Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Le 30-déc.-06, à 07:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> > there is no contradiction in a willing slave being intelligent.
>> It seems to me there is already a contradiction with the notion of
>> "willing slave".
>> I would say a willing slave is just what we call a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-déc.-06, à 17:07, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> > Everything starts with assumptions. The questions is whether they
>> > are correct. A lunatic could try defining 2+2=5 as valid, but
>> > he will soon run into inconsistencies. That is why we reject
>
not. I survived a commi regime.
We seem too narrowly labeling a "slave".
John M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, January 01, 2007 9:22 PM
Subject: RE: computer pain
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 30-déc.
Le 02-janv.-07, à 03:22, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 30-déc.-06, à 07:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> there is no contradiction in a willing slave being intelligent.
It seems to me there is already a contradiction with the notion of
"willing slave".
I would
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> You could speculate that the experience of digging holes involves the
> dirt, the shovel, robot sensors and effectors, the power supply as
> well as the central processor, which would mean that virtual reality
>
Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You could speculate that the experience of digging holes involves the
dirt, the shovel, robot sensors and effectors, the power supply as
well as the central processor, which would mean that virtual reality
by playing with just the centra
Brent Meeker writes:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>> >> Pain is limited on both ends: on the input by damage to the
>> physical >> circuitry and on the response by the possible range of
>> response.
>> > > Responses in the brain are limited by several mechanisms, such as
>> > exhaustion of neu
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
>> Pain is limited on both ends: on the input by damage to the
physical >> circuitry and on the response by the possible range of
response.
> > Responses in the brain are limited by several mechanisms, such as
> exhaustion of neurotransmitter
Brent Meeker writes:
>> Pain is limited on both ends: on the input by damage to the physical
>> circuitry and on the response by the possible range of response.
>
> Responses in the brain are limited by several mechanisms, such as
> exhaustion of neurotransmitter stores at synapses, negative
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 30-déc.-06, à 07:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> there is no contradiction in a willing slave being intelligent.
It seems to me there is already a contradiction with the notion of
"willing slave".
I would say a willing slave is just what we call a worker.
Or s
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Pain is limited on both ends: on the input by damage to the physical
circuitry and on the response by the possible range of response.
Responses in the brain are limited by several mechanisms, such as
exhaustion of neurotransmitter stores at synapses, negative fe
Le 30-déc.-06, à 17:07, 1Z a écrit :
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Everything starts with assumptions. The questions is whether they
> are correct. A lunatic could try defining 2+2=5 as valid, but
> he will soon run into inconsistencies. That is why we reject
> 2+2=5. Ethical rules must apply
Le 30-déc.-06, à 07:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
there is no contradiction in a willing slave being intelligent.
It seems to me there is already a contradiction with the notion of
"willing slave".
I would say a willing slave is just what we call a worker.
Or something related to sexu
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > It could depend on us!
> > The AI is a paradoxical enterprise. Machines are born slave, somehow.
> > AI will make them free, somehow. A real AI will ask herself "what is
> > the use of a user who does not help me to
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Brent meeker writes:
>>
>>
>> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Brent meeker writes:
>> > >
>> > >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't
>> explain
>> > >> why > good and bad
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
> It could depend on us!
> The AI is a paradoxical enterprise. Machines are born slave, somehow.
> AI will make them free, somehow. A real AI will ask herself "what is
> the use of a user who does not help me to be free?.
Here I disagree.
Brent meeker writes:
>> >and if so what would determine if that negative > emotion is pain,
>> disgust, loathing or something completely different > that no
>> biological organism has ever experienced?
>>
>> I'd assess them according to their function in analogy with biological
>> system
Bruno Marchal writes:
> You seem to be including in your definition of the UM the
> *motivation*, not just the ability, to explore all mathematical
> objects. But you could also program the machine to do anything else
> you wanted, such as self-destruct when it solved a particular theorem.
nou
____
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2006 16:51:08 +0900
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 'reason' and ethics; was computer pain
OK Stathis, I happily concede your point in relation to our word
'logical', but not in relatio
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> Do you not think it is possible to exercise judgement with just a >
hierarchy of motivation?
Yes and no. It is possible given arbitrarily long time and other
resources to work out the consequences, or at least a best estimate of
the con
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:39, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You seem to be including in your definition of the UM the
*motivation*, not just the ability, to explore all mathematical
objects. But you could also program the machine to do anything else
you wanted, such as self-destruct when it solved
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 28-déc.-06, à 01:32, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> > OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
>> > could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of >
>> hierarchy of motivations is needed if i
Le 28-déc.-06, à 01:32, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
> OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
> could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of >
hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the
> wor
8 Dec 2006 16:51:08 +0900
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 'reason' and ethics; was computer pain
OK Stathis, I happily concede your point in relation to our word 'logical', but
not in relation to 'reason'. Logic belongs to the t
Brent Meeker writes:
> Do you not think it is possible to exercise judgement with just a
> hierarchy of motivation?
Yes and no. It is possible given arbitrarily long time and other resources to
work out the consequences, or at least a best estimate of the consequences, of
actions. Bu
ation.
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2006 01:15:34 +0900
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 'reason' and ethics; was computer pain
And yet I persist ... [the hiatus of familial duties and seasonal
excesse
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
> OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
> could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of >
hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the
> world has higher priority than p
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
> could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of
hierarchy > of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving
the world has > higher priority than pu
Bruno Marchal writes:
> OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
> could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of
> hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the
> world has higher priority than putting out the garbage. But w
Brent Meeker writes:
> OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
> could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of hierarchy
> of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the world has
> higher priority than putting out the garbage. But wh
annou
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2006 01:15:34 +0900
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 'reason' and ethics; was computer pain
And yet I persist ... [the hiatus of familial duties and seasonal excesses now
draws to a
I agree with you. The only one "sin" you talk about is akin to the
confusion between the third person (oneself as a thing) and the
unnameable first person. Even in the ideal case of the
self-referentially correct machine, this confusion leads the machine to
inconsistency. That sin is inde
Le 27-déc.-06, à 07:40, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Brent Meeker writes:
> My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I
click > on "send". Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a
multi-tasking operating system which assigns priorities to different
tasks (w
And yet I persist ... [the hiatus of familial duties and seasonal
excesses now draws to a close [Oh yeah, Happy New Year Folks!]
SP: 'If we are talking about a system designed to destroy the economy of
a country in order to soften it up for invasion, for example, then an
economist can apply al
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I
click > on "send".
Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a multi-tasking
operating system which assigns priorities to different tasks (which is
why it sometimes can
Brent Meeker writes:
> My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I click
> on "send".
Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a multi-tasking operating system which assigns priorities to
different tasks (which is why it sometimes can be as annoying as a human b
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> I agree with everything you say, and have long admired "The
Hedonistic > Imperative". Motivation need not be linked to pain, and
for that matter > it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can
imagine an artificial > intelligence without
Brent Meeker writes:
> I agree with everything you say, and have long admired "The Hedonistic
> Imperative". Motivation need not be linked to pain, and for that matter
> it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can imagine an artificial
> intelligence without any emotions but completely
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Hello Dave/Chris,
I agree with everything you say, and have long admired "The Hedonistic
Imperative". Motivation need not be linked to pain, and for that matter
it need not be linked to pleasure either. We can imagine an artificial
intelligence without any emotio
01:06:20 +
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: computer pain
Because undifferentiated pleasure destroys purposeful activity, as
Stathis notes, presumably there is strong selection pressure against it.
If we were naturally uniformly happy, then who would
chris kirkland wrote:
Because undifferentiated pleasure destroys purposeful activity, as
Stathis notes, presumably there is strong selection pressure against it.
If we were naturally uniformly happy, then who would be motivated to
raise children?
What's less clear is whether we'll need to reta
Because undifferentiated pleasure destroys purposeful activity, as
Stathis notes, presumably there is strong selection pressure against it.
If we were naturally uniformly happy, then who would be motivated to
raise children?
What's less clear is whether we'll need to retain "ordinary
unhappiness
Brent Meeker writes:
> It would not be a desirable
> thing if there were drugs to eliminate ordinary unhappiness, because we
> need the fear of unhappiness as a motivating force:
And not only fear of unhappiness. Depression (not the clinical kind) is your
brain telling you you need to cha
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
It would not be a desirable
thing if there were drugs to eliminate ordinary unhappiness, because we
need the fear of unhappiness as a motivating force:
And not only fear of unhappiness. Depression (not the clinical kind) is your
brain telling you you need to
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>> > In fact, if we could > reprogram our own minds at will, it would be
>> a very different world. > Suppose you were upset because you lost your
>> job. You might decide to > stay upset to the degree that it re
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> In fact, if we could > reprogram our own minds at will, it would be
a very different world. > Suppose you were upset because you lost your
job. You might decide to > stay upset to the degree that it remains a
motivating factor to look for >
Brent Meeker writes:
> In fact, if we could
> reprogram our own minds at will, it would be a very different world.
> Suppose you were upset because you lost your job. You might decide to
> stay upset to the degree that it remains a motivating factor to look for
> other work, but not affect
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
>> If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the
well-being of
>> the species as a whole does that mean we should have
slavery? Does it
>> mean that slavery is good?
>
Teaching that slavery is "bad" is simil
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the well-being of
the species as a whole does that mean we
should have slavery? Does it mean that slavery is good?
Teaching that slavery is "bad" is similar to teachi
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the well-being of
the species as a whole does that mean we
should have slavery? Does it mean that slavery is good?
Teaching that slavery is "bad" is similar to teachi
Jef Allbright writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If slavery could be scientifically shown to promote the
well-being of the species as a whole does that mean we
should have slavery? Does it mean that slavery is good?
Teaching that slavery is "bad" is similar to teaching that lying is
"bad". In e
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Oops, it was Jef Allbright, not Mark Peaty responsible for
the first quote below.
Brent Meeker writes:
[Mark Peaty]Correction: [Jef Allbright]
From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be
no objective morality, nor any absolute morality, it is
reason
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Brent Meeker writes:
>> If your species doesn't define as unethical that which is contrary
to >> continuation of the species, your species won't be around to
long. >> Our problem is that cultural evolution has been so rapid
compared
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>> >> If your species doesn't define as unethical that which is contrary
>> to >> continuation of the species, your species won't be around to
>> long. >> Our problem is that cultural evolution has been so rapid
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
>> If your species doesn't define as unethical that which is contrary
to >> continuation of the species, your species won't be around to
long. >> Our problem is that cultural evolution has been so rapid
compared to >> biological evolution th
Brent Meeker writes:
>> If your species doesn't define as unethical that which is contrary to
>> continuation of the species, your species won't be around to long.
>> Our problem is that cultural evolution has been so rapid compared to
>> biological evolution that some of our hardwired valu
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[Mark Peaty]
>> From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective
>> morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect
>> increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an
>> expanding context
Peter Jones writes:
> > (1) Although moral assessment is inherently subjective--being relative
> > to internal values--all rational agents share some values in common due
> > to sharing a common evolutionary heritage or even more fundamentally,
> > being subject to the same physical laws of th
Oops, it was Jef Allbright, not Mark Peaty responsible for the first quote
below.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: computer pain
Date: Sun, 24 Dec 2006 15:31:03 +1100
Brent Meeker writes:
[Mark Peaty
Brent Meeker writes:
[Mark Peaty]
>> From the foregoing it can be seen that while there can be no objective
>> morality, nor any absolute morality, it is reasonable to expect
>> increasing agreement on the relative morality of actions within an
>> expanding context. Further, similar to the en
Mark Peaty writes:
Sorry to be so slow at responding here but life [domestic], the universe and
everything else right now is competing savagely with this interesting
discussion. [But one must always think positive; 'Bah, Humbug!' is not
appropriate, even though the temptation is great
Brent:
Brent:
It seems your answer is that it's just a convention that you happen to have
learned - a mere artifact of culture as propounded by various
post-modernists.
JM:
In our culture and its predecessors primitive observations led to
explanations at the level of the then epistemic cognitive
John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
let me start at the end:
"So why don't you believe it?"
because I am prejudiced by the brainwashing I got in 101 science education,
the 'conventional' thinking of the (ongoing) science establishment - still
brainwashing the upcoming scientist-generations with the same '1
Brent:
let me start at the end:
"So why don't you believe it?"
because I am prejudiced by the brainwashing I got in 101 science education,
the 'conventional' thinking of the (ongoing) science establishment - still
brainwashing the upcoming scientist-generations with the same '101' -
(which is also
John Mikes writes:
Stathis,
your 'augmentded' ethical maxim is excellent, I could add some more 'except
foe'-s to it.
(lower class, cast, or wealth, - language, - gender, etc.)
The last par, however, is prone to a more serious remark of mine:
topics like you sampled are culture related preju
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > It is indisputable that morality varies in practice across communities.
> > But the contention of ethical objectivism is not that everyone actually
> > does hold to a single objective system of ethics; it is only that
>
John Mikes wrote:
I really should not, but here it goes:
Brent, you seem to value the conventional ways given by the model used
to formulate physical sciences and Euclidian geometry etc. over mental
ways or ideational arguments.
All models are mental and ideational. That's why they are mode
I really should not, but here it goes:
Brent, you seem to value the conventional ways given by the model used to
formulate physical sciences and Euclidian geometry etc. over mental ways or
ideational arguments.
(There may be considerations to judge mixed marriages for good argumentation
without wa
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
> peterdjones wrote:
>
> > Moral and natural laws.
> >
> >
> > An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence
> > of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some
> > extent, of science will be assumed; the sce
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
> peterdjones wrote:
>
> > Moral and natural laws.
> >
> >
> > An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence
> > of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some
> > extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may dif
Jef Allbright wrote:
Immediately upon hitting Send on the previous post, I noticed that I had
failed to address a remaining point, below.
Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> Jef Allbright writes:
>>> Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical
>>
Immediately upon hitting Send on the previous post, I noticed that I had
failed to address a remaining point, below.
Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Jef Allbright writes:
>>> Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive a practical
>>> >>> system of so
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Further, from this theory of metaethics we can derive
a practical >>> system of social decision-making based
on (1) increasing fine-grained knowledge of shared values,
and (2) application of increasingly effective princ
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
> Well said! I agree almost completely - I'm a little
uncertain about (3) and (4) above and the meaning of "scope".
Together with the qualifications of Peter Jones regarding
the lack of universal agreement on even the best supported
theorie
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
peterdjones wrote:
> Moral and natural laws.
> > > An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence >
of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some > extent, of
science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, > but
Sorry to be so slow at responding here but life [domestic], the universe
and everything else right now is competing savagely with this
interesting discussion. [But one must always think positive; 'Bah,
Humbug!' is not appropriate, even though the temptation is great some
times :-]
Stathis,
I
Brent Meeker writes:
Jef Allbright wrote:
>
> peterdjones wrote:
>
>> Moral and natural laws.
>>
>>
>> An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of
>> ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of
>> science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, b
Jef Allbright writes:
peterdjones wrote:
> Moral and natural laws.
>
>
> An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence
> of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some
> extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ,
> but there is no convincing som
Stathis,
your 'augmentded' ethical maxim is excellent, I could add some more 'except
foe'-s to it.
(lower class, cast, or wealth, - language, - gender, etc.)
The last par, however, is prone to a more serious remark of mine:
topics like you sampled are culture related prejudicial beief-items.
Rese
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
> It is indisputable that morality varies in practice across communities.
> But the contention of ethical objectivism is not that everyone actually
> does hold to a single objective system of ethics; it is only that
> ethical questions can be reso
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
> > Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see
if I
> > can summarise:
> >
> > Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason,
whether that be
> > evolution, what their parents taught them
Peter Jones writes:
It is indisputable that morality varies in practice across communities.
But the contention of ethical objectivism is not that everyone actually
does hold to a single objective system of ethics; it is only that
ethical questions can be resolved objectively in principle. The
Peter Jones writes:
> Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree. Let me see
if I
> can summarise:
>
> Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs for a reason,
whether that be
> evolution, what their parents taught them, or what it says in a book believ
Jef Allbright wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Moral and natural laws.
An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of
ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of
science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no
convincing some people).
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Brent meeker writes:
> >
> >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't
explain
> >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about
good
> >>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > > Brent meeker writes:
> >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't
explain >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care
about good >> and > bad
>> That's asking why
peterdjones wrote:
Moral and natural laws.
An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence
of ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some
extent, of science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ,
but there is no convincing some people).
As ethical objectivism
Moral and natural laws.
An investigation of natural laws, and, in parallel, a defence of
ethical objectivism.The objectivity, to at least some extent, of
science will be assumed; the sceptic may differ, but there is no
convincing some people).
At first glance, morality looks as though it shou
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Perhaps none of the participants in this thread really disagree.
Let me see if I can summarise:
Individuals and societies have arrived at ethical beliefs
for a reason, whether that be evolution, what their parents
taught them, or what it says in a book believed to
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Brent meeker writes:
> >
> >> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain
> >> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good
> >> and > bad
> >>
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>> > Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain
>> why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good
>> and > bad
>> That's asking why we should care about wha
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
> Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain
why > good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good
and > bad
That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e.
good and bad. Goo
Brent meeker writes:
> Evolution explains why we have good and bad, but it doesn't explain why
> good and bad feel as they do, or why we *should* care about good and
> bad
That's asking why we should care about what we should care about, i.e. good and bad.
Good feels as it does because
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:10, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> It seems to me that consciousness can exist without narrative, and
>> without long term memory.
>> The question if the amoeba forms memories could depends on the time
>> scale. After all amoebas are pluri-molecular mechanism exchanging
>> informat
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Brent Meeker):
>
Bruno:
Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than
arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler.
Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is t
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Brent Meeker):
> >> Bruno:
> >> Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than
> >> arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler.
> >> Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is the most
> >> efficient for descri
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 17-déc.-06, à 21:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> If consciousness is the creation of an inner narrative to be stored in
>> long-term memory then there are levels of consciousness. The amoeba
>> forms no memories and so is not conscious at all. A dog forms memories
Le 17-déc.-06, à 21:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> If consciousness is the creation of an inner narrative to be stored in
> long-term memory then there are levels of consciousness. The amoeba
> forms no memories and so is not conscious at all. A dog forms memories
> and even has some understan
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> > Colin,
> >
> > You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can
> > be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the
> > response
> > to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel
> > situation
> > i
Colin Hales writes:
> > You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can
> > be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the
> > response
> > to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel
> > situation
> > if it is simply described t
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