[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So Bruno says that:
a) "I am a machine."
b) "...no man can grasp all aspect of man"
Tom says that to philosophize is one aspect of
humanness that is more than a machine (i.e.
simply following a set of instructions).
Jef and Bre
Norman Samish wrote:
>
>"Why is there something rather than nothing?"
>
> When I heard that Famous Question, I did not assume that "nothing" was
> describable - because, if it was, it would not be "nothing." I don't think
> of "nothing" as an empty bitstring - I think of it as the absence of
Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> Hi Bruno:
>
> As I see it, to hold that numbers are the precursor
> existence of all else is a selection.
I would not hold that one is the precursor of the other.
Rather I suggested that both could actually be the same.
Georges.
--~--~-~--~~~---
John M a écrit :
>
> Bruno wrote:
>
> "What can be said about numbers is that it is
> impossible to explain what numbers are to someone who
> does not already knows what they are..."
>
>
>
> "..If a TOE does not implicitly or explicitly
> presupposes the existetnce of natural numbers, then
>
Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> Hi Georges:
Hi Hal,
> I was responding to Bruno's comments. However, I
> would have the same response to your
> position. Why that selection?
I wrote "could". This means that it *could* be that "all else" be
wihtin (and identical to) the "world of numbers". Indeed, i
Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> Hi Georges:
>
> The key division of my list of possible properties of objects is:
> [empty [read the "Nothing"]:all other properties [read my All[perhaps
> the Everything]]]. The Nothing is incomplete [there is a meaningful
> question it must answer but of course can n
Norman Samish wrote:
>
> I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself, contain any meaningful
> information. Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program, but
> there has to be an executive program to execute the executable program.
>
> The multiverse has to therefore consist
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>Georges wrote:
>
>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
Context: this is a conjecture/speculation.
> This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
> object.
> Otherwise it is nonsense.
In http://space.mit.edu/home/tegma
Georges Quenot wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Georges wrote:
>>
>>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>
> Context: this is a conjecture/speculation.
>
>> This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 14-mars-06, à 10:31, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
>> [...]
>> I feel that the computational approach is a wrong direction
>> for the question of existence.
>
> The question is whether comp is true or not. If comp is false then it
&
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> [...]
> I should have said that the appearance of a universe cannot entirely be
> a mathematical object from the internal (first person) point of view.
> Arguably so with comp or with weaker hyp.
I feel a strong ambiguity about the possible sense of
"appearance" here.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Georges wrote:
>>> - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
>> This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
>> object.
>> Otherwise it is nonsense.
>
> No, because all mathematical objects, as mathemat
John M a écrit :
>
> to more recent posts:
>
> 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
I am not sure to understand what you mean by "REAL" here.
There are arguments against solipsism. Wittgenstein for
instance produced some. None of them is lilkey to be
decisive. They may work with som
John M wrote:
>
> to more recent posts:
>
> 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our
> stupidity may allow also all the bad things that
> "happen".)
>
> 2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for
> ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession?
> or is it an elitist heaug
John M wrote:
>
> --- Georges Quénot <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> John M wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
>> Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
>> I probably missed your point.
>>
>>> [...]
>>> By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such thing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>
>> There might be universes interacting one with each other
>> (though from my viewpoint I would tend to consider a set
>> of interactive universes as a single universe) but it
>> might also be that the one in which we live is among
>> the one
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>
>> |...]
>> And what about 3. ?
>
> if every universe is instantiated, wolrds where everyone is a sorcerer
> and no-one is a muggle are instantiated.
That was mot my 3. There might be worlds with only muggles,
worlds with only sorcerers,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 19-mars-06, à 14:09, Georges Quénot a écrit :
>
>> I am sorry. I don't see. What Comp can say about the relation
>> between first and third person concepts that could not be said
>> in a "simple" "mathematical-monism" context?
>
> But this just depend of your theory
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>>
>> If you are a being that have never observed magical events
>> any duplicate of you "will" never have observed any magical
>> event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be
>>
Georges Quenot a écrit :
SKIP
> I consider the possibility that mind emerges from matter
> activity. I think that modern physics and the synthetic
> theory of evolution provide a resonable (though partial)
> account for the "technical" capabilities of the human
> mind
peterdjones wrote:
>
> [...] What we can be sure of is that
> 1) we exist
> 2) we are conscious
> 3) there is some sort of external world
> 4) there is some phenomenon of time.
*You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do
not decide for others.
> These are all quite problematical
peterdjones wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
> [...]
> (To put it another way: the point is to explain
> experience. Physicalism explains non-experience
> of HP universes by saying they don't exist. MM appeals
peterdjones wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> peterdjones wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
>>>> mathematical existence and physical existence.
>>> Then why do we use two di
Hi all,
I am Georges Quénot. I have a PhD in Computer Science. I have worked
on computer architectures dedicated to speech recognition and image
processing. I am now more on the software side and I am working in
the field of Multimedia Information Retrieval. My main work is not
so related to the s
I start from a part of this post from David Barrett-Lennard (Mon,
3 Nov 2003 19:48:49) but I could probably hev selected several
similar other ones:
> Given the "source code" for the simulation of our universe, it would
> seem to be possible to add some extra instructions that test for a
> certain
Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> [...]
> I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
> about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
> question of what "happens" (in the simulated universe) in any non-
> synchronous simulation &q
John M wrote:
>
> Dear Georges,
> to your series of questions I would like to add one as first:
> "What do you call universe?"
I would naively answer: the universe in which I live
according to the current intuition I have of it. I am
not sure this makes sense and I also understand that
others may
John M wrote:
>
> George Q wrote (among many others, full post see below):
>
> A."the universe in which I live according to the current intuition
> I have of it"
> and
> B:> the possibility to simulate the universe at any level of accuracy. <
>
> First I wanted to ask what is intuition, but let
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> > Also I feel some confusion between the questions "Is the universe
> > computable ?" and "Is the universe actually 'being' computed ?".
> > What links do the participants see be
Norman Samish :
>
> Max Tegmark, at http://207.70.190.98/toe.pdf, published in Annals of
> Physics, 270, 1-51 (1998), postulates that "all structures that exist
> mathematically exist also physically."
Max Tegmark postulated or conjectured even more in that paper:
that the distinction between mat
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
> >problem) to accept a "Platonic existence" for *the* integers.
> >I am far from sure however that this does no
Hal Finney wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot writes:
> > I would be interested in reading the opinions of the participants
> > about that point and about the sense that could be given to the
> > question of what "happens" (in the simulated universe) in any non-
>
John M wrote:
>
> [...]
> If you consider (the) (your) universe, something according to YOUR
> current intuition what YOU have of it, then there is nothing else upon which
> you can "simulate" it. You definitely need something ELSE on which
> a simluation can be based. More than just your intuitio
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 09:45 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > > At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> > >
> > > >I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
> >
In a previous post in reply to Hal Finnay, I have suggested the use
of a particuliar case of additional conditions to the hypothetical
set of equation that would rule ou universe. This is an attempt
to clarify it while taking it out from the computation perspective
with which it has nothing to do.
Hal Finney wrote:
>
> Georges Quenot writes:
> > Considering the kind of set of equation we figure up to now,
> > completely specifying our universe from them seems to require
> > two additional things:
> >
> > 1) The specification of boundary conditions (or an
Wei Dai wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 05:32:05PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> > Many other way of simulating the universe could be considered like
> > for instance a 4D mesh (if we simplify by considering only general
> > relativity; there is no reason for the app
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 13:36 09/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
> >Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > It seems, but it isn't. Well, actually I have known *one* mathematician,
> > > (a russian logician) who indeed makes a serious try to develop
> &g
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> At 10:14 13/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> >Some people do argue that there is no arithmetical property
> >independent of us because there is no thing on which they would
> >apply independentkly of us. What we would call their arithmeti
Eugen Leitl :
>
> On Tue, Jan 13, 2004 at 05:30:10PM +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>
> > No. They actually came to me while I was figuring some other
> > ways of simulating a universe than the sequential one that seemed
> > to give rise to many problems to me. T
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.
Justification:
1) Given definiti
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> 4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might appear so only in our minds (and/or in other types of minds).
Georges.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
are the result of unavoidable definition and logic
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
> >
> > Hal Ruhl wrote:
> > >
> > > 4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
> >
> > That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
> > deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everythin
Georges Quenot wrote:
>
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
> >
> > Hal Ruhl wrote:
> > >
> > > 4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
> >
> > That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only somethi
Hal Ruhl wrote:
> [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to bui
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to
erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual
boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
> [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it
Hal Ruhl wrote:
> At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
> [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a
potential to erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this
potential. Actual boundaries ar
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Darwin seems to have felt this way about "Origins" [Stephen Gould's "The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory", page 2] so why should my ideas be
special?
We agree here. Interesting reference.
Georges.
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
Hi George:
Hi Hal,
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an
All and a Nothing.
The "prohibition" does not "come from" an anemia of
Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All,
Nothing] pair have a "conceptual" foundation within the All. Why would
the [All, Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent
"physical" expression?
Well... It seems that we do not share the same
rmiller wrote:
>
This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
Might be. And was Hume finally able to conclude something ?
Georges.
John Collins wrote:
>
There do exist consistent approaches to set theory where you do have a
universal set and can therefore consider taking complements to be a
sinle-argument operation. to bypass the obvious paradox (that any set can be
used to make a necessarily larger powerset) you need to conco
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