Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 3:03 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

 I meant if the table talks to you just like a person does, giving you
 consistently interesting conversation and useful advice on a wide
 variety of subjects. Unless it's a trick and there's a hidden speaker
 somewhere, you would then have to say that the table is intelligent.
 You might speculate as to how the table does it and whether the table
 is conscious, but those are separate questions.


 Who is to say that that table was actually a TV set in the shape of a
 table or a table that had some other means to transmit what would satisfy a
 speech-only Turing test? This goes nowhere, Stathis.

That's why I said unless it's a trick. The same consideration
applies to anything: how do I know that my neighbour isn't a puppet
manipulated by someone else?

 I think you're using the word intelligent in a non-standard way,
 leading to confusion. The first thing to do in any debate is agree on
 the definition of the words.


 Could you define intelligence for us in unambiguous terms? I don't
 recall Craig trying to do that...

I gave an operational definition. One dictionary definition is the
ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. It is not
synonymous with consciousness.


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Stathis Papaioannou

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Science is a religion by itself.

2013-02-15 Thread socra...@bezeqint.net

 Schrodinger's cat
 and  “ The law of conservation and  transformation  energy/mass”
=.
This law consist of  two  (2) parts:
a)
 according to “ The law of conservation (!) energy/mass”
 Schroedinger's cat cannot die.
b)
according to “ The law of transformation (!) energy/mass”
 Schroedinger's cat can change its image (geometrical form).
c)
Of course,  it is impossible to separate these two parts of Law,
==.
socratus.

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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/15/2013 6:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 3:03 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:


I meant if the table talks to you just like a person does, giving you
consistently interesting conversation and useful advice on a wide
variety of subjects. Unless it's a trick and there's a hidden speaker
somewhere, you would then have to say that the table is intelligent.
You might speculate as to how the table does it and whether the table
is conscious, but those are separate questions.


 Who is to say that that table was actually a TV set in the shape of a
table or a table that had some other means to transmit what would satisfy a
speech-only Turing test? This goes nowhere, Stathis.

That's why I said unless it's a trick. The same consideration
applies to anything: how do I know that my neighbour isn't a puppet
manipulated by someone else?

Hi Stathis,

Maybe because we (individually) might want to understand (predict) 
the behavior of that neighbour, so that we could trust them?






I think you're using the word intelligent in a non-standard way,
leading to confusion. The first thing to do in any debate is agree on
the definition of the words.


 Could you define intelligence for us in unambiguous terms? I don't
recall Craig trying to do that...

I gave an operational definition. One dictionary definition is the
ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. It is not
synonymous with consciousness.



Umm, are you OK with anthropomorphication... ? Let me ask a 
different question: In your opinion, does the universe 'out there' have 
to have properties that match up one-to-one with some finite list of 
propositions that can be encoded in your skull?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2013, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect  
that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.


I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from  
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique  
experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated  
relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the  
experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making  
astonishing why you are using those points against the  
possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated  
by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication  
(as Stathis argues convincingly).


To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed  
by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the  
1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel  
the split in any way.


That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of  
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is  
no 'person'.


Not at all. Both the Bp  p, and the UDA-personal-diary  
definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of  
having those experiences, locally.
Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally  
by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to  
others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons.
There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal  
bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their  
self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations.


Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of  
bodies, etc.  So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world  
in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN.


Yes, indeed. At least in the form of long/deep  computations, having  
the correct first person sharable indeterminacy measure. That's why  
physics is necessary indeed, so much that it has to be extracted from  
arithmetic when we assume comp. That's why also we can accept the  
postulation of a physical world, or of a God, as an explanation.


You might disagree as necessary in natural language can be  
ambiguous. In logic, if P is necessary in some context, it means that  
it is derivable from the context, but sometimes it can mean that we  
have to postulate it (which is the opposite). But with necessary in  
the logical sense, it makes sense with computationalism and its  
consequences.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2013, at 22:00, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/14/2013 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg

Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular,  
only the sum of whatever is in the original which is not  
accessible in the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt  
though. If you don't experience a profound reality, then you  
might be a p-zombie already.





Right!



Right?

Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like  if *you*  
believe that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a  
zombie yourself.


They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different  
opinion altogether.


Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law  
(who get an artificial brain before marriage).


But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his   
steak, but neither my daughter! Brr...


Bruno


Dear Bruno,

Could you re-write this post. It's wording is unintelligible to  
me. :_(



Craig sum up well Baudrillard with the  sentence If you don't  
experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already.


That sentence illustrate the willingness to not attribute a  
consciousness to a person with a copied, or artificial brain, as such  
copy is suspected not being able to live a profound reality. This is  
like saying, we the human with the original carbon brain, can live  
profound reality, but not the machine, together with and if you doubt  
that profound reality then *you* are a zombie too.


It remind me a fundamentalist of some confessional religion who told  
me if your machine cannot believe that some man is the son of God,  
then your machine can't think. I told him ---and what I doubt that a  
man is the son of God?. he told me that in that case I can't think  
either ...


This leads to the idea that not only a machine cannot be conscious,  
but any human who would pretend the contrary is also not conscious.


As I said: brrr...

Bruno





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Re: Does p make sense?

2013-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hello Dan,

On 15 Feb 2013, at 05:31, freqflyer07281972 wrote:


Dear Bruno,

I would like to know what 'doxastic models of consciousness' means,  
as well as what means S4Grz - I know Craig was the one who  
originally used the term 'doxastic models' but you seemed to know  
right away what that meant, so I'd like to know from your  
perspective what it means;



Epistemic = knowledge

Doxastic = belief

Epistemic logic are modal (most of the time) logics where the modal  
box (here written with a B) represents a unary connector intended for  
the knower (Bp = the agent know p, or I know p).


Doxastic logic are modal (most of the time) logics where the modal box  
(here written with a B) represents a unary connector intended for the  
believer (Bp = the agent believes p, or I believe p).


The main difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledges  
are true, by definition, when beliefs can be false.


So among the axioms accepted for knowledge or epistemic logic, we have  
that Bp - p (I know p entails p is true).

Contrariwise, modal doxastic logics will NOT have the axiom Bp - p.

For the ideally self-referentially correct machine I consider, the  
belief B is modeled by provability. Before Gödel, most people  
(mathematicians and philosophers) would have thought that in this case  
we do have Bp - p.


But as Gödel already remarked, the provability predicate, even in the  
correct case, cannot be modeled by a (normal) modal logic having Bp -  
p. Indeed we would have Bf - f, that is ~Bf, and that's consistency,  
which cannot be proven by the machine, despite it being true. That's  
why the logic of provability (belief) split into a true part and an  
believable, or provable part.


But that is also why the Theaetetus definition works non trivially  
when we define knowledge by Bp  p (that is I know p is I can justify  
it, and it is the case that p). Bp  p implies trivially p, and in the  
arithmetical setting we do get the classical modal logic of knowledge,  
known as S4. Indeed we get S4 + a new axiom:


S4 is

Know p - p   (main axiom for knowledge)
Know p - Know Know p  (self-awareness, or introspective axiom)
Know (p - q) - (Know p - Know q)   (rational omniscience, more  
used for knowledgeable)


+ the logical inference rule (p/ know p).   All this on the top of the  
classical propositional logic.


In the arithmetical context, we inherit the following axioms, named  
after a formula of Grzegorczyk, Grz):


Know (Know (p- Know p) - p) - p.

It introduces a sort of antisymmetry on the Kripke accessibility  
relations, and avoid circular structure (in the finite world case,  
when used together with the other axioms). But there are other  
semantics too.


Note that the Bp of G represent an arithmetical sentence (beweisbar  
('p'), with beweisbar defining provability in arithmetic, and 'p'  
being a representation in arithmetic of the sentence put for the  
proposition p). We have no choice in the modal logic, and Solovay  
provided the relevant completeness of G for the formal effective  
theories, which correspond to the rich ideally correct machines.


For Bp  p, we have no similar direct definition in arithmetic, but we  
can study them at the metalevel by modeling Bp  p for each individual  
instantiated sentences, so I know 2+2 = 4 is, in arithmetic:  
beweisbar ('2+2=4')  2 + 2 = 4.




moreover, I want to know S4Grz or be pointed towards an advanced  
level logic book so I can understand what that means.


S4Grz is quite well explained in Boolos 1979, and Boolos 1993.  
Together with the logics of self-reference G and G*. Known also as GL  
and GLS (Gödel, Löb, Solovay).


Boolos, G. (1979). The unprovability of consistency. Cambridge  
University Press, London.


Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University  
Press, Cambridge.


A good book on Modal logic is the book by Chellas:

Chellas, B. F. (1980). Modal Logic, an introduction. Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge.


To get matter from arithmetic, we need to add a consistency condition  
(so we get intelligible matter with Bp  Dt), and sensible matter with  
Bp  p  Dt. This gives quantum-like logic. It is an open, but well  
formulated problem to know if we get quantum computer from them, as we  
should, if we are machine, and if the classical theory of knowledge is  
correct, by the UD Argument.


This is explained (concisely, with reference) in the sane04 paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




Finally, as a simple confirmation, I do assume that when you guys  
talk about Bp  p you mean the literal proposition someone believes  
p  it is the case that it is p --


OK.



if I don't get at least that, I should hang up my hat around here!


No worry :)

Best,

Bruno


On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that 

Re: How can intelligence be physical ?

2013-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2013, at 05:52, socra...@bezeqint.net wrote:


The learned men  confuse the mathematical tools with the
physical reality and therefore we have math-physical  fairy-tales.
=.


That happens too, and is of course even worst than confusing  
mathematical tools and the mathematical reality.


Bruno






On Feb 14, 5:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2013, at 08:48, socra...@bezeqint.net wrote:






Euler's Equation and the Reality of Nature.
=.
Mr. Dexter Sinister  wrote:
‘ I understand Euler's Identity,
and I know what it means, and I know how to prove it,
there's nothing particularly mystical about it,
it just demonstrates that exponential, trigonometric,
and complex functions are related.
Given what we know of mathematics it shouldn't surprise
anyone that its various bits are connected.
It would be much more surprising if they weren't, that would
almost certainly mean something was badly wrong somewhere.’



   Mr. Gary wrote:
Mathematics is NOT science.
Science is knowledge of the REAL world.
Mathematics is an invention of the mind.


This is of course false in the comp theory.

It is also intuitively false for most mathematicians.

It is usually asserted by people confusing the mathematical tools,
that we invent indeed, and the mathematical reality, which is  
really a

sequence of surprising facts, that we discover.

The use of REAL world is dogmatic physicalism. It proposes as a  
fact

what is a theological or metaphysical hypothesis, and this condemns
any attempt to be rigorous on the subject. It is as bad as using  
God

as a gap explanation. It is the same mistake.

Bruno






Many aspects of mathematics have found application
in the real world, but there is no guarantee.
Any correlation must meet the ultimate test:
does it explain something about the real world?
As an electrical engineer I used the generalized
Euler's equation all the time in circuit analysis:



exp(j*theta) = cos(theta) + j*sin(theta).



So it works at that particular level in electricity.
Does it work at other levels, too?
Logic cannot prove it.
It must be determined by experiment, not by philosophizing.
..
Thinking about theirs posts I wrote brief article:
  Euler's Equation and Reality.
=.
a)
Euler's Equation as a mathematical reality.
Euler's identity is the gold standard for mathematical beauty'.
Euler's identity is the most famous formula in all mathematics.
‘ . . . this equation is the mathematical analogue of  Leonardo
da Vinci’s Mona Lisa painting or Michelangelo’s statue of David’
‘It  is God’s equation.’, ‘ It is a mathematical icon.’
. . . .  etc.
b)
Euler's Equation as a physical reality.
it is absolutely paradoxical; we cannot understand it,
and we don't know what it means, .  . . . .’
‘ Euler's Equation reaches down into the very depths of existence’
‘ Is Euler's Equation about fundamental matters?’
‘It would be nice to understand Euler's Identity as a physical  
process

using physics.‘
‘ Is it possible to unite Euler's Identity with physics, quantum
physics ?’
==.
My aim is to understand the reality of nature.
Can Euler's equation explain me something about reality?
To give the answer to this question I need to bind
Euler's equation with an object - particle.
Can it  be math- point or string- particle or triangle-particle?
No, Euler's formula has quantity (pi) which says me that
the particle must be only a circle .
Now I want to understand the behavior of circle - particle and
therefore I need to use spatial relativity and quantum theories.
These two theories say me that the reason of circle – particle’s
movement  is its own inner impulse (h) or  (h*=h/2pi).
a)
Using  its own inner impulse (h) circle - particle moves
( as a wheel) in a straight line with constant speed c = 1.
We call such particle - ‘photon’.
From Earth – gravity point of view this speed is maximally.
From Vacuum point of view this speed is minimally.
In this movement quantum of light behave as a corpuscular (no  
charge).

b)
Using  its own inner impulse / intrinsic angular momentum
( h* = h / 2pi ) circle - particle  rotates around its axis.
 In such movement particle has charge, produce electric waves
( waves property of particle) and its speed ( frequency) is :  c1.
We call such particle - ‘ electron’  and its  energy is:  E=h*f.



In this way I (as a peasant ) can understand the reality of nature.
==.
I reread my post.
My God, that is a naïve peasant's explanation.
It is absolutely not scientific, not professor's explanation.
Would a learned man adopt such simple and naive explanation?
Hmm,  . . .   problem.
In any way, even Mr. Dexter Sinister  and Mr. Gary
wouldn't agree with me, I want to say them
' Thank you for emails and cooperation’
=.
Best wishes.
Israel Sadovnik  Socratus.
=.
P.S.
' They would play a greater and greater role in mathematics –
and then, with the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth
century, in physics and engineering and any field that deals with
cyclical 

For athjeists and other seekers of truth; Willard Quine on Truth

2013-02-15 Thread Roger Clough
http://www.scaruffi.com/phi/quine.html

Synopsis: 
Purely analythic truths do not exist: all truth depends on both language and 
facts 
Even Logic and Mathematics are, ultimately, empirical 
A statement alone cannot be verified: only the totality of statements (science 
in its totality) can be verified 
A hypothesis is verified true or false only relative to background assumptions 
Each statement in a theory partially determines the meaning of every other 
statement in the same theory 
The structure of concepts is determined by the positions that their 
constituents occupy in the web of belief of the individual 
No part of a scientific theory can be proved or disproved; only the whole can 

Several different theories may offer equally plausible accounts of the same 
situation 
Scientific theories are undetermined by experience 
There are infinite interpretations of a discourse depending on the context 
A single word has no meaning, its referent is inscrutable 
Words have a meaning only relative to the other words they are connected to in 
the sentences that we assume to be true 
The meaning of a sentence depends on the interpretation of the entire language. 
Its meaning can even change in time. 
The meaning of language is not in the mind of the speaker 
It is impossible to define what a correct translation of a statement is from 
one language to another, because that depends on the interpretations of both 
entire languages. 
Translation from one language to another is indeterminate 
Translation is possible only from the totality of one language to the totality 
of another language 

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Sheldrake's Morphic resonance in terms of Leibniz 2-13-13

2013-02-15 Thread Roger Clough

Sheldrake's Morphic resonance in terms of Leibniz 2-13-13


The concepts discussed here are modified forms of those found in 
http://www.uky.edu/~look/8899403.pdf ,
which is a treatise on the meanings of domination and subordination in 
Leibniz' metaphysics.
We will only discuss monads of persons. Morphic resonance is explained in terms 
of
basic definitions as follows: Subject to change.

Definitions:

These definitions are generally based on Leibniz's Monadology.

Monad. The blind and passive mental representation of a corporeal body
containing no internal boundaries (a substance). A mental entity. 
A whole. Being mental, it may contain references to space and time in the 
perceptions or appetitions given to it, but it exists outside of spacetime.  
It contains only perceptions and appetitions and an energy source.
It has no windows, so all perceptions are given indirectly to it
by a Supreme monad. Being mental, it cannot interact directly
with other monads, but indirect actions are possible. It cannot
be created or destroyed except by a divinity. 

Substance. A corporeal body which is a whole and contains no
internal boundaries, although it may be variegated in qualities.
Each body is its own substace, so there are an infinite
number of types of substances. So it is chiefly characterized by its form. 

Soul or spirit. Each person or animal has a soul or spirit
which contains its identity and is attached to the dominant
monad of its composite monad. Each soul is different and cannot be
either created or destroyed except by a divinity.


Person. A composite monad consisting of a soul or spirit, mind monad, and body 
monad

Entelechy.  The driving force of a monad, its life-force,
which strives toward greater realization or perfection.

Perfection. The degree to which a monad emulates
the best of its type. 

Perceptions. A set of accumulating data sets in each monad containing 
representations (reflections or snapshots) from its own perspective of all of 
the other
perceptions in the universe. So each monad contains  all of the information in
the universe taken from its own perspective.  Since a monad had no windows, its 
perceptions
are continually being updated by the Supreme Monad.  These perceptions are 
alwys unclear or
distorted to some extent. 

Appetitions. An accumulating set of indicators pointing to the next 
perceptions,   Will.
Desire. 

Memory.  The personal set of perceptions and appetitions contained in each 
monad.

Identity of a monad. Its personal set of perceptions and appetitions.

Dominant monad.  A monad of greater perfection than a subordinate monad.

Subordinate monad.  A monad of lesser perfection than a dominant monad.

Transformation.  The continual change in each monad's perceptions (memory 
updates)
toward greater perfection, guided by the appetions on a monad and powered or 
provided by a more dominant monad. 

Preestablished harmony (PEH). The preestablishment of a harmonic order for the 
transformations.

Resonance.  Potential transformations between pairs of monads in the universe 
according to appetition and
dominance,  toward greater perfections and according to the PEH.

Morphism. A potential transformation.

-
The concepts discussed here are modified forms of those found in 
http://www.uky.edu/~look/8899403.pdf ,
which is a treatise on the meanings of domination and subordination in 
Leibniz' metaphysics.
We will only discuss monads of persons.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
2/13/2013 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen





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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: 

  On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 

  On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

 *Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than 
 Artificial Intelligence?*

 Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a 
 hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an �artificial 
 hurricane�. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we 
 would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or 
 electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.


 No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a robot or other 
 machine which interacts with the real world, whereas a simulate AI or 
 hurricane acts within a simulated world.
  

 AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It makes no 
 difference to the AI whether its environment is real or simulated. Just 
 because we can attach a robot to a simulation doesn't change it into an 
 experience of a real world.
  

 Hi Craig,

 I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a difference that 
 does not always make a difference between a public world and a private 
 world! IMHO, that makes the 'real' physical world Real is that we can all 
 agree on its properties (subject to some constraints that matter). Many can 
 point at the tree over there and agree on its height and whether or not it 
 is a deciduous variety.
  

 Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean anything other 
 than that though?


 Hi Craig,

 Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't forget 
 about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals...


We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our agreeing on 
what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so I was saying that it 
doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just that reality is the quality of 
having to agree involuntarily on conditions.


  We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so it 
 would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that involve our 
 bodies.


 We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable of 
 being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable of being 
 represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra.


We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word object, since 
it can be used in a lot of different ways. An object can be anything that 
isn't the subject. In another sense an object is a publicly accessible body.
 


  You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point to 
 your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon waking, you are 
 re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public world with longer and more 
 stable histories.


 Right, it is the upon waking' part that is important. Our common 
 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when we depart the 
 mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide discussion any?


I haven't been, no.
 


  These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream though. 
 If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is real to you, and 
 to the universe through you.
  

 You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What one 
 observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily real to every 
 one else... but there is a huge overlap between our 1p 'realities'. Andrew 
 Soltau has this idea nailed now in his Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)


One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not real' also 
though.
 


  
   
  

  
 By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of 
 natural vs man-made as categories of origin. 


 Why is the distinction between the natural intelligence of a child and 
 the artificial intelligence of a Mars rover obsolete?� The latter is one 
 we create by art, the other is created by nature.
  

 Because we understand now that we are nature and nature is us.


 I disagree! We can fool ourselves into thinking that we understand' 
 but what we can do is, at best, form testable explanations of stuff... We 
 are fallible!
  
 I agree, but I don't see how that applies to us being nature.


 We are part of Nature and there is a 'whole-part isomorphism' 
 involved..


Since we are part of nature, there is nothing that we are or do which is 
not nature.
 


  What would it mean to be unnatural? How would an unnatural being find 
 themselves in a natural world?
  

 They can't, unless we invent them... Pink Ponies


Pink Ponies are natural to imagine for our imagination. A square circle 
would be unnatural - which is why we can't imagine it.
 


   
  
  
  We can 

Re: Science is a religion by itself.

2013-02-15 Thread socra...@bezeqint.net
  Comment:

according to (a)+(b),
when the cat mass change in cat energy,
his image change,
the cat is already in life,
so there is life after death

 /  laurent.damois  /
===..


On Feb 15, 12:28 pm, socra...@bezeqint.net socra...@bezeqint.net
wrote:
  Schrodinger's cat
  and  “ The law of conservation and  transformation  energy/mass”
 =.
 This law consist of  two  (2) parts:
 a)
  according to “ The law of conservation (!) energy/mass”
  Schroedinger's cat cannot die.
 b)
 according to “ The law of transformation (!) energy/mass”
  Schroedinger's cat can change its image (geometrical form).
 c)
 Of course,  it is impossible to separate these two parts of Law,
 ==.
 socratus.

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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Thursday, February 14, 2013 11:20:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg

 Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only the sum 
 of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in the copy. His 
 phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you don't experience a profound 
 reality, then you might be a p-zombie already.



 Right!



 Right?

 Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like  if *you* believe 
 that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a zombie yourself.


No, I was saying that if you don't believe that your own experience is 
profoundly real, then you are a zombie yourself.
 


 They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different 
 opinion altogether.

 Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law (who get 
 an artificial brain before marriage).

 But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his  steak, 
 but neither my daughter! Brr...


Hahaha. How about your son in law gets a simulation of steak which is 
beneath his substitution level? Even better, I just hack into his hardware 
and move one of his memories of eating steak up on the stack so it seems 
very recent. 

Is your brother in law racist against simulated steaks as memory implants?

Craig


 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, February 15, 2013 12:23:44 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Feb 13, 2013  Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:

 * *Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than 
 Artificial Intelligence?


 Yes that euphemism could have advantages, it might make the last human 
 being feel a little better about himself just before the Jupiter Brain 
 outsmarted him and sent him into oblivion forever.  


Then we had better destroy every circuit on Earth to prevent that from 
happening.
 

  

  By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion 
 of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. 


 What on earth is obsolete about the natural verses man-made dichotomy? The 
 Jupiter brain really was the product of a intelligent designer while the 
 human being was not. 


But the intelligent designer was the product of nature. It's a seamless 
continuum, unless you think that human beings came from some other 
metaphysical universe which is unnatural.

Craig

 


   John K Clark   



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Re: The duplicators and the restorers

2013-02-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 5:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 That's what you suspect, but in order for you to be correct there must
 be a mysterious non-physical entity that cannot be duplicated, even
 with advanced scientific methods.


 Not at all. All that is required for me to be correct is that experience not
 be 100% repeatable, which, because an experience cannot ultimately be
 limited to anything except everything in the entire universe, is
 automatically true on that level. For me to be incorrect there would have to
 be a mysterious non-physical entity which separates any particular event
 from eternity.

If an experience is not 100% repeatable by repeating the presumed
physical basis underlying it, then you are saying that there is
something other than a physical basis to the experience. This
something else is the mysterious non-physical entity.

 This is equivalent to saying it is
 magic. You get offended when I say this, perhaps because it has a
 pejorative connotation, but that's what it is. Calling it something
 else does not change the facts.


 I only get offended because you have no idea what I'm talking about, so you
 strawman it as some kind of weird idealism. Everything that I refer to is
 either Matter, Energy, Time, Space, Sense, Motive, Entropy, or Significance
 - all of which can be ultimately reduced to sense. There is nothing else,
 and I claim nothing else.

Sense, motive and significance are non-physical, but the conventional
view is that they supervene on the physical. You don't agree with
this, so must believe that some other non-physical entity is needed.
This would by definition be something magical, like a soul.

  Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from
  1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe
  as
  bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of
  a
  single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between,
  contingent
  upon the experiential capacity of the participant.

 There is no reason in principle why the year 1965 could not be
 replicated.


 Except that it happened already and will never happen again - just like
 every experience.

If experience is caused by the brain and the brain is reproduced
exactly then the experience will be reproduced exactly.

 In fact, in several models of cosmology it *is*
 duplicated. Even if there is only one universe but it is infinite in
 extent, given a large enough volume there is bound to be an exact copy
 of anything you care to name.


 You're not seeing that it begs the question though. No matter what I say,
 you won't be able to imagine that the universe could be fundamentally
 experiences rather than objects.

 The whole notion of 'copies' or 'exact' is based purely on sensitivity. If
 you have cataracts, it becomes harder to tell people apart and the Jack of
 Diamonds looks like an exact copy of the Queen of Hearts. If you factor out
 sensation from the start, everything that comes afterward is misconception.

Bruno thinks the universe is fundamentally experiences but his view is
consistent with science, eg. a close enough copy of an object will
behave like the original, even if neither the copy nor the original
have a basic physical existence.

  So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
  you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,
 
 
  If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical
  twin -
  my guess is probably a dead one.

 If it's dead then you would have made some mistake in the duplication.


 No, your assumption of duplication is not necessarily possible. If you clone
 everyone in New York City, and drop them into a model you have built of New
 York, they aren't suddenly going to know where they live and how to
 communicate with each other. You are assuming that particles are
 disconnected generic entities which have no past of future. I am saying that
 precisely the opposite is also true.

Of course they will know where they live and how to communicate with
each other. The reason you know where you live and how to communicate
is that your brain today is a close copy of your brain yesterday. If
something goes wrong in the copying process, like a head injury, you
might forget how to do these things.

 Cells and cell components are constantly being replaced yet you
 survive. Therefore, it is possible to make a copy of you using
 inanimate matter; for that is in fact what you are.


 Because you aren't cells, you are the experiences of cells, molecules,
 organs, people, civilizations. The cells are like the fuel which experience
 burns. Copying is an intersubjective relation. It just means that in our
 particular state of mind two things seem identical.

But if you copy the cells you reproduce the experience, and if you
don't then something is missing.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/15/2013 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2013, at 22:00, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 2/14/2013 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:37, Stephen P. King wrote, to Craig Weinberg

Baudrillard is not talking about consciousness in particular, only 
the sum of whatever is in the original which is not accessible in 
the copy. His phrase 'profound reality' is apt though. If you 
don't experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie 
already.





Right!



Right?

Here Craig is on the worst slope. It looks almost like  if *you* 
believe that a machine is not a zombie, it means that you are a 
zombie yourself.


They will persecuted the machines and the humans having a different 
opinion altogether.


Craig reassure me. he is willing to offer steak to my sun in law 
(who get an artificial brain before marriage).


But with Baudrillard, not only my sun in law might no more get his 
 steak, but neither my daughter! Brr...


Bruno


Dear Bruno,

Could you re-write this post. It's wording is unintelligible to 
me. :_(



Craig sum up well Baudrillard with the  sentence If you don't 
experience a profound reality, then you might be a p-zombie already.


That sentence illustrate the willingness to not attribute a 
consciousness to a person with a copied, or artificial brain, as such 
copy is suspected not being able to live a profound reality. This is 
like saying, we the human with the original carbon brain, can live 
profound reality, but not the machine, together with and if you doubt 
that profound reality then *you* are a zombie too.


It remind me a fundamentalist of some confessional religion who told 
me if your machine cannot believe that some man is the son of God, 
then your machine can't think. I told him ---and what I doubt that a 
man is the son of God?. he told me that in that case I can't think 
either ...


This leads to the idea that not only a machine cannot be conscious, 
but any human who would pretend the contrary is also not conscious.


As I said: brrr...

Bruno


Ah! I see.. Yeah, Craig seems to have some trouble communicating 
the variability of Sense. It is 1p and thus cannot have a 3p measure, 
so... I feel his pain. I am trying to use the idea of the difference 
between a simulation of X as compared to the real X by a large 
ensemble of observers to parse this distinction to connect with your 
ideas...


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Simulated Intelligence Mini-Manifesto

2013-02-15 Thread Stephen P. King

On 2/15/2013 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 11:01:30 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King 
wrote:


On 2/13/2013 9:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 5:37:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul
King wrote:

On 2/13/2013 5:21 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 2:58:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

*Wouldn�t Simulated Intelligence be a more
appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?*

Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which
can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a
simulation, not an �artificial hurricane�. If we
modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we
would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or
gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created
artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.


No, because the idea of an AI is that it can control a
robot or other machine which interacts with the real
world, whereas a simulate AI or hurricane acts within a
simulated world.


AI doesn't need to interact with the real world though. It
makes no difference to the AI whether its environment is
real or simulated. Just because we can attach a robot to a
simulation doesn't change it into an experience of a real world.


Hi Craig,

I think that you might be making a huge fuss over a
difference that does not always make a difference between a
public world and a private world! IMHO, that makes the 'real'
physical world Real is that we can all agree on its
properties (subject to some constraints that matter). Many
can point at the tree over there and agree on its height and
whether or not it is a deciduous variety.


Why does our agreement mean on something's properties mean
anything other than that though?


Hi Craig,

Why are you thinking of 'though' in such a minimal way? Don't
forget about the 'objects' of those thoughts... The duals...


We might be agreeing here. I thought you were saying that our agreeing 
on what we observe is a sign that things are 'real', so I was saying 
that it doesn't have to be a sign of anything, just that reality is 
the quality of having to agree involuntarily on conditions.


Hi Craig,

We are stumbling over a subtle issue within semiotics. This video 
in 5 parts is helpful: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxV3ompeJ-Y





We are people living at the same time with human sized bodies, so
it would make sense that we would agree on almost everything that
involve our bodies.


We is this we? I am considering any 'object' of system capable
of being described by a QM wave function or, more simply, capable
of being represented by a semi-complete atomic boolean algebra.


We in this case is you and me. I try to avoid using the word object, 
since it can be used in a lot of different ways. An object can be 
anything that isn't the subject. In another sense an object is a 
publicly accessible body.


I use the word 'object' purposefully. We need to deanthropomorphize 
the observer! An object is what one observer senses of another 
(potential) observer.






You can have a dream with other characters in the dream who point
to your dream tree and agree on its characteristics, but upon
waking, you are re-oriented to a more real, more tangibly public
world with longer and more stable histories.


Right, it is the upon waking' part that is important. Our
common 'reality' is the part that we can only 'wake up' from when
we depart the mortal coil. Have you followed the quantum suicide
discussion any?


I haven't been, no.


It is helpful for the understanding of the argument I am making. 
The way that a user of a QS system notices or fails to notice her demise 
is relevant here. The point is that we never sense the switch in the 
off position...






These qualities are only significant in comparison to the dream
though. If you can't remember your waking life, then the dream is
real to you, and to the universe through you.


You are assuming a standard that you cannot define. Why? What
one observes as 'real' is real to that one, it is not necessarily
real to every one else... but there is a huge overlap between our
1p 'realities'. Andrew Soltau has this idea nailed now in his
Multisolipsism stuff. ;-)


One can observe that one is observing something that is 'not real' 
also though.


Exactly, but that is the point I am making. There has to be a 
'real' thing for there to be a simulated thing, no? Or is that just the 
standard tacit assumption of people new to this question?












By calling it artificial, we