[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So Bruno says that:
a) I am a machine.
b) ...no man can grasp all aspect of man
Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of
humanness that is more than a machine (i.e.
simply following a set of instructions).
Jef and Brent
Norman Samish wrote:
Why is there something rather than nothing?
When I heard that Famous Question, I did not assume that nothing was
describable - because, if it was, it would not be nothing. I don't think
of nothing as an empty bitstring - I think of it as the absence of a
bitstring
Hal Ruhl a écrit :
Hi Bruno:
As I see it, to hold that numbers are the precursor
existence of all else is a selection.
I would not hold that one is the precursor of the other.
Rather I suggested that both could actually be the same.
Georges.
Hal Ruhl a écrit :
Hi Georges:
Hi Hal,
I was responding to Bruno's comments. However, I
would have the same response to your
position. Why that selection?
I wrote could. This means that it *could* be that all else be
wihtin (and identical to) the world of numbers. Indeed, it could
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
Context: this is a conjecture/speculation.
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
In
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
John M a écrit :
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
I am not sure to understand what you mean by REAL here.
There are arguments against solipsism. Wittgenstein for
instance produced some. None of them is lilkey to be
decisive. They may work with some
John M wrote:
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our
stupidity may allow also all the bad things that
happen.)
2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for
ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession?
or is it an elitist heaughtiness to
John M wrote:
--- Georges Quénot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John M wrote:
[...]
Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
I probably missed your point.
[...]
By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things
into my mind after my
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
There might be universes interacting one with each other
(though from my viewpoint I would tend to consider a set
of interactive universes as a single universe) but it
might also be that the one in which we live is among
the ones that are
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Georges Quénot wrote:
|...]
And what about 3. ?
if every universe is instantiated, wolrds where everyone is a sorcerer
and no-one is a muggle are instantiated.
That was mot my 3. There might be worlds with only muggles,
worlds with only sorcerers, worlds
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-mars-06, à 14:09, Georges Quénot a écrit :
I am sorry. I don't see. What Comp can say about the relation
between first and third person concepts that could not be said
in a simple mathematical-monism context?
But this just depend of your theory of mind.
With
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Georges Quenot wrote:
If you are a being that have never observed magical events
any duplicate of you will never have observed any magical
event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be
true duplicates).
That doesn't work the other way round
Georges Quenot a écrit :
SKIP
I consider the possibility that mind emerges from matter
activity. I think that modern physics and the synthetic
theory of evolution provide a resonable (though partial)
account for the technical capabilities of the human
mind. What remains unclear to me
peterdjones wrote:
[...] What we can be sure of is that
1) we exist
2) we are conscious
3) there is some sort of external world
4) there is some phenomenon of time.
*You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do
not decide for others.
These are all quite problematical for
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
[...]
(To put it another way: the point is to explain
experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
to ad-hoc hypotheses about
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence.
Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and physical) ?
For various historical
Hi all,
I am Georges Quénot. I have a PhD in Computer Science. I have worked
on computer architectures dedicated to speech recognition and image
processing. I am now more on the software side and I am working in
the field of Multimedia Information Retrieval. My main work is not
so related to the
I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon,
3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several
similar other ones:
Given the source code for the simulation of our universe, it would
seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a
certain
Georges Quenot wrote:
[...]
I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
question of what happens (in the simulated universe) in any non-
synchronous simulation when the simulation diverges ?
Thanks
John M wrote:
Dear Georges,
to your series of questions I would like to add one as first:
What do you call universe?
I would naively answer: the universe in which I live
according to the current intuition I have of it. I am
not sure this makes sense and I also understand that
others may have
John M wrote:
George Q wrote (among many others, full post see below):
A.the universe in which I live according to the current intuition
I have of it
and
B: the possibility to simulate the universe at any level of accuracy.
First I wanted to ask what is intuition, but let us stay with
Norman Samish :
Max Tegmark, at http://207.70.190.98/toe.pdf, published in Annals of
Physics, 270, 1-51 (1998), postulates that all structures that exist
mathematically exist also physically.
Max Tegmark postulated or conjectured even more in that paper:
that the distinction between
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
problem) to accept a Platonic existence for *the* integers.
I am far from sure however that this does not involve a
significant amount of faith.
Indeed. It needs
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 09:45 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
problem) to accept a Platonic existence for *the* integers.
I am far from sure
In a previous post in reply to Hal Finnay, I have suggested the use
of a particuliar case of additional conditions to the hypothetical
set of equation that would rule ou universe. This is an attempt
to clarify it while taking it out from the computation perspective
with which it has nothing to do.
Hal Finney wrote:
Georges Quenot writes:
Considering the kind of set of equation we figure up to now,
completely specifying our universe from them seems to require
two additional things:
1) The specification of boundary conditions (or any other equivalent
additional constraint
Wei Dai wrote:
On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 05:32:05PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
relativity; there is no reason for the approach not being possible
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 13:36 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It seems, but it isn't. Well, actually I have known *one* mathematician,
(a russian logician) who indeed makes a serious try to develop
some mathematics without that infinite act of faith (I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:14 13/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical property
independent of us because there is no thing on which they would
apply independentkly of us. What we would call their arithmetical
properties is simply a set
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.
Justification:
1) Given
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might appear so only in our minds (and/or in other types of minds).
Georges.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might
Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to
erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual
boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a
potential to erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this
potential. Actual boundaries
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Darwin seems to have felt this way about Origins [Stephen Gould's The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory, page 2] so why should my ideas be
special?
We agree here. Interesting reference.
Georges.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi George:
Hi Hal,
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an
All and a Nothing.
The prohibition does not come from an anemia of
Hal Ruhl wrote:
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All,
Nothing] pair have a conceptual foundation within the All. Why would
the [All, Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent
physical expression?
Well... It seems that we do not share the same
rmiller wrote:
This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
Might be. And was Hume finally able to conclude something ?
Georges.
John Collins wrote:
There do exist consistent approaches to set theory where you do have a
universal set and can therefore consider taking complements to be a
sinle-argument operation. to bypass the obvious paradox (that any set can be
used to make a necessarily larger powerset) you need to
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