Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 5:24 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:50:35 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of
ANY theory to be compatible with experimental results, and
one of those experiments shows the violation of Bell's
Inequality. And that violation tells us that for ANY theory
to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST
one of the following properties of that theory must be untrue:

1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is
not strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:

"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out
/determinism/, or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is
sometimes reported as ruling out, or at least calling in
question, /realism/. But these are all mistakes. What Bell's
theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be
impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism,
but /locality, /in a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell
proved, and what theoretical physics has not yet properly
absorbed, is that the physical world itself is non-local."


Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG


It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question

Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet
influences the other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read
Maudlin to find out more about what these terms mean.

Bruce


There's an ambiguity in English as to what "beg the question" means.


Not really. Look up Wikipedia for /petitio principii/. It is not 
ambiguous -- just often misused.


I meant it as you say. Does non locality mean the future influences 
the past as Clark alleged?


No.


Does it mean the non existence of local hidden variables?


Yes.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:50:35 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>> On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> ​
>> The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum Mechanics, 
>> but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory to be 
>> compatible with experimental results, and one of those experiments shows 
>> the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that violation tells us that for 
>> ANY theory to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST one 
>> of the following properties of that theory must be untrue: 
>>
>> 1) Determinism
>> 2) Locality   
>> 3) Realism
>>
>>
>> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
>> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>>
>> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*, 
>> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
>> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes. 
>> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be 
>> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality, 
>> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical 
>> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is 
>> non-local."
>>
>
> Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG
>
>
> It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question
>
> Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet influences the 
> other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read Maudlin to find out more 
> about what these terms mean.
>
> Bruce
>

There's an ambiguity in English as to what "beg the question" means. I 
meant it as you say. Does non locality mean the future influences the past 
as Clark alleged? Does it mean the non existence of local hidden variables? 
Will read Maudlin. AG 

>
>
>> This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv:1408.1826 
>> He says the same thing in his book and numerous other articles where he 
>> spells this out in considerable detail.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY
theory to be compatible with experimental results, and one of
those experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And
that violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at
explaining how the world works AT LEAST one of the following
properties of that theory must be untrue:

1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not
strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:

"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out
/determinism/, or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is sometimes
reported as ruling out, or at least calling in question,
/realism/. But these are all mistakes. What Bell's theorem,
together with the experimental results, proves to be impossible is
not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but /locality, /in
a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell proved, and what theoretical
physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world
itself is non-local."


Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG


It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question

Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet influences 
the other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read Maudlin to find out 
more about what these terms mean.


Bruce



This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin,
arxiv:1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous
other articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> ​
> The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum Mechanics, 
> but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory to be 
> compatible with experimental results, and one of those experiments shows 
> the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that violation tells us that for 
> ANY theory to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST one 
> of the following properties of that theory must be untrue: 
>
> 1) Determinism
> 2) Locality   
> 3) Realism
>
>
> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>
> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*, 
> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes. 
> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be 
> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality, 
> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical 
> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is 
> non-local."
>

Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG

>
> This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv:1408.1826 
> He says the same thing in his book and numerous other articles where he 
> spells this out in considerable detail.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum 
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory 
to be compatible with experimental results, and one of those 
experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that 
violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at explaining 
how the world works AT LEAST one of the following properties of that 
theory must be untrue:


1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:


"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out /determinism/, 
or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
or at least calling in question, /realism/. But these are all mistakes. 
What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to 
be impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but 
/locality, /in a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell proved, and what 
theoretical physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical 
world itself is non-local."


This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, 
arxiv:1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous other 
articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, November 10, 2017 at 12:46:09 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 10:43 AM, > 
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> If the measurement problem were solved in the sense being able to predict 
>> exact outcomes,
>>
>
> ​That's not the measurement problem, its determining if how and why 
> observation effects things. ​
>
> ​> ​
>> thus making QM a deterministic theory, would that imply an INCONSISTENCY 
>> in the postulates of QM?
>>
>
> ​It's not just Quantum Mechanics, Bell proved that any theory that is 
> deterministic must ​be nonlocal or non realistic or both, otherwise it 
> would be inconsistent with experimental results. 
>
>  John K Clark 
>

Due to the uncertainty principle, it's impossible to know the exact state 
of any measuring device or any system being measured. This means that no 
theory of micro reality can be deterministic or realistic, and this shows 
(without appealing to Bell experiment results) that hidden variables cannot 
exist to know such states if one agrees that the UP is operating. So it's 
not that God plays dice with the universe; rather, it's impossible *in 
principle* to predict the outcome of any micro experiment. Hence, we are 
forced to develop probabilistic theories of micro reality. Do you agree, 
and if so, how does this effect our understanding of Bell experiments and 
non locality? AG

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been
proved in MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too:
it has never been proved that it does not. Bell was no
fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an
escape from his theorem, he would have addressed the
issue. The fact that he did not suggests strongly that
you do not have a case.


Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental
results would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is
eliminated. This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t
prepare a random state,


What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no
free variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?


Yes.


As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as
an account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't
Hooft's arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:

https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398


Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies
that would be required in the general case would be such, that if
they were generalized, they would render science and experimental
confirmation of theories meaningless.

I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication
that superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are
necessarily incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an
explanation of anything, since anything you observe can be
explained away in this way.


Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:

--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far 
apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his 
inequality if the world is local. But this requires that the 
measurements have results in order that there be the requisite 
correlations. What if no “measurement” ever has a unique result at 
all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? What would it even 
mean to say that in such a situation there is some correlation among 
the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course, the idea of 
the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s analysis, 
but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical world 
do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments 
that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. 
Indeed, the world does not actually conform to the predictions of 
quantum theory at all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts 
of experiments have single unique outcomes, which correspond to 
eigenvalues), it just seems that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a 
grip on this theory.

--endquote--

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf


It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation Immediately 
following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:


"That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that 
Bell's result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even 
address the question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous amount 
of interpretive work has to be done. This is not the place to attempt 
such a task."


Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite common 
in the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is completely 
correct in his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip on the theory -- 
it can if one understands many worlds in terms of superpositions of 
possible outcomes. But that is by the way. What I have presented is a 
concrete counterexample to the contention that Many Worlds is local. 
Maudlin does not consider this counterexample, so that does rather 
render his comments on MWI moot!


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW theory?
>>> Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved that it does
>>> not. Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an escape
>>> from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did
>>> not suggests strongly that you do not have a case.
>>>
>>
>> Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results would be
>> the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in
>> MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random state,
>>
>>
>> What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
>> variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
> As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an
> account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments
> in a long exchange with him on Facebook:
>
> https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
>
> Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that would
> be required in the general case would be such, that if they were
> generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of
> theories meaningless.
>
> I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that
> superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily
> incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
> since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.
>

Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:

--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far
apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his inequality if
the world is local. But this requires that the measurements have results in
order that there be the requisite correlations. What if no “measurement”
ever has a unique result at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur?
What would it even mean to say that in such a situation there is some
correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course,
the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s
analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical
world do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments
that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed,
the world does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at
all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of experiments have
single unique outcomes, which correspond to eigenvalues), it just seems
that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a grip on this theory.
--endquote--

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf

> But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not have to
>> prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet state consisting of
>> two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.
>>
>
> Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until it
> is done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know” about it
> instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the measurement
> in the multiverse as a whole, although there is uncertainty from the point
> of view of individual observers, because they do not know in which branch
> they will end up in.
>
> Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local, theory
>> was a better bet. But you have not addressed my counterexample to your
>> contention that MWI eliminates non-locality. The time-like measurement of
>> the two entangled particles clearly requires non-locality in order to
>> conserve angular momentum.
>>
>
> There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously
> reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular
> momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.
>
>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 12:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local.


I am not sure what that means, but I can imagine this could make sense 
in the "one-world" hypothesis, not much in many-worlds, still less in 
many-computations.


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local because it involves two 
particles without specifying any particular separation. Because the 
singlet requires both particles, it is clearly non-separable -- it 
cannot be explained by the purely local properties of the individual 
particles. Non-separability means that changing one of the particles 
influences the other 'instantaneously'. That is non-locality.


A simple argument is that any experimental set-up showing a 
non-locality can be simulated by a classical (local) computer, and the 
simulated observer(s), like all the Bob-Alice pair we get, will all 
(the majority) describe an apparent non-locality, despite we, looking 
patiently at the whole emulation will see that there are none.


That argument has been debunked by Brunner et al, arxiv:1303.2849


It actually has nothing to do with whether people meet or not - it 
describes a situation which explicitly violates Einstein's notion of 
local realism: the state of one of the entangled pair is not 
separable from the state of the other distant particle. 
Non-separability here implies non-local influence, or simple 
non-locality. The attempt to claim that non-separability does not 
imply non-locality is mere verbal gymnastics, with no physical content.


The singlet state does not describe one pair, but an infinity of 
pairs, having spin (say) in all directions, but correlated in all the 
case verifiable by Bob and Alice when they can interact. I would say.


That is a complete misrepresentation of the situation. Only one pair is 
necessary. You are confusing 'pairs' with the rotational symmetry of the 
singlet state, and that is your continuing egregious error.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 12:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 18/11/2017 12:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/15/2017 7:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Nov 2017, at 21:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/14/2017 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Nov 2017, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 14/11/2017 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2017, at 23:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What really annoys me is the continued claim that many worlds 
eliminates the need for non-locality. It does not, and 
neither Bruno nor anyone else has ever produced a valid 
argument as to how many worlds might restore locality.


But nobody has proved that there is non locality in the MWI. 
EPR-BELL proves non-locality apparant in each branch, but the 
MWI avoids the needs of action at a distance to explains them. 
Once Alice and Bob are space-separated, their identity are 
independent. It makes no sense to talk of each of them like if 
they were related, (unless you correlate them with a third 
observer, etc) If they do measurement, some God could see that 
they are indeed no more related, but if they decide to come 
back to place where they can compared locally their spin, they 
will always get contact to the corresponding observer with the 
well correlated spin. The independent Alice and Bob will never 
meet because they can't belong to the same branch of the 
multiverse, by the MWI of the singlet state. So Mitra is 
right. Although Bertlmann's socks are tyically not working for 
Bell's violation in a MONO-universe, it works again in the 
MWI, applied in this case to the whole singlet state.


Bell has proved non-locality in MWI, every bit as much as in 
each branch separately. You appear not to have grasped the 
significance of the scenario I have argued carefully. Alice and 
Bob are not space-like separated in the scenario I outlined. 
Alice and Bob are together in the same laboratory when the 
second measurement is made. They are necessarily in the same 
world before, and branch in together according to Bob's result. 
Your mumbo-jumbo about them only being able to meet in 
appropriate matching branches does not work here, because they 
are always in the same branch. And there is no reason to 
suppose that their results in some of those branches do not 
violate conservation of angular momentum.


I have no clue what you mean. The singlet state guaranties the 
conservation of angular momentum in all worlds. The singlet 
state describes an infinity of "worlds",  and in each of them 
there is conservation of angular momentum, and it has a local 
common cause origin, the same in all worlds.


But it's not a sufficient 'hidden' variable to explain the 
space-like correlation of measurements.


If the the explanation is based on hidden variable, per branch, 
then there will be non-locality. But the many universe are not 
really hidden variable in the sense of EPR-Bell's, which assumes 
Alice and Bob have the same identity and keep it, when they do the 
space-like measurement, but it seems to me that this is a wrong 
interpretation of the singlet state when we suppress any possible 
collapse. If Alice and Bob are space-like separated, they will 
later only access to the Bob and Alice they will locally be able 
to interact with, and those are "new" people, not the original 
couple.


But that's the point of Bruce's version in which the measurements 
are time-like.  Alice and Bob will have continuity of identity and, 
as he argues, the explanation for the correlation of results being 
stronger than classical must be the same.


But there are the same. The singlet state explains this too. The 
mystery is in the apparent space-like separation, where it looks 
like a physical action at a distance plays some role, except that 
this has not been proved in the MW theory.


Again you appeal to the 'apparent space-like separation'. As Brent 
said, the point of my time-like example was that there is no 
space-like separation at any time, so that escape is not available to 
you.


Without space-like separation, I don't see why invoke a physical 
action at a distance at all.


No, as I pointed out in my original post, a local hidden variable 
explanation for the time-like correlations is available. That would mean 
no more than that QM is incomplete. The problem is that this explanation 
is not available in the space-like case, and you cannot use one 
explanation in one place when it doesn't work elsewhere. When the 
singlet particles are produced before separation, they cannot know 
whether they are going to be measured at space-like or time-like 
separations: any hidden variables that are going to explain the 
correlations by some common cause mechanism have to be set in place from 
the start. That is ruled out by simple logic given the time-like 
violations of angular momentum conservation.


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW 
t

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in
MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never
been proved that it does not. Bell was no fool: he did not
like MWI, but if that provided an escape from his theorem, he
would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did not
suggests strongly that you do not have a case.


Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results
would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated.
This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random
state,


What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?


Yes.


As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an 
account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's 
arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:


https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398

Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that 
would be required in the general case would be such, that if they were 
generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of 
theories meaningless.


I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that 
superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily 
incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything, 
since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.


Bruce




But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not
have to prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet
state consisting of two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.


Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until 
it is done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know” 
about it instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the 
measurement in the multiverse as a whole, although there is 
uncertainty from the point of view of individual observers, because 
they do not know in which branch they will end up in.


Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local,
theory was a better bet. But you have not addressed my
counterexample to your contention that MWI eliminates
non-locality. The time-like measurement of the two entangled
particles clearly requires non-locality in order to conserve
angular momentum.


There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously 
reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular 
momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
>>> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
>>> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>
>>
>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>> he Schrodinger 
>> ​Wave ​E
>> quation 
>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>> somehow it does. ​
>>
>>
>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
>> explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
> this case in other worlds. *
>
>
> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
> depending where you put the cut.
>

*CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
realized. So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*

*I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the 
> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible universes 
> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been, realized. 
> AG*
>
>
> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state, 
> many-worlds, etc.).
>

*Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of String 
Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI. AG *

>
> Bruno
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the  
MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized  
in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this assumption other  
than an insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid  
"collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E quation ​  
about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that  
somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed  
QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious  
mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the cut.





I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of  
the Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the  
possible universes finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will  
be, or have been, realized. AG


OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state, many- 
worlds, etc.).


Bruno




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Nov 2017, at 05:35, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 7:18:23 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/17/2017 6:08 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 6:41:43 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/17/2017 4:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 2:38:40 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/17/2017 1:17 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI.  
Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in  
some world. I see no reason for this assumption other than an  
insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".  
Same situation in String Theory; no "must"; simply other possible  
universes in the landscape. Do you really think that when you  
pull a slot machine and get some outcome, the 10 million other  
possible outcomes occur in 10 million other universe? Seems  
ridiculous to me.


The problem is a conflict:

(1) If the wave-function collapses when does it do it and what is  
the process.



The fact that we have unsolved problems, does not suggest we  
should grasp as straws such as the MWI.


Does a human being have to look at the record?  Is simply having a  
recorde enough?  But then what constitutes a record?  Does it have  
be made of more than 100 atoms, more than 10, more than 1?  How is  
the record created, if not by evolution of the Schrodinger equation?


If you consider a specific experiment, say the double slit using  
micro objects like electrons, all you need is a recorder, any  
recorder, and if it is designed to determine which-way, the  
interference is destroyed. Thus, you don't need humans or  
consciousness in any form to collapse the wf. Feynman discusses  
this and it's quite conclusive IMO.


But you need to "collapse" it somehow by measuring the position of  
the electrons - otherwise there is no interference pattern.  So the  
question remains, what is a measurement?  If you replace the film  
by an array of atoms and you plan to measure where the electron  
lands by which atom it strikes and ejects from the array, you will  
them have to make a second measurement to see which atoms are  
missing.  So "measurement" must include more interaction than that;  
enough interaction to constitute a "record".  But that seems to  
just reword the problem.  How much of a "record"? and what  
constitutes a record?


I think these details can be worked out on a case-by-case basis.  
But the main point seems solid; no human observers or consciousness  
needed to produce interference, which is tantamount to collapse. Do  
you agree to that? AG


I agree that a human observer is not necessary...even a Trump  
supporter would suffice.




(2)If it's created by a splitting of the world, then you still  
have the same questions with "splitting" in places of "collapse"  
except that the SE does provide the evolution.  But then in the  
Schrodinger cat experiment the world is splitting continuously.


IMO, the problem posed by the cat is a macro object in an  
unthinkable superposition of Alive and Dead simultaneously. But if  
the object is macro,won't the interference  
terms be vanishingly small, so small that the unthinkable  
conclusion does not occur in the lifetime of the universe? IOW,  
FAPP there is no superposition and thus no enigmatic superposition.


Forget the cat.  It's the radioactive atom whose emission will  
break the vial that causes the continuous splitting of the world:  
decay at 0:00...0:01...0:02  And is FAPP enough?  There are  
going to be intermediate cases in which there are 10 dof instead  
1e30 dof, and the superposition can be eliminated by a change of  
basis.


FAPP is probably not enough. What is the change of basis that  
eliminates the superposition? For the singlet state, Bruce says  
there is none and that I may have misunderstood your earlier  
comments that every superposition can be eliminated by a change of  
basis. TIA,


No, Bruce was thinking of what local operator could be implemented.   
In theory any pure state can be an element of a basis.  So if the  
superposition is pure it  will an eigenstate of some  
operatoralthough in general it will often be one that is  
impractical to implement.


Brent

If you can remove the superposition from any pure state by a change  
of basis, why not do it for the cat and maybe the problem will go  
away? AG


You can do that. Even after looking at the cat, and seeing it dead,  
you can make a measurement on the global operator, and resurrect the  
cat! of course, that is technically terribly demanding, and you will  
have to erase all traces remaining of the dead cat state. That is just  
technically unfeasible, and that is why, decoherence's result  is FAPP  
statistical and non reversible. It is as much difficult as to separate  
the milk from the coffee, but it is possible in theory, and that is  
what make the theory demand

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 18/11/2017 12:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 16/11/2017 1:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 00:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 15/11/2017 12:47 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, 13 Nov 2017 at 8:54 am, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


I don't think you have fully understood the scenario I have  
outlined.
There is no collapse, many worlds is assumed throughout. Alice  
splits
according to her measurement result. Both copies of Alice go to  
meet
Bob, carrying the other particle of the original pair. Since  
they both
have now met Bob, the split that Alice occasioned has now  
spread to
entangle Bob as well as the rest of her environment. So there  
are now
two worlds, each of which has a copy of Bob, and an Alice, who  
has a
particular result. Locality says that Bob's particle is  
unchanged from
production, so when he measure its spin, he splits into two  
copies,
according to spin up or spin down. Since Alice is standing  
beside him,
she also becomes entangled with his result. But Alice already  
has a
definite result in each branch, so we now have four branches:  
with
results 'up-up', 'up-down', 'down-up', and 'down-down'.  
However, only
the 'up-down' and 'down-up' branches conserve angular momentum.  
How do

you rule out the other branches?

When you put something in the cupboard and come back later to  
get it, why, under MWI, is it still there?


I don't understand the significance of your question. Why  
wouldn't things remain stable in MWI? After all, the whole  
world, as it is, becomes entangled with the particular branching  
event.


OK, but not instantaneously. This might be the point where we  
disagree in the interpretation of the Non-collapse theory.


I think that the general idea is that the entanglement with the  
result spreads at the velocity of light -- inside the forward  
light cone. This spread of entanglement does not require that all  
objects in the forward light cone have explicitly interacted with  
the original event. The mathematics are quite clear on this point.


You are right. So you might need an experience like Mandel & Co(I  
will look at the reference, I guess you see which experience I  
allude to) where two distant lasers create a singlet state non  
locally. That one has made me doubt that MW could avoid Action-at-a- 
distance, and some thought experience by Lucien Hardy too, but  
eventually, I remain unconvinced,


You will have to give more precise references. Searching on these  
names throws up so many papers that it is impossible to sort out  
exactly what you mean here.


I think it should be this one:
Z.Y. Ou, L. Mandel, Violation of Bell’s inequality and classical  
probability in

a two-photon correlation experiment, Phys. Rev. Lett. 61, 50–53 (1988)






because wherever are the actors, the singlet state never describes  
a non-local affair, it only predicts the result of the people who  
will met at some time.


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local.


I am not sure what that means, but I can imagine this could make sense  
in the "one-world" hypothesis, not much in many-worlds, still less in  
many-computations.


A simple argument is that any experimental set-up showing a non- 
locality can be simulated by a classical (local) computer, and the  
simulated observer(s), like all the Bob-Alice pair we get, will all  
(the majority) describe an apparent non-locality, despite we, looking  
patiently at the whole emulation will see that there are none.



It actually has nothing to do with whether people meet or not - it  
describes a situation which explicitly violates Einstein's notion of  
local realism: the state of one of the entangled pair is not  
separable from the state of the other distant particle. Non- 
separability here implies non-local influence, or simple non- 
locality. The attempt to claim that non-separability does not imply  
non-locality is mere verbal gymnastics, with no physical content.


The singlet state does not describe one pair, but an infinity of  
pairs, having spin (say) in all directions, but correlated in all the  
case verifiable by Bob and Alice when they can interact. I would say.


Bruno







Bruce


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 18/11/2017 12:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/15/2017 7:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Nov 2017, at 21:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/14/2017 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Nov 2017, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 14/11/2017 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2017, at 23:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What really annoys me is the continued claim that many  
worlds eliminates the need for non-locality. It does not,  
and neither Bruno nor anyone else has ever produced a valid  
argument as to how many worlds might restore locality.


But nobody has proved that there is non locality in the MWI.  
EPR-BELL proves non-locality apparant in each branch, but the  
MWI avoids the needs  of  
action at a distance to explains them. Once Alice and Bob are  
space-separated, their identity are independent. It makes no  
sense to talk of each of them like if they were related,  
(unless you correlate them with a third observer, etc) If  
they do measurement, some God could see that they are indeed  
no more related, but if they decide to come back to place  
where they can compared locally their spin, they will always  
get contact to the corresponding observer with the well  
correlated spin. The independent Alice and Bob will never  
meet because they can't belong to the same branch of the  
multiverse, by the MWI of the singlet state. So Mitra is  
right. Although Bertlmann's socks are tyically not working  
for Bell's violation in a MONO-universe, it works again in  
the MWI, applied in this case to the whole singlet state.


Bell has proved non-locality in MWI, every bit as much as in  
each branch separately. You appear not to have grasped the  
significance of the scenario I have argued carefully. Alice  
and Bob are not space-like separated in the scenario I  
outlined. Alice and Bob are together in the same laboratory  
when the second measurement is made. They are necessarily in  
the same world before, and branch in together according to  
Bob's result. Your mumbo-jumbo about them only being able to  
meet in appropriate matching branches does not work here,  
because they are always in the same branch. And there is no  
reason to suppose that their results in some of those branches  
do not violate conservation of angular momentum.


I have no clue what you mean. The singlet state guaranties the  
conservation of angular momentum in all worlds. The singlet  
state describes an infinity of "worlds",  and in each of them  
there is conservation of angular momentum, and it has a local  
common cause origin, the same in all worlds.


But it's not a sufficient 'hidden' variable to explain the space- 
like correlation of measurements.


If the the explanation is based on hidden variable, per branch,  
then there will be non-locality. But the many universe are not  
really hidden variable in the sense of EPR-Bell's, which assumes  
Alice and Bob have the same identity and keep it, when they do  
the space-like measurement, but it seems to me that this is a  
wrong interpretation of the singlet state when we suppress any  
possible collapse. If Alice and Bob are space-like separated,  
they will later only access to the Bob and Alice they will  
locally be able to interact with, and those are "new" people, not  
the original couple.


But that's the point of Bruce's version in which the measurements  
are time-like.  Alice and Bob will have continuity of identity  
and, as he argues, the explanation for the correlation of results  
being stronger than classical must be the same.


But there are the same. The singlet state explains this too. The  
mystery is in the apparent space-like separation, where it looks  
like a physical action at a distance plays some role, except that  
this has not been proved in the MW theory.


Again you appeal to the 'apparent space-like separation'. As Brent  
said, the point of my time-like example was that there is no space- 
like separation at any time, so that escape is not available to you.


Without space-like separation, I don't see why invoke a physical  
action at a distance at all.





And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW  
theory? Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved  
that it does not.


EPR and Bell assumes unicity of outcomes, or the collapse. Without  
this, the "spliting/differentiation" of consciousness/universe becomes  
a local phenomenon, and the formalism ensure locality.





Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an  
escape from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue.


He did not. He arguably made something worst: reinterpretating the  
Many-world in term of a local hidden variable theory.




The fact that he did not suggests strongly that you do not have a  
case.



That is not a convincing argument. I just do not see any non-local

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW theory?
>> Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved that it does
>> not. Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an escape
>> from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did
>> not suggests strongly that you do not have a case.
>>
>
> Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results would be
> the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in
> MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random state,
>
>
> What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
> variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
>

Yes.

But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not have to
> prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet state consisting of
> two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.
>

Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until it is
done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know” about it
instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the measurement
in the multiverse as a whole, although there is uncertainty from the point
of view of individual observers, because they do not know in which branch
they will end up in.

Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local, theory
> was a better bet. But you have not addressed my counterexample to your
> contention that MWI eliminates non-locality. The time-like measurement of
> the two entangled particles clearly requires non-locality in order to
> conserve angular momentum.
>

There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously
reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular
momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.

>

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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