Re: The Finney phone

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, 28 Sep 2017 at 12:52 am, Russell Standish 
wrote:

> People here might be interested to know that an early contributer on
> this list, Hal Finney has just had a mobile phone named after him:
>
>
> https://www.engadget.com/2017/09/26/blockchain-smartphone-sirin-finney-solarin/


Also, people might be interested to know that Ether, the cryptocurrency of
the Ethereum platform, a distributed computer platform that runs autonomous
contracts, is divided into subunits of ”wei” and “finney”. Wei Dai was the
founder of this list.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Will computationalism be refuted?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 28/09/2017 6:37 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I've only read the abstract, but it appears that they are assuming 
spacial overlap causes collapse, which would go along with some thing 
gravity based.  But in fact measurements also collapse to eigenstates 
of energy or momentum.


Overlap of energy or momentum eigenstates would also lead to overlapping 
spacetime geometries -- something gravity based.


Bruce




Brent

On 9/27/2017 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi,

Here is the first account of some theoretical prediction in physics, 
which if verified, would refute Computationalism (and Everett QM).


Tilloy proposes a rather clean  way to test a version of 
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber collapse-of-the-wave theory, which would 
undermine the evidential support for comp and for Everett.


https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.03809.pdf

"Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model with massive flashes
Antoine Tilloy
∗
Max-Planck-Institut für Quantenoptik, Hans-Kopfermann-Straße 1, 85748 
Garching, Germany

(September 13, 2017)

Abstract
We introduce a modification of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) model 
in which the
flashes (or collapse space-time events) source a classical 
gravitational field. The resulting
semi-classical theory of Newtonian gravity preserves the statistical 
interpretation of quantum
states of matter in contrast with mean field approaches. It can be 
seen as a discrete version
of recent proposals of consistent hybrid quantum classical theories. 
The model seems to be
in agreement with known experimental data and introduces new 
falsifiable predictions: (1)
particles do not attract themselves, (2) the 1/r gravitational 
potential of Newtonian gravity
is cut-off at short (. 10^−7 m) distances, and (3) gravity makes 
spatial superpositions decohere
at a rate inversely proportional to that coming from the vanilla GRW 
model. Together, the
last two predictions make the model experimentally falsifiable for all 
values of its parameters."



Bruno


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The Finney phone

[Russell Standish]

People here might be interested to know that an early contributer on
this list, Hal Finney has just had a mobile phone named after him:

https://www.engadget.com/2017/09/26/blockchain-smartphone-sirin-finney-solarin/

Cheers

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Will computationalism be refuted?

[Brent Meeker]

I've only read the abstract, but it appears that they are assuming 
spacial overlap causes collapse, which would go along with some thing 
gravity based.  But in fact measurements also collapse to eigenstates of 
energy or momentum.


Brent

On 9/27/2017 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi,

Here is the first account of some theoretical prediction in physics, 
which if verified, would refute Computationalism (and Everett QM).


Tilloy proposes a rather clean  way to test a version of 
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber collapse-of-the-wave theory, which would 
undermine the evidential support for comp and for Everett.


https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.03809.pdf

"Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model with massive flashes
Antoine Tilloy
∗
Max-Planck-Institut für Quantenoptik, Hans-Kopfermann-Straße 1, 85748 
Garching, Germany

(September 13, 2017)

Abstract
We introduce a modification of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) model in 
which the
flashes (or collapse space-time events) source a classical 
gravitational field. The resulting
semi-classical theory of Newtonian gravity preserves the statistical 
interpretation of quantum
states of matter in contrast with mean field approaches. It can be seen 
as a discrete version
of recent proposals of consistent hybrid quantum classical theories. 
The model seems to be
in agreement with known experimental data and introduces new 
falsifiable predictions: (1)
particles do not attract themselves, (2) the 1/r gravitational 
potential of Newtonian gravity
is cut-off at short (. 10^−7 m) distances, and (3) gravity makes 
spatial superpositions decohere
at a rate inversely proportional to that coming from the vanilla GRW 
model. Together, the
last two predictions make the model experimentally falsifiable for all 
values of its parameters."



Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Terren Suydam]

>
>
> ​Then which *ONE* out of that infinite number is ​
> ​"*THE"*
>  stream of consciousness
> ​?​
>

You're asking that question from the objective, third-person point of view,
which is not relevant to the thought experiment. If you want to engage with
the thought experiment, then you must consider this from the first person.
If you do that, then you'll have to approach the problem knowing the
constraint that there is only ever one consciousness experienced by a
person.


> ​> ​
>> You agreed earlier that you cannot experience more than one city at the
>> same time.
>>
>
> ​I don't know about Mr. You but ​
> Terren Suydam
> ​ can ​
> experience more than one city at the same time
> ​ if there are ​
> Terren Suydam
> ​ duplicating machines.
>

Objectively, yes. Experientially, no.


>
>> This is the view from inside, the inner experience. There is only ever
>> one of them.
>>
>
> Terren Suydam
> ​ just said a infinite ​number of copies were made, and every single one
> of them remembers wondering what one and only one city they would end up
> seeing. So what turned out to be the one and only one correct answer to the
> question asked yesterday "What city will I see tomorrow ?" If the answer
> isn't just unknown but is nonexistent then it wasn't a question.
>

Objectively, it may be gibberish, but from the first-person point of view,
it's not.

Earlier we encountered a different question that was gibberish from the
objective point of view, but intelligible from the first-person point of
view. This is like that.

​> ​
>> You know this to be true:
>>
>
> ​I know it's true that everybody can only sees one stream of
> consciousness ​when looking from the present into the past, but the future
> behaves differently than the past, if they didn't they wouldn't need to
> have different names.
>
> ​And the question concerns the future not the past.​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> you may behave *as if* others are conscious, but you only ever know for
>> sure that one person is conscious.
>>
>
> ​That is part of our existence even today even without people duplicating
> machines.  ​
>
>
> ​> ​
>>  I believe that two people will say that they are John Clark, but I won't
>> have a clue if they are actually conscious or not.
>>
>
> ​Oh I think you'll have a clue, but at any rate
> I hope you don't believe the copy of me
> ​would be ​
> less likely to be conscious
> ​than​
>  the "original", but if you do
> ​believe that ​
> please explain what's so original about the original.
> ​
>

I don't know if the original is conscious either, if I'm adopting the
third-person perspective.

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> ​> ​
> The non-ambiguous question is how many cities can any "Helsinky-candidate"
> believing in computationalism, expect to see from a first person viewpoint
> just after pushing the button. The answer is the non ambguous "1",
>

​Congratulation on saying ​
​"​
a first person viewpoint
​" not "the
first person viewpoint
​"!
​ I think the word "expect" is unnecessary but in general I
have no problem with that question nor the answer, and it's all 100%
predictable. I also have no problem with the question "How many ​
first person viewpoint
​s ​of the Helsinki-remembering man will there be
just after pushing the
​button?".​ The non-ambiguous completely predictable answer is "2". But I
still have a *huge* problem with "How any cities will I see after I have
been duplicated?".

​John K Clark​

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 11:15 AM, Terren Suydam 
wrote:

​>> ​
>> ​If there is more than one then it would be very foolish to ask "what one
>> and only one thing will *you* see after *you* become two?".
>>
>

​> ​
> I'm not asking that.
>

​Then what are you asking??

​>> ​
>> ​I don't know how to follow ​"*THE"*
>>  stream of consciousness
>> ​ and don't even know what it means because there are two not one.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> No, there is only one, even if there are infinite diverging copies.
>

​Then which *ONE* out of that infinite number is ​
​"*THE"*
 stream of consciousness
​?​



> ​> ​
> You agreed earlier that you cannot experience more than one city at the
> same time.
>

​I don't know about Mr. You but ​
Terren Suydam
​ can ​
experience more than one city at the same time
​ if there are ​
Terren Suydam
​ duplicating machines.


> ​> ​
> Any other minds in other cities are not accessible to a copy.
>

​So what?​


> This is the view from inside, the inner experience. There is only ever one
> of them.
>

Terren Suydam
​ just said a infinite ​number of copies were made, and every single one of
them remembers wondering what one and only one city they would end up
seeing. So what turned out to be the one and only one correct answer to the
question asked yesterday "What city will I see tomorrow ?" If the answer
isn't just unknown but is nonexistent then it wasn't a question.


> ​> ​
> You know this to be true:
>

​I know it's true that everybody can only sees one stream of consciousness
​when looking from the present into the past, but the future behaves
differently than the past, if they didn't they wouldn't need to have
different names.

​And the question concerns the future not the past.​


> ​> ​
> you may behave *as if* others are conscious, but you only ever know for
> sure that one person is conscious.
>

​That is part of our existence even today even without people duplicating
machines.  ​


​> ​
>  I believe that two people will say that they are John Clark, but I won't
> have a clue if they are actually conscious or not.
>

​Oh I think you'll have a clue, but at any rate
I hope you don't believe the copy of me
​would be ​
less likely to be conscious
​than​
 the "original", but if you do
​believe that ​
please explain what's so original about the original.
​

John K Clark​

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 8:46 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​> ​
>> ​I do expect to survive the
>> copying process
>> ​, even better I expect I'll have a backup, although why my expectations
>> should be of interest to anyone but me I don't know. ​
>>
>
> Then the question “what future experiences will I have” is not nonsensical.
>

​It's not ​
nonsensical
​ in our everyday world ​to ask "What one and only one city will I see
tomorrow?" because it's clear what "I" will mean tomorrow, but people
duplicating machines don't yet exist in our everyday world because of
technological, not philosophical, limitations. In our everyday world the I
of tomorrow has a unique unambiguous meaning, the only being tomorrow that
will remember being John Clark today.


> ​> ​
> If it were then I could not have the expectation of surviving,
>

​The nonsense question is NOT "Will I survive tomorrow after I have been
duplicated?", that is a real question with a real answer; and it is yes
because something  (actually 2 things) tomorrow will remember being John
Clark today. The nonsense question is "What one and only one city will I
see tomorrow after I have been duplicated?" ​



> ​> ​
> I could not conceive of having future experiences if “I” loses meaning
> when I contemplate the post-duplication future.
>

​Sure you can, you can conceive of being in Santa Clauses's workshop if you
want; imagination is not limited by reality.

 John K Clark

 ​

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Terren Suydam]

On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 7:35 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> The expectations of what will happen will change from person to person,
>>> but the reality of what actually did happen will not.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The reality of what actually does happen is not available to anyone in
>> the thought experiment,
>>
>
> ​The reality of who does or does not have the memories of being the
> Helsinki man yesterday Is ​
> available
> ​ to anyone by simply asking the Moscow man and the Washington man about
> things the Helsinki man knew.
>

Yes, I probably could have stated my point better. Which is: the reality of
what happens to all the copies is not available to any one copy. The only
reality available to a copy is the contents of their own mind.


>
> ​>
 ​>>​
 t​
 o open their eyes to a single city.
>>>
>>>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> ​If he's a fool he might indeed expect that, but I don't much care what
>>> fools think. But ask yourself this, how many fools tomorrow will ​remember
>>> being asked the question today? I maintain the answer is 2 fools not one.
>>> Do you disagree?
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> It's irrelevant.
>>
>
> ​It's not irrelevant if the survival of the Helsinki man means somebody
> today remembers being the Helsinki man yesterday; and I can't imagine what
> else the survival of the Helsinki man could mean.  ​
>
>

What I'm saying is irrelevant is how many copies are actually created.
Nothing you said there makes that relevant. The survival of Helsinki man is
dependent only on at least one copy being made.


>
> ​> ​
>> The actual number of copies is irrelevant to the thought experiment, as
>> long as it's more than one.
>>
>
> ​If there is more than one then it would be very foolish to ask "what one
> and only one thing will *you* see after *you* become two?". And that's why
> the thought experiment ​is worthless.
>
>

I'm not asking that.


> ​> ​
>> before you enter the duplicator, what do you (the Helsinki you) expect to
>> experience?
>>
>
> ​I just don't get it! Why do you care what some jackass expects today but
> don't care who will remembers being that jackass ​tomorrow?
>
>

I didn't say I don't care who remembers being Helsinki man.


>
> > ​
>> Consider one's experience before entering the duplicator, and the
>> experience after. Follow the stream of consciousness, as if you were the
>> one entering the duplicator,
>>
>
> ​I don't know how to follow ​"*THE"*
>  stream of consciousness
> ​ and don't even know what it means because there are two not one.
>

No, there is only one, even if there are infinite diverging copies. You
agreed earlier that you cannot experience more than one city at the same
time. Any other minds in other cities are not accessible to a copy.  This
is the view from inside, the inner experience. There is only ever one of
them.  You know this to be true: you may behave *as if* others are
conscious, but you only ever know for sure that one person is conscious.

But I know what you mean. You're talking about the objective view, the view
from nowhere. That view is irrelevant to the thought experiment, because we
cannot know from that view who is conscious and who isn't.  It is possible,
for example, that the duplication procedure produces zombies with
probability *p*.


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> what happens on the other side?
>>
>
> ​John Clark will be in two cities on the other side, if you don't believe
> me then go to the two cities and see if there is anybody in them named John
> Clark.
>

I believe you. Well, I believe that two people will say that they are John
Clark, but I won't have a clue if they are actually conscious or not.

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Will computationalism be refuted?

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi,

Here is the first account of some theoretical prediction in physics,  
which if verified, would refute Computationalism (and Everett QM).


Tilloy proposes a rather clean  way to test a version of Ghirardi- 
Rimini-Weber collapse-of-the-wave theory, which would undermine the  
evidential support for comp and for Everett.


https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.03809.pdf

"Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model with massive flashes
Antoine Tilloy
∗
Max-Planck-Institut für Quantenoptik, Hans-Kopfermann-Straße 1, 85748  
Garching, Germany

(September 13, 2017)

Abstract
We introduce a modification of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) model  
in which the
flashes (or collapse space-time events) source a classical  
gravitational field. The resulting
semi-classical theory of Newtonian gravity preserves the statistical  
interpretation of quantum
states of matter in contrast with mean field approaches. It can be  
seen as a discrete version
of recent proposals of consistent hybrid quantum classical theories.  
The model seems to be
in agreement with known experimental data and introduces new  
falsifiable predictions: (1)
particles do not attract themselves, (2) the 1/r gravitational  
potential of Newtonian gravity
is cut-off at short (. 10^−7 m) distances, and (3) gravity makes  
spatial superpositions decohere
at a rate inversely proportional to that coming from the vanilla GRW  
model. Together, the
last two predictions make the model experimentally falsifiable for all  
values of its parameters."



Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 21:04, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Terren Suydam  wrote:


​> ​In this situation, does the copy that opens his eyes in  
Barcelona only see Barcelona?


​Obviously.​


​> ​And the copy that opens his eyes in Paris only see Paris?

​Obviously. And equally obvious John Clark will end up seeing 2  
cities. And speaking of predictions, I predict that Terry Suydam  
will next write the following sequence of words "So how many cities  
will you end up seeing?" and will claim that it must be a question  
because there is a question mark at the end of the word sequence.


It is an ambiguous question. The non-ambiguous question is how many  
cities can any "Helsinky-candidate" believing in computationalism,  
expect to see from a first person viewpoint just after pushing the  
button. The answer is the non ambguous "1", as both copies will  
immediately confirm.


Bruno





John K Clark

​








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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Andrei Linde on consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 20:14, Brent Meeker wrote:

Interesting interview (I wonder where it was...CERN?).  Linde makes  
leap though from the Hamiltonian of the universe is zero to we need  
consciosness to explain change.  He considers having an instrument  
record events, but then he says he must become conscious of the  
recording.  That doesn't follow.  Most treatments of this problem,  
which comes up in all QM because "time" is not an operator, resolve  
it by relating QM system states to a QM clock.  Anything functioning  
as a clock will serve to record the rest of the universe as  
changing.  If some interesting conclusion is to be drawn from this,  
I'd say that it is that perception of time order is essential to  
consciousness...so that it can act as a clock.


I agree on this.

His approach also presuppose some physical universe, and that cannot  
work if our bodies are Turing emulable. In that frame, it is possible  
that time would be need for consciousness, but with mechanism, even  
that is not guarantied.


Bruno



Brent

On 9/25/2017 7:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gc89m2SaOAc=youtu.be



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Infinities

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 19:24, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 9/25/2017 6:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Sep 2017, at 21:02, smitra wrote:


On 23-09-2017 10:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Sep 2017, at 13:47, David Nyman wrote:
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mathematicians-measure-infinities-find-theyre-equal-20170912/

[1]
A rare progress on the continuum hypothesis (CH). Shelah is  
amazingly

smart. There is that story that he arrived one week to early at a
congress of logic, and decided to follow a congress on group theory
instead, and depressed everybody by solving most open problems of  
that
congress! His first question was "what is a group?", and people  
taught

he was retarted!
Now, this does not necessarily concern us. I think. Even ZF and
ZF+Choice proves the same theorems in arithmetic. That is  
probably not

the case for ZF and ZF + CH, but the comp ontology will not change.
For the phenomenology, that might change something though, making  
the

measure problem more easy or more difficult. We are not yet enough
advanced on this to decide, i think. model theory and set theory  
are

*quite* complex compared to arithmetic!
Bruno
Everything in physics suggests that infinities don't actually  
exists, so perhaps more progress can be made if you use a  
finitistic logics system.


That is the case for computationalism. It belongs to finitism. You  
can interpret all the infinities which appears at the  
phenomenological level as machine's inventions to study the finite  
realm. That is what I do actually in the math treatment.


In fact, contrary to what I have thought some years ago, it even  
admits an ultrafinist reading, although you need again some  
infinities at the meta-level to prove this. Computationalism is  
consistent with "there is a highest natural number". But no need of  
this to proceed, unless we met a genuine ultra-finitist (that is  
very rare!).


How can that work?  In a finite system Goedel's theorem doesn't  
hold.  Every proposition can be decided by exhaustive search.


Not at all. It is true that both PA and ZF cannot be finitely  
axiomatized, but RA can, and RA is already essentially undecidable.  
Gödel's theorem applies to RA. Some universal proposition (shape  
(x)P(x)) will not been decided by exhaustive search.


RA is not Löbian, i.e. RA itself cannot prove its own incompleteness.  
But is Gödelian.


Yet there are finitely axiomatizable system which are Löbian: the von- 
Neumann-Bernays Gödel set theory (the most powerful theory knows today  
in math, you can formalize Category theory in!) is Löbian, despite it  
*can* be finitely axiomatized.


Bruno









Brent



Note that you cannot invoke a God or a Physical Universe to decide  
what exists or not, or you beg the (metaphysical) question. Someone  
could say that everything in physics suggest that there is no  
physical reality existing per se, but only statistically  
interfering computations "seen from inside". Look how quick people  
like Bohr and Heisenberg were to abandon realism in physics.  
Fortunately Einstein and Everett were not that quick, and  
computationalism go in that same direction.


Bruno







Saibal

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 16:58, John Clark wrote:




On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 9:41 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​It is the specific city that I will feel be in that I cannot  
predict.


​Because when talking about the future AFTER going through a "I"  
duplicating ​ ​machine the personal pronoun "I​" becomes  
ambiguous. Nobody can make the prediction because nobody knows what  
is suposed to be predicted.



'I" is an indexical. It is the d'd' in d'd' = F(d'd'), if you have  
look at some of my explanation how how to define indexical notions in  
arithmetic.  It referes to the person interviwed locally. The point is  
that when I ask the M-man (resp. the W-man) if his prediction was  
correct, he has to look at his diary (written in Helsinki, and  
duplicated with him), and compare it with what he sees. Ig the diary  
contains "W and M" it contradicts the experience lived by both. If it  
contains "W" (resp M), it contradicts half of the experiences, and if  
it contained W v M" it is a success for both.


​> ​I can explain more if you tell me if you agree that P(tea) =  
1.


​I've already answered that, no I don't agree. I have no reason to  
believe you will keep your promise about the tea


Given that the promise is part of the protocol, here, this is again a  
change of the protocol. You can't reason like that. It is not valid.




and I expect it is far more likely I will see ​Santa Claus's  
workshop​ than any tea. However I still don't understand why you're  
more interested in my expectations than the nature of reality.


Move on step 4, and sequitur. You will be enlightened.

Bruno







 John K Clark



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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 22:17, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 12:19 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


you must not neglect the question asked

​What question?  I saw words and question marks but I saw no  
question.​


The question is always the same. Just read the posts and the papers.  
It is "what could the helsinki guy expect to live as first person  
experience in the WM-duplication?". Is it "I will die plain and  
simple", or "I will survive"?
Well, you have already answer that you will survive. So now, the  
question is "do you expect to feel, from an 1p perspective, to be in  
one city or to be in two city"?. the answer is obvious (assuming of  
course computationalism).







​> ​which concerns the first person experience expected.

​Which THE the first person experience is the prediction suposed to  
be about,


Both, of course. "THE" refers to the only city EACH copies will seen.






John Clark's THE
first person experience in Helsinki John Clark's THE first person  
experience in Moscow or
John Clark's THE first person experience in Washington? John Clark  
predicts that Bruno's
answer will contain a gaggle of personal pronouns with no referent,  
talk about THE 1p as if

there were only one, or do both.



Just keep the 1p and 3p views difference into account, and all  
ambiguities on person vanish away. What remains is only that the  
copies have to admit that in Helsinki, they could not have written the  
city seen now in advance.






​> ​I am asking just the H-man, about what he expects

​For all I know​ ​the H-man​ ​expects​ ​Santa Claus's  
workshop, but I neither know nor care what the
H-man expects,I only care who will remember ​​tomorrow being the  
H-man today, and two men

will not one.


If you don't care, just say nothing. But you do seem care a lot.





Keep in mind that UDA is​...

​babytalk. ​


So you lost the argument if this is all what you can say.








​> ​You know you will push on a button,

​Yes, I know who "you" refers to up to this point, but after that  
the word "you" must be abandoned.​



There are no reason. After the experience "you" remains as useful as  
ever, but to remain consistent with computationalism, we just need to  
take into account the 1p/3p distinction which has been introduced and  
explain in the second step of the UD Argument.






 open a door and see a city

​John Clark opens 2 doors and ​ ​sees 2 cities.​



In the 3p description, but this is just a description of the protocol.





​> ​Don't patronize

No I think I’m going to continue to patronize


"patronizing" is insulting. In all circumstances.




as long as you continue to assume the meaning
of personal pronouns is ​always​ obvious even in a world that  
contains personal pronoun duplicating

machines as ​is done​ in the following:


I don't say it is obvious. Just "simple" once you keep the 1p and 3p  
distinction into account, which of course is important when working in  
a theory of mind.






"It is the specific city that I will feel be in that I cannot  
predict.”


>​> ​No, he should not expect to get tea he should expect the  
promise to be broken and it would be
better if he expected to end up in​ ​Santa Claus's workshop  
instead.Why should he expect that?
Because he will happier if he does,Santa Claus's​ ​workshop sound  
like more fun than drinking tea
Of course expectations need not turn out to be correct to bring  
happiness


​> ​Good joke.

I’m not joking.Santa Claus's workshop is as good a response as any  
to a meaningless sequence of

words followed be a question mark​.​


You make it meaningless by forgetting that the question is on the, or  
"a" if you prefer,  future first person experience. THE one which both  
are living after. The M-man man will say, yes I got a definite result  
among {W, M}, and the W-man too, but, as they could have guess in  
Helsinki, none of them live the experience of being in the two city at  
once, and the split has definitely lead to getting one bit of  
information for both of them. Both have to acknowledge the FPI, or be  
inconsistent.


Bruno





John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Sep 2017, at 23:13, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:
​>​>​ ​nobody can feel to be in two places at once with  
computationalism

​​> ​That is not a sacred axiom of computationalism!


​> ​It is simple consequence.

​Show me how! Explain to me why computers can't do 2 things at the  
same time.


They can. But if you duplicate a computer and allow them two different  
continuations, they cannot live or experience them both at once. We  
are reasoning in a precise context with a precise protocol. You over- 
generalize our claim.




Then tell me
why even with todays technology by using telepresence you can feel  
like you're in one place

even though you're brain is in another place far away.


Sure. But that is just changing the protocole. You are not  
invalidating an argument, but a generalization you are doing of it.







​>> ​The Moscow man and the Washington man could be merged back  
together and the resulting
Moscow/Washington man would have vivid memories of being in both  
cities at exactly the ​\​same time, as well as having memories of  
being just the Helsinki man.​


> ​In a metaphorical sense?

​No, in a literal sense.​


Then that is ambiguous, and again, even if we could make sense of your  
claim, that is a change of the protocol irrelevant for the WM- 
duplication. That has been shown in my last post. let us look at your  
comment ...





​> ​But strictly speaking, after fusing, the guy will remember  
having been in only one city


If after fusing the Moscow man and the Washington man back  
together ​and ​the resulting being
remembers​ ​having been in only one city​ don't you think it's  
a little odd that being is unable to
say what the name of that one and only one city is?​​ I think  
it's odd.​


It is not odd. You tell me that he has fused the two memories, and the  
two memories contains the content" I am in only one city, and I could  
not have written in Helsinki that unique name in the diary. That only  
confirms the first person indeterminacy.







without having been able to predict which one in​ ​Helsinki  
before.


Just imagine how that could be like. In helsinki the guy wrote  
"Washington" in his diary. he got duplicated and, in the 3-1p  
description, he lives the two incompatible experiences:


"I see Washington, my diary contains "Washington", so my bet was  
correct, I win!"


and

"I see Moscow, my diary contains "Washington", so my bet was wrong, I  
lost the bet".


After fusing the memory (admitting we can make sense of that), he  
knows that the bet is incorrect, given that he remembers that it  
failed in Moscow, and we have defined "correct prediction" when all  
copies agree on it.






​So if you asked the newly refused Moscow/Washington man "What is  
the name of that one and
only one city you ended up seeing after ​ Helsinki?", do you think  
he'd give you that one and only
one name or do you think he's look at you like you were crazy for  
asking such a thing?


The question is on the 1p expected before the pushing the button, on  
which cities he would see after opening the door.







> That's right, "he" still doesn't know and "he" will NEVER know  
because nobody will ever

know what "he" means in the above.


He remembers quite well that in one city, the prediction was false,  
and that is enough to conclude, after the fusing, that if the  
experience is iterated again, he still cannot predict a specific city,  
although he can predict that it belongs to {W, M}.







​> ​Then computationalism is false.

​Bullshit.​

​> ​Of course the helsinki man will be able to answer and verify  
the prediction.


 ​T​he ​Helsinki man​?!! ​T​he ​Helsinki man​ can't  
verify anything because after the duplication nobody

 is in Helsinki anymore. ​


We did agree that the Helsinki man survives in both city, but of  
course lives the experience of one city.
You change the identity criterion that you have accepted before. That  
is not a valid way to reason.








​>>​​I still don't understand why you're more interested ​in  
expectations than reality


​> ​Reality is the goal.

​Expectations are often proven to be wrong, reality never is.​ ​


Yes, but a physical law is supposed to help linking expectation and  
some reality. Cf Einstein criteria of reality, or just the goal of  
fundamental science.


So in this posts, you change the protocol, and/or you change the  
definition/criterion of personal identity. Hardly convincing.


Bruno



John K Clark​



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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Sep 2017, at 01:35, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Terren Suydam  wrote:


​​>> ​The expectations of what will happen will change from  
person to person, but the reality of what actually did happen will  
not.


​> ​The reality of what actually does happen is not available to  
anyone in the thought experiment,


​The reality of who does or does not have the memories of being the  
Helsinki man yesterday Is ​available​ to anyone by simply asking  
the Moscow man and the Washington man about things the Helsinki man  
knew.


​>​>>​ t​o open their eyes to a single city.

​>> ​​If he's a fool he might indeed expect that, but I don't  
much care what fools think. But ask yourself this, how many fools  
tomorrow will ​remember being asked the question today? I maintain  
the answer is 2 fools not one. Do you disagree?


​> ​It's irrelevant.

​It's not irrelevant if the survival of the Helsinki man means  
somebody today remembers being the Helsinki man yesterday; and I  
can't imagine what else the survival of the Helsinki man could  
mean.  ​


​> ​The actual number of copies is irrelevant to the thought  
experiment, as long as it's more than one.


​If there is more than one then it would be very foolish to ask  
"what one and only one thing will *you* see after *you* become  
two?". And that's why the thought experiment ​is worthless.


​> ​before you enter the duplicator, what do you (the Helsinki  
you) expect to experience?


​I just don't get it! Why do you care what some jackass expects  
today but don't care who will remembers being that jackass ​ 
tomorrow?



To make the prediction on the personal first person experience, you  
*do need* to take into account what all copies will remember  
"tomorrow". They all remember seeing one city, and not knowing which  
one in advance. We take into account what all copies can say.






> ​Consider one's experience before entering the duplicator, and  
the experience after. Follow the stream of consciousness, as if you  
were the one entering the duplicator,


​I don't know how to follow ​"THE" stream of consciousness​ and  
don't even know what it means because there are two not one.


Not from any 1p available, and the question is on the 1p. There will  
be two 1p, but they are logically incompatible (with this protocol) so  
in Helsinki the candidate knows with certainty that he will see only  
one city, but without being able to write which one in his diary. So  
we get the First Person Indeterminacy (FPI). QED.


Bruno





​> ​what happens on the other side?

​John Clark will be in two cities on the other side, if you don't  
believe me then go to the two cities and see if there is anybody in  
them named John Clark.


John K Clark





As you agreed earlier, it's an experience of a single city.

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Sep 2017, at 01:47, John Clark wrote:




On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​> ​It seems that you would want your assets distributed to the  
copies, ideally both of them, if not both then one, randomly chosen  
(“it doesn’t matter which one”).


​Yes. I want somebody tomorrow who remembers being me today because  
I prefer existence to nonexistence,  ​others may have a different  
preference and that's OK because there is no disputing matters of  
taste.


​> ​That’s what someone would do if they expected to survive  
the copying process.


​I do expect to survive the copying process​, even better I  
expect I'll have a backup, although why my expectations should be of  
interest to anyone but me I don't know. ​


You would have understood this since long he you could move to the  
next steps.


But for this you need to just answer the question about what the  
Helsinki guy can expect for his (his = the Helsinki guy) future  
*subjective experience*. The explanation will be that the whole  
science of physics will need to be a statistics on first person  
experience supported by the computations emulated in Arithmetic. That  
statistics can be made mathematically precise, (the pronouns are  
handled by the second recursion theorem) so this makes the  
computationalist hypothesis experimentally testable.


Bruno






J ohn K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Sep 2017, at 02:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Wed, 27 Sep 2017 at 1:48 am, John Clark   
wrote:


On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:


​> ​It seems that you would want your assets distributed to the  
copies, ideally both of them, if not both then one, randomly chosen  
(“it doesn’t matter which one”).


​Yes. I want somebody tomorrow who remembers being me today because  
I prefer existence to nonexistence,  ​others may have a different  
preference and that's OK because there is no disputing matters of  
taste.


​> ​That’s what someone would do if they expected to survive  
the copying process.


​I do expect to survive the copying process​, even better I  
expect I'll have a backup, although why my expectations should be of  
interest to anyone but me I don't know. ​


Then the question “what future experiences will I have” is not  
nonsensical. If it were then I could not have the expectation of  
surviving, since to survive I must have future experiences, and I  
could not conceive of having future experiences if “I” loses  
meaning when I contemplate the post-duplication future.


Which explain why John Clark refuses to answer "P(tea) = ?".

He claims that he survives the duplication, but in the reasoning, he  
cannot make that explicit without seeing that this would entail that  
P(I survive in only one city) = 1 too, and so P(W v M) = 1.


John is clever, he use insults or simple omission to avoid the logical  
trap that he sees very well (confirming that he get the point, but  
does not want to concede it).


Bruno




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