RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes I understand [Saibal's] point, but I think you are making an invalid assumption about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life. Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my mind

RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-02 Thread Lee Corbin
I continue to describe a different way of talking than that used by Stathis, who writes [Saibal writes] The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which include the effects of simulations) that there are indeed many more copies of you at t2. Yes, we can say that

RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit : [Stathis wrote] So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured. Good example, but I would say

RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes ...I think we may basically agree, but there are some differences. If you look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal identity over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inconsistent delusion. I'm not quite sure I understand why you say

RE: Equivalence

2005-06-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Sorry, but I don't have much of an idea of what is being discussed in this thread. Could you try to enlighten me? Rmiller originally wrote Equivalence If the individual exists simultaneously across a many-world manifold, then how can one even define a copy? Well, I would say this (i.e.,

RE: Functionalism and People as Programs

2005-06-04 Thread Lee Corbin
R. Miller writes Lee Corbin wrote: Stephen writes I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base the idea that copies could exist upon? It is a conjecture called functionalism (or one of its close variants). Functionalism, at least, in the social

Existence of Copies (was RE: Functionalism and People as Programs)

2005-06-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes Stephen writes I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base the idea that copies could exist upon? Don't worry about not going along with someone's program ;-) I think that you're just being polite by calling yourself a stick-in-the-mud. Why,

When and How Unconscious Processes Matter

2005-06-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent wrote -Original Message- From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 8:39 AM To: Everything-List Subject: RE: Functionalism and People as Programs I think there is considerable evidence to support the view that human level intelligence could be

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-04 Thread Lee Corbin
be ignored. Some time back Lee Corbin posed the question of which was more fundamental: observer-moments or universes? I would say, with more thought, that observer-moments are more fundamental in terms of explaining the subjective appearance of what we see, and what we can expect

Against Fundamentalism!

2005-06-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal Finney writes Lee Corbin writes: But in general, what do observer-moments explain? Or what does the hypothesis concerning them explain? I just don't get a good feel that there are any higher level phenomena which might be reduced to observer-moments (I am still very skeptical

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes All right. So you both (Hal Finney and Lee Corbin) with the first axiom Arghh! My new revelation says that axioms are fine if you are doing math. But some of us are doing something here that is entirely separate: philosophy. I love math; it is my hobby. But axioms and all

RE: Functionalism and People as Programs

2005-06-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno provides the exercise I notice that many people seek refuge in the no-copying theorem of QM. Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. My best guess right now? Your challenge would be a futile

RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes I believe that tomorrow I will become one of the people in the multiverse who believe they are me and share my memories. What if you have just taken Midazolam, and so won't remember any of this tomorrow? (I contend that you'll be them anyway.) When I think about this, I

RE: Another tedious hypothetical

2005-06-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Rich writes Another hypothetical. In 1939, let's say, a writer comes up with a sci-fi story, which is published the next year. It involves (let's say) a uranium bomb and a beryllium target in the Arizona desert that might blow up and cause problems for everyone. His main character is a

RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-07 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis wrote I got here this way: to be consistent, I must use all my knowledge to arrive at a class of events and processes that I approve of, and classes that I disapprove of. I decided that it was bad for me to suffer. Then since by physics, I seem to be any sufficiently

RE: Against Fundamentalism!

2005-06-07 Thread Lee Corbin
It's perfectly clear to me which of the two is more important: prediction or explanation? Now that I have been self-liberated from fear of circularity, it's clear that: each is more important than the other! Lee P.S. Someone pointed out to me off-list that I was far from the first to have had

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-22 Thread Lee Corbin
Hi everyone, I've been in heated discussions about duplicates for 39 years now, and so I just don't have much patience with it any more. I have not read many of the recent posts, but I have always gone along with the viewpoint that more runtime is good, and that it linearly bestows benefit on

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno wrote Le 23-juin-05, ? 05:38, Lee Corbin a ?crit : you *can* be in two places at the same time. From a third person pov: OK. From a first person pov: how? Right. From a first person... you cannot be. This further illustrates the limitations of the first person account, its

RE: the copy and the chair (was: torture yet again)

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
in, there will be a new, liberated instance that gets more life for Lee Corbin!

RE: another puzzle

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Here is yet another delightful Stathis experiment that I fished up from about ten days ago: Hal wrote Stathis Papaioannou writes: You find yourself in a locked room with no windows, and no memory of how you got there. The room is sparsely furnished: a chair, a desk, pen and paper, and

RE: another puzzle

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes Lee Corbin wrote: If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to be available to me on a specific date,... I would enthusiastically pay a good fraction of my net worth for this opportunity. Why? Why would I do it? Because logic grabs me

More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes First, I think that it's important to remove the qualifier identical here. Would two copies cease to be identical if one atom were out of place? I meant something more like running the same program Okay, that's fine. On another tack, you are the same person, etc., that

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes It's *not* aesthetic whether, say, George Bush is you or not. He's definitely not! He doesn't have your memories, for the first thing. It's simply objectively true that some programs---or some clumps of biological matter---are Jesse Mazur and others are not. (Even though

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes same here; if you are interested in knowing what the case is, and not merely what the appearances are, then you have to understand that you are a physical process, and it may so happen that you execute in different places, and in different times, and that overlaps are

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Eugen writes A program can run in two different places at the same time, and the program (treated as the pattern) is perfectly capable of receiving input X in one location at the same time that it No, program is the wrong model. You can have identical pieces of a bit pattern (CD-ROM,

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-28 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes This brings up an interesting conundrum that I raised three or four torture experiments ago. Given 10 instantiations of a person having an unpleasant experience E ... for example 10 sentient programs running in parallel, is it better, if we aim to reduce suffering, to (a)

People, Machines, and Manipulations

2005-06-28 Thread Lee Corbin
Eugen writes I am postulating that it *is* the same sequence of code bytes, the *same* program. Do you know what I mean when I say that program A is the same program as program B? An instantiated program is much more than a sequence of bytes -- it also has state. Most programs do not

RE: Continuity, Observer Moments and Memory of a Past

2005-06-28 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes [LC] I'm skeptical of continuity requirements. Now I do not believe in Greg Egan's equations in Permutation City: according to a premise of the story, it order to obtain the you of tomorrow, there is a short-cut alternative to just letting you run. And that is to

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-28 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes [Lee wrote] Here is the dreadful closest continuer method of Nozick and others. I claim it gives the wrong answer. Look, the continuation happens anyway, whether you die here or not! Especially if the events are outside each other's light cones, how can what happens

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes How about this? For ten million dollars, would you agree to have the last ten minutes of your memory erased, where you are now? These are all interesting questions that have bothered me for a long time. I think the most useful suggestion I can make about how to decide

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Jonathan writes I've sometimes wondered whether some anaesthetics might work this way: put you into a state of paralysis, and affect your short term memory. So you actually experience the doctor cutting you open, with all the concommitant pain, but you can't report it at the time and forget

RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)

2005-06-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Johnathan writes Lee Corbin wrote: When I was in high school, I read that dentists were considering use of a new anesthetic with this property. I was revolted, and even more revolted when none of my friends could see anything wrong with it. Experiences are real, whether you

To Eliminate Suffering

2005-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes I have not undergone conscious sedation myself, but I have administered the anaesthetic (midazolam, diazepam, propofol, fentanyl) for hundreds of gastroscopies and colonoscopies... The dose of the anaesthetic agent in conscious sedation is titrated according to how the

RE: How did he get his information?

2005-07-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes Hi Norman, Who gave this guy a Doctorate? That webpage appears to be merely an advertisement for a book. I think that your question is more important that the ramblings of Dr. Raj! I read the page and was pretty dubious myself, although I don't have the balls to

Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes Well, you've already admitted that a little memory loss does not threaten your identity! Recall the Aussies you wrote about who customarily lose an entire evening's inebriation :-) Yes, and I also admitted that there is an inconsistency in my position. Well, if you

RE: More is Better (anesthetic)

2005-07-03 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes It's interesting that during an operation, while the patient is well and truly unconscious, the same physiological response to a painful stimulus is seen as in an awake person: when the surgeon makes the first incision, heart rate and blood pressure immediately rise. If you

RE: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal writes I have been on vacation so I have a large backlog of messages to read! But they are very interesting and full of challenging ideas. I find this list to be one of the best I have ever been on in terms both of fearlessly exploring difficult areas and also remaining cordial and

RE: Duplicates Are Selves

2005-07-03 Thread Lee Corbin
Pete writes David Hume Quote In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in, those facts alone can't tell you how you should act. Okay. I agree. I too believe in the is/ought barrier, if

Definition of Self, Definition of People (was RE: Duplicates Are Selves)

2005-07-03 Thread Lee Corbin
Jonathan writes Hal wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and

RE: More is Better (anesthetic)

2005-07-04 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes [Lee wrote] I'm glad that even the appearance of pain in an unconscious patient is disturbing to physicians. That's very good. For the body to be experiencing pain---and presumably sending pain signals to the brain ---too closely resembles pain being experienced but with

Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)

2005-07-05 Thread Lee Corbin
, Lee Corbin a écrit : Yes, but I contend that while there are two organisms present, there is only one person. It's much as though some space aliens kidnapped you and tried to say that Pete at spacetime coordinates (X1,T1) could not possibly be the same person as Pete at coordinates (X1

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell writes I find it amazing that you claim I deny the existence of time. Au contraire, it is something I explicitly assume. My reading of Bruno's work is that time is implicitly assumed as part of computationalism (I know Bruno sometimes does not quite agree, but there you have it).

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-06 Thread Lee Corbin
Pete writes But isn't the use of time as the dimension along which things vary (or are 'processed') a somewhat arbitrary choice? I've wrote to the list before about a Game of Life simulation in which, instead of running the states of the automaton forward in time, erasing the

RE: Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)

2005-07-07 Thread Lee Corbin
that they are Lee Corbin it will be found that half of them saw a 1 and half saw a zero. It is preposterous to finger *any* of them and accuse them of not being me. They will each believe that they are me (i.e., the me here in the past). That is, for each Lee', they will assert Lee' = Lee. So also

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-08 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes Lee Corbin writes: But it is *precisely* that I cannot imagine how this stack of Life gels could possibly be thinking or be conscious that forces me to admit that something like time must play a role. Here is why: let's suppose that your stack of Life boards does

RE: Rép : Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)

2005-07-09 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the following bets: Immediate: A. I will see 0 on the wall. B. I will see 1 on the wall. C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall. D. I

Probabilistic Thinking (was Thought Experiment #269-G)

2005-07-10 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes But if you answer I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the wall then it makes it sound as though one of those cases will obtain but not the other. (This is usually how we talk when Bruno admits, for example, that tonight he either will watch TV *or* he will not

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-10 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal Finney writes Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in some sense), where there is no actual causality? You yourself have already provided the key example in imagining a two dimensional CA where the second

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-11 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes I wasn't very clear in my last post. What I meant was this: (a) A conscious program written in C is compiled on a computer. The C instructions are converted into binary code, and when this code is run, the program is self-aware. (b) The same conscious program is written

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-11 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes So again, is it enough to look at the natural laws of our universe in order to decide whether the consciousnesses within it are real? Or do we need more? Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in

RE: The Time Deniers

2005-07-12 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal Finney writes Lee Corbin writes: Hal Finney writes Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in some sense), where there is no actual causality? You yourself have already provided the key example

RE: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-25 Thread Lee Corbin
Aditya writes Although it is of course debatable, I hold that what we call reality is our minds' understanding of our sensory perceptions. It's just amazing on this list. Does no one speak up for realism? The *default* belief among *all* people up until they take their first fatal dive into

RE: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-25 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal writes I'd say they are *less* than models of reality. They are just consistency conditions on our models of reality. They are attempts to avoid talking nonsense. But note that not too long ago all the weirdness of quantum mechanics and relativity would have been regarded as

Reality vs. Perception of Reality

2005-07-25 Thread Lee Corbin
We all admit that it's easy to become confused. I myself regularly do so every day. In fact, you can't even learn anything until you first become confused. But there is *no* reason to become more confused than is necessary. The KEY DISTINCTION is between reality and perception of reality. This

RE: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-25 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell writes Sadly, your wish for the common sense understanding of reality to hold will be thwarted - the more one thinks about such things, the less coherent a concept it becomes. Well, all that I ask is that the *basics* be kept firmly in mind while we gingerly probe forward. The basics

RE: Reality vs. Perception of Reality

2005-07-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes Hi Lee, Beat around the 'bush', why don't you! You're right. I must be more direct. Okay, here it is: Philosophy is too important to be left to the philosophers. Academically, it has become an almost completely worthless cult. (I am *not* exaggerating one bit.) 'Reality',

What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes When 99% of the human race use the word reality, they mean the world outside their skins. If you sacrifice our common understanding of reality, then you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb. Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe

RE: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-26 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Look, it's VERY simple: take as a first baby-step the notion that the 19th century idea of a cosmos is basically true, and then add just the Big Bang. What we then have is a universe that operates under physical laws. So far---you'll readily agree---this is *very* simple

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor. The argument that

Recipe for becoming a Non-Realist

2005-07-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Recipe for becoming a non-realist. 1. Study your perceptions *introspectively*. This has several advantages. First, you are an authority (in fact, the ultimate authority) on your own perceptions, and so little in the way of humility will ever be needed. You can start out, as it were,

RE: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?

2005-07-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal wrote Brent Meeker wrote: In practice we use coherence with other theories to guide out choice. With that kind of constraint we may have trouble finding even one candidate theory. Well, in principle there still should be an infinite number of theories, starting with the data is

RE: Reality vs. Perception of Reality

2005-07-27 Thread Lee Corbin
Charles writes [col] I aologise in advance for my crap spelling. My fingers don;t type what I think. That's the relaity of it! :-) Do you have a spell-checker? Warning... I am also adopting Lee-style bombast because I feel like venting. Don't be too precious about it! :-) Blast away!

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-29 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes Lee Corbin wrote: Chris writes Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley. The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those perceptions is an unjustified inference

RE: Reality in the multiverse

2005-07-29 Thread Lee Corbin
Does everyone who is following the latest chapter of the book that Hal is evidently writing agree that there is no necessary conflict between it and more-or-less traditional realism? That is, I don't find anything too outre here; it seems to be an interesting but speculative theory about things

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse writes I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes because your brain is a part of an obviously successful survival machine designed by evolution. Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Aditya writes At the risk of barging in once again, Oh, please forget about all that! No one should apologize for it. Ever. I (Lee) had written When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice have of the world, we can easily see their limitations. What would we think of mice who

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-30 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Im dont know. Im in two minds now. I think my own objection to Sam Johnsons 'refutation' is based on a very strict definition of knowledge which entails some notion of certainty. To be only 99% certain is not enough on this definition to know something. Its a little sceptical

RE: OMs are events

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Saibal writes I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space. Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer,

Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell submits the following as clarifications: An event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It

RE: What We Can Know About the World

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes [Lee writes] [Jesse wrote] Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental level--something like the naturalistic panpsychism discussed on that webpage I mentioned.

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-07-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell writes John M. wrote I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. I agree: that is, so long as we can

RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)

2005-08-01 Thread Lee Corbin
Aditya writes [LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing.

RE: OMs are events

2005-08-01 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal writes I did mention the question of whether a given calculation instantiated a given OM. Maybe instantiate is not the right word there. I meant to consider the question of whether the first calculation added to the measure of the information structure corresponding to the OM. I think

RE: OMs are events

2005-08-02 Thread Lee Corbin
Brent writes Lee Corbin wrote: Hal writes I did mention the question of whether a given calculation instantiated a given OM. Maybe instantiate is not the right word there. I meant to consider the question of whether the first calculation added to the measure of the information

RE: OMs are events

2005-08-05 Thread Lee Corbin
Hal asks How about the case of mathematical proofs? Could an entire proof exist Platonically? A proof has a sort of time-like flow to it, causal dependency of later steps on earlier ones. It seems to be an interesting intermediate case. My tentative opinion is that it does make sense to

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-07 Thread Lee Corbin
Jesse and Norman gave excellent reasons for us not to abandon the objective stance. About Norm's post, I agree with I realize that different observers must see different versions of events, but so what? In our 3+1 dimensional universe, couldn't objective reality be defined as the state of

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-08 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Le 07-août-05, à 21:24, John M a écrit : Reality is supposed to be something independent from our personal manipulations Srtictly speaking I do not agree. Some satellites of Earth are human made, and local physical reality can depends, at least locally, on us. Sure, but

RE: Maudlin's Machine and the UDist

2005-08-08 Thread Lee Corbin
Y. X might be, for example, a calculation that proves 1,000,000,000,061 is prime. And Y might be Lee Corbin. As it takes a much, much shorter program to give rise to X than to Y (I say not with just a trace of pride), the measure of X is greater than that of Y (unfortunately for me). What

RE: Maudlin's Machine and the UDist

2005-08-08 Thread Lee Corbin
Russell said (Hal's paraphrase) I guess that you would say that if the unused counterfactual machinery would actually work if tested, then she is conscious; but if the counterfactual machines were broken or blocked such that they wouldn't work (even though they are not used) then she

RE: Maudlin's Machine and the UDist

2005-08-08 Thread Lee Corbin
I wrote P.S. Platonists != UDist-ers != computationalists != COMP and meant != to have the programming meaning of not equal. For example, I am a (math) Platonist and also a computationalist, but don't know enough about (Bruno's) COMP to say anything, and am skeptical of UDist. Surely

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-09 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Le 08-août-05, à 17:49, Lee Corbin a écrit : (True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it to be utterly true that he is experiencing pain, but I think that John and I (and many) are simply not comfortable with introducing a reality, namely, subjective reality to cover

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-10 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes You just seems to want those [1st person] experiences to be just an unnecessary epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never address what they really are and where they came from. For you it looks like consciousness is just a sort of subjective mirror partially

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-10 Thread Lee Corbin
Godfrey writes Hi Everythingers, Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating posts on this troubling issue of reality and subjectivity so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion right away. I have a background in computer and cognitive

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-11 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Well, maybe some of the above helped to explain it. Basing stuff on 1st person has a long history. That's what everyone, it seems to me, did before the scientific era (about 1600?). So far as I know, nothing has ever come of it. Its been the cornerstone of modern philosophy

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-12 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes The point is that given the certainty of 'I exist' subjective experience can not just be dismissed by the realist. Given its certainty, it demands some kind of explanation, Of course it does. But I imagine that you are looking at the phenonmenon from inside the system. I warn

The Reality of Observer Moments

2005-08-14 Thread Lee Corbin
I wish to emphasize that according to a traditional realist's beliefs, observer moments are objective and real, and hence do exist, so that there is nothing objectionable about speculations concerning them. Suppose that a mouse during some small time delta t is in a particular state (or set of

RE: The Reality of Observer Moments

2005-08-14 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. Of course, I will bow to whatever word usage is favored by most of the people, or by those who have the longest experience with the term. I merely want

RE: The Reality of Observer Moments

2005-08-14 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes Lee Corbin [wrote] The final word: OMs can be viewed as objective processes, and efforts to find the simplest explanation considering Everything seem quite appropriate. It sounds like a final word but I'd urge caution. It may be _your_ final word but not the natural

RE: The Reality of Observer Moments

2005-08-15 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes Lee Corbin a écrit : Stephen writes I would like for you to consider that we should not take OMs as objective processes but the result of objective processes. Of course, I will bow to whatever word usage is favored by most of the people, or by those who have

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-15 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes Russell's (wasnt it Bernard Williams'?) criticism of the cogito is just to say that Descartes added non certainties to his certainty. The assumption of an 'I' to recieve the 'Thoughts'. Nevertheless, with regards to the hardcore 'realist', this isnt going to be much comfort.

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-15 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist accept that a wholly independent world out there exists and existed before he did and yet can admit that the particular properties of this independent world are not *definite* prior to the

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-16 Thread Lee Corbin
John writes Lee and Stephen: since we have only our subjective access to out there does it make any difference if it is REALLY? like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner: different? You write we have only our subjective access to [what is out there]. Yes, and from that we have two

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Stephen writes I would like to refute your [Lee's] common sense Realism and show that it is missing the most salient point of Realism: that it not have any cracks through which anything unreal might slip. An interestingly stated goal: it *sounds* as though you've written as preamble to the

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Chris writes I admire Descartes as a man [I would have said scientist and mathematician], not so much as a philosopher. I admire his method more than his results, he looked inwards. He also did a tremendous amount of good work in science and math. Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes ACCURACY Extent to which a measurement matches and international standard. REPEATABILITY Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement. For example the SICK DME 200 laser distance measurement instrument has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a

Naive Realism and QM

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Godfrey writes As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive realism Good heavens! How many times must it be said? What is going on with people? There is a *clear* definition of naive realism. Try the almost always extremely reliable wikipedia:

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Colin writes So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the observer. Experiential qualities, in

RE: Naive Realism and QM

2005-08-17 Thread Lee Corbin
Russel writes why *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of everything, though). This is

What Theories Explain vs. What Explains Theories

2005-08-20 Thread Lee Corbin
Godfrey writes Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did there would not be

RE: subjective reality

2005-08-31 Thread Lee Corbin
Quentin writes I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read himself You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you just like insulting other people and show your big neck... By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and

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