AIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2004 11:45 PM
Subject: [issues] Re: Is the universe computable?
> Dear Russell,
>
> Let me add that I do not think that it is sufficient to embed
space-time
> in Hilbert space, we also need some way of explaining how space-time
>
r at this point ...
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2004 11:39
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2004 11:22 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?
On Sun, Feb 22, 2004 at 10:33:37PM -0500, Stephen P
zor paper).
> Kindest regards,
>
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> S
quot;Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2004 6:04 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?
On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 11:46:17AM -0500, Ste
On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 11:46:17AM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Again, that does not work because we can not take space-time (ala GR) to
> be "big enough" to allow us to fit QM into it. On the other hand, it has
> been shown that a QM system, considered as a quantum computational system
lassical comp at the
Totality of existence level, but this indistiguishability breaks down when we
consider finite comp systems.
Am I making any sense so far?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: Stephen Paul King ; [EMAIL PROTECTE
Dear Stephen,
[SPK] No, Bruno, I
like Comp, I like it a LOT! I just wish that it had a support that was
stronger than the one that you propose ...
[BM] Where do I give a support to comp? I don't remember. No doubt
that I am fascinated by its consequences, and that I appreciate the so
deep mo
At 1/27/04, Hal Finney wrote:
One way to approach an answer to the question is to ask, is there such
a CA in which a universal computer can be constructed? That would be
evidence for at least a major prerequisite for conscious observations.
Do you have any examples like this?
In my opinion, comput
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 9:27
AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe
computable
At 11:57 27/01/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Tha
At 11:57 27/01/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Thank you for this post. It gives me a
chance to reintroduce one problem that I have with your model. Like you,
I am very interested in comments from others, as it could very well be
that I am misunderstanding some subtle detail of your
the
At 17:12 27/01/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Kory and Hal,
Kory's idea strongly reminds me of the basic idea explored by John
Cramer in his "Interactional" interpretation in that it takes into account
both past and future states. Please see:
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-03/msg
" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
> Kory Heath writes:
> > Forget about our own (potentially non-computable) universe for a second.
> > Surely you agree that we can imagine some
Kory Heath writes:
> Forget about our own (potentially non-computable) universe for a second.
> Surely you agree that we can imagine some large-but-finite 3+1D CA (it
> doesn't have to be anything like our own universe) in which the state of
> each bit is dependent on the states of neighboring b
atter.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 10:46
AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe
computable
Hi Kory, Hi Stephen, Hi All,
I understand Kory very well and believe he ar
Hi Kory, Hi Stephen, Hi All,
At 01:19 27/01/04 -0500, Kory Heath wrote:
At 1/26/04, Stephen Paul King
wrote:
The modern incarnation of this is
the so-called
4D cube model of the universe. Again, these ideas only work for those
who
are willing to completely ignore the facts of computational comple
At 1/26/04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
The modern incarnation of this is the so-called
4D cube model of the universe. Again, these ideas only work for those who
are willing to completely ignore the facts of computational complexity and
the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle.
I think you and I are livin
is subject much better than I
could:
From: "Jim Whitescarver" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [InfoPhysics] Fw: Is the universe computable
In so far as the universe is logical it can be modeled as a logical
information system. The information nature of the quantum makes such a
model con
Dear Kory,
Interleaving below.
- Original Message -
From: "Kory Heath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 26, 2004 2:54 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
> At 1/24/04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> > I sh
At 1/24/04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I should respond to Kory's ME == PE idea. In PE we find such things as
"thermodynamic entropy" and "temporality". If we are to take Kory's idea
(that Mathspace doesn't require resources) seriously, ME does not. This
seems a direct contradiction!
Perhaps
Dear Jesse,
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 9:45 PM
Subject: RE: Is the universe computable?
> David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
> >
> >Georges Quenot wrote:
> &g
ningfulness" of the
NP-Complete problem.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "John Collins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, January 22, 2004 6:02 AM
Subject: R
Dear Bruno,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, January 23, 2004 9:42 AM
Subject: Re: Is the univ
Dear Stephen,
At 12:39 21/01/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Bruno and Kory,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 9:21 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe co
uary 2004 8:30 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: Is the universe computable
>
> At 1/21/04, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
> >Saying that the probability that a given integer is even is 0.5 seems
> >intuitively to me and can be made precise (see my last post).
>
&
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 5:39 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
SPK wrote:
>
You are con
On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 09:34:50AM -0800, CMR wrote:
> I'm familiar with the concept of a metalayer in software dev as a
> compatibility interface between apps etc.. So, in this case the
> "meta-layer" being I assume the "interface" between the universes abstractly
> and between the simulation an
Dear Bruno and Kory,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 9:21 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
> At 02:50 21/01/04 -0500, Kory Heath wrote:
> &g
Greetings Eugen
>While it is not possible to infer physics of the metalayer, it is possible
to
>infer the number of bits necessary to encode this universe.
I'm familiar with the concept of a metalayer in software dev as a
compatibility interface between apps etc.. So, in this case the
"meta-laye
Dear CMR,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "CMR" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 1:07 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?
>
> > Think of it this way, what is the cardinality
n to dream up different ones. All
(sci-fi, white rabbit, comp, etc.) are variations upon our universe. I
try to be consequent in my "scientific agnosticism". Just FYI, I do not
request acceptance. My 'narrative'.
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Finn
At 02:50 21/01/04 -0500, Kory Heath wrote:
At 1/19/04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Were and when is the consideration of the "physical resources" required
for the computation going to obtain? Is my question equivalent to the old
"first cause" question?
The view that Mathematical Existence == Physi
At 1/21/04, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
Saying that the probability that a given integer is even is 0.5 seems
intuitively to me and can be made precise (see my last post).
We can say with precision that a certain sequence of rational numbers
(generated by looking at larger and larger finite sets
On Tue, Jan 20, 2004 at 10:33:57PM -0800, CMR wrote:
> Yes! you've captured the gist and fleshed out the raw concept that "hit" me
> whilst reading your post on "weightless" computation; that's potentially the
> value of it as an avenue to explore, I think: that there is an
> equivalence/symmetry/
At 1/19/04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Were and when is the consideration of the "physical resources" required
for the computation going to obtain? Is my question equivalent to the old
"first cause" question?
The view that Mathematical Existence == Physical Existence implies that
"physical resou
> And what does it say about the physical properties which are necessary
> for computation? We have energy; Life has "blinkiness" (the degree to
> which cells are blinking on and off within a structure); neither property
> has a good analog in the other universe. Does the "real" universe win,
>
> Think of it this way, what is the cardinality of the equivalence class
> of representations R of, say, a 1972 Jaguar XKE, varying over *all
possible
> languages* and *symbol systems*? I think it is at least equal to the
Reals.
> Is this correct? If R has more than one member, how can we cohe
lian's argument falls flat on its face because he is making the very
> same mistake: Assuming that his "best-matching" scheme can exists without
> addressing the obvious status that it is an NP-Complete problem of
> uncountable infinite size. It is simply logically impos
Kory said...
>
> At 1/21/04, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
> >This allows us to say the probability that an integer is even is 0.5,
or
> >the probability that an integer is a perfect square is 0.
>
> But can't you use this same logic to show that the cardinality of the
even
> integers is half tha
Kory Heath wrote:
At 1/19/04, Hal Finney wrote:
However, here is an alternate formulation of my argument which seems to
be roughly equivalent and which avoids this objection: create a random
program tape by flipping a coin for each bit. Now the probability that
you created the first program above
At 1/21/04, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
This allows us to say the probability that an integer is even is 0.5, or
the probability that an integer is a perfect square is 0.
But can't you use this same logic to show that the cardinality of the even
integers is half that of the cardinality of the tot
At 1/19/04, Hal Finney wrote:
However, here is an alternate formulation of my argument which seems to
be roughly equivalent and which avoids this objection: create a random
program tape by flipping a coin for each bit. Now the probability that
you created the first program above is 1/2^100, and fo
the probability that an integer is even is 0.5, or
the probability that an integer is a perfect square is 0.
- David
> -Original Message-
> From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, 20 January 2004 1:24 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: Is the universe co
f the Mind"). When we put
these two arguments together, what do we get?
See: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0304128 ;-)
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 7:18 PM
Su
Dear CMR,
- Original Message -
From: "CMR" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 6:46 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?
> Greetings Stephen,
>
> >BTW, have you ever read about the Maxwell Demon?
&g
CMR writes:
> Then question then becomes, I suppose, if in fact our universe is a digital
> one (if not strictly a CA) havng self-consistent emergent physics, then
> might it not follow that it is "implemented" (run?) via some extra-universal
> physical processes that only indirectly correspond to
Greetings Pete,
> If not, then can you say what it is about the active process of
> flipping or laying down that "counts" as computation but does not count
> when the stack is a static block?
>
I suppose I'm ultimately in the "hard" info physics camp, in that the
pattern's the thing; given the 2d
Greetings Stephen,
>BTW, have you ever read about the Maxwell Demon?
Being partial to the information physical view; not only have I read it, I
also account for it by viewing a system's information as physical.
So by inference should then I be viewing the mapping of the intra and extra
universal
Pete Carlton writes:
> Imagine a Life universe that contains, among other things, two SASes
> talking to each other (and showing each other pictures, and in general
> having a very lucid, conscious, conversation.) Imagine that instead of
> being implemented on a computer, it's implemented by a
Dear CMR,
- Original Message -
From: "CMR" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 5:19 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
> [SPK previous]
> > The fact that an Algorithm is "independent of any p
The following thought experiment might provoke some intuitions on this
question..
Imagine a Life universe that contains, among other things, two SASes
talking to each other (and showing each other pictures, and in general
having a very lucid, conscious, conversation.) Imagine that instead of
> The fact that an Algorithm is "independent of any particular
> implementation" is not reducible to the idea that Algorithms (or Numbers,
or
> White Rabbits, etc.) can exist without some "REAL" resources being used in
> their implementation (and maybe some kind of "thermodynamics").
>
To par
that it is an NP-Complete problem of
uncountable infinite size. It is simply logically impossible to say that the
mere postulation of a Platonia allows for the a priori existence of the
solution to such a computationally intractable problem.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message ---
At 13:19 19/01/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>Where and when is the consideration of the "physical resources" required
>for the computation going to obtain? Is my question equivalent to the old
>"first cause" question?
Anything "physical" is by definition within a universe (by my definition,
Dear Bruno,
Interleaving.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 5:55 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
> Dear Stephen,
>
> At 13:19 19/01/04 -0500, Stephen Pa
ittle" programs, though.
Regards,
Bruno
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2004 12:23 PM
Subject: RE: Is the universe computable
> Kory Heath wrote:
> > At 1/18/04, Hal
I find it hard to believe that the measure of a
program/book/movie/experience is proportional to the number it is
executed/read/seen/lived, independently of everything else.
I have an alternative proposition:
Measure is a function of how accessible a particular
program/book/movie/experience
PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2004 12:23 PM
Subject: RE: Is the universe computable
> Kory Heath wrote:
> > At 1/18/04, Hal Finney wrote:
> > >Now consider all possible program tapes being run at the same time,
> > >perhaps on an
Kory Heath wrote:
> At 1/18/04, Hal Finney wrote:
> >Now consider all possible program tapes being run at the same time,
> >perhaps on an infinite ensemble of (virtual? abstract?) machines.
> >Of those, a fraction of 1 in 2^100 of those tapes will start with that
> >100 bit sequence for the program
Eugen Leitl :
>
> On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 05:30:10PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> > No. They actually came to me while I was figuring some other
> > ways of simulating a universe than the sequential one that seemed
> > to give rise to many problems to me. The second one is influenced
>
> Wha
At 15:05 16/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Possibly making you not better than them. But this not that
simple. They do not disagree with dialog and argumentation.
Rather they argue in different ways and/or with different
premises.
OK, so I perhaps did not understand you fully. I thought they di
At 17:36 16/01/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Fri, Jan 16, 2004 at 02:28:27PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> of brain and the like. I of course respect completely that opinion; but I
> point on the fact
> that once you make the computationnalist hypothesis then it is the reverse
> which becomes
>
At 1/18/04, Hal Finney wrote:
Now consider all possible program tapes being run at the same time,
perhaps on an infinite ensemble of (virtual? abstract?) machines.
Of those, a fraction of 1 in 2^100 of those tapes will start with that
100 bit sequence for the program in question.
[snip]
Now conside
David Barrett-Lennard writes:
> Why is it assumed that a multiple "runs" makes any difference to the
> measure?
One reason I like this assumption is that it provides a natural reason
for simpler universes to have greater measure than more complex ones.
Imagine a Turing machine with an infinite
004 4:56 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
>
> Eugen Leitl:
> >I have trouble alternating between the internal and the external
observer
> >view. So we have a machine crunching bits, sequentially falling from
> state
> >to
> &
Eugen said...
> I was using a specific natural number (a 512 bit integer) as an
> example for
> creation and destruction of a specific integer (an instance of a class of
> integers). No more, no less.
>
That's plenty to bring out our difference of opinion. cf "creation and
destruction of a speci
> Actually I tend to think that Godel's and other incompleteness
> result makes comp a sort of vaccine against reductionist view of
> self and reality (and arithmetic).
Agreed. Godel, (as interpreted by Chaitin), precludes a "purely"
reductionist view of both, IMHO. Given Reductionism as:
"Belie
Eugen Leitl:
I have trouble alternating between the internal and the external observer
view. So we have a machine crunching bits, sequentially falling from state
to
state. This spans a continous trajectory. We can make a full record of that
trajectory, eliminating a time axis. When does the subjec
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 10:14 13/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical property
> >independent of us because there is no thing on which they would
> >apply independentkly of us. What we would call their arithmetical
> >properties is simply
On Fri, Jan 16, 2004 at 02:28:27PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> of brain and the like. I of course respect completely that opinion; but I
> point on the fact
> that once you make the computationnalist hypothesis then it is the reverse
> which becomes
> true: even if locally pi is a production o
On Fri, Jan 16, 2004 at 10:27:49AM +0800, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
>
> I agree with everything you say, but did you really think I was making a
> point because Eugen happened to use hex?!
I've fallen behind on answering my email, so sorry if this is brief and a bit
out of context. This post i
At 17:13 14/01/04 +, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 wrote:
Please correct me if I am wrong:
Bruno believes that information, for example mathematical concepts and
theorems, exist independently of their encoding in some physicsl systems
(arithmetic realism); in other words, that the number 4 esists
independe
At 17:13 14/01/04 +, Giu1i0 Pri5c0 wrote:
Please correct me if I am wrong:
Bruno believes that information, for example mathematical concepts and
theorems, exist independently of their encoding in some physicsl systems
(arithmetic realism); in other words, that the number 4 esists
independe
Hi Eric,
> >>0xf2f75022aa10b5ef6c69f2f59f34b03e26cb5bdb467eec82780
> >> didn't exist in this universe (with a very high probability, it
being a
> >> 512 bit number, generated from physical system noise) before I've
> >> generated it. Now it exists (currently, as a hex string (not
> necessarily
> >
Eugen Leitl wrote:
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
> Here is a justification of why I think arithmetical realism is at least
> very plausible...
I'm all ears.
> Let's suppose that a computer simulation can (in principle) exhibit
> awareness. I don't know whether you dispute this hypothesis, but let'
Please correct me if I am wrong:
Bruno believes that information, for example mathematical concepts and theorems, exist
independently of their encoding in some physicsl systems (arithmetic realism); in
other words, that the number 4 esists independently of the presence in the physical
world of s
Jesse wrote:
(- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 4:02 PM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?)
> Hal Finney wrote:
Snip
>As long as everything that happens in the universe&
At 13:02 14/01/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> Also, I don't like to repeat to much arguments, so, if you want to argue
"You're too dumb to get it, and I won't waste time explaining it to you."
No. It is just for not boring people with arguments already send to the list.
You misinterpret me.
> B
On Wed, Jan 14, 2004 at 12:22:13PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Indeed I wasn't. In general I don't like to much argue on hypotheses.
"I just say lots of stuff. I don't mean it. Please attach no significance to
what I say; it's just hot air."
> Also, I don't like to repeat to much arguments, so
At 18:32 13/01/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 03:03:38PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Don't tell me you were believing I was arguing.
You were asserting a lot of stuff. That's commonly considered arguing, except
you weren't providing any evidence so far. So, maybe you were
Hi Georges,
I got that mail before. And I did answer it. Are you sure you send the
right mail?
see http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5026.html
Bruno
At 10:14 13/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 13:36 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> >Bruno Marchal wrote
I agree with you Ben, you make a point. My objection admits indeed
your wonderful generalization. Thanks.
Bruno
At 11:07 13/01/04 -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote:
[Georges Quenot]>>Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical
property independent of us because there is no thing on which they wo
On Wed, Jan 14, 2004 at 10:38:51AM +0800, David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
> You seem to be getting a little hot under the collar!
Nope, just a bit polemic. I was getting tired of glib assertions, and needed
to poke a stick, to find out what's underneath.
> Here is a justification of why I think ar
in them. Within this "self
contained" mathematical world we *do* have the context for numbers.
It's a bit like the chicken and egg problem. (egg = number theory,
chicken = objects and observers). Both come together and can't be
pulled apart.
- David
> -Original M
Dear Wei, Georges, et al,
Where does the notion of computational resources factor in this?
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Georges Quenot" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, Januar
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Hal Finney wrote:
> >Suppose we sought to construct a consistent history of such a CA system
> >by first starting with purely random values at each point in space and
> >time. Now, obviously this arrangement will not satisfy the CA rules.
> >But then we go through and start mo
Hal Finney wrote:
Suppose we sought to construct a consistent history of such a CA system
by first starting with purely random values at each point in space and
time. Now, obviously this arrangement will not satisfy the CA rules.
But then we go through and start modifying things locally so as to
s
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 13:36 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> >Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > It seems, but it isn't. Well, actually I have known *one* mathematician,
> > > (a russian logician) who indeed makes a serious try to develop
> > > some mathematics without that infinite act o
Georges Quenot writes:
> I do not believe in either case that a simulation with this level
> of detail can be conducted on any computer that can be built in
> our universe (I mean a computer able to simulate a universe
> containing a smaller computer doing the calculation you considered
> with a le
On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 05:30:10PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> No. They actually came to me while I was figuring some other
> ways of simulating a universe than the sequential one that seemed
> to give rise to many problems to me. The second one is influenced
What's your take on how subjective
Wei Dai wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 05:32:05PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> > Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
> > for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
> > relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in
On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 03:03:38PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> What is the point? Do we have experimental procedure to validate
> the opposite of the fanciful scenario? Giving that we were talking about
I see, we're at the "prove that the Moon is not made from green cheese when
nobody is look
[Georges Quenot]>>Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical property
independent of us because there is no thing on which they would apply independentkly
of us. What we would call their arithmetical properties is simply a set of tautologies
that do come with them when they are considere
At 10:14 13/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical property
independent of us because there is no thing on which they would
apply independentkly of us. What we would call their arithmetical
properties is simply a set of tautologies that do come with t
At 14:08 13/01/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> you be able to do a thing like that. I will not insist on this
> startling consequence of COMP or QM, giving that you
> postulate physicalism at the start. See my thesis for a proof that
> physicalism is incompatible with comp. We have discuss the
> i
On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 12:24:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >If I'd kill you, you'd have no chance of thinking that thought.
>
> Actually this is pure wishful thinking, unless you mean succeeding
I was referring to a gedanken experiment, of course.
> to kill me and my counterparts in some
Hi John,
At 10:39 12/01/04 -0500, John M wrote:
Bruno,
in the line you touched with 'numbers:
I was arguing on another list 'pro' D.Bohm's "there are no numbers in
nature"
position ...
But what is "nature" ? I have never said that numbers exist in nature.
The word "nature" or the word "universe"
At 16:37 12/01/04 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
If I'd kill you, you'd have no chance of thinking that thought.
Actually this is pure wishful thinking, unless you mean succeeding
to kill me and my counterparts in some absolute way, but how would
you be able to do a thing like that. I will not insist
On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 05:32:05PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
> for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
> relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible in
> an even more general wa
uantized working models).
Sorry for the "physicistically" unorthodox idea.
Best regards
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Is the universe computable?
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