On 21 Dec 2011, at 23:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only
On 22 Dec 2011, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict
On 22 Dec 2011, at 00:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 05:49:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...snip...
Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle 323?
I don't believe so.
So you agree that comp entails 323?
This makes even harder my understanding of
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 23:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single
On 21 Dec 2011, at 23:24, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 01:06:45PM +, David Nyman wrote:
Russell, isn't it central to the multiverse view that distinct,
univocal observer experiences supervene on each branch? In which
case, isn't it correct to apply Maudlin's argument
On 22 Dec 2011, at 15:40, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 23:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish
On 12/22/2011 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Quantum computing is a specific process of exploiting entangled
states. I do not mean that, and think it unlikely that nature works
that way (contra Penrose). Supervenience over multiple MW branches
does not entail that sort of quantum computing.
But
Hello, Everythinglisters!
The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may represent.
I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to hear
your opinion about what it says.
Thanks!
A simpler model of
Hello everyone and everything,
I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have another
MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created that one too)
seems to have split into at least two different discussions, both of which
are largely different from what I have to
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 03:40:47PM +0100, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Let's call the precise computational state of the computer a
microstate. Then it is clear that the MGA applies to microstates, so
you get into trouble when you assume that some specific evolution of
the computer defined in
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 03:53:09PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When I say that the movie is thinking, it is in the frame of both
comp *and* the physical supervenience thesis, and it is to get the
reductio ad absurdum.
OK - but how does supervenvience cause the reductio in this case? Or
is it
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 12:06:54PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Dec 2011, at 00:30, Russell Standish wrote:
Maybe you haven't explained the 323 principle properly. My
understanding was that if a program did not need register 323 in order
to be conscious, then it would be possible to
Joseph,
I found your post very interesting. While I agree with your conclusion,
how I get there is a little different.
I think that at the time all of Alice's neuronal firings are triggered by
random particles she is a zombie. It is less clear in the case of a single
malfunctioning neuron.
On Dec 22, 7:13 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
This is because of the modularity of our brains:
Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some neurons
may serve only as communication links between different regions in the
brain, while others may be involved in
On 12/22/2011 7:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 22, 7:13 pm, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
This is because of the modularity of our brains:
Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some neurons
may serve only as communication links between different regions in
Their experiment consisted of people clicking on the image of a word spoken
aloud. They found it took people longer for similar sounding words, such
as when present with an image of candy and candle. From this, they
concluded:
In thinking of cognition as working as a biological organism does,
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Joseph,
I found your post very interesting. While I agree with your conclusion,
how I get there is a little different.
I think that at the time all of Alice's neuronal firings are triggered by
random particles she is
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:21 PM, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Joseph,
I found your post very interesting. While I agree with your conclusion,
how I get there is a little different.
I think that at
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:21 PM, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote:
Joseph,
I found your post very interesting. While I agree with
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 10:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:21 PM, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Jason Resch
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:08 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.comwrote:
I am truly agnostic. I really have no earthly idea. But assuming
computationalism, as in the MGA, I have to say yes. With this assumption,
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 04:27:28PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:
Regarding Maudlin’s argument: Russell has recently stated that Maudlin’s
argument doesn’t work in a multiverse, and that consciousness is thus a
multiverse phenomenon. I disagree for the same reason that Bruno disagrees:
the
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