 
> that is, approximately, conserved. 
>

Continuity of self reference = something like comp substitution level, i.e. 
I can recall a continuous self history which seems sufficiently coherent 
that I can identify a self. There is a continuity of physical structure, 
but one that is based on the pattern of relations not the physical atoms. 
So I could be duplicated, ending up with two selves. Now let's say one of 
these selves is tortured. Should I, prior to the duplication, fear this 
torture? Following the UDA, one 'diary' will record torture and the other 
won't. So do I have a 50% chance of being tortured? Should I fear it as if 
the matter were to be decided by a toin coss? I think not - this is not a 
normal type of probability. Both branches happen, and 'I' will experience 
both.

> But let's say the atoms are jumbled a little at reassembly, resulting in 
> a slight personality change or the loss of some or all memories. 
>
> Happens to me all the time. 
>
> Yes, and well the question is, at what point do you stop being you and 
become someone else? Of course that is pure semantics from the 3p 
perspective, but from the 1p POV, it is the difference between being the 
locus of an experience or not, as the torture example shows. Imagine the 
brain is duplicated a million times, but each duplication introduces 
varying degrees of change from the original brain structure. Some 
duplications are almost (or exactly) the original me, others are completely 
different people. Now how do I 'bet' on whether or not to be scared of the 
torture that will be imposed on some of those copies? Should I only fear 
torture that happens to exact copies, slight variants, or *all* the copies, 
regardless of how divergent from the original they are?

> Should I, about to undergo brain disassembly and reassembly, be worried 
> about experiences of this person in the future who is now not quite me? 
> What then if the reassembled brain is changed enough that I am no longer 
> recognizable as me? 
>
> Are you worried that you may experience a heart attack in 20yrs?  Are you 
> eating a 
> cheeseburger? 
>

Heart attack's the least of my worries, but I hope you appreciate I'm not 
personally considering cryogenic freezing. I'm talking about the paradoxes 
that the idea of singular identity presents.

>
> > Following this through to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear that 
> the division between subjects is not absolute. What separates 
> subjectivities is the contents of consciousness 
>
> That seems to me a tautology; just an implicit definition of 
> "subjectivities"? 
>

I don't think so. It arises as a necessary conclusion from contemplation of 
the foregoing scenarios and their variants. In comp, what maintains the 
continuity of the subject in the duplication experiment? The substitution 
level. The subject coheres through the teleportation/duplication because 
the structure of computations is retained  - in my thought experiment, the 
physical brain structure. My statement that the contents of consciousness 
pro

Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.06.2012 18:49 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and
b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)
leads to

arithmetic -> mind -> physics

That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in
simulation is possible.


Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.

Let me explain why.

Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of
life, arithmetic, S & K, etc.

Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called
phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable
functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra.
We can associate a number to each partial computable functions.

A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =
 phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In
that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first
approximation of a definition to be sure).

Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function,
so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With
this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by
yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the
 universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of
simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical
relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We
 cannot avoid them in the measure problem.

The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities
 computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above
the substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never
know our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a
matter of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion,
something like that.

In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic, there are a lot of even
infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with
 variants etc.


Bruno,

I do not completely understand consequences from your theorem, sorry.

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and 
physics?


arithmetic -> mind -> physics -> mind -> physics -> ...

For example, does it imply that my 1st person view can make a 
supercomputer and then instantiate itself in that supercomputer? Then 
there should be two my 1st person views and we seem to come to what you 
have referred to as first person indeterminacy.


Could you please relate simulation in simulation with what you are 
saying about first person indeterminacy?


Evgenii

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Re: One subject

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 11.06.2012 03:12 Pierz said the following:

I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI
and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a
new topic. It seems to me an obvious corollary of comp that there is
in reality (3p) only one observer, a single subject that undergoes
all possible experiences.


You may want to read Erwin Schrödinger, Mind and Matter
Chapter 4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind

"The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical 
fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the 
singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one 
consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of 
this ever happening anywhere in the world."


Evgenii
--

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/03/the-arithmetical-paradox-the-oneness-of-mind.html




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