2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
écrit :
On 15 Apr 2015, at 01:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated,
would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, killing
On 15 Apr 2015, at 05:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
a écrit :
Certainly some
On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis
2015-04-15 9:19 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015
2015-04-15 4:53 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
married bachelor.
Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is
not bound to logic, what
2015-04-15 9:35 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 15 Apr 2015, at 00:15, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my
prediction is correct because this will happen in one
On 15 Apr 2015, at 09:26, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-15 9:19 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40
On Wednesday, April 15, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But what would it mean to duplicate consciousness. It doesn't have a
location in spacetime, so any two instances will be identical and hence
only one by Leibniz's identity of indiscernables.
Yes, it should be spelt out what
2015-04-15 12:23 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On Wednesday, April 15, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But what would it mean to duplicate consciousness. It doesn't have a
location in spacetime, so any two instances will be identical and hence
only one by
On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you
can
whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked
for
example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and
2015-04-14 8:44 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you
can
whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked
for
On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit :
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit :
On 14 April 2015 at 15:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
écrit :
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 14:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on
this, and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain
transplants and duplicating machines play merry
On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means
personal
identity is an illusion; you can
On 13 Apr 2015, at 22:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain,
maybe the whole body or the entire planet. The duplication machines
assume the body, but then this restriction is removed.
If no
Of Telmo Menezes
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote
On 14 Apr 2015, at 00:21, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even if some protocol is used to keep both copies experiencing
exactly the same stimuli, there are still two first person views. I
don't think that a first person view and a personal identity are the
same thing.
In the math part, the 3-self
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying
consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not
duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine
either entity being duplicated.
On 14 Apr 2015, at 05:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
It's an illusion even in a dualist
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying
consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not
duplicable: it is still
2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
javascript:; wrote:
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
javascript:;:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
javascript:; wrote:
I don't see any difference between a
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
écrit :
Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
that cannot be a logical requirement. To
Hi Liz,
Ok. I have an idea about that, it is probably not original. Tell me what
you think:
The universe was not created. All possible states just exist. The moment
of the big bang is one of the many possible states. What we call the past
is a sequence of steps in the state graph that are
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
God is not bound to logic
Yes I've noticed, or to say the same thing with different words, God is
stupid.
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
wrote:
My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear
to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when
objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve
On Sun, Apr 12, 2015 at 12:44 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Apr 11, 2015 , Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
I have this crazy idea to remove the supposed ambiguity: ask a specific
Telmo if his prediction was correct or not.
If Telmo were logical then that
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is destroyed.
Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be
asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how
would
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :
Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
logically
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Consciousness could be linked for example by an invisible force to your
body by an unknown and unknowable and unmeasurable link
But we know for a fact that the link between matter and consciousness,
including the matter in your
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated, would
you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, killing someone with comp is equivalent
with an amnesia. Dying
On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
married bachelor.
Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not bound to
logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using
On 4/14/2015 3:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com javascript:;
wrote:
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
javascript:;:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
javascript:;
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be
asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how
would things be different if persisting through time were not an
illusion?
On 4/14/2015 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's entropy, which is a
measure of information content and not just a statistical effect. Once in the realm of
digital physics, it becomes questionable if physical entropy and information
On 4/14/2015 6:22 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that
should be
asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion;
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 02:36, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be
asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how
would things be different if persisting through time
On 4/14/2015 6:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');:
On 14
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :
On 4/14/2015 4:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 02:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00
2015-04-14 15:56 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my
prediction is correct because this will happen in one of the branches of
the multiverse. Do you agree with this statement?
No I do not agree because matter
On 15 April 2015 at 02:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit
:
Certainly some theories of consciousness
On 15 April 2015 at 02:36, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is
destroyed.
Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be
asked
Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett
] *On Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 10:16 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain, maybe
the whole body or the entire planet. The duplication machines assume the
body, but then this restriction
Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett
Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this,
and it is widely understood
-list@googlegroups.com wrote:
*From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 14 April 2015 at 08:15, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a
matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life.
No that's not what happen, you're not duplicated in everyday life. Unde MWI
maybe, under a
On 4/13/2015 7:39 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Comp does not specify a substitution level. Maybe it's the brain, maybe the whole body
or the entire planet. The duplication machines assume the body, but then this
restriction is removed.
If no substitution level exists, then comp is false.
What
: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal
identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word illusion
but the underlying fact is unchanged.
I
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer'
account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal
identity despite the gradual replacement of the cells in one's body.
The problems arise when
On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not
logically rule out copying. The illusion, to
On 4/13/2015 7:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer' account of
personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity despite the gradual
replacement of the
On 4/13/2015 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
if the resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the same as the
original that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same person... but that is
not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would have to be). We would have
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means
personal identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word
illusion but the underlying fact is unchanged.
I think all you are saying is that you don't believe in Cartesian
duality --
Of *Telmo
Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote
On 14 April 2015 at 09:47, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body
is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me.
On 4/13/2015 4:47 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body
is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were
created, both
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not
logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is
that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That is what I feel
to be
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not
logically rule out copying. The illusion, to spell it out further, is
that I am a unique entity persisting through time. That
de Morsella' via Everything List
everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote:
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means personal
identity is an illusion; you can disagree about use of the word illusion
but the
On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a
matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a
question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, but
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
It's an illusion even in a dualist model, because dualism does not
logically rule out
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar body
is created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were
created, both would think they were me.
It would, if
-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 09:47, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
That is a balanced statement of the position. The 'closest continuer'
account of personal identity captures the continuation of personal identity
despite the gradual replacement of the cells in
Le 14 avr. 2015 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a écrit :
On 14 April 2015 at 09:52, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My body disintegrates yet I feel that I persist. I say this means
personal
identity is an illusion; you can
On 14 April 2015 at 14:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I can. It could include a predilection to learn this or ignore that, an
ability to follow logical argument or not, a tendency to whistle while
working,...
Which I would also classify as mental contents. I did not mean to
imply
On 14 April 2015 at 13:03, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
It's an
On 14 April 2015 at 13:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
If I commit suicide but a duplicate survives with my memories at the
time of suicide then I feel that I survive; this is what happens with
destructive duplication. Another way to put it (in terminology which
has been more
On 14 April 2015 at 13:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a
matter of fact, since that is what
On 14 April 2015 at 13:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I can't see how, logically, personal identity could be more than
mental contents.
So if I cut off a few of your external limbs, take your house, your wife,
your children, and, to cap it
On 4/13/2015 8:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 13:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is
On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a
matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a
question as to whether we could
On 4/13/2015 8:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 13:03, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 12:18, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett
','everything-list@googlegroups.com');] *On
Behalf Of *Telmo Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com
wrote:
And now that I have answered you question I repeat my
question
that you dodged: Who is traveling through time in
On 13 April 2015 at 13:31, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question
that you dodged: Who is
On 13 Apr 2015, at 00:06, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Apr 12, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You have already ans unambiguously agree that the Moscow Man is
the same person than the Helsinki Man, in the same sense than in
step 1.
As I said before the relationship is not
Thanks Bruce, that was quite illuminating. I know Bruno will say that
these other notions of personal identity contradict COMP - and I can
see that considering the original copy as dead, and two new persons
being created directly contradicts the Yes, doctor postulate. But I
can see it may be
Russell Standish wrote:
Thanks Bruce, that was quite illuminating. I know Bruno will say that
these other notions of personal identity contradict COMP - and I can
see that considering the original copy as dead, and two new persons
being created directly contradicts the Yes, doctor postulate. But
On 13 Apr 2015, at 08:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Thanks Bruce, that was quite illuminating. I know Bruno will say that
these other notions of personal identity contradict COMP - and I can
see that considering the original copy as dead, and two new persons
being created
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 5:31 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com mailto:
te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question
that you dodged:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this,
and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and
duplicating machines play merry havoc with our intuitive notions of
personal
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this,
and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You cannot attack a result in science with philosophy.
Of course you can. It happens all the time. True, many scientists
(especially physicists) are dismissive of metaphysics. But it is usually
those who are most dismissive
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au'); wrote:
I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends,
with X is an illusion.
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins, or ends, with
X is an illusion.
Yes, I could not agree more! If X is an illusion you've got to spell out
exactly how that illusion works or you're not saying
On Monday, April 13, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended discussions on this,
and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain transplants and
John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
And now that I have answered you question I repeat my question
that you dodged: Who is traveling through time in a forward
direction, Mr. John Clark or Mr.
On Sun, Apr 12, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You have already ans unambiguously agree that the Moscow Man is the same
person than the Helsinki Man, in the same sense than in step 1.
As I said before the relationship is not symmetrical. Cats are
unambiguously animals but it
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