Hi Russell:
[My current mail client does not work the way I like and I can not spend the
time to insert ">"s in the right places so this indicator of who said what
will be missing from my posts for awhile, I will use an "xxx" separator for
my responses.]
>
> Selecting out space like aspects
On Tue, Apr 01, 2008 at 09:34:29PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> Hi Russell:
>
> You wrote:
>
> >What does it mean to "have a material aspect"?
>
>
> I see my model as requiring a time like aspect induced by the evolution
> triggering "endurance" meaningful question.
>
> Selecting out space lik
Hi Russell:
You wrote:
>The time postulate is a requirement of observerhood. I'm not sure this
>means that time-like components are "in" the Everything, but I can
>accept this is possible.
>I don't know of any similar requirement for space, but I have tossed
>around some ideas to do with embedd
On Mon, Mar 31, 2008 at 09:29:40PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> As I understand your Theory of Nothing book the "Everything" in it has or at
> least contains time like components [time postulate]. I agree but
> apparently for a different reason.
> In your reply to Jason you allowed that the OM "ma
Hi Russell:
On Sun, Mar 30, 2008 at 09:35:47PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>>
>> Hi Russell:
>>
>> In response to Jason you wrote:
>>
>>>An OM is a state of a machine. In as far as the machine is embedded
>>>in space, the the OM is spread across space. Successive OMs involve
>>>state change,
>
>>
On Sun, Mar 30, 2008 at 09:35:47PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> Hi Russell:
>
> In response to Jason you wrote:
>
> >An OM is a state of a machine. In as far as the machine is embedded
> >in space, the the OM is spread across space. Successive OMs involve
> >state change,
>
> In my model a unive
Hi Russell:
In response to Jason you wrote:
>An OM is a state of a machine. In as far as the machine is embedded
>in space, the the OM is spread across space. Successive OMs involve
>state change,
In my model a universe is an incomplete entity [a Something or a Nothing]
within the Everything [t
On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 12:53:23AM -0700, Jason wrote:
>
> I appreciate the quick reply and your patience in answering my
> questions. Perhaps it would help if I explained the thought process
> that led me to where I am. When reading your "ants are not conscious"
> paper two questions came to m
I appreciate the quick reply and your patience in answering my
questions. Perhaps it would help if I explained the thought process
that led me to where I am. When reading your "ants are not conscious"
paper two questions came to mind that I could not resolve:
1. If anthropic reasoning is valid
On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 01:28:42AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Yes, I've read it, and I think I have a more formal way of describing
> my objection to it. If there were a device that could randomly pick a
> conscious observer moment from among all conscious observers on earth,
> and allow you
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 9:03 PM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> An OM is a state of a machine. In as far as the machine is embedded
> in space, the the OM is spread across space. Successive OMs involve
> state change, ie must differ by at least a bit. Therefore, OMs must
> a
On Wed, Mar 26, 2008 at 02:16:06PM -0700, Jason wrote:
>
> A common theme on the everything list is the idea of an Observer
> moment, which is a snapshot of an observer's mind in a point of time,
> or the smallest amount of time a single conscious moment can be
> experienced in. However I think
Hi David,
Le 29-août-07, à 16:57, I (Bruno Marchal) wrote :
>
> I must go. Tomorrow I begin to explain the idea of a computable
> function. To let you think in advance I give you a problem: have you an
> idea why NON computable functions have to exist?
I feel a bit guilty because, 'course, t
Le 28-août-07, à 18:26, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 28/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
If you drop a pen, to
compute EXACTLY what will happen in principle, you have to consider
all
comp histories in UD* (the complete development of the UD) going
throug
On 28/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> If you drop a pen, to
> >> compute EXACTLY what will happen in principle, you have to consider
> >> all
> >> comp histories in UD* (the complete development of the UD) going
> >> through your actual state (the higher level description of
Le 27-août-07, à 13:27, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 16/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> If you drop a pen, to
>> compute EXACTLY what will happen in principle, you have to consider
>> all
>> comp histories in UD* (the complete development of the UD) going
>> through your ac
On 16/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If you drop a pen, to
> compute EXACTLY what will happen in principle, you have to consider all
> comp histories in UD* (the complete development of the UD) going
> through your actual state (the higher level description of it, which
> exist
Le 17-août-07, à 18:12, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 16/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> OK. I will come back on this too.
>
> I'm away until next Thursday, so I'll continue to think about - and
> reserve my response to - your last post until I return. I've
> received Alb
On 16/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> OK. I will come back on this too.
I'm away until next Thursday, so I'll continue to think about - and
reserve my response to - your last post until I return. I've
received Albert, Cutland, and Franzen, so I've got plenty of bed-time
readi
Le 15-août-07, à 17:00, David Nyman a écrit :
>
>> What comp (by UDA+FILMED-GRAPH) shows, is that, once the digitalness
>> of
>> your local relative description is taken seriously, you can no more
>> distinguish the comp stories existing below your comp substitution
>> level.
>
> So, 'material
On 15/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> David, please recall that one half of the propositions I assert are
> false.
Yes, but which half?
> Also, my "s" spelling seems to be uncomputable.
In that case it must lie outside comp reality! :-)
David
>
> Hi David, and all,
>
>
>
>
On 15/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Like Stathis argued a lot, if you identify yourself with your
> history/personality there is a sense to be 50 years old, but if you
> identify yourself with your matter, you disappear a bit by eating and
> shitting (is this correct? polite?)
Hi David, and all,
Le 15-août-07, à 13:36, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
> Where a layman says: the temperature in Toulouse is 34.5, the logician
> says: temperature(Toulouse) = 17.
read instead:
> Where a layman says: the temperature in Toulouse is 34.5, the logician
> says: temperature(
Le 13-août-07, à 17:37, David Nyman a écrit :
> On 11/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> That the 'comp reality' is founded on the number realm, is almost
>> trivial. What is not trivial at all, and this is what the UDA shows,
>> is
>> that, once you say "yes" to the digital d
Hi Mirek,
Welcome to the list,
Le 13-août-07, à 16:54, Mirek Dobsicek a écrit :
> Hello Bruno !
>
> I am a freshman to this list and it seems to me that some kind of a
> 'course' is going to happen.
Let us say that I try to give some information linking my (already old)
work and the main disc
On Wed, Aug 01, 2007 at 11:31:51AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > No, I mean all information known by the observer (including, but not
> > exclusively information know by the observer about erself).
>
>
> OK, but then adding "about the universe" is confusing at this stage.
> You interpret
On 11/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That the 'comp reality' is founded on the number realm, is almost
> trivial. What is not trivial at all, and this is what the UDA shows, is
> that, once you say "yes" to the digital doctor, for some level of
> substitution, then your immateri
Le 10-août-07, à 22:32, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 10/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> OK. Have you seen that this is going to made physics a branch of
>> "intensional number theory", by which I mean number theory from the
>> points of view of number ... ?
>
> Insofar as we
On 10/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> OK. Have you seen that this is going to made physics a branch of
> "intensional number theory", by which I mean number theory from the
> points of view of number ... ?
Insofar as we accept that the foundation of 'comp reality' is the
number
Le 10-août-07, à 14:26, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 09/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I hope you will not mind if I ask you "stupid" question, like "Do you
>> know what mathematicians mean by "function?".
>> Sometimes I realize that some people does not grasp what I say be
On 09/08/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I hope you will not mind if I ask you "stupid" question, like "Do you
> know what mathematicians mean by "function?".
> Sometimes I realize that some people does not grasp what I say because
> they just miss some elementary vocabulary, or th
Le 08-août-07, à 15:26, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On 30/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Meanwhile I would suggest you read the book by David
>> Albert: "Quantum Mechanics and Experience"
>
> OK, I've ordered it.
Good.
>
>> I can compare only the "logic of probability/c
On 30/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Meanwhile I would suggest you read the book by David
> Albert: "Quantum Mechanics and Experience"
OK, I've ordered it.
> I can compare only the "logic of probability/credibility one" of nature
> (more or less quantum logic) and the logic o
Le 31-juil.-07, à 14:47, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Tue, Jul 31, 2007 at 04:06:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 31-juil.-07, à 00:08, Russell Standish a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 11:47:48AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If this is not relevant in this
On Tue, Jul 31, 2007 at 04:06:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 31-juil.-07, à 00:08, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 11:47:48AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> If this is not relevant in this context, I ask what is relevant ... ?
> >> The problem you
Le 31-juil.-07, à 00:08, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 11:47:48AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> If this is not relevant in this context, I ask what is relevant ... ?
>> The problem you mention is at the cross of my work and the everything
>> list. Now, as I said some
On Mon, Jul 30, 2007 at 11:47:48AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> If this is not relevant in this context, I ask what is relevant ... ?
> The problem you mention is at the cross of my work and the everything
> list. Now, as I said some days ago, I think that a way to link more
> formally my
Hi Stathis:
At 02:15 AM 7/6/2005, you wrote:
I'm not sure what you are saying here. Are you invoking something like
Zeno's Paradox, which purports to show that motion is impossible? If you
believe in observers and in moments (even if they are the "block universe"
kind of moments), then you be
I'm not sure what you are saying here. Are you invoking something like
Zeno's Paradox, which purports to show that motion is impossible? If you
believe in observers and in moments (even if they are the "block universe"
kind of moments), then you believe in observer moments. The main utility of
Hal wrote:
> Jonathan Colvin writes, regarding the Doomsday argument:
> > There's a simple answer to that one. Presumably, a million
> years from
> > now in the Galactic Empire, the Doomsday argument is no longer
> > controversial, and it will not be a topic for debate. The
> fact that we
> >
Jonathan Colvin writes, regarding the Doomsday argument:
> There's a simple answer to that one. Presumably, a million years from now in
> the Galactic Empire, the Doomsday argument is no longer controversial, and
> it will not be a topic for debate. The fact that we are all debating the
> Doomsday
Hal Finney wrote:
> > I presume the answer is that rather than look at physical
> size/weight
> > of our bodies, one must try to calculate the proportion of the
> > universe's information content devoted to that part of our beings
> > essential to being an observer (probably something to do
>
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> I presume the answer is that rather than look at physical size/weight of our
> bodies, one must try to calculate the proportion of the universe's
> information content devoted to that part of our beings essential to being an
> observer (probably something to do with the am
Hal wrote:
> I wanted to add a few points to my earlier posting about how
> to derive OM measure in a Schmidhuberian multiverse model.
>
> The method is basically to take all the universes where the
> OM appears and to sum up the contribution they make to the OM
> measure. However, the key id
I wanted to add a few points to my earlier posting about how to derive
OM measure in a Schmidhuberian multiverse model.
The method is basically to take all the universes where the OM appears
and to sum up the contribution they make to the OM measure. However,
the key idea is that this contributio
Le 14-juin-05, à 00:35, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Godel's theorem:
~Bf -> ~B(~Bf),
which is equivalent to B(Bf -> f) -> Bf,
Just a little aside a la Descartes + Godel: (assume that "think" and
"believe" are synonymou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Godel's theorem:
~Bf -> ~B(~Bf),
which is equivalent to B(Bf -> f) -> Bf,
Just a little aside a la Descartes + Godel: (assume that "think" and
"believe" are synonymous and that f = "you are")
B(Bf -> f) -> Bf can
Hi Brent,
You didn't answer my last post where I explain that Bp is different
from Bp & p.
I hope you were not too much disturbed by my "teacher's" tone (which
can be enervating I imagine). Or is it because you don't recognize the
modal form of Godel's theorem:
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 06:41 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >Fr
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2005 02:43 AM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >Fr
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
> >-Original Message-
&g
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
> >-Original Message-
&g
Le 09-juin-05, à 23:00, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Bruno wrote:
I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assign
special ontological status to mental states over any other
arrangement
of matter.
I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to
assign special ontol
Bruno wrote:
> > I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assign
> > special ontological status to mental states over any other
> arrangement
> > of matter.
> I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to
> assign special ontological status to some substance, by w
Le 09-juin-05, à 01:19, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I don't believe in observers, if by "observer" one means to assign
special
ontological status to mental states over any other arrangement of
matter.
I don't believe in matters, if by "matters" one means to assign special
ontological statu
Hal Finney wrote:
>Jonathan Colvin writes:
>> There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I
>> suppose, for a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think
>> there is such a thing as an "essence of an experience"? I'd suggest
>> there is no such "thing" as an observer-mo
>-Original Message-
>From: "Hal Finney" [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 6:11 PM
>To: everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
>Brent Meeker writes:
>> But the problem I s
Brent Meeker writes:
> But the problem I see is that we don't know with certainity the present moment
> either. I have thoughts and perceptions in a stream, these have finite
> durations (on the order of hundreds of milliseconds) that overlap one another.
> When you say we know a present moment yo
The motivation for the observer-moment concept is that it is intended
to capture the bare minimum that we know to be true about the world.
We don't know that our pasts are real. They could be imagined,
synthesized, or faked. We may have been created one second ago and be
destroyed one second in t
Paddy Leahy wrote:
[quoting Hal Finney]
Here's how I attempted to define observer moment a few years ago:
Observer - A subsystem of the multiverse with qualities sufficiently
similar to those which are common among human beings that we consider
it meaningful that we might have been or might be
erse of an observer which defines the observer.
Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.
Saibal
- Original Message -
From: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Wednesday, June 08
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose,
for
a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
as an "essence of an experience"? I'd suggest there is no such "thing" as
an
observer-moment. I'm happy with using t
On Tue, 7 Jun 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for
a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
as an "essence of an experience"? I'd suggest there is no such "thing" as an
ob
Le 08-juin-05, à 07:51, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Hal Finney wrote:
To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what
is an OM.
We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.
Consider, for example, someone's brain when he is having a
particular experience. He is eatin
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for
> a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
> as an "essence of an experience"? I'd suggest there is no such "thing" as an
> observer-moment. I'm happy with using
>-Original Message-
>From: Jonathan Colvin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:51 AM
>To: everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
>Hal Finney wrote:
>>To apply Wei's method, firs
Hal Finney wrote:
>To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what
>is an OM.
>We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.
>Consider, for example, someone's brain when he is having a
>particular experience. He is eating chocolate ice cream while
>listening to Bee
Le 07-juin-05, à 00:31, Brent Meeker a écrit :
BM:
For knowability I take the S4 axioms and rules:
1) axioms:
BX -> X
BX -> BBX
B(X->Y) -> (BX -> BY)
2) Rule:
X X -> Y X
--- - (Modus ponens, necessitation)
YBX
But in the interview of the Lobia
>-Original Message-
>From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 12:36 PM
>To: Brent Meeker
>Cc: EverythingList list
>Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
>
>Le 06-juin-05, à 01:40, Brent Meeker a éc
Johnathan Corgan writes:
> As I'm sure many on the list are familiar, David Brin's "Kiln People" is
> an interesting science fiction treatment of similar issues.
It is an interesting story which helps to make some of our philosophical
thought experiments more concrete. Making copies, destroying
Hal Finney wrote:
Imagine facing your copy, perhaps an exact copy whose mind is synchronized
with yours, and seeing a coin flip which will determine which one is
destroyed. Your measure will be halved. In a sense it will have no
subjective effect, your thoughts and memories will be preserved i
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >There are a few unintuitive consequences, though, such as that large
> >instantiations of OMs will have more measure than small ones, and
likewise
> >slow ones will have more measure than fast ones. This is because in
each
Le 06-juin-05, à 01:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
What do you take to be the standard definition of "knows"? Is it "X
knows Y"
iff "X believes Y is true" and "Y is true"?
That's the one by Theaetetus.
Or do you include Gettier's
amendment, "X knows Y" iff "X believes Y is true" and "Y is tru
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >There are a few unintuitive consequences, though, such as that large
> >instantiations of OMs will have more measure than small ones, and likewise
> >slow ones will have more measure than fast ones. This is because in each
> >case the interpretat
Le 05-juin-05, à 17:30, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
FAR AWAY IN THE HEAVENLY ABODE OF THE GREAT GOD INDRA, THERE IS A
WONDERFUL NET WHICH HAS BEEN HUNG BY SOME CUNNING ARTIFICER IN SUCH A
MANNER THAT IT STRETCHES OUT INDEFINITELY IN ALL DIRECTIONS. IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRAVAGANT TASTES OF
Hi Brent,
Le 05-juin-05, à 13:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 7:02 AM
To: "Hal Finney"
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Le
Hal Finney writes:
There are a few unintuitive consequences, though, such as that large
instantiations of OMs will have more measure than small ones, and likewise
slow ones will have more measure than fast ones. This is because in each
case the interpretation program can be smaller if it is eas
OOPS! I meant to post it to the list. I'll now just post this.
Brent
>-Original Message-
>From: Lee Corbin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 4:52 PM
>To: Brent Meeker
>Subject: (offlist) RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
>
>
Bruno writes
> All right. So you both (Hal Finney and Lee Corbin) with the first axiom
Arghh! My new revelation says that axioms are fine if
you are doing math. But some of us are doing something
here that is entirely separate: philosophy. I love math;
it is my hobby. But axioms and all that s
Dear Hal and Bruno,
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, June 05, 2005 3:02 AM
Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Le 05-juin-05, à
- Original Message -
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 08:10 PM
Subject: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
> To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what is an OM.
> We need a formal model and description of a particu
Le 05-juin-05, à 05:53, Hal Finney a écrit :
Lee Corbin writes:
But in general, what do observer-moments explain? Or what does the
hypothesis concerning them explain? I just don't get a good feel
that there are any "higher level" phenomena which might be reduced
to observer-moments (I am stil
Lee Corbin writes:
> But in general, what do observer-moments explain? Or what does the
> hypothesis concerning them explain? I just don't get a good feel
> that there are any "higher level" phenomena which might be reduced
> to observer-moments (I am still very skeptical that all of physics
> or
Hal Finney has provided some intriguing notions and possibly
some very useful explanations. But I would like help in clarifying
even the first several paragraphs, in order to maximize my
investment in the remainder.
But first a few comments; these may be premature, but if so,
the comments should b
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