Re: Superdeterminism in comics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/16/2019 10:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 5:01 PM Quentin Anciaux > wrote:


Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> a écrit :

On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux
mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:

/> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put
your shoes in the experiment,/


Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W
Man's, or the M Man's?

>///imagine you in front of the button, /


OK

> /what do you expect after pushing it.. /


If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.


Expecting what you will experience after pushing the
button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed,
so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man.  And the answer
is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before
the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought
about the future.  So the question is clear enough.


But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE
pushing it. So after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated
to both W and M: So the W copy expects Washington, and the M
copy expects Moscow.


No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what
does he expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the
next moment after pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki
man to himself... Wilk he vanish from existence ? Will he see m or
w ? Will he see m and w ? The question is clear, has been for more
than twenty years now, only bad faith has make it go through 2019
again... And will through 2029.


H-man will not see anything after pushing the button -- according to 
the protocol he will be eliminated. He can have no particular 
expectations for what his subsequent experiences will be because the 
probabilities of future experiences are not well defined. The only 
rational account is that since he is eliminated, two new persons are 
created, one seeing M and one seeing W. These are new persons -- maybe 
sharing some memories with H-man, but neither can claim uniquely to BE 
H-man.


But each can claim to be H-man.  And each could report what the H-man 
was thinking just before he pushed the button.  I don't know what JKC 
thinks he's proving by pretending this question can't be answered.


Brent



Bruce
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 5:01 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
 *> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
 experiment,*

>>>
>>> Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M
>>> Man's?
>>>
>>> > *imagine you in front of the button, *

>>>
>>> OK
>>>
>>>
 > *what do you expect after pushing it.. *

>>>
>>> If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
>>>
>>>
>>> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer
>>> to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the
>>> Helsinki man.  And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man
>>> exists before the button is pushed.  "Expecting" is having a thought about
>>> the future.  So the question is clear enough.
>>>
>>
>> But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So
>> after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W
>> copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.
>>
>
> No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he
> expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after
> pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he
> vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The
> question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith
> has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.
>

H-man will not see anything after pushing the button -- according to the
protocol he will be eliminated. He can have no particular expectations for
what his subsequent experiences will be because the probabilities of future
experiences are not well defined. The only rational account is that since
he is eliminated, two new persons are created, one seeing M and one seeing
W. These are new persons -- maybe sharing some memories with H-man, but
neither can claim uniquely to BE H-man.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
>>> experiment,*
>>>
>>
>> Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M
>> Man's?
>>
>> > *imagine you in front of the button, *
>>>
>>
>> OK
>>
>>
>>> > *what do you expect after pushing it.. *
>>>
>>
>> If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
>>
>>
>> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to
>> thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki
>> man.  And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists
>> before the button is pushed.  "Expecting" is having a thought about the
>> future.  So the question is clear enough.
>>
>
> But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So
> after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W
> copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.
>

No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he
expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after
pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he
vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The
question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith
has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.

>
> Bruce
>
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>
>> *> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
>> experiment,*
>>
>
> Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M
> Man's?
>
> > *imagine you in front of the button, *
>>
>
> OK
>
>
>> > *what do you expect after pushing it.. *
>>
>
> If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
>
>
> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to
> thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki
> man.  And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists
> before the button is pushed.  "Expecting" is having a thought about the
> future.  So the question is clear enough.
>

But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So
after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W
copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.

Bruce

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux > wrote:


/> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in
the experiment,/


Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the 
M Man's?


>///imagine you in front of the button, /


OK

> /what do you expect after pushing it.. /


If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.


Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer 
to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the 
Helsinki man.  And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man 
exists before the button is pushed.  "Expecting" is having a thought 
about the future.  So the question is clear enough.


Brent

If "you" means the M Man I expect to be experiencing M.  If "you" 
means the H Man I expect to be experiencing nothing at all because 
after that button is pushed nobody will be in H. Any other questions?


John K Clark
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:


> *> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
> experiment,*
>

Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M
Man's?

> *imagine you in front of the button, *
>

OK


> > *what do you expect after pushing it... *
>

If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.  If "you" means the
M Man I expect to be experiencing M.  If "you" means the H Man I expect to
be experiencing nothing at all because after that button is pushed nobody
will be in H. Any other questions?

John K Clark

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Re: Quantum Computer Factoring

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, December 16, 2019 at 8:31:53 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:49 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> If the the "superpositions" (needed to grow exponentially to get 
>> quantum speedup via parallelism) are physically wiped out (in a real QC 
>> with more than a few qubits), I don't see how any error correction can 
>> help.*
>>
>
> Conventional error correcting works mainly through clever use of 
> redundancy, 
>

Hamming distance is used so this is done with changes in bits and in the 
case of quantum computing qubits. This is more efficient and for classical 
error correction it is almost perfect. For quantum information it is 
limited by things such as the Holevo theorem.

LC

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le lun. 16 déc. 2019 à 23:22, John Clark  a écrit :

>
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W
>>> and also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things
>>> could be predicted long ago back in H.
>>
>>
>> *> But in H, it was still impossible to predict any of the two outcomes.*
>>
>
> Please explain exactly what those two outcomes turned out to be and please
> do not use personal pronouns when doing so, instead use the referent those
> personal pronouns would have had. And if the term "first person
> perspective" is mentioned please make it clear who's first person
> perspective is being referred to.
>
>  John K Clark
>

You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the
experiment, imagine you in front of the button, what do you expect after
pushing it...

But I know it's a waste of time, dodging Clark's coming.

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> 
> .
>

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:16 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W
>> and also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things
>> could be predicted long ago back in H.
>
>
> *> But in H, it was still impossible to predict any of the two outcomes.*
>

Please explain exactly what those two outcomes turned out to be and please
do not use personal pronouns when doing so, instead use the referent those
personal pronouns would have had. And if the term "first person
perspective" is mentioned please make it clear who's first person
perspective is being referred to.

 John K Clark

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Fwd: QM makes a "[Dr.] B."-line to the future

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

Good.  I'm always looking for someplace Bruno could apply his ToE and 
make some testable predictions.  If physics is based on a p-adic metric 
that seems to be something that might be derived from his theory of 
computational physics.


Brent


 Forwarded Message 


via http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-path-we-didnt-take.html


 Rethinking Superdeterminism

S. Hossenfelder 
, 
T.N. Palmer 


(Submitted on 13 Dec 2019)

   Quantum mechanics has irked physicists ever since its conception
   more than 100 years ago. While some of the misgivings, such as it
   being unintuitive, are merely aesthetic, quantum mechanics has one
   serious shortcoming: it lacks a physical description of the
   measurement process. This "measurement problem" indicates that
   quantum mechanics is at least an incomplete theory -- good as far as
   it goes, but missing a piece -- or, more radically, is in need of
   complete overhaul.
   Here we describe an approach which may provide this sought-for
   completion or replacement: Superdeterminism. A superdeterministic
   theory is one which violates the assumption of Statistical
   Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are independent
   of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical
   Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science
   (never mind physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is
   typically discarded swiftly in any discussion of quantum foundations.
   The purpose of this paper is to explain why the existing objections
   to Superdeterminism are based on experience with classical physics
   and linear systems, but that this experience misleads us.
   Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only to solve the
   measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent nonlocality
   of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it may be
   possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent way.

Comments:   23 pages, 2 figures
Subjects: 	Quantum Physics (quant-ph); General Relativity and Quantum 
Cosmology (gr-qc)

Cite as:arXiv:1912.06462  [quant-ph]
	(or arXiv:1912.06462v1 
 [quant-ph] for this version)



   Bibliographic data

[Enable Bibex(What is Bibex? )]


   Submission history

From: Sabine Hossenfelder [view email 
]

*[v1]* Fri, 13 Dec 2019 13:25:21 UTC (421 KB)





@philipthrift
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Future-bounded path integrals

[Philip Thrift]

ref: http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-path-we-didnt-take.html

   *Rethinking Superdeterminism*
   S. Hossenfelder, T.N. Palmer


   https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.06462.pdf


The path integral approach to superdeterminism [S. Donadi, S. Hossenfelder, 
in preparation] rests on the observation that the Feynman path integral has 
a future input dependence already, which is the upper time of the 
integration. However, in the usual path integral of quantum mechanics (and, 
likewise, of quantum field theory), one does not evaluate what is the 
optimal future state that the system can evolve into. Instead, one posits 
that all of the future states are realized, which results in a merely 
probabilistic prediction.

The idea is then to take a modified path integral for the combined system 
of detector and prepared state and posit that in the underlying theory the 
combined system evolves along merely one possible path in state space that 
optimizes a suitable, to-be-defined, function. This function
must have the property that initial states which evolve into final states 
containing superpositions of detector eigenstate states are disfavoured, in 
the sense that they do not optimize the function. Instead, the optimal path 
that the system will chose is one that ends up in states which are
macroscopically classical. One gets back normal quantum mechanics by 
averaging over initial states of the detector.

This approach solves the measurement problem because the system does 
deterministically evolve into one particular measurement outcome. Exactly 
which outcome is determined by the degrees of freedom of the detector that 
serve as the “hidden variables”. Since it is generically impossible to 
exactly know all the detector’s degrees of freedom, quantum mechanics can 
only make probabilistic predictions. The challenge of this approach is to 
find a suitable function that actually has this behaviour.

@philipthfit

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Dec 2019, at 16:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Dec 15, 2019 at 6:55 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> every time I ask you for an example of a program in nothing but 
> >> "arithmetical reality" making a real calculation and producing a real 
> >> result you refer me to ASCII characters printed in the pages of a dusty 
> >> old book.
> 
> > Well, I am hoping to read, and understand them.
> I could do the same as you, and tell you that each time you answer a post, 
> you just add up a sequence of ASCII character.
> 
> But when my ASCII characters enter your physical computer in the form of 
> physical electrical impulses they cause the production of physical photons 
> radiating from your physical screen that enter your physical eye that then 
> sends a physical nerve impulse to your physical brain which process that 
> information in the way Turing described and then causes your physical fingers 
> to make certain physical movements over your physical keyboard.


That happens. No problem. But the whole thing happens in the arithmetical 
reality too, so your point here does not make matter primary.





> 
> > The notion of computation is absolute in the sense that all computations in 
> > derives models of arithmetic are the same.
> 
> I agree, all computations derived from nothing but pure arithmetic are 
> exactly the same because zero is equal to zero.

0 = 0 is not enough to axiomatise Arithmetic.





>  
> >> Turing already explained how matter can be intelligent,
> 
> > No. He just bet on computationalism. That does not make matter intelligent. 
> > That makes mater bale to emulate an intelligent person
> 
> I don't know what that means you need to give me an example.


There is no doubt (empirically) that matter is Turing-complete. So we can 
implement universal numbers with matter, and that happened with cells, brains 
and computers.

But the arithmetical reality, even a small part of it, do emulate *all* 
computations, thanks to the Church-turing thesis.

If mechanism is correct, you are Turing emulable at some level of description, 
and you are not able to distinguish between “you” (1p) when emulated by Fortran 
itself emulated by Algol  itself emulated in a physical universe itself emulate 
(at the right level) by arithmetic, from “you” emulated by Algol, emulated by 
Fortran, emulated by arithmetic, emulated by a physical universe. If you can 
distinguish those computations, you have something playing a role in your 
consciousness which would not be Turing emulable, and computationalism would be 
false.






> Was Einstein intelligent or did he just emulate an intelligent person and how 
> can you tell the difference? 


If it is an emulation done at the right substitution level, then it is Einstein 
(by definition). 

No machine can know-for-sure its own substitution level, but the machine might 
infer that level correctly, and some knowledge à-la Theaetetus is possible.



> 
> > If you believe that matter plays a role in the existence of a computation, 
> > you have to explain a bit more what you mean by matter
> 
> Rather than give a definition let me give an example. Matter is something 
> that can explain why the inverse of the Fine Structure Constant is the pure 
> dimensionless number 137.03602855338, physics can see that there is something 
> very very special about that pure number but to pure mathematics there is 
> absolutely nothing special about it even though it's a pure number, to 
> mathematics it's just another humdrum number. And that's why physics is more 
> fundamental than mathematics.


You beg the question by assuming that  137.03602855338 cannot be find by reason 
and mechanism, which it should if mechanism is correct.





> 
> > and explain how it can select a computation in arithmetic and make it “more 
> > real”,
> 
> I don't need to explain how matter makes computations more real,

Sorry, but you have to do that to refute my point, or refute it in another way.




> I just need to demonstrate that it does, and to do that all I have to do is 
> point to one of INTEL's multi-billion dollar chip fabrication foundries.


I might be dreaming when you do that. Ostensive definition are helpful in 
practice, but cannot be used to prove the primary character of something. 
Whatever experience you propose to me is dream-able (assuming mechanism), and 
so does not prove any sort of primitive existence.

Bruno 





> 
> John K Clark
> 
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> 

Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Dec 2019, at 19:43, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Dec 15, 2019 at 7:06 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> > the  indexical first person self, which know very well who he is,
> 
> Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W and 
> also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things could 
> be predicted long ago back in H.


But in H, it was still impossible to predict any of the two outcomes lived 
individually, as both copies confirm.



>  
> > You talk like if the guy could feel to be in the two places at once, which 
> > is pure nonsense.
> 
> THE guy can't even be at one place at once because the entire concept of "THE 
> guy" becomes pure nonsense in a world that has guy duplicating machines.


After duplication “the” refer to both guys, obviously. And both knows very well 
who they are. Both know that they are the H-guy, and that both are the H-gy, 
but now just put in different contexts, Although both are the H-guy, none of 
them is the other guy, in the indexical sense of the “you” or “I” we could use 
when we talk with them. We have already agreed that the personal identity is 
not a transitive notion. It does not obey to the Leibniz law (and that is 
confirmed in the mathematical treatment of the 1p and 3p selves).




>  
> > in H, he is unable to write down in its diary (taken with him in the 
> > duplication experience) the particular outcome he can expect,
> 
> Bruno I don't know or care what Mr.He expects


That is the problem. Because that is all what the question is about.



> but I do know one thing, there can not be a "particular outcome" because 
> Mr.He HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what the word "duplicated" means. 


That does not make any sense, as you have agreed that the H-guy does not die, 
and that in both city, both copies FEEL that they live a particular outcome 
(and given that the question is about the 1p feeling that they can expect, it 
is more than worse to say “W or M” instead of any other solutions.

Bruno 





> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Dec 2019, at 13:29, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 15, 2019 at 6:06:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Dec 2019, at 22:46, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:59 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> >> For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person 
>> >> experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE 
>> >> first person experience;
>> 
>> > There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience.
>> 
>>  Bruno Marchal would be utterly lost without his best friend, good old 
>> Mr.You.
>>  
>> > In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because [...]
>> 
>> In Helsinki John Clark can make a educated guess about what will happen to 
>> John Clark tomorrow, but no living thing has a clue what Mr.You's fate will 
>> be because thanks to Bruno's "You Duplicating Machine" nobody has a clue who 
>> Mr.You is.
>> 
>> > you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the first 
>> > person [...]
>> 
>> In a world that contains a "THE Duplicating Machine" there is no such thing 
>> as "THE first person"
>>  
>> > The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki.
>> 
>> If that's what it means then "he" will not survive because tomorrow nobody 
>> will be unique in Helsinki because tomorrow nobody will be in Helsinki. That 
>> doesn't contradict Mechanism it just shows that you've made yet another 
>> goofy definition and I'm sure it won't be your last.
>>  
>> > The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience accessible
>> 
>> And now in addition to goofiness we have ambiguity, the same personal 
>> pronoun referring to two different people.
>>  
>> > So now, move to step 4
>> 
>> You must be joking!
>> 
>> >> It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what 
>> >> question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t.
>> 
>> > The question is simple,
>> 
>> The question is not simple, the question is retarded.
>> 
>> > and most people get the answer by themselves
>> 
>> Most people, including a certain Mr.Marchal, just assumes that articles 
>> "the" and "a" and common personal pronouns can keep on being used in exactly 
>> the same way as they always have been even in the presence of something that 
>> has never existed before like a "Matter Duplicating Machine", a "People 
>> Duplicating Machine", a "First Person View Duplicating Machine", a "THE 
>> Duplicating Machine". And a few years ago John Clark would have just assumed 
>> that a professional logician would know better than to make the same sort of 
>> silly mistake that most people make, but John Clark's assumption turned out 
>> to be wrong.
>> 
>> >> If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 
>> >> then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute 
>> >> certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody 
>> >> will be experiencing H on December 9.
>> 
>> > Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion.
>> 
>>  WHAT?! You said just a few lines before that "The first “he” is the guy, 
>> when unique, in Helsinki."!
>> 
>>  >> But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody 
>> who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in 
>> December 10.
>> 
>> > That’s far better.
>> 
>> Yes, but December 10 is after the duplication so the personal pronoun "he" 
>> is now open to more than one meaning, in other words "he" is ambiguous.
>> 
>> >> And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as 
>> >> used in the above is ambiguous
>> 
>> > No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity. 
>> 
>> Sometimes John agrees with Bruno for half a sentence but then in the second 
>> half Bruno contradicts the first half. If today both remember being the 
>> Helsinki man yesterday and that is when the question was asked, and if 
>> today, to nobody's surprise, both answer to the name Mr.You, then yesterday 
>> it would be ambiguous to ask about what Mr.You would or would not see on the 
>> next day.  If that's not a example of ambiguity what is?
>>  
>> > It is just that the prediction is impossible to make. 
>> 
>> If you've found something where the prediction is impossible and the 
>> postdiction is impossible too then what you have found is not profound, it's 
>> just stupid.
>> 
>> >>> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW,  they did get one bit of information.
>>  
>> >>  And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got?
>> That he ended up seeing W.
>> 
>> > Yes,
>> 
>> So the "experiment" provided zero bits of new information because yesterday 
>> before the "experiment" everybody already knew that would happen, even 
>> Mr.You (whoever that is) knew it because everybody knows that tautologies 
>> are always true. 
> 
> 
> 
> You keep confusing the indexical third person self, that in my thesis is 
> defined with 

Re: Quantum Computer Factoring

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Dec 2019, at 17:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Dec 14, 2019 at 7:52 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> > There are some engineers who think that although quantum processes do occur 
> > in the quantum computers of the various types being built, none will ever 
> > turn out to be useful (in doing really big tasks - whether factoring huge 
> > integers or finding minimum-distance traveling-salesman paths). On big 
> > problems they will just return random answers that are only "close" at best.
> 
> That's true for the sort of machines that D-Wave makes that use Quantum 
> Annealing, that's good for some specialized problems but Quantum Annealing is 
> not Turing Complete and D-Wave never claimed it was; devices like that might 
> not be able to find the perfect solution to the traveling salesman problem 
> but they could find a very good one and that is nothing to sneeze at. However 
> to run Peter Shor's factoring algorithm you need a Quantum Computer that is 
> Turing Complete,

Strictly speaking this is not correct. Just factoring numbers is not enough to 
emulate a universal machine.

The difficulties are just in isolating large number of qubits. This is solved 
in principle by topological quantum computation, but there too, the technical 
difficulties are very great. I have few doubt that quantum computer will appear 
though.



> and those are the types of machines that IBM, Google, and others make. As far 
> as I know D-Wave is the only company that makes Quantum Annealers.

Which, like the RMN quantum computation, is a sort of fake quantum computation. 
It is some step in the good direction, but other technics are needed to get 
genuine quantum computation (like indeed the factorisation of 15, and now of a 
very bigger number).

I have seen that China invests a lot in quantum cryptography and computing. 
They believe in some sort of quantum supremacy indeed, and their goal does not 
seem rosy.

Bruno




> 
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Re: Quantum Computer Factoring

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:49 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*> If the the "superpositions" (needed to grow exponentially to get quantum
> speedup via parallelism) are physically wiped out (in a real QC with more
> than a few qubits), I don't see how any error correction can help.*
>

Conventional error correcting works mainly through clever use of
redundancy, that works for bits but due to the No Cloning Theorem it won't
work for Qubits. But Peter Shore found that you can split up the
information in a Qubit and send the parts to 9 other Qubits, this number
has been later reduced to 5.  By analyzing these 5 Qubits it is possible to
figure out if the original Qubit had been corrupted and if so how; and you
can do all this without obtaining any information at all about the actual
value of the Qubit which is very important as that would destroy the
entanglement. You've obtained information about the error but not about the
original Qubit.

In 1996  Michael Ben-Or and Dorit Aharonov discovered the Quantum
Fault-Tolerance Theorem, it says that if you can reduce the error rate of a
physical Qubit below a certain threshold value you can reduce the error
rate of the entire computer to a arbitrarily low value, in other words
you'd be correcting errors faster than you'd be creating them.
Unfortunately it takes a lot of overhead to do this, if you had a physical
error rate of 1%, which seems achievable, you might need 10,000 error
correcting Qubits for every Qubit that was actually working on the problem
you want to solve. That's why if you could compute with 100 perfect Qubits
you could probably rule the world, but a real Quantum Computer that you
could actually build might need a million Qubits to do the same thing.

However if you could reduce that initial physical error rate you'd need a
lot less overhead for error correction. A type of quasiparticle called a
Majorana fermion is thought to be non-abelian, if so then the particle
exchange operation between two quasiparticles would be non-commutative, the
particles would in a sense remember where they have been and you could tie
their world lines into a knot. This could have big implications for a new
type of quantum computer called a "Topological Quantum Computer" because
they would be MUCH less sensitive to quantum decoherence, so MUCH less
error correction would be needed. Think of it this way, It's easy to jolt a
string into a new position but it's far more unlikely that you could jolt a
string in just the right way to untie a knot in it, and a Topological
Quantum Computer uses the knots in the world line of those Majorana
quasiparticles to do its quantum computing. The leading company in
Topological Quantum Computing is Microsoft.

John K Clark

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Re: Quantum Computer Factoring

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 15, 2019 at 6:00:44 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, December 14, 2019 at 3:40:21 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 14, 2019 at 3:26 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> It is doubtful (to some)  ANY of them, (IBM, Google, ...) will work 
>>> for factoring big numbers. (You might have to run them returning false 
>>> results after false results for a long time until you get a true answer - 
>>> because of the noise.) *
>>>
>>
>> Quantum Computer expert Scott Aaronson says in his book "Quantum 
>> Computing since Democritus" it would be more interesting if that turned out 
>> to be true because if large scale Quantum Computers can not be built for a 
>> fundamental reason rather than just because of engineering or monetary 
>> difficulties that would mean a new law of physics has been discovered. 
>> Nothing we know now precludes their existence, but there is a lot we don't 
>> know.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
> The difficulty is quantum error correction coding (QECC). One needs to 
> have a system for computing the Hamming distance between states and their 
> updates. Any error then can be computed with a type of quantum error 
> correction, such as hexicode or E8. Now to make things a bit loopy, with 
> quantum computing you have quantum processors running the QECC. So things 
> run into some funny issues. In general, this could be done "well enough," 
> so if the quantum computing can occur in a short enough time then errors 
> can be managed. 
>
> LC
>
>
>
If the the "superpositions" (needed to grow exponentially to get quantum 
speedup via parallelism) are physically wiped out (in a real QC with more 
than a few qubits), I don't see how any error correction can help.

@philipthrift

>  
>

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