subject:"Notion of \(mathematical\) reason"



On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/12/2015 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You claim that physics emerges from the UD,


I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from  
the UD.


But I don't think you've shown that.  Comp1 doesn't imply that all  
possible computations exist.


You don't need comp1 for that. That each computations exist is already  
a theorem in RA.






That's a separate assumption you slip in that all computations or  
all arithmetic exists.


You need only that 2+2=4 independently of you, and this is assumed  
already when we assume Church's thesis.


The notion of computation itself assumes either the numbers and some  
relations between them, or anything else Turing equivalent.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


John Mikes wrote:


(Brent):
But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable  
physics. The two are not separable.

(Bruno):
Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- 
referentially correct machine theory.

...

The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as  
derived on
Planet Earth for us.  If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far  
unaccessed' in the Entirety, our the sophistication may reduce to a  
flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics,

universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc.

Theory of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything'  
TOGETHER(?)  may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety',   
of which we got glimpses of details only
 and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to  
less sophisticated

believers (scientists?).

One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super- 
intelligence.
I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if  
the one we are talking

about is 'super' indeed.
I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter- 
lego) i.o.w. to
consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts  
spelled out. In such
respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our  
brain. IFFF?
Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The  
reason, why I went
with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses  
(unidentified nature) upon

relations (unidentified and  unrestricted) over the entire Entirety.
Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both  
concepts to humans

(machines).

With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness)



John, you cannot use agnosticism to criticize the search of a theory,  
be it on atoms, persons, or everything.
You can criticize the lack of modesty and foolishness of the pseudo- 
scientists who would pretend we know the truth of this or that theory,  
but you cannot use agnosticism to forbid attempt to theorize on  
anything, including on everything.


If you do that you introduce a separation between science and  
theology, and this is what will make people stopping modestly  
theorizing, and taking the first pseudo-scientist or guru for granted.


If you decide that all theory of everything are hoaxes, only hoaxes  
will develop. But we can propose precise theories, in the modest way  
(that is never pretending they are true, even when not yet refuted)  
and then test them empirically, like with any other subject matter.


Without naïve things, like the Atom of Bohr, we can't progress. To do  
theology scientifically, is just the right to  propose wrong, but  
improvable, theories, in that realm.


Bruno

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind.  
What is not Turing emulable in the brain?


Its interaction with the universe.


Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?


Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.


Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily)  
make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true,  
but might be of the type G* minus G.)


What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on  
an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and  
consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way?


That is exactly my criticism of your theory.  I think you do need to  
invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning  
to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes  
everything.


I need a universal system, or a universal machine, or a universal  
number (we get all of those simultaneously).


I made my assumpition clear: I assume K, S, their combinations, and  
the axioms Kxy = x, and Sxyz= xz(yz), or if you prefer, the numbers, +  
RA axioms. Nothing more, in the TOE.





But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation  
instantiates thought


I need only a universal machine, which instanciates the thought of  
other machine.





you can't use thought to explain the universe.


Nor to explain numbers or combinators. That is why I need to postulate  
them. Logic alone cannot do that, but I don't need to assume a  
physical universe. On the contrary, adding that assumption makes us  
losing the mind-body solution provided by computationalism.





It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I  
have never understood; white rabbits are common).


I quoted the passage of Alice in Wonderland which justifies that  
appellation. The white rabbit has a coat, a clock, and say too late,  
too late ..., and then go in the deep rabbit hole :)





It's all very well to say thought is computation


Thought is as much a computation than a centimeter is energy.  
Computation can support a thought in some relative way (relative to  
one universal number above the substitution level, and an infinity of  
computations below).





and all computation is implicit in arithmetic


Well, it is implicit if you agree that the distribution of the prime  
numbers is implicit in arithmetic. OK.




so all thought is implicit in arithmetic.  The problem is getting it  
out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything.


A rock does not compute, and with UDA a rock is a first person  
sharable product of the universal mind (the mind of the universal  
machine).


The problem is only to get the measure, and here the machine itself  
gives sense to a quantization whoich seems promising to get something  
close to the empiric quantum measure. So we can test the idea.


Keep in mind that we try to solve the mind-body problem. That we get  
an explanation why there is something instead of nothing, assuming  
arithmetic, is a by product.


That explains it all (almost) as the Löbian machine, like PA, can  
already justify why, if consistent, they cannot justify the SK axioms  
(or the arithmetical axioms) from less. It might be the only thing  
that we cannot explain.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/12/2015 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

nor have you produced a conscious program or computer.


Here is one:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

+ for all F first order arithmetical formula:

(F(0)  Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x).

That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is  
the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the  
work.


That seems more absurd than the reductio of the MGA.  One must ask  
of what is the program conscious?...all theorems of PA?  That's not  
only very different from what I am aware of, it's also infinitely  
greater.


Yes, it is very great, and should plausibly be seen as an alternated  
state of consciousness, of the dissociative kind. It is what you would  
be conscious of when you calm down enough neurons in your brain. It is  
almost maximally conscious, except that apparently, the induction  
axioms is the main filter of consciousness, so that the virgin  
universal machine without induction (and thus with less theorem, and  
less constraints) is more conscious. So, PA is not conscious a priori  
of the theorems. it is more subtle, and I have not solved the details  
of that problem. Indeed, as I said, it is the place where the salvia  
reports made my personal feeling changing here. Above the treshold of  
Turing universality, the biggest your brain are, the less conscious  
you become, and the more able to say stupidities you become. I find  
that weird, but it is hard to interpret the machine's discourse in a  
different way. I am aware this might be shocking in the aristotelian  
tradition especially if you add axioms like God made us in its own  
image. To be sure, this is not used in UDA, nor in AUDA, but might  
belong to the further consequences of the classical version of comp  
(classical= with excluded middle and the use of the Theatetus' idea).


Bruno










Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 13 Jun 2015, at 00:10, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that  
Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock  
computing ...


Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...?



Aaaahh! That is what you mean by a rock think?!? Then ...  
I am still not OK. It is no more the rock that do the thinking than it  
is the transistor of the computer running Deep Blue which win the  
chess game. It is the program defined at a higher level. The fact that  
the computer use transistor is simply not relevant, even if accidently  
and ciontingnetly, transistiors were used. It is not part of the  
program Deep Blue.


Here, you do Searle's confusion of level error. RA can emulate PA,  
even ZF, like I can emulate the brain of a chinese person, but that  
does not mean I am the one having the thought of the chinese person. I  
am just the low level processor, and it does not do the thinking. (by  
definition of the machine substitution level). Likewise, RA can  
emulate PA proving the consistency of RA, but this does not mean that  
RA can prove its own consistency.


Bruno






Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 12 Jun 2015, at 22:34, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/12/2015 1:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:

You wrote:


(Brent):
But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a  
stable   
physics. The two are not separable.

(Bruno):
Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- 
referentially correct machine theory.

...

The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as  
derived on
Planet Earth for us.  If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far  
unaccessed' in the Entirety, our the sophistication may reduce to  
a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics,

universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc.

Theory of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything'  
TOGETHER(?)  may be a balanced and inseparable - well -  
'Entirety',  of which we got glimpses of details only
 and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all  
to less sophisticated

believers (scientists?).

One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super- 
intelligence.
I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide  
if the one we are talking

about is 'super' indeed.
I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the  
lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to
consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts  
spelled out. In such
respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in  
our brain. IFFF?
Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The  
reason, why I went
with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses  
(unidentified nature) upon

relations (unidentified and  unrestricted) over the entire Entirety.
Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both  
concepts to humans

(machines).

With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness)
JM

On Fri, Ju












That sounds like Darwin's worry when he concluded that we were  
descended from an ape ancestor that he could not trust his own  
thought processes because they were also descended from an ape  
ancestor.


To which someone no doubt replied, Whose thoughts will you trust if  
not your own.  Samiya has an answer to this, but I think Darwin  
would have chosen to stick with his own.


Or like rejecting a thesis on the brain, invoking circularity because  
the candidate used a brain to write it.


Only plant should have the right to study zoology, in that case.

Bruno





Brent



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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working  
in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may  
be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism.


Bruno


One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has  
implications for physics which are not metaphysical.  There are many  
speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the  
ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist  
theory of the world would have something to say about them.


It is comp. Just more fuzzy, more empirically based, and less  
advanced, except of course for the matter part (with the Landauer  
result, and the Feynman-Deutsch universal quantum Turing computer).


But some people plays with the word information, as in the mundane  
sense, it points on the semantic of the information, and not his  
possible Shannon or algorithmic measure (classical or quantum).


With computationalism this is easier: we have the bit of  
information, and we have the universal machine which will interpret  
that information, and we have the arithmetical truth, which gauge that  
interpretation.


Most people in the field seems still unaware of the FPI, and invoke an  
Aristotelian God (Primary Matter) which makes no sense if we take  
computationalism seriously enough.


The information paradigm hides the one who interprets the information:  
the universal numbers/systems. They miss thus also the opportunity to  
use Theoretical Computer Science.


Comp makes easy to distinguish the 3p and 1p notions, which in the  
case of information is something very important to do, as it is almost  
as different than quanta and qualia.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-14 Thread Bruce Kellett


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Jun 2015, at 00:10, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce 
Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing 
...


Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...?


Aaaahh! That is what you mean by a rock think?!? Then ... I 
am still not OK. It is no more the rock that do the thinking than it is 
the transistor of the computer running Deep Blue which win the chess 
game. It is the program defined at a higher level. The fact that the 
computer use transistor is simply not relevant, even if accidently and 
ciontingnetly, transistiors were used. It is not part of the program 
Deep Blue.


C'mon, Bruno. It was a joke. :-)

Bruce


Here, you do Searle's confusion of level error. RA can emulate PA, even 
ZF, like I can emulate the brain of a chinese person, but that does not 
mean I am the one having the thought of the chinese person. I am just 
the low level processor, and it does not do the thinking. (by definition 
of the machine substitution level). Likewise, RA can emulate PA proving 
the consistency of RA, but this does not mean that RA can prove its own 
consistency.


Bruno


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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-12 Thread Bruce Kellett


Bruno Marchal wrote:


It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce 
Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ...


Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...?

Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-12 Thread John Mikes

You wrote:

*(Brent):*
*But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics.
The two are not separable.*

*(Bruno):*
*Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially
correct machine theory.*
*...*

The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on
Planet Earth for us.  If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed'
in the *Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy
explanatory ignorance. Including physics,
universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc.

*Theory* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything'
TOGETHER(?)  may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety',  of
which we got glimpses of details only
 and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less
sophisticated
believers (scientists?).

One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of
super-intelligence.
I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the
one we are talking
about is 'super' indeed.
I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines'
(inter-lego) i.o.w. to
consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled
out. In such
respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain.
IFFF?
Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason,
why I went
with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified
nature) upon
relations (unidentified and  unrestricted) over the entire Entirety.
Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to
humans
(machines).

With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness)
JM

On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 2:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in
 some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce
 just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism.

  Bruno


 One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications
 for physics which are not metaphysical.  There are many speculative
 theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one
 would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would
 have something to say about them.

 Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing
emulable in the brain?

Its interaction with the universe.

Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?

Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.

Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that
understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G*
minus G.)

What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of
where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a
testable way?

That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe,
i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of
the rock that computes everything. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how
computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the universe. It's just
another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white
rabbits are common). It's all very well to say thought is computation and all computation
is implicit in arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is
getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything.

Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and 
admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and 
metaphysical physicalism.


Bruno


One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics 
which are not metaphysical.  There are many speculative theories of physics that are based 
on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist 
theory of the world would have something to say about them.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 6/12/2015 1:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:

You wrote:

/(Brent):/
/But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are
not separable*.*/

/(Bruno):/
/Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially correct
machine theory./

/.../
/
/
The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on
Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the
*Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance.
Including physics,

universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc.

*/_Theory_/* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may
be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only

and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less
sophisticated
believers (scientists?).

One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super-intelligence.
I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are
talking

about is 'super' indeed.
I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego)
i.o.w. to
consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In
such
respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain.
IFFF?
Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I
went
with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature)
upon
relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety.
Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to
humans
(machines).

With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness)
JM

On Fri, Ju

That sounds like Darwin's worry when he concluded that we were descended from an ape
ancestor that he could not trust his own thought processes because they were also
descended from an ape ancestor.

To which someone no doubt replied, Whose thoughts will you trust if not your own.
Samiya has an answer to this, but I think Darwin would have chosen to stick with his own.

Brent

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-12 Thread Bruce Kellett


meekerdb wrote:

On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an 
explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and 
consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way?


That is exactly my criticism of your theory.  I think you do need to 
invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to 
computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes 
everything.  But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how 
computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the 
universe.  It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose 
name I have never understood; white rabbits are common).


You mean that you don't get the allusion to 'Alice in Wonderland'?

All the best phrases come from Lewis Carroll. Like 'Humpty Dumpty 
Dictionary' and 'What I tell you three times is true.'


Bruce



 It's all very
well to say thought is computation and all computation is implicit in 
arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic.  The problem is 
getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything.


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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 14:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states
of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation,
the rock alone is not.

What is the interpreter in Platonia?

The transition function relating the states.

A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of  
states and the relation between them.


The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are  
the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.


So a computer computing without us, is not computing

The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a  
sequence of state + a transition table relating the states.


Yes, and the mapping is defined, and implemented in arithmetic by the  
universal number.




As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any  
computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just  
means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the  
interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but  
relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the  
correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make  
sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want  
to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is  
computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ?


It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce  
Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock  
computing ...
Well, I guess it is not weird, as Bruce seems to have also that  
typical negative tone of those who criticizing without studying. Why  
people does that is beyond my comprehension, but I am interested, as  
this is rather frequent (with humans).


Bruno





Quentin



Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- 
commutation?


For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct  
from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long  
to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of  
technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can  
come back on this later, if you are more interested.


I'm interested.


I know that more best in the journal I publish in, more difficult it  
is to get it without being in an institution, but this is explained in  
most paper.


You need to understand many representation theorem.

That computability can be represented in arithmetic by sigma_1  
provability,
that sigma_1 provability represent an idea scientist having self- 
referential abilities,
that the logic of self-reference is axiomatized (that the modal  
propositional level) by *two* logic: G and G* (also know as GL and  
GLS, Prl and prl-omega, K4W (for G) in the literature).
That a logic of knowledge is canonically associated, and can be  
represented in G and G* (but there they coincide).
That an intuitionist logic is associated, and can be represented, by  
that logic of knowledge.
That a logic of observability (in a simple direct sense provided by  
the UDA, which I illustrate recently (thank to John Clark!) with the  
step 3 protocol + the 2 coffees. That logic of observability is a B- 
type of modal logic.
That quantum type of logic admits representation in term of B-type of  
modal logic.


All the representation theorem are constructive, and all logics, and  
the multimodal logic (like the 3-1 notions) are, by composition of  
representations; inherit the decidability of G.


G* itself is representable, mechanical emulable, by G. making all of  
the material logic decidable, but they are also untractable, when you  
get many modal nesting.


G is what the machine can say about itself, about what it can say and  
not say.

G* is what is true about what the machine can say and not say.

Typically, self-consistency, belongs to G* minus G, the proper  
classical theology of the machine looking inward.


I don't believe that PA is a zombie, even if that discourse, in the  
third person way, appears to be atemporal: it is itself infinity  
recurrent in arithmetic.


You need only a passive, but genuine, understanding of Gödel's paper,  
fundamentally. He is the one starting the interview. He missed the  
reversal, because he was sceptical on mechanism. he missed the Church- 
thesis too, and the *universal* beast.










Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is  
not clear if they will be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test


That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and  
space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case,  
time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and  
space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure,  
I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time  
existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this  
needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation  
with the comp Quantum Logic.


Where have you explained it?  On this list?


Yes. You might search on temperley and/or lieb on the archive. The  
winner might be a universal subgroup of the braid group. the physicist  
in me suspect some Moonshine Magic and role for finite simple group,  
and the number 24 (which might intervene in dimension comp theory).








But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am  
still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp  
explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be  
matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness  
flux.


If the stability of consciousness is not explained then  
consciousness is not explained.


Agreed.


It's no good saying, There must be an explanation if my theory is  
right.


It depends. When you do reasoning on reasoning, this can be done in  
valid, or not, way. But when you bet on some theory, if you throw out  
the theory at a first problem, you might never solve that first  
problem. If physicists would have abandoned Newton each time it was  
contradicted, they would never have found relativity and the quantum.
Löbianity allow a sort of arithmetical valid way to beg the question,  
but, here, I allude to something slightly different (yet related).


There must be an explanation if my theory is right. can be put: let  
us assume P and we see that we have that problem. But that is the  
whole point: comp leads to a very interesting problem, formulable in  
the arithmetical language, and look, machines like PA and ZF can  
already provide unexpected incredible light on that subject.


I am the guy who say that there is a problem, and who show

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au LizR wrote:

   I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result
   of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a
   /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that  
physics

   is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it
   isn't. Which is taken as an argument against  physical
   supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could
   equally be an argument against brains performing computations.
   If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were  
made
   more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more  
explicit
   is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the  
conclusion

   that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false,
   *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso
   quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.
I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his  
argument is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis,


It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of  
primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis.


MGA alone is a reductio ad absurdo of the physical supervenience, but  
not of comp supervenience.






I do not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience.


Only physical supervenience (called supervenience by most  
(materialist) philosophers).




It would be strange if he did, since brain replacement by a computer  
at the appropriate substitution level is the beginning of the  
argument.


No doubt.




But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism  
fails because nothing is introduced that actually depends on  
primitive physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to  
backfire.


?

What you say does not make sense. I introduce both comp and primitive  
physicalism to get the contracdition.


Physicis does not rely, indeed, on primitive physicalism, and that'w  
why there is no prblem with physics at all.


The problem is for the computationalist only: they have to retrieve  
physics from machine self-reference.

Then I show PA has already done the job at the propositional part.






assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the  
assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the  
assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains).


But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows  
that your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the  
other stages of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to  
*which* assumption is at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so  
it is all irrelevant for understanding the real world of experience.


I just show a problem for the computationalist, and to avoid people  
makes easy conclusion, i show how machine as clever as PA can already  
debunk the use of such result to argue that comp is false.


Then I am strike by the functional morphism between neoplatonism and  
the discourse of the machine introspecting itself.


The point is that with comp, metaphysics can be proceeded with the  
scientific way, without any metaphysical ontological commitment, but  
the terms of the theory.


It seems to me that you are the one doing a metaphysical commitment,  
if not, why would you like comp false, or useless, etc.


Bruno





Bruce

You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole  
draw full of alternative metaphysics available...

** With apologies to Groucho Marx.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:06, LizR wrote:

On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:

LizR wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not
computable - which would entail that brain processes are not
computable, which would imply that comp1 is false.  Except
there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical
object then the physics of that object is not computable  
either

and so it might work.

Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might  
happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)


Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they  
jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the  
supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know  
everything?


Just illustrative. The other available alternatives to reality being  
computable are oracles, hypercomputers, the physical existence of a  
continuum, and maybe a few other things this margin is too small to  
contain.


I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of  
Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on  
the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable,  
and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is  
taken as an argument against  physical supervenience of  
consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument  
against brains performing computations.


If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made  
more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit  
is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion  
that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false,  
*inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso  
quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.


I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his  
argument is a reductio on the physical supervenience thesis,  
assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the  
assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the  
assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains).


I think that's correct. I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I've  
misunderstood.



It is correct.

The idea is that I make comp clear, even if at first using the  
physical image (doctor, real artificial brain, etc.), then when making  
clear the physical supervenience thesis, we get the contradiction. At  
that stage, people can still be materialist, but have to abandon  
computationalism.
yet, in AUDA, I illustrate that such a move can also be premature,  
because, when asked, the machine illustrates that self-reference does  
put non trivial constraints on the knowable and bettable (observable).


Bruno






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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind.  
What is not Turing emulable in the brain?


Its interaction with the universe.


Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?


Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.


Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily)  
make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true,  
but might be of the type G* minus G.)


What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an  
explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/ 
knowledge come from, in a testable way?


I know that there is bad news, like some amount of math, and then a  
sequence of more and more complex questions.









Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?


No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable -  
which would entail that brain processes are not computable,



That does not follow. Something non computable can emulate something  
computable. It has too, if we want universal machine and brain there.





which would imply that comp1 is false.  Except there's a loophole:  
if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of  
that object is not computable either and so it might work.


yes, we inherit each time the normality of our neighborhood. (I find  
this a bit frightening but then God know which theory is true, isn't  
it?)








With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists,  
is not a computable notion, a priori.




  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is.   
But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated  
consciousness supervenes on emulated brains.


OK. (But then there is no problem).


There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated  
becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness  
supervenes on brains.


?

Only the Sigma_1 truth is emulated. The Pi_1 and Sigma_2 truth and  
above are not mechanically emulable. You can define corresponding  
divine being capable of emulating them, but that is not logically  
necassery. yet those are well defined truth (even definable in PA)  
approximating the non definable, by PA, union of all those truth.


Yes, what Gödel, Turing, Church results illustrate is that the  
computable lives in a complicated relation with the non computable. In  
philosophy of mind (and matter) this is doubly so due to the FPI,  
which makes us confronted with infinities at the border of our Turing  
emulable parts.



Bruno








Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 11 Jun 2015, at 01:47, LizR wrote:

On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain
So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer
to Maudlin and the MGA?

Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a
sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is
defined ostensively.

Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK.

Er, you are not answering me here.

It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do
you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or
a neurological account? Or a personal account?

It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the
brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about.

I see you are ware of that, but the quote above suggests differently.
We agree of course.

What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording
conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate
recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.

You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't
very long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being
employed.

Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in
different ways.

But Bruce made clear that he is not interested in the problem.

It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in
some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be
Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism.

Bruno

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a  
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this  
interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading  
to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were  
completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.
No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John  
Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare  
it to physics.
We have answered this, but you come back again on what has  
already been explained in detail: please reread the posts.


As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the  
teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum  
mechanics.
It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of  
self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions,  
not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to  
the quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view.


No, it has nothing to do with it. You are arguing that since my dog  
has four legs, and my cat also has four legs, then my dog is a cat.



Not at all. You abstract yourself from the UDA.

Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:00, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine,  
it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's  
argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program  
computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers

Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send  
(x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is  
eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it  
does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the  
difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a  
problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so  
define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation  
when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the  
state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it!
How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S,  
in the physical core.
But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can  
implement an approximation of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will  
first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for  
the rock, and how the rock computes.


Digital computation is just a sequence of states.


Not really. It is a sequence of states brought by a universal machine  
(and then by infinities of such universal machines).




With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire),  
it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly  
to give whatever computation you want.


Any sequence of physical state can be made into any computation, by  
changing the universal machine. computation is a relative notion. you  
need to make precise the universal machine you talk about when  
mentioning a computation.




This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a  
computation, and everything is a computer.


That does not follow. With computationalism, almost everything is NOT  
a computation. The computable part of arithmetic is only a tiny part  
of arithmetical truth. That play some role in the measure problem.


Bruno






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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/10/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.


Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be  
recovered from the computations of the dovetailer?


By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and- 
now (defined indexically with the DX=XX method).
Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the  
winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial  
approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play  
a crucial role here.


But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable  
physics. The two are not separable.


Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- 
referentially correct machine theory.


Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:20, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it  
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument  
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing  
the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers
Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x,  
y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is  
eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does  
not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty  
of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a  
Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as  
(x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds  
itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a  
problem. Even a rock can do it!


How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S,  
in the physical core.


But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can  
implement an approximation of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will  
first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for  
the rock, and how the rock computes.


Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as  
we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through  
a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever  
computation you want.


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the  
interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting  
the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The  
rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not.


Exactly.

Bruno




Quentin

This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a  
computation, and everything is a computer.



Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:21, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on  
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these  
quite simple matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like  
Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce  
the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'.  
But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is  
something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the  
study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not  
have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they  
do have seldom get in the way of their science.

So they use comp by default,


You mean that work on the basis that conscious supervenes on the  
physical brain,



Not really. At least conscious supervenes on the physical brain is  
ambiguous.


No, I meant the idea that what is relevant in the brain for  
consciousness does not invoke actual infinities, nor non computable  
elements so that we can survive with a brain/body computer.






and that that brain operates according to regular physical laws.


That will do, as those laws are computable, as far as we know.




You don't have to accept comp, even unknowingly, to believe that.



Once you believe that, modula the prcision I just gave, this is  
equivalent with comp1, and this ential comp2.






except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that  
if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process  
which is not Turing emulable.  Some believe that with
a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff,  
but it is far fetched and controversial.
You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the  
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel  
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.
I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying  
that comp is false.


And I have given such an account, many times.


I have not seen them. Please give a link, or make a summary.



In any case, I can criticize comp without having to provide an  
alternative. One can say that general relativity and QM are mutually  
incompatible without having to solve the problem of quantum gravity.


Like we can show that computationalism and physicalism is  
incompatible. Fair enough. But I have missed your argument against  
comp1 (and I have show the flaw in your argument that comp1 does not  
lead to comp2).






I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to  
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal  
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?

The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp.


And what did you find? The truth is that you have not tested any of  
these ideas in practice,


In practice? I just prove theorems. I am a theoretician. There is no  
practical application, except learning that science has not yet really  
begun, given that we use incompatibe theological ideas, like comp and  
the beliefs in a primitive physical reality. The practice of this  
needs theology to come back in academy.





nor have you produced a conscious program or computer.


Here is one:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

+ for all F first order arithmetical formula:

(F(0)  Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x).

That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the  
one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work.


Bruno






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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:44, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- 
commutation?

For the yes-no operator in general.


What quantum operator is that?


Frequency operator, a bit like in some paper by Graham, Hartle, but  
recasted in the Z and X logic. I can do that tnaks to work done in  
quantum logic (Dalla Chiara, Goldblatt, Bell, ...).





And with what other quantum operator does it fail to commute.


Other yes-No question/operator. I don't want to explain this right  
now. I need you first to understand the UDA.





They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the  
logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no  
interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of  
the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are  
more interested.


Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is  
not clear if they will be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test
That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and  
space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case,  
time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and  
space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem.


You claim that physics emerges from the UD,


I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from  
the UD.





but you just happen not to be sure about time and space.?


because time and space might be a geographical notion.



What, in your opinion then, is physics? A set of dynamical laws  
describing the behaviour of material objects in time and space, or  
what?


Yes, laws, which have to be true everywhere, for all machines. But  
comp cannot explain geographico-historical happenings (nor do the  
physical law; that is why geography is not physics).


If the modalities of the material hypostases would have collapsed,  
like most people thought a long time ago, then physics might have  
become, assuming comp, entirely geographical, and this would have lead  
to a continous multiverse, incarnating all physical/geographical laws.  
But now, the modalities do not collapse, and we know (with comp) that  
there is a genuine physical reality.






You need to be a bit more precise about what you consider to be  
geographical (contingent) and what you consider to be derivable  
physics.


You need to understand the way I proceed. I start from comp, and show  
only that physics is derivable, so we will see clearly what is  
genuinely physical and what is contingent. The contingencies are  
differnet for each material hypostases, and described by 0, 1,  
2, 3, in arithmetic.




Physics is often taken to be a set of dynamical laws together with  
some boundary conditions. The hope of some is that we can subsume  
more and more of the boundary into the dynamics, so that a true TOE  
is only physics, with no boundary conditions, geography, or  
contingencies at all.


You need to come clean on what the dovetailer can actually give --


What precisely. you have shown that you don't know what a computation  
is, so I doubt that you can assess what has already be done, to be  
frank.




we have to be ably to check this against observable physics in order  
to verify it, after all.


This has been done. It is, like for any theory on reality, an infinite  
task, and the problem now is to solve open question in computer  
science/mathematical logic. the quantum proposition physics has  
already been extracted.







But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am  
still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp  
explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be  
matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness  
flux.


Comp does not explain why there is consciousness, it assumes it.


It assumes it in UDA, but we got the complete explanation in AUDA, up  
to something which is explained as being not explainable for logical  
reason.



And what is more, it doesn't actually tell us anything useful about  
consciousness.


It explains completely why consciousness is not a computation, nor  
matter can be computable.




According to your recent statements, consciousness is not even a  
computation.


Yes, that is an example of application of comp.





Also, there is no requirement for me to offer any theory of  
consciousness, as I have explained in detail elsewhere.


So, you have just a negative tone, but you have neither find a flaw in  
comp and its consequences, nor propose any alternative. I am not sure  
what is your goal.


Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/10/2015 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on  
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these  
quite simple matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like  
Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce  
the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'.  
But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is  
something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the  
study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not  
have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they  
do have seldom get in the way of their science.



So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and  
general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we  
don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some  
believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non- 
computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial.





You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the  
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel  
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.


I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying  
that comp is false.





I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to  
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal  
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?


The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp.


But you only assume it instantiates your consciousness because it  
instantiates all possible Turing computations.  So it's validation  
of your theory depends on assuming your theory.




But I am not defending the idea that comp is true at all.

I was obviously assuming comp.

I work in that theory. You know that since the start. I tell only  
consequence of that theory.


I only show the problem (UDA), and the machine's solution (AUDA),  
which I compare to the human solution (the Plato-type one, and the  
Aristotle type one).


I think you made a sort of straw man thing here.

Bruno








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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/12/2015 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

nor have you produced a conscious program or computer.


Here is one:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

+ for all F first order arithmetical formula:

(F(0)  Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x).

That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on 
the theological and physical question in the work.


That seems more absurd than the reductio of the MGA. One must ask of what is the program 
conscious?...all theorems of PA?  That's not only very different from what I am aware of, 
it's also infinitely greater.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/12/2015 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You claim that physics emerges from the UD,


I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. 


But I don't think you've shown that.  Comp1 doesn't imply that all possible computations 
exist.  That's a separate assumption you slip in that all computations or all arithmetic 
exists.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it 
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument 
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program 
computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers

Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) 
to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, 
you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty 
of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a 
Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as 
(x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds 
itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. 
Even a rock can do it!


How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in 
the physical core.


But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement 
an approximation of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will 
first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the 
rock, and how the rock computes.


Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we 
warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a 
sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever 
computation you want. This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- 
everything is a computation, and everything is a computer.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on 
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite 
simple matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose 
that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave 
packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But 
your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an 
overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical 
brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular 
metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the 
way of their science.


So they use comp by default,


You mean that work on the basis that conscious supervenes on the 
physical brain, and that that brain operates according to regular 
physical laws. You don't have to accept comp, even unknowingly, to 
believe that.


except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general 
hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in 
nature any process which is not Turing emulable.  Some believe that with
a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff, but 
it is far fetched and controversial.


You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the 
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel 
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.


I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that 
comp is false.


And I have given such an account, many times. In any case, I can 
criticize comp without having to provide an alternative. One can say 
that general relativity and QM are mutually incompatible without having 
to solve the problem of quantum gravity.


I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to 
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal 
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?


The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp.


And what did you find? The truth is that you have not tested any of 
these ideas in practice, nor have you produced a conscious program or 
computer.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated 
non-commutation?


For the yes-no operator in general.


What quantum operator is that? And with what other quantum operator does 
it fail to commute.


They are given and construct from 
the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to 
describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic 
needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on 
this later, if you are more interested.


Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not 
clear if they will be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test


That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space 
are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and 
space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time 
structure might be contingent. Open problem.


You claim that physics emerges from the UD, but you just happen not to 
be sure about time and space.? What, in your opinion then, is 
physics? A set of dynamical laws describing the behaviour of material 
objects in time and space, or what?


You need to be a bit more precise about what you consider to be 
geographical (contingent) and what you consider to be derivable physics. 
Physics is often taken to be a set of dynamical laws together with some 
boundary conditions. The hope of some is that we can subsume more and 
more of the boundary into the dynamics, so that a true TOE is only 
physics, with no boundary conditions, geography, or contingencies at all.


You need to come clean on what the dovetailer can actually give -- we 
have to be ably to check this against observable physics in order to 
verify it, after all.



But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still 
waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains 
already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a 
testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux.


Comp does not explain why there is consciousness, it assumes it. And 
what is more, it doesn't actually tell us anything useful about 
consciousness. According to your recent statements, consciousness is not 
even a computation.


Also, there is no requirement for me to offer any theory of 
consciousness, as I have explained in detail elsewhere.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:


 Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


 Why not? If it can emulate a specific
 purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a
 universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's
 argument for unlimited pancomputationalism
 implies this.

 I am not convince by that argument. Show me a
 rock program computing the prime numbers.


 Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime
 numbers

 Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
 Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function
 which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be
 done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for
 it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


 You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
 You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the
 difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not
 a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state
 machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x).
 Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the
 state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even
 a rock can do it!


 How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor
 S, in the physical core.

 But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can
 implement an approximation of K.
 But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you
 will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the
 information for the rock, and how the rock computes.


 Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as
 we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through
 a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever
 computation you want.


 Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter...
 the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating
 all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a
 computation, the rock alone is not.


 What is the interpreter in Platonia?


The transition function relating the states.

A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and
the relation between them.

Quentin




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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

  Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


 Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it
 can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for
 unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.

 I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing
 the prime numbers.


 Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers

 Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
 Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y)
 to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need
 a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


 You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
 You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of
 eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing
 machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and
 another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the
 state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do
 it!


 How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the
 physical core.

 But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an
 approximation of K.
 But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first
 need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and
 how the rock computes.


 Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we
 warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a
 sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever
 computation you want.


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the
rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all
the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a
computation, the rock alone is not.

Quentin


 This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a
 computation, and everything is a computer.


 Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a 
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation 
of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was 
readily shown that such thought experiments were completely 
orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.
No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). 
You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics.
We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already 
been explained in detail: please reread the posts.


As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation 
experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics.


It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of 
self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions, not 
that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the quantum 
MWI, when taken from the material points of view.


No, it has nothing to do with it. You are arguing that since my dog has 
four legs, and my cat also has four legs, then my dog is a cat.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific
purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a
universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's
argument for unlimited pancomputationalism
implies this.

I am not convince by that argument. Show me a
rock program computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime
numbers

Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function
which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be
done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for
it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the
difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not
a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state
machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x).
Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the
state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even
a rock can do it!


How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor
S, in the physical core.

But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can
implement an approximation of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you
will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the
information for the rock, and how the rock computes.


Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as
we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through
a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever
computation you want.


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... 
the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and 
relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the 
interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not.


What is the interpreter in Platonia?

Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain
So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer
to Maudlin and the MGA?

Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a
sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is
defined ostensively.

It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do
you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or
a neurological account? Or a personal account?

What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording
conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate
recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.

Good!

Bruno

Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
  Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
 interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
 interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states
 of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation,
 the rock alone is not.

 What is the interpreter in Platonia?

 The transition function relating the states.

 A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and
 the relation between them.


 The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one
 who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.


So a computer computing without us, is not computing

The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence
of state + a transition table relating the states.

As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations,
it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states
are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on
itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute
meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such
a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the
computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say
the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ?

Quentin




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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-10 15:13 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
 interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
 interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of
 states
 of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a
 computation,
 the rock alone is not.

 What is the interpreter in Platonia?

 The transition function relating the states.

 A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of
 states and the relation between them.

 The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are
 the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.

 So a computer computing without us, is not computing
 The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence
 of state + a transition table relating the states.

 As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations,
 it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states
 are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on
 itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute
 meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such
 a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the
 computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say
 the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ?


 A computation can be regarded as a mapping between inputs and outputs. A
 Turing machine has a transition table relating the states -- that has to be
 provided to define the machine, as you say. You can do this with the rock,
 you map each rock state to the necessary computational state, and that
 mapping makes the interpretation in the same way as for any other computer.


That's what I said... you need the mapping and the rock... the rock alone
is not sufficient...

So instead of repeating what I said... in what sense the rock *alone* is
computing anything relevant relatively to you without the mapping ?

Quentin




 Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states
of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation,
the rock alone is not.

What is the interpreter in Platonia?

The transition function relating the states.

A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states 
and the relation between them. 


The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the 
one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 


Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au   
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of
states
of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a
computation,
the rock alone is not.

What is the interpreter in Platonia?

The transition function relating the states.

A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of
states and the relation between them.

The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are
the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.

So a computer computing without us, is not computing 

The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a 
sequence of state + a transition table relating the states.


As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any 
computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just 
means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the 
interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively 
to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct 
mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense 
relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to 
the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing 
relatively to you in any meaningful sense ?


A computation can be regarded as a mapping between inputs and outputs. A 
Turing machine has a transition table relating the states -- that has to 
be provided to define the machine, as you say. You can do this with the 
rock, you map each rock state to the necessary computational state, and 
that mapping makes the interpretation in the same way as for any other 
computer.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change  
the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be  
comp which has to be abandoned.
The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories...
I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true  
and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics,  
and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is  
testable.


These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not  
change the content of physical theories, then it will have no  
testable consequences.
In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a  
branch of machine theology. Sure.


OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the  
computations of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so  
recovered contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of  
science -- and tested by observation and experiment -- then that  
disproves comp.


But then, later we have


Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.


Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be  
recovered from the computations of the dovetailer?


By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and-now (defined  
indexically with the DX=XX method).
Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the  
winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial  
approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play a  
crucial role here.






I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing  
emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines  
are digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and  
complex numbers?


That can play some role, yes. But some non computable oracle can also,  
a priori, play some role. the random oracle can be shown to have some  
role in the measure.


Keep in mind that my goal is just to make that problem precise.  When  
starting the thesis, I did not expect to solve the propositional case.




Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot predict  
what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment?


?

Only when you perform a self-duplication experience. I cannot use the  
quantum here.





As things stand, you do have a conflict here.


You have not yet really grasp the step 7. We will come back on this.

Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on  
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite  
simple matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like  
Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the  
wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But  
your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of  
an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the  
physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any  
particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have  
seldom get in the way of their science.



So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and  
general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we  
don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some  
believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non- 
computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial.





You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the  
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel  
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.


I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying  
that comp is false.





I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to  
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal  
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?


The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp.

Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a  
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation  
of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was  
readily shown that such thought experiments were completely  
orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.
No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John  
Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it  
to physics.
We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already  
been explained in detail: please reread the posts.


As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation  
experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics.


It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of  
self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions,  
not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the  
quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view.




You said that you had only ever raised MWI as an illustration to  
help those who were familiar with Everettian quantum mechanics to  
understand the concept of FPI.


That can help, to avoid a frontal shock with the self-multiplication  
idea. This list is absed in part to an acceptation of Everett  
formulation of QM.



FPI in the teleportation scenarios, and later in the UDA, have  
nothing to do with the MWI of quantum mechanics, and one cannot be  
used to support or justify the other.


The one in the QM MW use the general idea defining the classical FPI.  
And UDA shows that the one of the QM MW, if the quantum is physical (s  
it seems to be), must be retrieved from the FPI, in the material  
hypostases.







Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause.  
Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the  
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection  
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no  
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing.  
In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a  
specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate  
logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When  
you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum  
operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed.
UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of  
some observable is already proved.


OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- 
commutation?


For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct  
from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to  
describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of  
technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come  
back on this later, if you are more interested.






Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not  
clear if they will be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test


That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space  
are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and  
space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time  
structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure, I have some  
conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong to  
the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb  
algebra, the braid group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic.


But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still  
waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains  
already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in  
a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine,  
it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's  
argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program  
computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers

Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x,  
y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is  
eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does  
not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty  
of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a  
Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as  
(x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds  
itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a  
problem. Even a rock can do it!


How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in  
the physical core.


But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement  
an approximation of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will  
first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for  
the rock, and how the rock computes.


Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip  [i] i~p,  
for [i] being a material hypostase.


?? What role does i play in the above?  Are you assuming i implies p?


i is for 1, 2, 3 in

[1]p = []p  p
[2]p = []p  t
[3]p = []p  t  p  = [2]p  p

The quantization makes sense only in the material hypostases (and,  
unexpectedly, in the knower).


Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What  
is not Turing emulable in the brain?


Its interaction with the universe.


Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?

Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is  
not a computable notion, a priori.




  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is.   
But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated  
consciousness supervenes on emulated brains.


OK. (But then there is no problem).

Bruno





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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/10/2015 4:00 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a 
universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited 
pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime 
numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers

Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not 
obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and 
a proof that it does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating 
physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state 
machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the 
machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. 
Even a rock can do it!


How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the 
physical core.

But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation 
of K.
But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show 
me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes.


Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually 
(by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these 
correctly to give whatever computation you want. This is the basic pan-computationalism 
thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. 


Which is why I think we need interaction with the world in order to ground a computation 
relative to that world.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/10/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.


Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the 
computations of the dovetailer?


By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and-now (defined indexically with 
the DX=XX method).
Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the winner is given by 
infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial approximations. The first person invariance 
for the UD delays play a crucial role here. 


But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not 
separable.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/10/2015 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the 
realm of study of the neurosciences.

Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple 
matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron 
use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your 
theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that 
the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are 
based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any 
particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way 
of their science.



So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, 
given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is 
not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement 
non-computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial.





You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of 
consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to 
provide such a mechanistic account.


I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is 
false.




I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran 
program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why 
not produce it?


The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp.


But you only assume it instantiates your consciousness because it instantiates all 
possible Turing computations.  So it's validation of your theory depends on assuming your 
theory.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation?


For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct from the quantization 
([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest 
for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can 
come back on this later, if you are more interested.


I'm interested.







Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will 
be derived.


If they are not, comp fails a crucial test


That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more 
geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. 
Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To 
be sure, I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong 
to the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid 
group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic.


Where have you explained it?  On this list?



But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your 
non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, 
and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the 
consciousness flux.


If the stability of consciousness is not explained then consciousness is not explained.  
It's no good saying, There must be an explanation if my theory is right.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing
emulable in the brain?

Its interaction with the universe.

Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?

Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.

Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail
that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except
there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of
that object is not computable either and so it might work.

With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable
notion, a priori.

Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case
you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains.

OK. (But then there is no problem).

There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and
you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains.

Brent

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 6/10/2015 5:41 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the
interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine
interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states
of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation,
the rock alone is not.

What is the interpreter in Platonia?

The transition function relating the states.

A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states
and the
relation between them.

The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one
who
'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning.

So a computer computing without us, is not computing

The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a
transition table relating the states.

As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't
mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you
forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but
relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping...
and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to
do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the
rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ?

I agree except Quentin doesn't go all the way to the end. Bruce might have a mapping from
the rock states to propositions in English, but what gives meaning to the English?
Ostensive definitions, actions and reactions in the world.

Brent

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


 Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? That
 'comp' is going nowhere?


Comp appears to go somewhere quite specific. What go round in circles tend
to be the arguments against it, which get repeated regularly. I listed them
somewhere (on this forum) so we could have a handy reference, but I'm not
sure where now. (Unfortunately none of them are rigorous enough to show
that comp is actually wrong, though they do show that it strikes some
people - including me when I first came across it - as absurd).

I will have a quick look and let you know if I can find the list.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 


On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett

   That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
   supervenes on the physical brain
So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the
answer to Maudlin and the MGA?

Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a
sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is
defined ostensively.

Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK.


That's what an ostensive definition is. You seem to be after something 
along the lines of Kant's 'ding an sich'. I can't give you that.



It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is?
Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical
account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account?

It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the 
brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about.


You asked me what actually is consciousness? so I assumed that it was 
you who wanted to know. I certainly know what I mean when I say 
consciousness supervenes on the brain. Don't you understand what that 
means?



What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording
conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and
accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.

You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very 
long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed.


Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways.


OK, so outline the argument in your own words. Even in Bruno's theory, 
consciousness supervenes on brains -- he just has some different ideas 
about what brains and consciousness might be.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


LizR wrote:

meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not
computable - which would entail that brain processes are not
computable, which would imply that comp1 is false.  Except
there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical
object then the physics of that object is not computable either
and so it might work.

Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to 
work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)


Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump 
to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is 
not possible that we might simply not yet know everything?


I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of 
Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the 
notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that 
assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an 
argument against  physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, 
although it could equally be an argument against brains performing 
computations.


If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made 
more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is 
that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that 
comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, 
*inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or 
better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 meekerdb wrote:
 On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

 No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not
 computable - which would entail that brain processes are not
 computable, which would imply that comp1 is false.  Except
 there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical
 object then the physics of that object is not computable either
 and so it might work.

 Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to
 work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)


 Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to
 the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not
 possible that we might simply not yet know everything?


Just illustrative. The other available alternatives to reality being
computable are oracles, hypercomputers, the physical existence of a
continuum, and maybe a few other things this margin is too small to contain.


  I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's
 argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of
 comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption
 leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against
 physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could
 equally be an argument against brains performing computations.


 If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more
 explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it
 is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is
 false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as
 Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex
 contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.


I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a
*reductio* on the physical supervenience thesis, assuming I've got that
right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a
contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness
supervenes on brains).

I think that's correct. I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I've
misunderstood.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


meekerdb wrote:

On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What 
is not Turing emulable in the brain? 


Its interaction with the universe.


Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?


Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.



Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?


No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - 
which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would 
imply that comp1 is false.  Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means 
replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not 
computable either and so it might work.


With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is 
not a computable notion, a priori.


  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is.  But 
in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated 
consciousness supervenes on emulated brains.


OK. (But then there is no problem).


There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated 
becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes 
on brains.


Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? 
That 'comp' is going nowhere?


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


On 6/10/2015 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing 
emulable in the brain? 


Its interaction with the universe.


Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?


Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.



Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?


No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail 
that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false.  Except 
there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of 
that object is not computable either and so it might work.


With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable 
notion, a priori.


  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is.  But in that case 
you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated 
brains.


OK. (But then there is no problem).


There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless 
and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains.


Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? That 'comp' is 
going nowhere?


Yes, because comp is metaphysics.  But the part that interests me is the engineering 
aspect.  How in consciousness related to intelligence?  I think it's a kind augmentation 
via running internal simulations and I think Bruno's theory may have something to say 
about proof and belief.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 11 June 2015 at 13:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 6/10/2015 4:55 PM, LizR wrote:

  I suspect that physics is not computable is the *end* result of
 Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a *reductio* on the
 notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that
 assumption leads to the result that it isn't.


 But I don't see that it leads to that result.  His argument of step 7 and
 the MGA purport to reach a *reductio* from comp1.  Those arguments are
 still assuming that thought is a computation.  But it is only after he
 introduces the idea of all possible computations and the UD that he then
 asserts that consciousness (and physics) is not computable but is rather
 some kind of statistic mechanics of computational threads.


That's a separate point. I was only explaining why Bruno says that physics
isn't computable (or trying to, at least).

So when Bruno comes on line you should ask him at which point in the
argument the reversal is supposed to occur.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:

  LizR wrote:

 On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain
 So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to
 Maudlin and the MGA?


 Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently
 severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively.


Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK.


 It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you
 want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a
 neurological account? Or a personal account?


It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the brain
so I assumed you knew what you were talking about.


 What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious?
 Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of
 normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.


You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very
long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed.

Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 meekerdb wrote:

 On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

 On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is
 not Turing emulable in the brain?


 Its interaction with the universe.


 Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?


 Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.


 Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?


 No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable -
 which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would
 imply that comp1 is false.  Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means
 replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not
 computable either and so it might work.


 Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to
work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)

I suspect that physics is not computable is the *end* result of Brnuo's
argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a *reductio* on the notion of
comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption
leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against
 physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could
equally be an argument against brains performing computations.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 6/10/2015 4:55 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of
mind. What
is not Turing emulable in the brain?

Its interaction with the universe.

Are you sure it is not the interaction with God?

Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does.

Can you explain why such interaction is not computable?

No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable -
which would
entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that
comp1 is
false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a
physical
object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so
it might
work.

Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd
have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)

I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument
(comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes
that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't.

But I don't see that it leads to that result. His argument of step 7 and the MGA purport
to reach a /reductio/ from comp1. Those arguments are still assuming that thought is a
computation. But it is only after he introduces the idea of all possible computations and
the UD that he then asserts that consciousness (and physics) is not computable but is
rather some kind of statistic mechanics of computational threads.

Brent

Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on
brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


LizR wrote:
On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
LizR wrote:


I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result
of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a
/reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics
is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it
isn't. Which is taken as an argument against  physical
supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could
equally be an argument against brains performing computations.

If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made
more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit
is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion
that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false,
*inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso
quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.

I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument 
is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis,


It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of 
primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis. I do 
not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience. It would be strange 
if he did, since brain replacement by a computer at the appropriate 
substitution level is the beginning of the argument.


But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism fails 
because nothing is introduced that actually depends on primitive 
physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to backfire.


assuming I've got 
that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a 
contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness 
supervenes on brains).


But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows that 
your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the other stages 
of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to *which* assumption is 
at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so it is all irrelevant for 
understanding the real world of experience.


Bruce

You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole draw 
full of alternative metaphysics available...

** With apologies to Groucho Marx.

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:

But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations.

What?
Reference?
You mean the brain is not Turing emulable?
Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can  
be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is  
only a computation.

Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism.


So what is it then?


A mental, subjective, state. A first person view. Indeed the one at  
the base of all the others that we can be aware of.



Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is  
replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical  
computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely  
supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly  
confused?


The theory is that a (generalized) brain is Turing emulable, at a  
level such that I remain conscious (and feel no difference by  
introspection).
You can say in that case that it merely supervene on the activity of  
the brain, but not necessarily on the physical activity of the brain,  
which can be shown arbitrarily variate. It is only contingently  
related to consciousness.











Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious.
A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be  
conscious.
It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be  
identified with some 3p thing.


So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious?  
Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we  
can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct  
first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our  
own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person  
is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism.


We cannot know as such, or for sure,, but this does not entail that e  
cannot know in the larger Theaetetus' sense indeed. We can believe  
that others are conscious, and they might be conscious. But then it is  
the person in Platonia which is conscious, not the one we see (in our  
indexical time) as this one is a construction of our brain: it does  
not exist literally. That is counter-intuitive, but not more than SR.







In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of  
computation such that only computers and brains perform  
computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by  
a rock, for instance.
With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the  
role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary  
turing machine.


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it  
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument  
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.


I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing  
the prime numbers.








With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible  
continuations.
I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's  
solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or  
religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor.


But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the  
nature of consciousness,


I think AUDA shows on the contrary a lot of new insight. We get a  
complete theory of qualia, and explanation of souls which fits with  
both QM and all neoplatonist researchers. In the seventies it  
predicted the rise of Artificial Intelligence and ... the possibility  
of quantum computing. It explains easily why physics is based on math,  
and it gives some light on the possible after-life etc.





much less give any useful results for physics.


No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all.
You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't  
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this  
is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the  
mathematician.


Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me  
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that  
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and  
cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of  
math).


I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the  
actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a  
widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible  
(without adding non-comp magic).


Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second  
part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand  
the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem,  
but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part  
shows that this is

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic
per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic,
since

emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is
relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think
emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by
discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D
manifold from the laws of physics)

Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my
understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic
postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis
emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time
was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is
not actually derived from anything other than observation.

Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a
necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe
observation also proves the MUH wrong?

Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says
everything happens in some universe. ;-)

Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the
laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical
intensional nuance brought by incompleteness.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that  
observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example  
posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to  
allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though  
the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense.


The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the  
way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light  
cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have  
said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there  
is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or  
world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the  
relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and  
specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of  
physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the  
caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time.


Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it,  
but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule  
memory of earlier moments, but not later ones.


The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour.  
Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact,  
completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are  
time symmetric.


(The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones,  
according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in  
a way that means they aren't accessible.)
Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain  
memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed  
earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the  
current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it  
does involve that certain laws apply to computation.


Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more  
important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical  
clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are  
physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well- 
defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical  
processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless.



Comp is just the statement that there is no magic operating in the  
brain. If you have a different theory of mind, please give it to us.  
What, in the brain, would be not Turing emulable. Matter? Then we  
agree, but you need to abandon all known theory of matter, except the  
collapse of the wave, which does not make sense to me.
But my point was not more than that: comp entails a MWI, and we can  
test it by comparing it with the MWI of nature.




The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p  
picture), or it cannot reproduce physics.


Of course.





None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is  
well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late)


You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they  
are seldom a reliable source.


The validity of a reasoning does not depend on the paper on which it  
is written.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote:

What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers  
will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block  
universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to  
experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D  
structure is already there in some sense. Not because we crawl up  
world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment  
along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments,  
but not later ones. (The later ones are just as already there as  
the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics  
are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.)


Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain  
memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed  
earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the  
current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it  
does involve that certain laws apply to computation.


None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well  
understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late)


It is proved in the frame of comp, and we don't have there any problem  
with time and memory, as we get them easily from computer science. See  
the book of Matiyasevich to see how a diophantine number polynomial  
relation can simulate a conventional Turing machine. It can simulate a  
Von Neuman type of computer, with register memory, etc.


In my opinion, comp is the *only* satisfactory explanation of why the  
reality looks quantum, and why there is a difference between quanta  
and qualia. Physicists take the physical reality for granted, because  
their goal is to do physics; not cognitive science. Physics fails to  
explain the origin of matter, without assuming matter of course, and  
physics does not address the problem of consciousness, afterlife, etc.


The problem is only for the aristotelian believers who want a  
primitive matter, and physicalism. But, if they find a non-comp theory  
of mind, and if it works, why not. But such theory does not even exist  
today. So it might be premature. Let us test comp, and see. Up to now,  
we get starling quantization exactly where UDA shows them to be  
necessary. So comp is not only not yet refuted, but it really does  
seem to explain both consciousness and matter, and I don't know any  
theory which does that (without adding magic or fairy tales).


Bruno







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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that  
can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or  
mathematics themselves.


Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is  
made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology  
and theology that this happens, and the science physics are  
explained to be different from the mathematical science. For  
example mathematical (arithmetical)  existence is some  
thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x).  
Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico- 
arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It  
becomes testable, and false if comp is true.


That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that  
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be  
no test of comp.


I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics!  
If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it  
will be comp which has to be abandoned.




Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical  
hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via anempirical  
prediction?


It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing  
comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin  
of physics (IF true)..





You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.


I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false.


That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports  
creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.


?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work  
toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


Bruno





Brent


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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Note that it is important to distinguish between
structures that can be described mathematically and the
structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves.

Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although
physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through
machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the
science physics are explained to be different from the
mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical)
existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence
is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp.,
except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change
is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false
if comp is true.

That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that 
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be 
no test of comp. 


I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! 
If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it 
will be comp which has to be abandoned.


Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, 
is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? 


It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp 
true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of 
physics (IF true)..


You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.  


I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false.

That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports 
creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.


?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the 
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward 
it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the 
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which 
has to be abandoned.
The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of 
the physical theories...


These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the 
content of physical theories, then it will have no testable 
consequences. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then 
it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what 
physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in 
question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp.


Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences 
for physical theories. I think we have previously argued at length about 
the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the 
actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical 
hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. This, as has been pointed 
out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as 
emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, 
independent of any metaphysical overtones.


I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not 
amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. 
Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but 
none is empirically testable.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:


But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations.


What?
Reference?
You mean the brain is not Turing emulable?

Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be 
emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a 
computation.


Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism.


So what is it then? Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and 
if that brain is replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that 
physical computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely 
supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly confused?



Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious.


A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be conscious.
It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be identified 
with some 3p thing.


So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious? 
Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we can 
all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct 
first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our own, 
but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person is 
conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism.


In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of 
computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. 
The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for 
instance.


With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the role of 
the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary turing machine.


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can 
emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for 
unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.



With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible continuations.

I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's 
solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or religion, 
just the right to do those things with some rigor.


But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the nature 
of consciousness, much less give any useful results for physics. You can 
do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any 
useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the 
irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-09 Thread meekerdb


On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


   If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic
   per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since
   emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this 
case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get 
very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D 
manifold from the laws of physics)


Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D 
pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if 
that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was 
observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived 
from anything other than observation.


Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. 
Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong?


Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in 
some universe. ;-)


Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the 
relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by 
incompleteness.


By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be 
nomologically inconsistent?  That is the same as denying there is any such thing as laws 
of physics.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:

   Bruno Marchal wrote:

   On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


   Note that it is important to distinguish between
   structures that can be described mathematically and the
   structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves.

   Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although
   physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through
   machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the
   science physics are explained to be different from the
   mathematical science. For example mathematical  
(arithmetical)

   existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence
   is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp.,
   except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change
   is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and  
false

   if comp is true.

That last seems incoherent.  If comp leaves physics untouched that  
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can  
be no test of comp.
I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by  
physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows  
physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned.


Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical  
hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical  
prediction?
It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing  
comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the  
origin of physics (IF true)..

You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.
I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is  
false.
That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence  
supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.
?  (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work  
toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the  
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp  
which has to be abandoned.
The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the  
content of the physical theories...


I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and  
then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on  
both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable.






These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change  
the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable  
consequences.



In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a  
branch of machine theology. Sure.




If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might  
become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what  
physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in  
question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp.


Well that is the result. Then the logic of the observable has been  
derived, and tested.






Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable  
consequences for physical theories.


Unless that metaphysics is derived from comp, which leads to a  
theology which include physics, and so get testable.

Anyway, I derive this from comp.





I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because  
that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics  
of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis  
-- it actually refutes comp itself.


?



This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument  
applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as  
investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical  
overtones.


Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.






I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not  
amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means.  
Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others,  
but none is empirically testable.


Good, so let us not doing metaphysics, but only cognitive science.  
Then a theorem is that if the brain is Turing emulable then physics is  
a branch of machine theology, and the physical reality is recovered  
through a notion of persistent and stable appearances.


Thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay, we can axiomatize completely the  
propositional part of the theology, including the propositional part  
of physics, and compare it to the logic of the observable. Up to now,  
it fits (at a place where many have thought this cannot happen,  
because this marry symmetry and antisymmetry at a deep level, without  
collapsing the logic.


Bruno








Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it  
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument  
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program  
computing the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers


Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.

Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y)  
to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you  
need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.





and I can emulate that with a rock.


Like with the pebble.



For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia  
computing the prime numbers.









..

much less give any useful results for physics.
No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at  
all.

You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine  
totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp!



?

You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is  
not Turing emulable in the brain?









You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't  
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps  
this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and  
the mathematician.
Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me  
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that  
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math  
and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a  
branch of math).
I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the  
actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a  
widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are  
incompatible (without adding non-comp magic).
Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the  
second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to  
understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen  
the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is  
false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that  
QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum  
tautologies (until now).


Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM.


Exact.

Comp implies trivially the many-dreams. It is QM which confirms the  
many dreams aspect, and so use of it to get the measure right.





You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a  
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation  
of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was  
readily shown that such thought experiments were completely  
orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.


No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark).  
You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics.


We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already  
been explained in detail: please reread the posts.







Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause.  
Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the  
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection  
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no  
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In  
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a  
specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate  
logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you  
can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum  
operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed.


UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of  
some observable is already proved. Of course position and momentum are  
not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived.


Again, I am not proposing a new theory, I show that two old antic  
theories, often confused or used simultaneously are incompatible. Then  
I show that appearance of matter is already justified at the  
propositional level, so comp is not yet refuted.






My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem,  
but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental  
science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory  
of mind.


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness  
supervenes on the physical brain,


Only if you add some amount of magic in both the brain and matter:  
which one. I ask the theory, the math, not religious mantra like  
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. Today materialist  
believe that consciousness sueprvenes on the rbain *because*

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason



On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:


  If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in  
arithmetic
  per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic,  
since

  emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that  
is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think  
emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by  
discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a  
4D manifold from the laws of physics)


Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my  
understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic  
postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis  
emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time  
was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold  
is not actually derived from anything other than observation.


Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a  
necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe  
observation also proves the MUH wrong?


Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says  
everything happens in some universe. ;-)


Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but  
the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the  
logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness.


By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that  
no event can be nomologically inconsistent?  That is the same as  
denying there is any such thing as laws of physics.


A set of beliefs is consistent if it does not lead to a proof of a  
statement and its negation. By completeness we can say that a set of  
belief is consistent if there is a world satisfying those beliefs.


It can be nomonological or not. And it has a different semantics  
according to which theory, or which intensional nuance of a  
provability predicate it is applied.


We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip  [i] i~p,  
for [i] being a material hypostase.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-09 Thread LizR

On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


 That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on
 the physical brain


So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to
Maudlin and the MGA?

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the 
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which 
has to be abandoned.
The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content 
of the physical theories...


I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and 
then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both 
case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable.


These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change 
the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable 
consequences.


In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a 
branch of machine theology. Sure.


OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the computations 
of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so recovered 
contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of science -- and 
tested by observation and experiment -- then that disproves comp.


But then, later we have



Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.


Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered 
from the computations of the dovetailer?


I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing 
emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines are 
digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and complex 
numbers? Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot 
predict what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment?


As things stand, you do have a conflict here.

Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-09 Thread meekerdb


On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing 
emulable in the brain? 


Its interaction with the universe.  Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the 
universe is.  But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness 
supervenes on emulated brains.


Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

2015-06-09 Thread meekerdb


On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip  [i] i~p, for [i] being a 
material hypostase. 


?? What role does i play in the above?  Are you assuming i implies p?

Brent

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain

So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to 
Maudlin and the MGA?


Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a 
sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined 
ostensively.


It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you 
want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a 
neurological account? Or a personal account?


What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? 
Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of 
normal conscious brain activity) and ask it.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on 
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite 
simple matters.


The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose 
that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? 
is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?


No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But 
your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an 
overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical 
brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular 
metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the 
way of their science.


You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the 
phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel 
myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account.


I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to 
produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal 
consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it?


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it 
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument 
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing 
the prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers


Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.

Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to 
x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need 
a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.


You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno!
You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of 
eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing 
machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and 
another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the 
state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can 
do it!


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can 
emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for 
unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.


I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the 
prime numbers.


Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers and I can 
emulate that with a rock. For that matter, show me an arithmetical 
computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers.


..

much less give any useful results for physics.


No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all.
You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.


Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally 
useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp!



You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't 
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is 
the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the 
mathematician.


Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me 
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that 
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and 
cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of 
math).


I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual 
theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread 
belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without 
adding non-comp magic).


Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second 
part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the 
problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but 
want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows 
that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp 
many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now).


Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. You appear 
to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a 
while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation 
thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such 
thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and 
the MWI. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your 
cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the 
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection 
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no 
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In 
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a 
specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic 
and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive 
the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I 
might be a little more impressed.



My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but 
for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If 
that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind.


That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on 
the physical brain, and was produced by evolution over the course of 
time by completely natural processes. The details of the operation of 
the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of 
the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over 
these quite simple matters.


Bruce

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Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason