Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Nov 9, 11:36 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 11/9/2011 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Oct 28, 10:59 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> 2011/10/28 Craig Weinberg > > >>> On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg > >>> wrote: > > Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. > > Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football > > field somewhere? > > Strawman: He didn't say *direct* connection. Since there is nothing that is not indirectly connected to everything else, it is meaningless to talk about such distinctions. Numerous times Stathis has asserted a neurological connection between the larynx and the optic nerve and that the fact we can describe what we see is evidence of such a connection. My position is that this is an obvious logical fallacy, since A connecting to B and B connecting to C does not mean that A connects to C. There is no such connection between larynx and optic nerve, and the fact that they both connect to the brain explains our ability to verbally express whatever we like, including what we may have seen or thought we saw or whatever. By Stathis logic, the oven is connected to the refrigerator since we can eat a hot meal with a cold salad. > > > What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of > > purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being > > what connects the retina and larynx? > There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, > >>> since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. > >>> Any such connection is one that is only inferred. > > Strawman: No one suggested it was other than inferred. What else would it > be? a > mathematical theorem? Almost everything we know about the world is inferred. What was suggested is a direct neurological connection which literally allows the larynx to output signals from the optic nerve. That would not be inferred, it would be a physiological fact. > > >>> What happens on the > >>> football field only affects your larynx if you decide to talk about > >>> it. > > Strawman: The hypothetical was that you watch and football game and describe > it. That > there are other possibilities, like not describing it, is a red herring. The hypothetical was a strawman. I am correcting it. The implication is that the mouth is a machine that can only describe what the eyes see, which is of course, ludicrous. > > > > > > > > > > >>> If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football > >>> field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has > >>> not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you > >>> faster than light. > >>> You could listen to it on the radio or read about it in the newspaper. > >>> You could invent an imaginary game and describe it in intricate > >>> detail. > >> How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go > >> against determinism? > > Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel > > circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can > > the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care > > if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic > > and passive. > The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but > >>> that does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond > >>> differently > >>> to every input. > >>> Then that means that it isn't deterministic. > >> It is. Every part of it is determined exactly from input + rules, > > You are assuming that input exists independently of the subject. I > > don't. A black and white TV has no capacity to ever show color > > broadcasts, so that the all of it's inputs can only be rendered in > > monochrome. A living organism, unlike a TV, can learn and adapt by > > itself. It can choose what to foster and what to avoid. It is not just > > input + rules against a dumb lookup table, it is volition and > > affinity. It is determined by the organism itself as well as the > > environment. > > Strawman: He is not assuming that the possible inputs are not constrained by > the subject. > Only that the input can vary independently of the subject. It is not true > that an > organism can change from black and white to color vision. A computer or > robot can also > learn and adapt. I didn't say 'not constrained by the subject', I said 'exists independently of the subject'. There is no input without a subject to input into. I didn't say that organisms could change it's vision, although over time, species evolve to do just that. We also shift into black and white vision when there is insufficient light. My point though is that organisms develop new capabilities through their interactions with their environment, which actually redefines both inputs and rules. Computers or robots can only lea
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
This is a joke. Quantumly the quines computed the qualia of the quails and so on until... That's why we have qualia before everything else! On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 10:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > it is seeing? > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
Apologies, meant to capitalize "Gödel" and "explain". Anal-retentive to post just to fix that, I know. On Wed, Nov 9, 2011 at 11:50 PM, Felix Hoenikker wrote: > This reminds me of something: this is the best test question I ever > came up with: > > "In the language of the Japanese quails, what was the gödel' statement > that started the universe over again at 0 AD? explain your answer > precisely in pure mathematical terms without appeal to the existence > of mayan buddhists or other forms of the axiom of choice." > > Q.E.D.? > > On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 10:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: >> http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 >> >> "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between >> a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of >> correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering >> from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to >> reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli >> are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, >> they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when >> asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with >> subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to >> guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do >> with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to >> discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way >> appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show >> color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual >> capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in >> light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " >> >> Sounds like absent qualia to me. >> >> "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" >> >> So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain >> doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it >> says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what >> it is seeing? >> >> Craig >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
This reminds me of something: this is the best test question I ever came up with: "In the language of the Japanese quails, what was the gödel' statement that started the universe over again at 0 AD? explain your answer precisely in pure mathematical terms without appeal to the existence of mayan buddhists or other forms of the axiom of choice." Q.E.D.? On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 10:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > it is seeing? > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On 11/9/2011 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 28, 10:59 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/10/28 Craig Weinberg On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football field somewhere? Strawman: He didn't say *direct* connection. What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being what connects the retina and larynx? There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. Any such connection is one that is only inferred. Strawman: No one suggested it was other than inferred. What else would it be? a mathematical theorem? Almost everything we know about the world is inferred. What happens on the football field only affects your larynx if you decide to talk about it. Strawman: The hypothetical was that you watch and football game and describe it. That there are other possibilities, like not describing it, is a red herring. If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you faster than light. You could listen to it on the radio or read about it in the newspaper. You could invent an imaginary game and describe it in intricate detail. How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go against determinism? Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic and passive. The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but that does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond differently to every input. Then that means that it isn't deterministic. It is. Every part of it is determined exactly from input + rules, You are assuming that input exists independently of the subject. I don't. A black and white TV has no capacity to ever show color broadcasts, so that the all of it's inputs can only be rendered in monochrome. A living organism, unlike a TV, can learn and adapt by itself. It can choose what to foster and what to avoid. It is not just input + rules against a dumb lookup table, it is volition and affinity. It is determined by the organism itself as well as the environment. Strawman: He is not assuming that the possible inputs are not constrained by the subject. Only that the input can vary independently of the subject. It is not true that an organism can change from black and white to color vision. A computer or robot can also learn and adapt. Strawman: No one suggested a "dumb lookup table". what isn't (from the point of view of the model) is the environment, that has been said *from the beginning of the discussion*. We don't model the environment, and we don't have to, since what we want is connect the model to the environment, we don't want to model the universe *but a brain* (in the though experiment) One of the main purposes of the brain is to model the environment, just as the purpose of a TV set is to provide TV programs. Without factoring that in, any model of the brain is a waste of time. You cannot separate the brain from the universe which is created through that brain. Strawman: No one has suggested modeling the brain in some universe other than this one. And it nonsense to talk of separating a brain from a universe created through that brain. For example, a neuron may see see a concentration of dopamine molecules that varies over a trillionfold range, but it has only two responses: depolarise its membrane if the concentration is above a certain threshold, don't if it isn't. The neuron does not know what the dopamine concentration is going to be ahead of time, but it looks at what it is and responds according to this algorithm. It has to be able to tell the difference between dopamine and every other molecule in the body first. It's outrageously simplistic to say that the neuron can only respond to this binary algorithm It's like saying that we can respond to our environment by living or dying. You are beating around the bush... You do straw man arguments all the times. "A straw man is a component of an argument and is an informal fallacy based *on misrepresentation of an opponent's position*" My advice is "Give it up, Quentin". Brent I think that your position is actually that simplistic though. I'm describing it in another case to expose that reductionism, but I'm not trying to misrepresent it. Craig No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.454 /
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 28, 10:59 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2011/10/28 Craig Weinberg > > > On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > > Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. > > > > Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football > > > > field somewhere? What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of > > > > purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being > > > > what connects the retina and larynx? > > > > There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, > > since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. > > > Any such connection is one that is only inferred. What happens on the > > football field only affects your larynx if you decide to talk about > > it. > > > If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football > > field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has > > not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you > > faster than light. > > > You could listen to it on the radio or read about it in the newspaper. > > You could invent an imaginary game and describe it in intricate > > detail. > > > > >> How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go > > > >> against determinism? > > > > > Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel > > > > circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can > > > > the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care > > > > if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic > > > > and passive. > > > > The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but > > that does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond differently > > to every input. > > > Then that means that it isn't deterministic. > > It is. Every part of it is determined exactly from input + rules, You are assuming that input exists independently of the subject. I don't. A black and white TV has no capacity to ever show color broadcasts, so that the all of it's inputs can only be rendered in monochrome. A living organism, unlike a TV, can learn and adapt by itself. It can choose what to foster and what to avoid. It is not just input + rules against a dumb lookup table, it is volition and affinity. It is determined by the organism itself as well as the environment. > what isn't > (from the point of view of the model) is the environment, that has been said > *from the beginning of the discussion*. We don't model the environment, and > we don't have to, since what we want is connect the model to the > environment, we don't want to model the universe *but a brain* (in the > though experiment) One of the main purposes of the brain is to model the environment, just as the purpose of a TV set is to provide TV programs. Without factoring that in, any model of the brain is a waste of time. You cannot separate the brain from the universe which is created through that brain. > > > For example, a neuron may see see a concentration of dopamine > > molecules that varies over a trillionfold range, but it has only two > > responses: depolarise its membrane if the concentration is above a > > certain threshold, don't if it isn't. The neuron does not know what > > the dopamine concentration is going to be ahead of time, but it looks > > at what it is and responds according to this algorithm. > > > It has to be able to tell the difference between dopamine and every > > other molecule in the body first. It's outrageously simplistic to say > > that the neuron can only respond to this binary algorithm It's like > > saying that we can respond to our environment by living or dying. > > You are beating around the bush... You do straw man arguments all the times. > > "A straw man is a component of an argument and is an informal fallacy based > *on misrepresentation of an opponent's position*" I think that your position is actually that simplistic though. I'm describing it in another case to expose that reductionism, but I'm not trying to misrepresent it. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
2011/10/28 Craig Weinberg > On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > > > Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. > > > Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football > > > field somewhere? What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of > > > purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being > > > what connects the retina and larynx? > > > > There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, > since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. > > Any such connection is one that is only inferred. What happens on the > football field only affects your larynx if you decide to talk about > it. > > If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football > field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has > not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you > faster than light. > > You could listen to it on the radio or read about it in the newspaper. > You could invent an imaginary game and describe it in intricate > detail. > > > > > >> How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go > > >> against determinism? > > > > > Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel > > > circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can > > > the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care > > > if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic > > > and passive. > > > > The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but > that does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond differently > to every input. > > Then that means that it isn't deterministic. > > It is. Every part of it is determined exactly from input + rules, what isn't (from the point of view of the model) is the environment, that has been said *from the beginning of the discussion*. We don't model the environment, and we don't have to, since what we want is connect the model to the environment, we don't want to model the universe *but a brain* (in the though experiment) > For example, a neuron may see see a concentration of dopamine > molecules that varies over a trillionfold range, but it has only two > responses: depolarise its membrane if the concentration is above a > certain threshold, don't if it isn't. The neuron does not know what > the dopamine concentration is going to be ahead of time, but it looks > at what it is and responds according to this algorithm. > > It has to be able to tell the difference between dopamine and every > other molecule in the body first. It's outrageously simplistic to say > that the neuron can only respond to this binary algorithm It's like > saying that we can respond to our environment by living or dying. > You are beating around the bush... You do straw man arguments all the times. "A straw man is a component of an argument and is an informal fallacy based *on misrepresentation of an opponent's position*" > > > > >> I think this is again a very basic > > >> misunderstanding that you have. A lighting circuit behaves completely > > >> deterministically, ON when the switch is down and OFF when the switch > > >> is up. The circuit doesn't know when someone is going to come along > > >> and flick the switch, but modelling the circuit does not involve > > >> modelling the entire universe. > > > > > No, it's a very basic misunderstanding that you have that a living > > > organism is the same thing as a light switch. > > > > Does a lighting circuit have to be programmed to know exactly when > someone is going to walk into the room in a year's time and flick the > switch? That's the sort of requirement you seem to have for a model of a > neuron. > > If light switches were like neurons, they would turn on whenever the > person who owned the house felt like opening their eyes. They would > not need to be programmed because they would already be telepathic. > > > > > >> If the components are deterministic then the system is deterministic, > > >> although it may show complex, surprising or chaotic behaviour. > > > > > That would make sense if we were still in the 19th century. In the > > > last 150 years a lot has changed though. Heisenberg? Goedel? This is > > > not some fringe idea that I came up with. > > > > > "We have seen that extremely simple dynamical > > > systems can behave in ways very much at odds with our > > > intuition about the deterministic nature of classical > > > physics," -http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td/td1604/Sommerer.pdf > > > > There are two considerations here. One is classical chaotic, or > non-linear, systems. These are deterministic but unpredictable. The brain is > probably such a system. The other consideration is true randomness, which > occurs in quantum level systems. Radioactive decay is an example of this. > (Actually, quantum mechanics is s
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 28, 8:10 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. > > Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football > > field somewhere? What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of > > purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being > > what connects the retina and larynx? > > There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, > since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. Any such connection is one that is only inferred. What happens on the football field only affects your larynx if you decide to talk about it. If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you faster than light. You could listen to it on the radio or read about it in the newspaper. You could invent an imaginary game and describe it in intricate detail. > > >> How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go > >> against determinism? > > > Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel > > circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can > > the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care > > if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic > > and passive. > > The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but that > does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond differently to > every input. Then that means that it isn't deterministic. For example, a neuron may see see a concentration of dopamine molecules that varies over a trillionfold range, but it has only two responses: depolarise its membrane if the concentration is above a certain threshold, don't if it isn't. The neuron does not know what the dopamine concentration is going to be ahead of time, but it looks at what it is and responds according to this algorithm. It has to be able to tell the difference between dopamine and every other molecule in the body first. It's outrageously simplistic to say that the neuron can only respond to this binary algorithm It's like saying that we can respond to our environment by living or dying. > > >> I think this is again a very basic > >> misunderstanding that you have. A lighting circuit behaves completely > >> deterministically, ON when the switch is down and OFF when the switch > >> is up. The circuit doesn't know when someone is going to come along > >> and flick the switch, but modelling the circuit does not involve > >> modelling the entire universe. > > > No, it's a very basic misunderstanding that you have that a living > > organism is the same thing as a light switch. > > Does a lighting circuit have to be programmed to know exactly when someone is > going to walk into the room in a year's time and flick the switch? That's the > sort of requirement you seem to have for a model of a neuron. If light switches were like neurons, they would turn on whenever the person who owned the house felt like opening their eyes. They would not need to be programmed because they would already be telepathic. > > >> If the components are deterministic then the system is deterministic, > >> although it may show complex, surprising or chaotic behaviour. > > > That would make sense if we were still in the 19th century. In the > > last 150 years a lot has changed though. Heisenberg? Goedel? This is > > not some fringe idea that I came up with. > > > "We have seen that extremely simple dynamical > > systems can behave in ways very much at odds with our > > intuition about the deterministic nature of classical > > physics," -http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td/td1604/Sommerer.pdf > > There are two considerations here. One is classical chaotic, or non-linear, > systems. These are deterministic but unpredictable. The brain is probably > such a system. The other consideration is true randomness, which occurs in > quantum level systems. Radioactive decay is an example of this. (Actually, > quantum mechanics is still deterministic under the Many Worlds > Interpretation, but it is truly random from the point of view of any observer > since they cannot know which world they will end up in). Truly random systems > can still be very predictable: we can be pretty sure how much of a > radioisotope will decay after a certain time. Agency of living organisms is clearly neither random not deterministic unless you twist those words as to be meaningless. > > >> Everything is ultimately just a dumb conduit. It's the combination of > >> many dumb conduits that makes you smart. > > > Interesting double standard. You say that deterministic components > > cannot scale up to anything except deterministic wholes, yet you also > > say that many dumb conduits make you smart. To me
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. > Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football > field somewhere? What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of > purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being > what connects the retina and larynx? There is a causal connection between your larynx and the football field, since what happens on the football field affects your larynx. If it did not, you could not describe what happened on the football field. You cannot describe a football game if the light from it has not reached you, for example, since information cannot get to you faster than light. >> How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go >> against determinism? > > Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel > circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can > the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care > if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic > and passive. The environment can provide a rich variety of inputs to an entity but that does not mean that the entity must be programmed to respond differently to every input. For example, a neuron may see see a concentration of dopamine molecules that varies over a trillionfold range, but it has only two responses: depolarise its membrane if the concentration is above a certain threshold, don't if it isn't. The neuron does not know what the dopamine concentration is going to be ahead of time, but it looks at what it is and responds according to this algorithm. >> I think this is again a very basic >> misunderstanding that you have. A lighting circuit behaves completely >> deterministically, ON when the switch is down and OFF when the switch >> is up. The circuit doesn't know when someone is going to come along >> and flick the switch, but modelling the circuit does not involve >> modelling the entire universe. > > No, it's a very basic misunderstanding that you have that a living > organism is the same thing as a light switch. Does a lighting circuit have to be programmed to know exactly when someone is going to walk into the room in a year's time and flick the switch? That's the sort of requirement you seem to have for a model of a neuron. >> If the components are deterministic then the system is deterministic, >> although it may show complex, surprising or chaotic behaviour. > > That would make sense if we were still in the 19th century. In the > last 150 years a lot has changed though. Heisenberg? Goedel? This is > not some fringe idea that I came up with. > > "We have seen that extremely simple dynamical > systems can behave in ways very much at odds with our > intuition about the deterministic nature of classical > physics," - http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td/td1604/Sommerer.pdf There are two considerations here. One is classical chaotic, or non-linear, systems. These are deterministic but unpredictable. The brain is probably such a system. The other consideration is true randomness, which occurs in quantum level systems. Radioactive decay is an example of this. (Actually, quantum mechanics is still deterministic under the Many Worlds Interpretation, but it is truly random from the point of view of any observer since they cannot know which world they will end up in). Truly random systems can still be very predictable: we can be pretty sure how much of a radioisotope will decay after a certain time. >> Everything is ultimately just a dumb conduit. It's the combination of >> many dumb conduits that makes you smart. > > Interesting double standard. You say that deterministic components > cannot scale up to anything except deterministic wholes, yet you also > say that many dumb conduits make you smart. To me it's clearly the > opposite. Dumb conduits make nothing but dumb conduits. A quadrillion > ping pong balls can make... nothing but ping pong balls. This means to > me that atoms are smarter than ideal spheres, and that intelligence > scales up into more complex, indeterminate intelligence. It's the complexity of interacting components that scales up to intelligence. >> The visual cortex has projections to the temporal and parietal lobes >> but you don't need to know the details to know that there *must* be a >> connection if a person can describe what they see. > > No. There is no connection, unless you are talking about a > philosophical connection. There is no direct transfer of > electrochemical signalling between the visual cortex and the larynx > which bypasses the brain. Of course it doesn't bypass the brain - the connection consists of the neural connections in the brain. >> The depolarisation of neurons occurs deterministically, and the result >> of that is that you decide to move your arm. > > Depolarization occurs deterministically or voluntarily, d
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 27, 12:11 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 3:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> Indirectly, the larynx must be connected to the optic nerve or we > >> wouldn't be able to describe what we see. Is that not obvious? > > > Indirectly everything is connected to everything. The foot is > > connected to the ass indirectly too. So what? Indirect connection is > > meaningless in this context. The larynx doesn't talk to the retina. > > Of course it does, otherwise it would be impossible to describe what > you see. Let's say that I watch a football game on TV and describe what I see. Is there now a direct connection between my larynx and a football field somewhere? What is this connection made of? Is this the kind of purely semantic-philosophical 'connection' you are talking about being what connects the retina and larynx? If I hold up 3 fingers you say "3" and if I hold up 4 fingers > you say "4". If there were a break in the connection anywhere between > retina and larynx you would be unable to do this. I would have thought > this was a quite obvious and uncontroversial point, whatever else you > believe, and the fact that you are arguing against it makes me wonder > if you are just being contrary. A connects to B. A connects to C. Are you saying that B by definition connects to C? You know that's a logical fallacy, right? > > >> Whether there is a feeling associated with neuronal activity is > >> separate from the question of whether the neuronal activity is > >> determined by the observable physical factors. If something > >> unobservable, the qualia, causes something observable, membrane > >> depolarisation, then that would appear like magic. > > > No it would appear exactly as it does, as depolarization. You aren't > > getting it. Depolarazation is what a neuron's qualia looks like from > > our technologically extended point of view. To the neuron it's a > > feeling. You keep imagining that physics demands some sort of schedule > > or timing for neurons to fire but the necessity of neurons to respond > > to their environment (just as you agreed cells must respond to their > > environment or die) would demand independence from any kind of > > deterministic schedule. How do you reconcile these contradictions you > > insist upon? > > How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go > against determinism? Because living cells must confront unanticipated and novel circumstances in their environment which cannot be determined, nor can the responses be determined in advance. Inorganic molecules don't care if they survive or not so their interactions are more deterministic and passive. > I think this is again a very basic > misunderstanding that you have. A lighting circuit behaves completely > deterministically, ON when the switch is down and OFF when the switch > is up. The circuit doesn't know when someone is going to come along > and flick the switch, but modelling the circuit does not involve > modelling the entire universe. No, it's a very basic misunderstanding that you have that a living organism is the same thing as a light switch. > > >> I don't think it is right to say that the physical state of the neuron > >> and the subjective experience are the same but even if it is, then the > >> neuron's behaviour should be deterministic and computable, since all > >> the physical processes in neurons of which we are aware are > >> deterministic and computable. > > > A single neuron may well be quite deterministic, just as an atom by > > itself is deterministic. If you scale up from atom to atoms, it is > > still pretty deterministic. From cell to cells or neuron to neurons > > however is very different, just as a culture of millions of > > individuals is not deterministic from the biology of the individual > > member. > > If the components are deterministic then the system is deterministic, > although it may show complex, surprising or chaotic behaviour. That would make sense if we were still in the 19th century. In the last 150 years a lot has changed though. Heisenberg? Goedel? This is not some fringe idea that I came up with. "We have seen that extremely simple dynamical systems can behave in ways very much at odds with our intuition about the deterministic nature of classical physics," - http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/td/td1604/Sommerer.pdf > > >> An electric motor has a lot of electromagnetism going on but it > >> probably doesn't have a lot of feeling. > > > The motor is only a motor relative to our frame of perception. The > > level where inorganic material feels or detects something, you can't > > really call it a motor, it's just charged volumes of metal. That is > > the most primitive sense of physical sense so I agree that I would not > > call it feeling in an animal sense, but there is an experience > > happening, a relation between matter which is exerting force and > > matter which is subjected to that proto-intentionality. > > But th
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 3:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> Indirectly, the larynx must be connected to the optic nerve or we >> wouldn't be able to describe what we see. Is that not obvious? > > Indirectly everything is connected to everything. The foot is > connected to the ass indirectly too. So what? Indirect connection is > meaningless in this context. The larynx doesn't talk to the retina. Of course it does, otherwise it would be impossible to describe what you see. If I hold up 3 fingers you say "3" and if I hold up 4 fingers you say "4". If there were a break in the connection anywhere between retina and larynx you would be unable to do this. I would have thought this was a quite obvious and uncontroversial point, whatever else you believe, and the fact that you are arguing against it makes me wonder if you are just being contrary. >> Whether there is a feeling associated with neuronal activity is >> separate from the question of whether the neuronal activity is >> determined by the observable physical factors. If something >> unobservable, the qualia, causes something observable, membrane >> depolarisation, then that would appear like magic. > > No it would appear exactly as it does, as depolarization. You aren't > getting it. Depolarazation is what a neuron's qualia looks like from > our technologically extended point of view. To the neuron it's a > feeling. You keep imagining that physics demands some sort of schedule > or timing for neurons to fire but the necessity of neurons to respond > to their environment (just as you agreed cells must respond to their > environment or die) would demand independence from any kind of > deterministic schedule. How do you reconcile these contradictions you > insist upon? How does "the necessity of neurons to respond to their environment" go against determinism? I think this is again a very basic misunderstanding that you have. A lighting circuit behaves completely deterministically, ON when the switch is down and OFF when the switch is up. The circuit doesn't know when someone is going to come along and flick the switch, but modelling the circuit does not involve modelling the entire universe. >> I don't think it is right to say that the physical state of the neuron >> and the subjective experience are the same but even if it is, then the >> neuron's behaviour should be deterministic and computable, since all >> the physical processes in neurons of which we are aware are >> deterministic and computable. > > A single neuron may well be quite deterministic, just as an atom by > itself is deterministic. If you scale up from atom to atoms, it is > still pretty deterministic. From cell to cells or neuron to neurons > however is very different, just as a culture of millions of > individuals is not deterministic from the biology of the individual > member. If the components are deterministic then the system is deterministic, although it may show complex, surprising or chaotic behaviour. >> An electric motor has a lot of electromagnetism going on but it >> probably doesn't have a lot of feeling. > > The motor is only a motor relative to our frame of perception. The > level where inorganic material feels or detects something, you can't > really call it a motor, it's just charged volumes of metal. That is > the most primitive sense of physical sense so I agree that I would not > call it feeling in an animal sense, but there is an experience > happening, a relation between matter which is exerting force and > matter which is subjected to that proto-intentionality. But the electric motor has a very strong electromagnetic field associated with it, much stronger than that inside the brain, so does the consciousness of the motor match or surpass that of the brain? >> If the impulses coming down the fibres of the optic nerve are the same >> then the visual experiences will be the same. In general, if any >> neuron is replaced by a device that passes on the signals it receives >> in a manner similar to the original neuron then the downstream neurons >> won't behave any differently, for how could they know that anything >> had changed? > > That's fine if all you are doing is passing on signals from an object > to a subject. You are failing to see that the subject is the > destination of the signal and not just a dumb conduit for it. Glasses > can help you see but they can't help someone see who is blind. Everything is ultimately just a dumb conduit. It's the combination of many dumb conduits that makes you smart. >> He would *say* that he feels perfectly normal because his language >> centre would be receiving normal electrochemical impulses from the >> artificial visual cortex, whose job it is to send those impulses with >> the same amplitude and frequency as the original. > > The language center receives no impulses from the visual cortex. Eyes > don't speak (not literally anyways). The visual cortex has projections to the temporal and parietal lobes but you don't
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 26, 3:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > Craig: a redface reply > I made it in reverse, when I wrote (and your answer was correct TO THAT): > I DO *NOT* see, how to realize OBJECTIVE existence, because all we can > perceive is > our subjective absorption, even that adjusted for ourselves from the > fragmental and poorly understood information we THINK we got and (in > science) hold for accounting to everything. > > I agree with your formulation about subjectivity, a reason why I speak only > about some "perceived reality" we may have. No claim about its connection to > something that MAY BE a (real?) reality(?). If there is one. > > I apologize > Oh, no problem, haha. I think that just as we cannot expect to be able to transcend our own subjectivity, so too can we not discount the subjective significance of objectivity. There is a degree of veridicality in our participation within physical reality which is not matched merely by realistic perception (as suggested by blindsight and synesthesia, our sensemaking capacity extends beyond our presumed channels of sense). The fact that there is a difference between dream and reality, fact and fiction, suggests a natural connection to a distal reality, at least in a loose overlapping sense, is not ruled out. If everything were just solipsistic fantasy to one degree or another, why so much elaborate pretense to the contrary? Our connection to any real reality may be questionable, but the feeling of authenticity is certainly potent enough that the distinction between direct noumenal participation and indirect phenomenal perception is really academic. Within our own perceptual frame of reference, our reality is real enough. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
Craig: a redface reply I made it in reverse, when I wrote (and your answer was correct TO THAT): *> *(JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to > realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. *> * *CW: It may be problematic to put subjectivity in objective terms, but isn't that what we should expect? Our natural experience has no problem reconciling meaning and mechanism. Our experience does not need to be realized, because it is already real to us.* ** I DO *NOT* see, how to realize OBJECTIVE existence, because all we can perceive is our subjective absorption, even that adjusted for ourselves from the fragmental and poorly understood information we THINK we got and (in science) hold for accounting to everything. I agree with your formulation about subjectivity, a reason why I speak only about some "perceived reality" we may have. No claim about its connection to something that MAY BE a (real?) reality(?). If there is one. I apologize John Mikes On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 5:50 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 24, 4:27 pm, John Mikes wrote: > > *I* *interjected some remarks just for keeping order on the list*.- *JM > > > > * > > On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > > > On Oct 23, 4:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > > > > *Craig,* > > > > ** > > > > *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term > Multisense > > > > Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* > > > > *satisfactory to whom? * > > > > > To whoever understands how it applies to the Hard Problem. > > > > * (JM: OK, I feel myself excluded from an explanation.)* > > > > > > > > > > *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like > your: > > > > "range of experience" as a limited term. * > > > > > Separation of subjective experience and objective existence. > > > > ** > > *(JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to > > realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. > > * > > It may be problematic to put subjectivity in objective terms, but > isn't that what we should expect? Our natural experience has no > problem reconciling meaning and mechanism. Our experience does not > need to be realized, because it is already real to us. > > > > > > > > > > > *Then again: to explain by "our awareness"? what is awareness and how > > > does > > > > it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * > > > > > Awareness is primitive. It isn't explained, it is experienced first > > > hand and cannot be explained without first hand experience. To explain > > > is to translate something which is not experienced directly into a > > > direct sense, so sense or awareness is always the beginning and ending > > > - the elephant in every room. Our awareness doesn't come from physical > > > phenomenon as much as both the physical and experiential phenomena are > > > actually the same thing, but part of what that thing does is to make > > > one side seem separate from the other. > > > > * JM: Newton became aware of some gravitation from physical > phenomena > > - experienced. So I can agree. What* > > *I cannot see, however, how the two SIDES of the same thing can be > > separated? Both are primitive. See the next line. * > > It is the relation that is primitive. Each side arises out of it's > separation from the other. There is no object until a subject becomes > privately separated from its world. There is always a subject though, > from the subject's perspective, and the object has no perspective. > Think of how we see a single image with two separate eyes, or hear a > single sound with ears on opposite sides of our head, and how that > bilateral symmetry opens our perception up to a deeper realism rather > than a de-coupled redundancy. It is the stereo image or sound which is > primitive, but it can only be realized through the sense organs on two > sides of the head. > > It is strange to think about the stereo image being the deeper reality > if you model it in objective terms (seems more like 3D images would > have to be an illusion based upon 2D images), but when you test the > truth of this proposition subjectively, it makes sense. We feel that > we make sense of an external world, perceiving aspects of something > which exists independently of our perception, rather than a collection > of unrelated illusions that we string together in a narrative. Our > access to this external world is made possible by our awareness of the > invariance between our senses as well as the qualitative extension > which each sense channel and each individual sensor contributes. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/ev
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 24, 4:27 pm, John Mikes wrote: > *I* *interjected some remarks just for keeping order on the list*.- *JM > > * > On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Oct 23, 4:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > > > *Craig,* > > > ** > > > *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term Multisense > > > Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* > > > *satisfactory to whom? * > > > To whoever understands how it applies to the Hard Problem. > > * (JM: OK, I feel myself excluded from an explanation.)* > > > > > > *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like your: > > > "range of experience" as a limited term. * > > > Separation of subjective experience and objective existence. > > ** > * (JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to > realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. > * It may be problematic to put subjectivity in objective terms, but isn't that what we should expect? Our natural experience has no problem reconciling meaning and mechanism. Our experience does not need to be realized, because it is already real to us. > > > > > > *Then again: to explain by "our awareness"? what is awareness and how > > does > > > it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * > > > Awareness is primitive. It isn't explained, it is experienced first > > hand and cannot be explained without first hand experience. To explain > > is to translate something which is not experienced directly into a > > direct sense, so sense or awareness is always the beginning and ending > > - the elephant in every room. Our awareness doesn't come from physical > > phenomenon as much as both the physical and experiential phenomena are > > actually the same thing, but part of what that thing does is to make > > one side seem separate from the other. > > * JM: Newton became aware of some gravitation from physical phenomena > - experienced. So I can agree. What* > *I cannot see, however, how the two SIDES of the same thing can be > separated? Both are primitive. See the next line. * It is the relation that is primitive. Each side arises out of it's separation from the other. There is no object until a subject becomes privately separated from its world. There is always a subject though, from the subject's perspective, and the object has no perspective. Think of how we see a single image with two separate eyes, or hear a single sound with ears on opposite sides of our head, and how that bilateral symmetry opens our perception up to a deeper realism rather than a de-coupled redundancy. It is the stereo image or sound which is primitive, but it can only be realized through the sense organs on two sides of the head. It is strange to think about the stereo image being the deeper reality if you model it in objective terms (seems more like 3D images would have to be an illusion based upon 2D images), but when you test the truth of this proposition subjectively, it makes sense. We feel that we make sense of an external world, perceiving aspects of something which exists independently of our perception, rather than a collection of unrelated illusions that we string together in a narrative. Our access to this external world is made possible by our awareness of the invariance between our senses as well as the qualitative extension which each sense channel and each individual sensor contributes. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 24, 9:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 2:15 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> Are you seriously suggesting that I can talk about an actual event without > >> there be a causal chain between the event and the sound that comes out of > >> my mouth? > > > You can talk about anything you want though. If I talk about a > > backache it doesn't mean that there is a connection from my back to my > > vocal cords. If I talk about the dark side of the Moon it doesn't mean > > there is a causal connection between my larynx and the unlit lunar > > surface. I don't understand why the A connected to B and B connected > > to C implies A connected to C directly. > > If I correctly read something put in front of me there must be a > causal connection between the paper or screen and the sound that comes > out of my mouth. The causal connection is through a chain of neural > connections. No. That's a logical fallacy. If I go to France and then I go to the Moon, that does not mean that there is a causal connection between France and the Moon. It's indefensible to claim otherwise. > > >> They are connected to each other through a network of neurons in which the > >> output of a downstream neuron is dependent on the inputs of the upstream > >> neurons. This so that the behaviour of the organism as a whole, controlled > >> by its nervous system, is dependent on its environmental inputs; otherwise > >> it would quickly die. > > > You know that a lot of simple organisms don't have nervous systems, > > right? > > > "• Eukaryotic, single-cell protists > > • Move through environment via coordinated motion of cilia on the > > outer surface > >But no nervous system!" > > I was of course referring to organisms with nervous systems, but even > the ones without must alter their behaviour according to environmental > inputs or they will not survive. They do alter their behavior, but without a nervous system. Your claim that a nervous system evolved out of survival necessity is false. > > >http://web.pdx.edu/~zelickr/sensory-physiology/lecture-notes/OLDER/L1... > > > As far as I know, there is no 'downstream' neuron in the larynx that > > depends on an upstream 'input' from the optic nerve or vice versa. > > Blindness does not cause people to lose their voice and laryngitis > > doesn't cause loss of vision. > > Indirectly, the larynx must be connected to the optic nerve or we > wouldn't be able to describe what we see. Is that not obvious? Indirectly everything is connected to everything. The foot is connected to the ass indirectly too. So what? Indirect connection is meaningless in this context. The larynx doesn't talk to the retina. > > >>If this sensitivity to environmental inputs did not require a causal > >>connection between neurons then why has the nervous system evolved at all? > >>>Why don't the muscles just make decisions and contract on their own? > > > Tissues and cells do make decisions, contract, move on their own (see > > PDF above - eukaryotes). Think about carnivorous plants > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymnLpQNyI6...no nervous system 2, > > nervous system 0. > > Their cells respond to environmental inputs. If they did not they > would display random behaviour and would die. You rhetorically asked why muscles don't just make decisions and contract their own, and now you are agreeing with me that cells actually do make decisions on their own. Your position has been that without a nervous system's functionality, organisms could not survive. Now your position has morphed into my position of sensemaking on the cellular level. Of course cells respond to environmental inputs. That is what I think sensorimotive experience is. > > >> Yes, we assume that that is so. If the visual cortex is missing the visual > >> qualia are missing. However, if neurons in the motor cortex controlling > >> >speech get the same inputs they normally get they will produce the same > >> outputs, so the speech produced will be the same. > > > Sorry, I find this is a bizarre misinterpretation of physiology. Motor > > neurons do not determine the content of our speech. They are just the > > mechanical conduit for the cognitive areas of the brain to express > > itself verbally. If the visual cortex is missing, the cognitive areas > > get no new visual experience, therefore they can't accurately report > > on that - not by speech, writing, gestures, etc. Nothing would be the > > same. > > Motor neurons controlling speech describing what the person is seeing > must get input indirectly from the retina, processed of course in > complex ways by the intermediate neural tissue. "intermediate neural tissue"?? Haha, you mean *the brain*? It's sort of like saying "the gas pedal must get input indirectly from the windshield, processed of course in complex ways by the intermediate hominid tissue." You are inverting the orientation of subjectivity, making the means into ends and the ends into means. Motor neu
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 2:15 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> Are you seriously suggesting that I can talk about an actual event without >> there be a causal chain between the event and the sound that comes out of my >> mouth? > > You can talk about anything you want though. If I talk about a > backache it doesn't mean that there is a connection from my back to my > vocal cords. If I talk about the dark side of the Moon it doesn't mean > there is a causal connection between my larynx and the unlit lunar > surface. I don't understand why the A connected to B and B connected > to C implies A connected to C directly. If I correctly read something put in front of me there must be a causal connection between the paper or screen and the sound that comes out of my mouth. The causal connection is through a chain of neural connections. >> They are connected to each other through a network of neurons in which the >> output of a downstream neuron is dependent on the inputs of the upstream >> neurons. This so that the behaviour of the organism as a whole, controlled >> by its nervous system, is dependent on its environmental inputs; otherwise >> it would quickly die. > > You know that a lot of simple organisms don't have nervous systems, > right? > > "• Eukaryotic, single-cell protists > • Move through environment via coordinated motion of cilia on the > outer surface > But no nervous system!" I was of course referring to organisms with nervous systems, but even the ones without must alter their behaviour according to environmental inputs or they will not survive. > http://web.pdx.edu/~zelickr/sensory-physiology/lecture-notes/OLDER/L10-invert-mechano.pdf > > As far as I know, there is no 'downstream' neuron in the larynx that > depends on an upstream 'input' from the optic nerve or vice versa. > Blindness does not cause people to lose their voice and laryngitis > doesn't cause loss of vision. Indirectly, the larynx must be connected to the optic nerve or we wouldn't be able to describe what we see. Is that not obvious? >>If this sensitivity to environmental inputs did not require a causal >>connection between neurons then why has the nervous system evolved at all? >>>Why don't the muscles just make decisions and contract on their own? > > Tissues and cells do make decisions, contract, move on their own (see > PDF above - eukaryotes). Think about carnivorous plants > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymnLpQNyI6 ...no nervous system 2, > nervous system 0. Their cells respond to environmental inputs. If they did not they would display random behaviour and would die. >> Yes, we assume that that is so. If the visual cortex is missing the visual >> qualia are missing. However, if neurons in the motor cortex controlling >> >speech get the same inputs they normally get they will produce the same >> outputs, so the speech produced will be the same. > > Sorry, I find this is a bizarre misinterpretation of physiology. Motor > neurons do not determine the content of our speech. They are just the > mechanical conduit for the cognitive areas of the brain to express > itself verbally. If the visual cortex is missing, the cognitive areas > get no new visual experience, therefore they can't accurately report > on that - not by speech, writing, gestures, etc. Nothing would be the > same. Motor neurons controlling speech describing what the person is seeing must get input indirectly from the retina, processed of course in complex ways by the intermediate neural tissue. The motor neurons controlling my hands as I type this must be receiving input from your brain, albeit relayed through multiple electronic and biological stages. Otherwise how could I possibly respond to what you are saying? >>It must be this way given the principle of no magical influences (to which >>you claim to subscribe). For if the qualia produced an effect on the >neurons >>separate to that of the physical factors, which are replicated by the >>artificial neurons, that would appear as a magical influence. > > 2. Qualia routinely has an effect on neurons. That is what voluntary > action is. Whether or not it appears as magical is a matter of > interpretation. > > Look at this: > http://www.domain-b.com/technology/biotech_pharma/20111019_communication.html > > '''This was a real surprise," says Tyszka. "We expected to see a lot > less coupling between the left and right brain in this group - after > all, they are missing about 200 million connections that would > normally be there. How do they manage to have normal communication > between the left and right sides of the brain without the corpus > callosum?''' > > I feel confident that it is only a matter of time before science will > have to model the nervous system in something like the way that I'm > suggesting. But the authors are not claiming a non-physical influence. The challenge is to find what mechanism is responsible for the coordination of the resting state activity in these brains:
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
*I* *interjected some remarks just for keeping order on the list*.- *JM * On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 23, 4:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > > *Craig,* > > ** > > *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term Multisense > > Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* > > *satisfactory to whom? * > > To whoever understands how it applies to the Hard Problem. > * (JM: OK, I feel myself excluded from an explanation.)* > > > *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like your: > > "range of experience" as a limited term. * > > Separation of subjective experience and objective existence. > ** *(JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. * > > > *Then again: to explain by "our awareness"? what is awareness and how > does > > it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * > > Awareness is primitive. It isn't explained, it is experienced first > hand and cannot be explained without first hand experience. To explain > is to translate something which is not experienced directly into a > direct sense, so sense or awareness is always the beginning and ending > - the elephant in every room. Our awareness doesn't come from physical > phenomenon as much as both the physical and experiential phenomena are > actually the same thing, but part of what that thing does is to make > one side seem separate from the other. > * JM: Newton became aware of some gravitation from physical phenomena - experienced. So I can agree. What* *I cannot see, however, how the two SIDES of the same thing can be separated? Both are primitive. See the next line. * > > > *So I frown to speak about different kinds (levels?) of it as 'making the > > difference'. * > > Not sure which kinds and which differences you mean. > > Craig > ** > > *JohnM* > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
Sthatis, thanks for your inserted remarks. Here is a condensed copy of them to facilitate my reflection: --- *10-24 Stathis reply entries: = We may not know all the physics behind the brain but we know there must be some physics, even if undiscovered. The magical theory of consciousness says that it is not due to physics or computation but to non-physical processes - a soul* * **JM*: Please: *NO "MUST BE"* it is the confession of our ignorance about anything else. Just as we could not figure out possibilities about the 'World' before they were learned (more-or-less flimsy explanations on poorly understood new information) we cannot *"suppose" *what ELSE could be acting/influencing the unknown items And I reject your simple-minded (pardon the expression, did not apply it to YOU) injection of some "SOUL" into an educated discussion. (Is it only a 'name'?) With 'consciousness' I did not go further than "response (acknowledgement?) to information" - later: response to relations, no matter if someone calls it 'magical'. It is BEYOND our *present* knowledge (base) and capabilities to know. Just as many other items were beyond such circumstances earlier in the course of culture(s). *---* ** *It may be a physical cause we don't yet know, but that is not the same as a supernatural cause. The history of science is that the number of things considered unexplainable, and previously magical, is diminishing all the time.* ** *JM: *Did I say 'supernatural'? I said NOT *"A" cause*, but *many,* most of them not yet even detected by us. Again the postulation of *ONE* 'maybe', whatever physical may mean. Like "a" cause for 'disliking a person's face'. Or: feeling guilty. Do you have (anticipate?) a schedule when that list of 'unexplainables' will disappear so we gain omniscience with our feeble 'brain'? I don't, in the contrary: I think we do not even imagine what *KIND OF* aspects to consider in the unknown infinity of the 'world' beyond our knowledge. And: in what relations of a total complexity? *--- It is still hard but *nothing* would offer a satisfactory explanation. If you say the explanation for consciousness is x someone can still ask, But why should x be associated with consciousness?* ** *JM: *with WHAT? see my question above if consciousness is only a noumenon (= x?) That c-word is a historic mish-mash of items put together to satisfy the (scientific?) needs of the actual author. I followed that only since 1992 (Tucson conferences). This was the time when I generalized the phenomena/processes considered under this fancy 'name' and arrived at the above given identification (information - later relations). It may not be perfect, I would be happy to accept a better one. * Saying "I dunno" is OK. It's the scientific way. Saying "I dunno, so it must be magic" is not OK.* *JM: *agree. (see above). Unfortunately conventional science tries to explain everything within the framework of the so far formulated 'scientific' knowledge and has frown away from "I dunno" which is not Nobel-stuff. *-- Stathis Papaioannou == --John Mikes* > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 23, 4:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > *Craig,* > ** > *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term Multisense > Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* > *satisfactory to whom? * To whoever understands how it applies to the Hard Problem. > *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like your: > "range of experience" as a limited term. * Separation of subjective experience and objective existence. > *Then again: to explain by "our awareness"? what is awareness and how does > it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * Awareness is primitive. It isn't explained, it is experienced first hand and cannot be explained without first hand experience. To explain is to translate something which is not experienced directly into a direct sense, so sense or awareness is always the beginning and ending - the elephant in every room. Our awareness doesn't come from physical phenomenon as much as both the physical and experiential phenomena are actually the same thing, but part of what that thing does is to make one side seem separate from the other. > *So I frown to speak about different kinds (levels?) of it as 'making the > difference'. * Not sure which kinds and which differences you mean. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
*Craig,* ** *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term Multisense Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* *satisfactory to whom? * *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like your: "range of experience" as a limited term. * *Then again: to explain by "our awareness"? what is awareness and how does it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * *So I frown to speak about different kinds (levels?) of it as 'making the difference'. * ** *My base is different: as a child I learned 4 different alphabets with 3 (4?) different languages (almost at the same time) and a good decade before I learned to formulate one of them into English words (maybe add another one applied in it: Gothic). So things for me are not so simple. * On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 11:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 23, 8:36 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Oct 23, 2011, at 6:23 AM, John Mikes wrote: > > > > It may well be. I am still at a loss how the physical (electrical) or > tissue measurements can explain mental effects (incl. consciousness, free > will, emotions etc. as they occur. The "hard problem" is still hard. > > > > It is still hard but *nothing* would offer a satisfactory explanation. If > you say the explanation for consciousness is x someone can still ask, But > why should x be associated with consciousness? > *Sthatis: There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be magic * ** > > Please, pardon me for my agnostic view I proudly believe in the power of > > "I dunno". > > Saying "I dunno" is OK. It's the scientific way. Saying "I dunno, so it must be magic" is not OK. *GW: Why isn't it ok to say "I dunno, so it might be exactly what it seems to be"? It's not magic, it's ordinary consciousness*. JM: I did not write "it must be magic". I wrote: 'magic' is a good word (which I wouldn't apply). My 'agnostic' views present no problem in """nothing would offer a satisfactory explanation""": I mean: as of today. Maybe tomorrow??? *GW:* > *Multisense Realism offers a satisfactory explanation. It includes the > realization that limits of a particular subject's frame of reference > define the nature of the separation between mind and matter. The > separation is the 'illusion' which arises from our particular range of > experience as human beings. Our awareness itself is the separator. The > hard problem arises out of mistaking high level multisense awareness > with low level object mechanics. The high level awareness can in fact > be correlated with overall high level object mechanics (globally in > the brain, nervous system, and environment) but it is a category error > to try to explain high level awareness as a function of objects. > > High level awareness and low level awareness are share mutual > functionality. Experience through time is the opposite of objects > across space so low level awareness does not have to physically cause > high level awareness like a small gear turns a larger gear. Experience > is recapitulated within experience - just as your years of learning to > read English letters and words as a child are recapitulated > subconsciously in your perception of these bit arrangements as legible > text. > * > *Craig > > * > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 23, 11:56 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2011/10/23 Craig Weinberg > > > On Oct 23, 7:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:23 AM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > >> How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the > > > >> newspaper? > > > > > The vocal cords don't know that what they are doing is related to the > > > > newspaper. There are parts of the brain which relate the aural > > > > expectation and the semantic intention through the articulation of the > > > > voice. On that level the vocal cords are not included within the > > > > perceptual inertial frame. On the level where the vocal cords are > > > > being considered, the other perceptual aspects are not relevant. > > > > >> There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be > > > >> magic. > > > > > There are all kinds of mechanisms and motives which are intertwined, > > > > some causally and some acausally. There is no basis to announce that > > > > all phenomena in the universe must be part of a causal chain or are > > > > disqualified from being real. > > > > Are you seriously suggesting that I can talk about an actual event > > without there be a causal chain between the event and the sound that comes > > out of my mouth? > > > You can talk about anything you want though. If I talk about a > > backache it doesn't mean that there is a connection from my back to my > > vocal cords. If I talk about the dark side of the Moon it doesn't mean > > there is a causal connection between my larynx and the unlit lunar > > surface. I don't understand why the A connected to B and B connected > > to C implies A connected to C directly. > > Well... When I read this, I can only say you do it on purpose not to > understand... He never says the word directly... so you should read "A > connected to B and B connected > to C implies A connected to C." and that's plainly true. I understand his assumption, but I don't understand why I should consider that assumption could be true. He thinks that if any activity of the eyes can be correlated in any way with the activity of the mouth that we must assume a causal connection and work backwards from there. That indeed would be the way that we would approach it if we studied an object. Since we have subjective insight into how this works in the case of human consciousness though, we know that we control what we say and that we are the ones who see through our eyes. We understand that it is necessary for us to be in the middle between what we see and what we say, to make sense of the former and instantiate the latter. Without us in the middle of the two, there can be no connection. On it's own, the neurological activity is meaningless cellular behaviors and the speech is meaningless laryngeal spasms. The 'information' is our experience of our environment, reflected as in a specular reflection http://download.blender.org/documentation/htmlI/ch10s02.html. Like a mirror, we are seeing distal physical events through proximal physical structures rather than inferring distal physical events mechanically through an unspecified metaphysical simulation/map. Just as in a reflection in a puddle we can choose to focus on the puddle or we can look at the clouds in the sky through our eye's ability to use the puddle as a prosthetic instrument to extend it's local perception of the optical field. You need an interpreter to choose which context the image belongs to. If you look *through* a nervous system, you get meaningful images, if you look *at* a nervous system, you get cells twitching and oozing. What the mechanistic perspective does is to look only at the nervous system and try to reverse engineer it from there. It is as if materialism looks at the specular reflection of blue sky in a puddle the same way that it looks at consciousness in the brain, it can only describe the sky as an emergent property of puddles which evolved to to make it easier for puddles not to evaporate. It would completely miss the point of reflection, which is that it occurs through the visual understanding of the viewer, not as a viewer-independent property of puddles. > And if there was no > causal chain between your eyes and your mouth (ie: going through the brain), > then you couldn't report anything that you see. Stathis never said your eyes > were *directly connected to your mouth*, it's stupid and a straw man. Stathis says: "> >> The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive > >> information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any > >> statement about what he sees. " To me that means that he intends for 'information' from the visual centers to end up in the 'speech centers', i.e. directly connected from eyes to mouth. All I am doing is agreeing with you that it is stupid and a straw man. I understand that his use of the word 'relay' implies (I hope) that he means there is an 'information pathway' that runs through the brain rather than a literal optic-vagus nerv
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 23, 8:36 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Oct 23, 2011, at 6:23 AM, John Mikes wrote: > > It may well be. I am still at a loss how the physical (electrical) or > > tissue measurements can explain mental effects (incl. consciousness, free > > will, emotions etc. as they occur. The "hard problem" is still hard. > > It is still hard but *nothing* would offer a satisfactory explanation. If you > say the explanation for consciousness is x someone can still ask, But why > should x be associated with consciousness? Multisense Realism offers a satisfactory explanation. It includes the realization that limits of a particular subject's frame of reference define the nature of the separation between mind and matter. The separation is the 'illusion' which arises from our particular range of experience as human beings. Our awareness itself is the separator. The hard problem arises out of mistaking high level multisense awareness with low level object mechanics. The high level awareness can in fact be correlated with overall high level object mechanics (globally in the brain, nervous system, and environment) but it is a category error to try to explain high level awareness as a function of objects. High level awareness and low level awareness are share mutual functionality. Experience through time is the opposite of objects across space so low level awareness does not have to physically cause high level awareness like a small gear turns a larger gear. Experience is recapitulated within experience - just as your years of learning to read English letters and words as a child are recapitulated subconsciously in your perception of these bit arrangements as legible text. > > Please, pardon me for my agnostic view I proudly believe in the power of > > "I dunno". > > Saying "I dunno" is OK. It's the scientific way. Saying "I dunno, so it must > be magic" is not OK. Why isn't it ok to say "I dunno, so it might be exactly what it seems to be"? It's not magic, it's ordinary consciousness. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 23, 7:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the > >> newspaper? > > > The vocal cords don't know that what they are doing is related to the > > newspaper. There are parts of the brain which relate the aural > > expectation and the semantic intention through the articulation of the > > voice. On that level the vocal cords are not included within the > > perceptual inertial frame. On the level where the vocal cords are > > being considered, the other perceptual aspects are not relevant. > > >> There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be > >> magic. > > > There are all kinds of mechanisms and motives which are intertwined, > > some causally and some acausally. There is no basis to announce that > > all phenomena in the universe must be part of a causal chain or are > > disqualified from being real. > > Are you seriously suggesting that I can talk about an actual event without > there be a causal chain between the event and the sound that comes out of my > mouth? You can talk about anything you want though. If I talk about a backache it doesn't mean that there is a connection from my back to my vocal cords. If I talk about the dark side of the Moon it doesn't mean there is a causal connection between my larynx and the unlit lunar surface. I don't understand why the A connected to B and B connected to C implies A connected to C directly. > > >> It would be magic if I could know what is happening on the > >> other side of the world without a causal link between me and the > >> event, and it would be magic if I could talk about it without a causal > >> link between my eyes and my mouth. > > > The eyes are connected to the brain and the mouth is connected to the > > brain. They aren't connected directly to each other though. Not in any > > causally efficacious way. > > They are connected to each other through a network of neurons in which the > output of a downstream neuron is dependent on the inputs of the upstream > neurons. This so that the behaviour of the organism as a whole, controlled by > its nervous system, is dependent on its environmental inputs; otherwise it > would quickly die. You know that a lot of simple organisms don't have nervous systems, right? "• Eukaryotic, single-cell protists • Move through environment via coordinated motion of cilia on the outer surface But no nervous system!" http://web.pdx.edu/~zelickr/sensory-physiology/lecture-notes/OLDER/L10-invert-mechano.pdf As far as I know, there is no 'downstream' neuron in the larynx that depends on an upstream 'input' from the optic nerve or vice versa. Blindness does not cause people to lose their voice and laryngitis doesn't cause loss of vision. >If this sensitivity to environmental inputs did not require a causal >connection between neurons then why has the nervous system evolved at all? >>Why don't the muscles just make decisions and contract on their own? Tissues and cells do make decisions, contract, move on their own (see PDF above - eukaryotes). Think about carnivorous plants http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymnLpQNyI6 ...no nervous system 2, nervous system 0. I would think that the nervous system evolved to help centralize sensemaking and free will within a large, multicellular organism. It makes possible a second order biological experience, just as organic life makes possible a second order physical experience. Through a nervous system, simplicity is reborn in an organism of billions of cells, much like a computer exploits the molecular properties of semiconductors to make a giant electromagnetic molecule of glass, the nervous system exploits the biochemical properties of cells to make a giant electrochemical cell. In this way we feel that we exist as a solitary individual unit rather than countless discrete cells and organs. > > >> If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli > >> from the replaced part how could it know that anything had changed? > > > Even if the rest of the brain believes that the substitute neurons > > have not changed, the neurons themselves are now missing so that > > whatever feelings they contribute to the overall conscious experience > > will be absent. If the whole brain is replaced, all feeling is absent > > and there is unconsciousness. > > Yes, we assume that that is so. If the visual cortex is missing the visual > qualia are missing. However, if neurons in the motor cortex controlling > >speech get the same inputs they normally get they will produce the same > outputs, so the speech produced will be the same. Sorry, I find this is a bizarre misinterpretation of physiology. Motor neurons do not determine the content of our speech. They are just the mechanical conduit for the cognitive areas of the brain to express itself verbally. If the visual cortex is missing, the cognitive areas get no new visual experience, therefor
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 23, 2011, at 6:23 AM, John Mikes wrote: > Stathis, > you wrote quite a 'study' to Craig. May I extract some sentences for my > reflections? > (I delete the entire discussion here) > John M > > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2011 at 10:42 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 2:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > === > How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the newspaper? There > must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be magic > "Do they indeed? because we don't know about anything else to do the job (so > far)? BTW "MAGIC" is a pretty good word. Notice that I have made no claim about the exact process involved. If I learn that there was an earthquake in China then in some way there must be a causal connection between the earthquake and me; otherwise how could I know about it? > -- > If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli from the > replaced part how could it know that anything had changed? > You would have to say that the visual cortex has some non-physical influence > on the rest of the brain, but no such effect has ever been observed. What has > been observed is that neurons fire in response to the > electrochemical signals from the other neurons with which they interface. > "Does it KNOW at all?"IMO the brain is a TOOL acting for "mentality" > (whatever that may be) in ways explained according to our so far detected > conventional sciences. > How did they explai electrical, or EM phenomena BEFORE Galvani? or atomic > fission before M. Curie? > - We may not know all the physics behind the brain but we know there must be some physics, even if undiscovered. The magical theory of consciousness says that it is not due to physics or computation but to non-physical processes - a soul. > If there is a physical cause then we can explain why and predict when a > neuron will fire; if there is not we can'tThat is contrary to science, by > definition. > A 'physical' cause? Are we omniscient to know them all? I agree: that would > be contrary to (conventional?) science, not only by definition. It may be a physical cause we don't yet know, but that is not the same as a supernatural cause. The history of science is that the number of things considered unexplainable, and previously magical, is diminishing all the time. > -- > You claim the putative non-physical influence is ubiquitous in living cells, > so it would not be unreasonable to expect that it would have been observed, > overturning all of science. But it has never been observed. > Right on > > The choosing and understanding, everything to do with consciousness, > cognition and free will, is *as a result of* the mechanistic neural activity. > That is the conventional > scientific view. > It may well be. I am still at a loss how the physical (electrical) or tissue > measurements can explain mental effects (incl. consciousness, free will, > emotions etc. as they occur. The "hard problem" is still hard. It is still hard but *nothing* would offer a satisfactory explanation. If you say the explanation for consciousness is x someone can still ask, But why should x be associated with consciousness? > - > to other parts: "observable" in our poor understanding and explanatory power > of the so far discovered knowledge? > Explained by those incomplete causes we SO FAR think we detected? We have a > very poor view of nature, the infinite complexity and epistemologically we > get enrichment all the time. > Would you abide by a "science" that ignores the 'rest of it' we may learn in > the future and explains everything on the level of today's total informative > knowledge-base? > Please, pardon me for my agnostic view I proudly believe in the power of > "I dunno". Saying "I dunno" is OK. It's the scientific way. Saying "I dunno, so it must be magic" is not OK. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the >> newspaper? > > The vocal cords don't know that what they are doing is related to the > newspaper. There are parts of the brain which relate the aural > expectation and the semantic intention through the articulation of the > voice. On that level the vocal cords are not included within the > perceptual inertial frame. On the level where the vocal cords are > being considered, the other perceptual aspects are not relevant. > >> There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be >> magic. > > There are all kinds of mechanisms and motives which are intertwined, > some causally and some acausally. There is no basis to announce that > all phenomena in the universe must be part of a causal chain or are > disqualified from being real. Are you seriously suggesting that I can talk about an actual event without there be a causal chain between the event and the sound that comes out of my mouth? >> It would be magic if I could know what is happening on the >> other side of the world without a causal link between me and the >> event, and it would be magic if I could talk about it without a causal >> link between my eyes and my mouth. > > The eyes are connected to the brain and the mouth is connected to the > brain. They aren't connected directly to each other though. Not in any > causally efficacious way. They are connected to each other through a network of neurons in which the output of a downstream neuron is dependent on the inputs of the upstream neurons. This so that the behaviour of the organism as a whole, controlled by its nervous system, is dependent on its environmental inputs; otherwise it would quickly die. If this sensitivity to environmental inputs did not require a causal connection between neurons then why has the nervous system evolved at all? Why don't the muscles just make decisions and contract on their own? >> If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli >> from the replaced part how could it know that anything had changed? > > Even if the rest of the brain believes that the substitute neurons > have not changed, the neurons themselves are now missing so that > whatever feelings they contribute to the overall conscious experience > will be absent. If the whole brain is replaced, all feeling is absent > and there is unconsciousness. Yes, we assume that that is so. If the visual cortex is missing the visual qualia are missing. However, if neurons in the motor cortex controlling speech get the same inputs they normally get they will produce the same outputs, so the speech produced will be the same. It must be this way given the principle of no magical influences (to which you claim to subscribe). For if the qualia produced an effect on the neurons separate to that of the physical factors, which are replicated by the artificial neurons, that would appear as a magical influence. >> You would have to say that the visual cortex has some non-physical >> influence on the rest of the brain, but no such effect has ever been >> observed. > > 5. No, there is no non-physical influence, there is non-physical > experience. Our visual experience is the actual subjective > phenomenology of the visual cortex. Our visual experience is not the > consequence of an 'influence', it is a phenomenon unto itself which > has a physical aspect and an experiential aspect. > >> What has been observed is that neurons fire in response to >> the electrochemical signals from the other neurons with which they >> interface. > > Yes, neurons often fire in chain reaction to other neurons, but not by > any means all the time. All chain reactions in the brain originate > somewhere, usually in thousands of separate locations simultaneously. > As long as you deny this neurological fact, you cannot understand how > low level processes supervene upon high level processes. It is to look > at a CRT monitor and say that every pixel can only be illuminated > sequentially by the electron gun during it's horizontal scan, and > completely ignoring that the whole point of those scans is to produce > a high level image composed of thousands of simultaneously illuminated > pixels. > > The human brain has thousands of 'electron guns', able to fire > unilaterally or in concert with many other interconnected neurons. > It's a community of hundreds of billions of interconnected living > organisms. It is *nothing* like the response-machine that you imagine. > Such a thing doesn't even make sense in theory as it conceives of > living organisms no less passive than a lump of coal. It's not even > worth serious consideration. You cite neurobiological research but you reject the most basic scientific principles of that research, which is that a neuron depolarises its membrane in response to physical factors that have been known for decades, and not seriously disputed. How the
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
Stathis, you wrote quite a 'study' to Craig. May I extract some sentences for my reflections? (I delete the entire discussion here) John M On Sat, Oct 22, 2011 at 10:42 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 2:40 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > === *How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating **to the newspaper? There must be *some* causal chain, **otherwise it would be magic* *"Do they indeed? because we don't know about anything else to do the job (so far)? BTW "MAGIC" is a pretty good word.* *--* *If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli from the replaced part how could it know that **anything had changed? You would have to say that the visual cortex has some non-physical influence on the rest of the brain, but no such effect has ever been observed. What has been observed is that neurons fire in response to the * *electrochemical signals from the other neurons with which they interface.* *"Does it KNOW at all?"IMO the brain is a TOOL acting for "mentality" (whatever that may be) in ways explained according to our so far detected conventional sciences. * *How did they explai electrical, or EM phenomena BEFORE Galvani? or atomic fission before M. Curie? * *-* * If there is a **physical cause then we can explain why and predict when **a neuron will fire; if there is not we can'tThat is contrary to science, by definition.* *A 'physical' cause? Are we omniscient to know them all? I agree: that would be contrary to (conventional?) science, not only by definition.* *--* *You claim the putative non-physical influence is ubiquitous in living cells, so it would not be unreasonable to expect that it would have been observed, overturning **all of science. But it has never been observed*. Right on *The choosing and understanding, everything to do with **consciousness, cognition and free will, is *as a result of* **the mechanistic neural activity. That is the conventional * *scientific view.* *It may well be. I am still at a loss how the physical (electrical) or tissue measurements can explain mental effects (incl. consciousness, free will, emotions etc. as they occur. The "hard problem" is still hard. * *-* *to other parts: "observable" in our poor understanding and explanatory power of the so far discovered knowledge? * *Explained by those incomplete causes we SO FAR think we detected? We have a very poor view of nature, the infinite complexity and epistemologically we get enrichment all the time. * *Would you abide by a "science" that ignores the 'rest of it' we may learn in the future and explains everything on the level of today's total informative knowledge-base? * *Please, pardon me for my agnostic view I proudly believe in the power of * *"I dunno". * *Regards* *John M* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 22, 10:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 2:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> When I read the newspaper this morning the light > >> has a physical effect on my retina which through a series of complex > >> neural relays modulates the output of the motor neurons to my larynx, > >> tongue and diaphragm producing sound waves relating to what I am > >> reading. > > > You're inventing a connection where none exists. There is no neural > > pathway for eye-voice coordination. You see through your eyes and you > > speak through your voice. Both processes require that you are > > conscious and voluntarily moving your eyes and larynx. That vocal > > expression has a physical characteristic which we can observe > > externally as motor neuron behaviors. > > How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the > newspaper? The vocal cords don't know that what they are doing is related to the newspaper. There are parts of the brain which relate the aural expectation and the semantic intention through the articulation of the voice. On that level the vocal cords are not included within the perceptual inertial frame. On the level where the vocal cords are being considered, the other perceptual aspects are not relevant. > There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be > magic. There are all kinds of mechanisms and motives which are intertwined, some causally and some acausally. There is no basis to announce that all phenomena in the universe must be part of a causal chain or are disqualified from being real. > It would be magic if I could know what is happening on the > other side of the world without a causal link between me and the > event, and it would be magic if I could talk about it without a causal > link between my eyes and my mouth. The eyes are connected to the brain and the mouth is connected to the brain. They aren't connected directly to each other though. Not in any causally efficacious way. > > >> If any component in this pathway, such as the optic nerve, is > >> replaced with an artificial device that relays the electrical signals > >> in a physiologically appropriate way do you claim that the downstream > >> neurons would respond differently because the artificial nerve lacks > >> the "sense" of the natural nerve? > > > It depends on the nature of the device and the nature of what it is > > the device replaces. You could replace the retina and your visual > > cortex will learn to use it. If you replace the visual cortex the rest > > of your brain will be able to compensate functionally but you will be > > blindsighted. If you have partial visual cortex replacement your brain > > could adapt and learn to use it. > > If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli > from the replaced part how could it know that anything had changed? Even if the rest of the brain believes that the substitute neurons have not changed, the neurons themselves are now missing so that whatever feelings they contribute to the overall conscious experience will be absent. If the whole brain is replaced, all feeling is absent and there is unconsciousness. > You would have to say that the visual cortex has some non-physical > influence on the rest of the brain, but no such effect has ever been > observed. 5. No, there is no non-physical influence, there is non-physical experience. Our visual experience is the actual subjective phenomenology of the visual cortex. Our visual experience is not the consequence of an 'influence', it is a phenomenon unto itself which has a physical aspect and an experiential aspect. >What has been observed is that neurons fire in response to > the electrochemical signals from the other neurons with which they > interface. Yes, neurons often fire in chain reaction to other neurons, but not by any means all the time. All chain reactions in the brain originate somewhere, usually in thousands of separate locations simultaneously. As long as you deny this neurological fact, you cannot understand how low level processes supervene upon high level processes. It is to look at a CRT monitor and say that every pixel can only be illuminated sequentially by the electron gun during it's horizontal scan, and completely ignoring that the whole point of those scans is to produce a high level image composed of thousands of simultaneously illuminated pixels. The human brain has thousands of 'electron guns', able to fire unilaterally or in concert with many other interconnected neurons. It's a community of hundreds of billions of interconnected living organisms. It is *nothing* like the response-machine that you imagine. Such a thing doesn't even make sense in theory as it conceives of living organisms no less passive than a lump of coal. It's not even worth serious consideration. > > >> If so, then you are claiming that > >> neurons affect other neurons by something other than physical factors, > >> going against not only all of neuroscience bu
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 2:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> When I read the newspaper this morning the light >> has a physical effect on my retina which through a series of complex >> neural relays modulates the output of the motor neurons to my larynx, >> tongue and diaphragm producing sound waves relating to what I am >> reading. > > You're inventing a connection where none exists. There is no neural > pathway for eye-voice coordination. You see through your eyes and you > speak through your voice. Both processes require that you are > conscious and voluntarily moving your eyes and larynx. That vocal > expression has a physical characteristic which we can observe > externally as motor neuron behaviors. How do my vocal cords know to produce output relating to the newspaper? There must be *some* causal chain, otherwise it would be magic. It would be magic if I could know what is happening on the other side of the world without a causal link between me and the event, and it would be magic if I could talk about it without a causal link between my eyes and my mouth. >> If any component in this pathway, such as the optic nerve, is >> replaced with an artificial device that relays the electrical signals >> in a physiologically appropriate way do you claim that the downstream >> neurons would respond differently because the artificial nerve lacks >> the "sense" of the natural nerve? > > It depends on the nature of the device and the nature of what it is > the device replaces. You could replace the retina and your visual > cortex will learn to use it. If you replace the visual cortex the rest > of your brain will be able to compensate functionally but you will be > blindsighted. If you have partial visual cortex replacement your brain > could adapt and learn to use it. If the rest of my brain receives the normal electrochemical stimuli from the replaced part how could it know that anything had changed? You would have to say that the visual cortex has some non-physical influence on the rest of the brain, but no such effect has ever been observed. What has been observed is that neurons fire in response to the electrochemical signals from the other neurons with which they interface. >> If so, then you are claiming that >> neurons affect other neurons by something other than physical factors, >> going against not only all of neuroscience but also against all of >> science. > > I forget what number I was on. I'll guess 6. > > 6. I have never claimed anything that goes against any neuroscientific > observation. I repeat again, if you think that I am claiming that, > then you do not understand what I am saying. My view is more > scientific because it accounts for all of the phenomena that are > involved and not just the ones that show up under a microscope. You are clearly saying just that, since you deny that there is a physical cause behind the neuron firing. If there is a physical cause then we can explain why and predict when a neuron will fire; if there is not we can't. You claim that a neuron can just decide to fire and go ahead and do it where all the observable physical factors suggest that it should not. That is contrary to science, by definition. >> For an artificial neuron I think the timing of the action potential in >> response to environmental factors is the main thing to get right. I >> think the neuron's shape is important to take into account in this >> regard since the shape affects the electric field and excitability, >> but I don't think its mass is important. But I might be wrong: it >> could be that neurons sense their neighbours' tiny gravitational field >> and therefore the network with the artificial neuron would behave >> slightly erratically until this was taken into account. The >> engineering project would involve sorting this sort of thing out until >> eventually the artificial neuron would slot into the network with the >> level of tolerance that is acceptable for biological neurons. > > If the neuron doesn't feel anything, then there is not going to be any > feeling at the higher processing level. These are living organisms. > They may not have a level of tolerance that is acceptable, just as > there is no substitute for water or carbon that is acceptable. Assume the artificial neuron feels nothing, and all it does it get the timing right in stimulating neurons to which it interfaces. Could that still result in those biological neurons firing erratically? How, if they get the same inputs? >> Qualia are not observable directly by a third party (you knew this is >> what I meant). > > Why does that matter though? If you connect your brain to theirs then > you could observe qualia directly, as some conjoined twins do. Why do > you privilege third party observability when dealing with a first > person phenomenology? Because I'm asking what would happen to the qualia if you ignored them and just took care of the observable behaviour, which must be explainable in terms of observable cau
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 19, 7:30 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 1:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> When you speak about what you see the information carried in the light > >> that comes into your pupils must somehow get to the motor neurons > >> controlling your vocal cords. How do you think this happens? > > > There is no 'information' carried in the light. There is only the > > sense that the visual cortex makes of the sense that the retina makes > > of the sense that the optical relations of the environment make to the > > person who is using the the visual cortex and retina to perceive the > > environment. At no point would anything that enters your pupils wind > > up coming out of your vocal chords through your motor neurons. I am > > flabbergasted that you can take this view seriously in all honesty. > > Aren't you saying that you think nuggets of 'information' from outside > > of your eyeballs are squirting into your brain and out of your throat? > > > How I think it happens that we can speak about what I see is that the > > cells of my retina experience a photosynthetic sense of their > > environment. The cells of my visual cortex experience a neurological > > sense of the retina's sense, which it arrives at by sharing it's own > > sense (image) with the sense of other participating parts of the brain > > - some conscious, like attention and focus, some subconscious like > > pattern recognition, and some unconscious like color and motion. The > > visual cortex is only part of what we experience of sight, the rest is > > influenced by our expectations and memories, which are the senses of > > other regions of the brain. > > > The overall sensemaking of the brain that we have conscious access to, > > including limbic feelings, prefrontal cognitions, etc, are all > > involved in building a consensus - a mutual, bi-directional process > > between the different channels of sensemaking and the executive > > intentions. That understanding is all that is communicated through the > > motor control of the vocal cords. There is no transduced visual > > 'information' present in our larynx or in the spasmodic manipulations > > thereof. > > You're off on a tangent, rejecting normal English usage and making up > terms of your own. Not really. > When I read the newspaper this morning the light > has a physical effect on my retina which through a series of complex > neural relays modulates the output of the motor neurons to my larynx, > tongue and diaphragm producing sound waves relating to what I am > reading. You're inventing a connection where none exists. There is no neural pathway for eye-voice coordination. You see through your eyes and you speak through your voice. Both processes require that you are conscious and voluntarily moving your eyes and larynx. That vocal expression has a physical characteristic which we can observe externally as motor neuron behaviors. > If any component in this pathway, such as the optic nerve, is > replaced with an artificial device that relays the electrical signals > in a physiologically appropriate way do you claim that the downstream > neurons would respond differently because the artificial nerve lacks > the "sense" of the natural nerve? It depends on the nature of the device and the nature of what it is the device replaces. You could replace the retina and your visual cortex will learn to use it. If you replace the visual cortex the rest of your brain will be able to compensate functionally but you will be blindsighted. If you have partial visual cortex replacement your brain could adapt and learn to use it. > If so, then you are claiming that > neurons affect other neurons by something other than physical factors, > going against not only all of neuroscience but also against all of > science. I forget what number I was on. I'll guess 6. 6. I have never claimed anything that goes against any neuroscientific observation. I repeat again, if you think that I am claiming that, then you do not understand what I am saying. My view is more scientific because it accounts for all of the phenomena that are involved and not just the ones that show up under a microscope. > > >> Cadrdiac myocytes in culture can synchronise their beating through > >> direct contact. Artificial myocytes, if they were to replicate this > >> behaviour, would have to be sensitive to the action potential of the > >> natural myocytes. > > >> In general, any observable behaviour of the > >> biological system that you want to replicate can be replicated by some > >> technology. > > > Observable by what? If a cat replicated their owner, you would > > probably have a very large and interesting smelling can opener. > > List any observable behaviour or property you want - it's up to you. Ok. I'm a biological system. I observe that I sometimes have dreams which foreshadow events in the near future. What technology would you suggest replicates this? > For an artificial neuron I think the timing
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 1:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> When you speak about what you see the information carried in the light >> that comes into your pupils must somehow get to the motor neurons >> controlling your vocal cords. How do you think this happens? > > There is no 'information' carried in the light. There is only the > sense that the visual cortex makes of the sense that the retina makes > of the sense that the optical relations of the environment make to the > person who is using the the visual cortex and retina to perceive the > environment. At no point would anything that enters your pupils wind > up coming out of your vocal chords through your motor neurons. I am > flabbergasted that you can take this view seriously in all honesty. > Aren't you saying that you think nuggets of 'information' from outside > of your eyeballs are squirting into your brain and out of your throat? > > How I think it happens that we can speak about what I see is that the > cells of my retina experience a photosynthetic sense of their > environment. The cells of my visual cortex experience a neurological > sense of the retina's sense, which it arrives at by sharing it's own > sense (image) with the sense of other participating parts of the brain > - some conscious, like attention and focus, some subconscious like > pattern recognition, and some unconscious like color and motion. The > visual cortex is only part of what we experience of sight, the rest is > influenced by our expectations and memories, which are the senses of > other regions of the brain. > > The overall sensemaking of the brain that we have conscious access to, > including limbic feelings, prefrontal cognitions, etc, are all > involved in building a consensus - a mutual, bi-directional process > between the different channels of sensemaking and the executive > intentions. That understanding is all that is communicated through the > motor control of the vocal cords. There is no transduced visual > 'information' present in our larynx or in the spasmodic manipulations > thereof. You're off on a tangent, rejecting normal English usage and making up terms of your own. When I read the newspaper this morning the light has a physical effect on my retina which through a series of complex neural relays modulates the output of the motor neurons to my larynx, tongue and diaphragm producing sound waves relating to what I am reading. If any component in this pathway, such as the optic nerve, is replaced with an artificial device that relays the electrical signals in a physiologically appropriate way do you claim that the downstream neurons would respond differently because the artificial nerve lacks the "sense" of the natural nerve? If so, then you are claiming that neurons affect other neurons by something other than physical factors, going against not only all of neuroscience but also against all of science. >> Cadrdiac myocytes in culture can synchronise their beating through >> direct contact. Artificial myocytes, if they were to replicate this >> behaviour, would have to be sensitive to the action potential of the >> natural myocytes. > >> In general, any observable behaviour of the >> biological system that you want to replicate can be replicated by some >> technology. > > Observable by what? If a cat replicated their owner, you would > probably have a very large and interesting smelling can opener. List any observable behaviour or property you want - it's up to you. For an artificial neuron I think the timing of the action potential in response to environmental factors is the main thing to get right. I think the neuron's shape is important to take into account in this regard since the shape affects the electric field and excitability, but I don't think its mass is important. But I might be wrong: it could be that neurons sense their neighbours' tiny gravitational field and therefore the network with the artificial neuron would behave slightly erratically until this was taken into account. The engineering project would involve sorting this sort of thing out until eventually the artificial neuron would slot into the network with the level of tolerance that is acceptable for biological neurons. >>Qualia are not observable > > Qualia is the only thing that can ever be observed directly. It is > only through inference and reason that we can imagine a world outside > of that. Qualia are not observable directly by a third party (you knew this is what I meant). >> and it is an open question >> whether they can be replicated, so we assume that they can't and >> consider the consequences. The consequences are that a person's qualia >> might change but, because the inputs to the motor neurons controlling >> speech are the same, he would declare that nothing has changed. > > This is your fantasy, not mine. Since the 'inputs' to the motor > neurons have little to do with the mechanics which deliver the qualia > experiences and more to do with the sense that th
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 18, 9:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 1:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive > >> information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any > >> statement about what he sees. > > > What makes you think that's the case? That's a blatant fallacy, isn't > > it? "The windshield wipers must, through a relay of mechanical parts, > > receive music from the from the radio station" > > > Visual centers don't talk, and speech centers don't see. People see > > and talk. > > When you speak about what you see the information carried in the light > that comes into your pupils must somehow get to the motor neurons > controlling your vocal cords. How do you think this happens? There is no 'information' carried in the light. There is only the sense that the visual cortex makes of the sense that the retina makes of the sense that the optical relations of the environment make to the person who is using the the visual cortex and retina to perceive the environment. At no point would anything that enters your pupils wind up coming out of your vocal chords through your motor neurons. I am flabbergasted that you can take this view seriously in all honesty. Aren't you saying that you think nuggets of 'information' from outside of your eyeballs are squirting into your brain and out of your throat? How I think it happens that we can speak about what I see is that the cells of my retina experience a photosynthetic sense of their environment. The cells of my visual cortex experience a neurological sense of the retina's sense, which it arrives at by sharing it's own sense (image) with the sense of other participating parts of the brain - some conscious, like attention and focus, some subconscious like pattern recognition, and some unconscious like color and motion. The visual cortex is only part of what we experience of sight, the rest is influenced by our expectations and memories, which are the senses of other regions of the brain. The overall sensemaking of the brain that we have conscious access to, including limbic feelings, prefrontal cognitions, etc, are all involved in building a consensus - a mutual, bi-directional process between the different channels of sensemaking and the executive intentions. That understanding is all that is communicated through the motor control of the vocal cords. There is no transduced visual 'information' present in our larynx or in the spasmodic manipulations thereof. > > > > > > > > > > >> If the visual centres are artificial, > >> but producing the same neural outputs to the rest of the brain, > > > They probably won't though. They can't because they don't feel the > > appropriate qualia to repspond to events in the same way over time. It > > depends how close they are to natural neurons, maybe even the neurons > > which are genetically specific to that individual. > > >> then > >> the rest of the brain will respond as if vision is normal: > > > If there is some part of the natural visual centers there, they may > > very well be able to use the artificial ones as a substitute - like a > > cane, but you can't use a cane as a substitute for your whole arm. > > >> the subject > >> will say everything looks normal, he will grasp things normally with > >> his hands, he will paint or write poetry about what he sees normally. > >> His motor cortex cannot be aware that the visual cortex has changed, > >> since the only awareness of the outside world the motor cortex can > >> have must come through the surrounding tissue. > > > I understand how you are thinking about it, but I think that would > > make sense if there were a such thing as functional equivalence of > > qualia, but qualia has no function. There is no way to know if you can > > make something that feels just like a neuron unless it is in fact a > > natural neuron. > > >> > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > >> > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in > >> > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > >> > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > >> > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > >> > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a > >> > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > >> > futuristic artificial device? > > >> We assume that the artificial device reproduces the pattern of neural > >> firing and nothing else. Do you think that is *impossible*? Why? > > > Sure, it might be impossible. Because the pattern is context > > dependent. If you have a bunch of separate heart cells, they will all > > beat regularly but not synchronized. So you make an artificial heart > > cell that beats regularly at the same interval as any of the other > > heart cells. When you put all of the separate heart cells in a dish > > together, they all
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 18, 9:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 1:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive > >> information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any > >> statement about what he sees. > > > What makes you think that's the case? That's a blatant fallacy, isn't > > it? "The windshield wipers must, through a relay of mechanical parts, > > receive music from the from the radio station" > > > Visual centers don't talk, and speech centers don't see. People see > > and talk. > > When you speak about what you see the information carried in the light > that comes into your pupils must somehow get to the motor neurons > controlling your vocal cords. How do you think this happens? There is no 'information' carried in the light. There is only the sense that the visual cortex makes of the sense that the retina makes of the sense that the optical relations of the environment make to the person who is using the the visual cortex and retina to perceive the environment. At no point would anything that enters your pupils wind up coming out of your vocal chords through your motor neurons. I am flabbergasted that you can take this view seriously in all honesty. Aren't you saying that you think nuggets of 'information' from outside of your eyeballs are squirting into your brain and out of your throat? How I think it happens that we can speak about what I see is that the cells of my retina experience a photosynthetic sense of their environment. The cells of my visual cortex experience a neurological sense of the retina's sense, which it arrives at by sharing it's own sense (image) with the sense of other participating parts of the brain - some conscious, like attention and focus, some subconscious like pattern recognition, and some unconscious like color and motion. The visual cortex is only part of what we experience of sight, the rest is influenced by our expectations and memories, which are the senses of other regions of the brain. The overall sensemaking of the brain that we have conscious access to, including limbic feelings, prefrontal cognitions, etc, are all involved in building a consensus - a mutual, bi-directional process between the different channels of sensemaking and the executive intentions. That understanding is all that is communicated through the motor control of the vocal cords. There is no transduced visual 'information' present in our larynx or in the spasmodic manipulations thereof. > > > > > > > > > > >> If the visual centres are artificial, > >> but producing the same neural outputs to the rest of the brain, > > > They probably won't though. They can't because they don't feel the > > appropriate qualia to repspond to events in the same way over time. It > > depends how close they are to natural neurons, maybe even the neurons > > which are genetically specific to that individual. > > >> then > >> the rest of the brain will respond as if vision is normal: > > > If there is some part of the natural visual centers there, they may > > very well be able to use the artificial ones as a substitute - like a > > cane, but you can't use a cane as a substitute for your whole arm. > > >> the subject > >> will say everything looks normal, he will grasp things normally with > >> his hands, he will paint or write poetry about what he sees normally. > >> His motor cortex cannot be aware that the visual cortex has changed, > >> since the only awareness of the outside world the motor cortex can > >> have must come through the surrounding tissue. > > > I understand how you are thinking about it, but I think that would > > make sense if there were a such thing as functional equivalence of > > qualia, but qualia has no function. There is no way to know if you can > > make something that feels just like a neuron unless it is in fact a > > natural neuron. > > >> > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > >> > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in > >> > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > >> > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > >> > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > >> > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a > >> > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > >> > futuristic artificial device? > > >> We assume that the artificial device reproduces the pattern of neural > >> firing and nothing else. Do you think that is *impossible*? Why? > > > Sure, it might be impossible. Because the pattern is context > > dependent. If you have a bunch of separate heart cells, they will all > > beat regularly but not synchronized. So you make an artificial heart > > cell that beats regularly at the same interval as any of the other > > heart cells. When you put all of the separate heart cells in a dish > > together, they all
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 1:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive >> information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any >> statement about what he sees. > > What makes you think that's the case? That's a blatant fallacy, isn't > it? "The windshield wipers must, through a relay of mechanical parts, > receive music from the from the radio station" > > Visual centers don't talk, and speech centers don't see. People see > and talk. When you speak about what you see the information carried in the light that comes into your pupils must somehow get to the motor neurons controlling your vocal cords. How do you think this happens? >> If the visual centres are artificial, >> but producing the same neural outputs to the rest of the brain, > > They probably won't though. They can't because they don't feel the > appropriate qualia to repspond to events in the same way over time. It > depends how close they are to natural neurons, maybe even the neurons > which are genetically specific to that individual. > >> then >> the rest of the brain will respond as if vision is normal: > > If there is some part of the natural visual centers there, they may > very well be able to use the artificial ones as a substitute - like a > cane, but you can't use a cane as a substitute for your whole arm. > >> the subject >> will say everything looks normal, he will grasp things normally with >> his hands, he will paint or write poetry about what he sees normally. >> His motor cortex cannot be aware that the visual cortex has changed, >> since the only awareness of the outside world the motor cortex can >> have must come through the surrounding tissue. > > I understand how you are thinking about it, but I think that would > make sense if there were a such thing as functional equivalence of > qualia, but qualia has no function. There is no way to know if you can > make something that feels just like a neuron unless it is in fact a > natural neuron. > >> >> > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be >> > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in >> > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be >> > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing >> > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why >> > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a >> > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably >> > futuristic artificial device? >> >> We assume that the artificial device reproduces the pattern of neural >> firing and nothing else. Do you think that is *impossible*? Why? > > Sure, it might be impossible. Because the pattern is context > dependent. If you have a bunch of separate heart cells, they will all > beat regularly but not synchronized. So you make an artificial heart > cell that beats regularly at the same interval as any of the other > heart cells. When you put all of the separate heart cells in a dish > together, they all will synchronize - except the artificial ones. If > you were to put enough artificial heart cells in a living heart, you > would cause an arrhythmia and kill the person who is using that heart > to live. Cadrdiac myocytes in culture can synchronise their beating through direct contact. Artificial myocytes, if they were to replicate this behaviour, would have to be sensitive to the action potential of the natural myocytes. In general, any observable behaviour of the biological system that you want to replicate can be replicated by some technology. Qualia are not observable and it is an open question whether they can be replicated, so we assume that they can't and consider the consequences. The consequences are that a person's qualia might change but, because the inputs to the motor neurons controlling speech are the same, he would declare that nothing has changed. > Neurons are orders of magnitude more interconnected than that. The > idea that there is a fixed 'pattern of neural firing' which can be > derived from a single neuron in isolation that can be extrapolated out > to the brain as a whole is just factually incorrect. It's not some > exotic wackiness that I dreamed up, it's actually not at all the way > that the brain, or any living organism works. Neurons aren't just > miniature brains, and brains aren't just a pile of neurons. It's like > assuming that if you make a mannequin that acts like a nomadic hunter > gatherer, you should have no trouble repopulating New York, London, > and Hong Kong with a large group of them. I keep repeating that there is no "pattern of neural firing" to replicate. Whether a biological neuron fires or not depends on its present state and its inputs. A neuron that would fire if the temperature is 37 degrees and the extracellular potassium concentration is 5 mM might not fire if the temperature is 39 degrees and the potassium concentration 6 m
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 18, 12:19 am, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/17/2011 7:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Oct 17, 9:06 pm, meekerdb wrote: > > >>> Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > >>> observed directly in the tissue of the brain, > >> We don't know that. We only know that we don't have the resolution and > >> instruments to > >> observe them directly...yet. > > Do you think we will be able to find miniature versions of every > > episode of the Flintstones that I've ever seen inside my neurons? It's > > not possible. What would they be made of? Atoms? > > We could find everything you can remember about the Flintstones (much of > which would be > confabulation) encoded in the interconnection of your neurons. Not without knowing what we were looking for in the first place. You're not getting it. If we know the code of the neurons, we may be able to make a picture of Fred Flintstone on a real monitor out of real pixels, but that is not possible inside of the tissue of the brain. That would entail a Cartesian theater. There are no qualia inside of our brain, so the idea of anything being 'encoded' in the interconnection of neurons presupposes that there is something decoding them somewhere, but you have no explanation for where that is. You can't stop taking perception for granted. You are simultaneously insisting that qualia are encoded neurologically and that there is also no decoding going on anywhere - no Cartesian theater. It's definitely tricky to understand, but until you do, you are going to overlook what is obvious to me. Fred Flintstone is not inside my neurons. Fred Flinstone is imagined through my neurons, but it is not an interconnection of neurons any more than 4Chan is an interconnection of routers. > > > > > I think that you are thinking of how we are able to now reverse > > engineer some of the visual patterns by recording the measured > > activities of the visual cortex and convert them into images we could > > see on a screen. That, while awesome and amazing, has nothing to do > > with observing experiences in the tissue of the brain. Because we are > > only mapping what we know correlates to experience that we already > > have subjectively. Without that Rosetta Stone, we would not be tempted > > to think that these physiological patterns correlate to anything other > > than what they are. There is no homunculus watching TV in a Cartesian > > theater. We know that already with absolute certainty. We don't need > > to wait until a new kind of microscope is invented. > > No one on this list has ever suggested that (except you). If we do not account for the decoding of neurology into subjective experience, then we are either denying subjective experience or positing a Cartesian homunculus. My idea resolves that. Neurology is not encoded into some kind of magical metaphysical 'representation', but rather subjectivity and neurology are just two opposite ends of the same underlying phenomenon. Neither is an epiphenomenon of the other, as neither 'heads' or 'tails' are the 'correct' side of the coin. As long as we consider 'heads' nothing but encoded interconnections of 'tails' we will continue to chase our own tail, wandering in circles looking for a way to disprove our own existence or find the philiosopher's stone that turns brain juice into Yabba Dabba Doo. It's never going to happen. > > > >>> there is no sense in > >>> imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > >>> missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > >>> simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > >>> would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive > >> But it is quiet insensitive in some respects, e.g. to touch, to light, to > >> EM fields,... > > Sure, they are highly specialized to be sensitive to interior > > sensorimotive experiences of the entire organism. It would make sense > > that they would rely on the rest of the body to take care of their > > physical maintenance and protection. > > >>> than a > >>> kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > >>> futuristic artificial device? > >> Because the brain is sensitive to afferent nerve impulses and it is > >> relatively plastic. > >> That's why people can learn to see via signals from nerves on their back > >> and blind people > >> "envision" their surroundings by ear. Read this all the way through: > > Neuroplasticity is part of the reason why artificial appliances aren't > > likely to replace the brain to a significant degree. Semiconductors > > have very little chance of developing plasticity. Every condition > > needs to be anticipated and programmed for in advance. > > Not at all. Artificial neural nets can exhibit plasticity, just as natural > ones do. They can only exhibit the plasticity within the range which we anticipate and program for. They do not spontaneously alter their physical structure and programmin
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On 10/17/2011 7:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 17, 9:06 pm, meekerdb wrote: Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be observed directly in the tissue of the brain, We don't know that. We only know that we don't have the resolution and instruments to observe them directly...yet. Do you think we will be able to find miniature versions of every episode of the Flintstones that I've ever seen inside my neurons? It's not possible. What would they be made of? Atoms? We could find everything you can remember about the Flintstones (much of which would be confabulation) encoded in the interconnection of your neurons. I think that you are thinking of how we are able to now reverse engineer some of the visual patterns by recording the measured activities of the visual cortex and convert them into images we could see on a screen. That, while awesome and amazing, has nothing to do with observing experiences in the tissue of the brain. Because we are only mapping what we know correlates to experience that we already have subjectively. Without that Rosetta Stone, we would not be tempted to think that these physiological patterns correlate to anything other than what they are. There is no homunculus watching TV in a Cartesian theater. We know that already with absolute certainty. We don't need to wait until a new kind of microscope is invented. No one on this list has ever suggested that (except you). there is no sense in imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive But it is quiet insensitive in some respects, e.g. to touch, to light, to EM fields,... Sure, they are highly specialized to be sensitive to interior sensorimotive experiences of the entire organism. It would make sense that they would rely on the rest of the body to take care of their physical maintenance and protection. than a kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably futuristic artificial device? Because the brain is sensitive to afferent nerve impulses and it is relatively plastic. That's why people can learn to see via signals from nerves on their back and blind people "envision" their surroundings by ear. Read this all the way through: Neuroplasticity is part of the reason why artificial appliances aren't likely to replace the brain to a significant degree. Semiconductors have very little chance of developing plasticity. Every condition needs to be anticipated and programmed for in advance. Not at all. Artificial neural nets can exhibit plasticity, just as natural ones do. If you are talking about prosthetics, that's a different story. I'm very optimistic that we will have useful appliances to augment or repair neurological organs - as long as the ratio to healthy tissue is sufficient. Again - a cane is a lot better than no cane for someone who needs it, but we should not confuse a cane with a replacement for an arm. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.09/vision.html In any case it is (for now) merely a thought experiment. Cool, yeah. Things like this are partly why I think that subjective experience has to do with 'pulling wholes through holes', jumps to conclusions, fills in the gaps. This is what fiction is. A leap of suspended disbelief to get you from where you are to somewhere else. It's true cognitively as it is perceptively, sensationally, emotionally, etc. That's what sensorimotive phenomena is based on, and that is also what electromagnetism is. You (and most everyone else too) probably think of a magnet generating a 'magnetic field' in space which picks up a piece of iron and moves it around, but I think of a magnet as just a piece of metal which is able to inspire similar pieces of metal to pick themselves up - or more accurately, to flip it's motive orientation from the mass and density of the Earth to the atomic affinity of the similar metal. This affinity is a kind of sense experience - a feeling of physical coherence which is amplified in an orderly, wavelike pattern the closer the two objects are drawn together. There is no actual field. The iron feels the magnet and moves toward it. It sounds insane, I know, but I'm pretty sure that it's true. It sounds exactly like Aristotle. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 17, 9:06 pm, meekerdb wrote: > > > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, > > We don't know that. We only know that we don't have the resolution and > instruments to > observe them directly...yet. Do you think we will be able to find miniature versions of every episode of the Flintstones that I've ever seen inside my neurons? It's not possible. What would they be made of? Atoms? I think that you are thinking of how we are able to now reverse engineer some of the visual patterns by recording the measured activities of the visual cortex and convert them into images we could see on a screen. That, while awesome and amazing, has nothing to do with observing experiences in the tissue of the brain. Because we are only mapping what we know correlates to experience that we already have subjectively. Without that Rosetta Stone, we would not be tempted to think that these physiological patterns correlate to anything other than what they are. There is no homunculus watching TV in a Cartesian theater. We know that already with absolute certainty. We don't need to wait until a new kind of microscope is invented. > > > there is no sense in > > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive > > But it is quiet insensitive in some respects, e.g. to touch, to light, to EM > fields,... Sure, they are highly specialized to be sensitive to interior sensorimotive experiences of the entire organism. It would make sense that they would rely on the rest of the body to take care of their physical maintenance and protection. > > > than a > > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > > futuristic artificial device? > > Because the brain is sensitive to afferent nerve impulses and it is > relatively plastic. > That's why people can learn to see via signals from nerves on their back and > blind people > "envision" their surroundings by ear. Read this all the way through: Neuroplasticity is part of the reason why artificial appliances aren't likely to replace the brain to a significant degree. Semiconductors have very little chance of developing plasticity. Every condition needs to be anticipated and programmed for in advance. If you are talking about prosthetics, that's a different story. I'm very optimistic that we will have useful appliances to augment or repair neurological organs - as long as the ratio to healthy tissue is sufficient. Again - a cane is a lot better than no cane for someone who needs it, but we should not confuse a cane with a replacement for an arm. > > http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.09/vision.html > > In any case it is (for now) merely a thought experiment. > Cool, yeah. Things like this are partly why I think that subjective experience has to do with 'pulling wholes through holes', jumps to conclusions, fills in the gaps. This is what fiction is. A leap of suspended disbelief to get you from where you are to somewhere else. It's true cognitively as it is perceptively, sensationally, emotionally, etc. That's what sensorimotive phenomena is based on, and that is also what electromagnetism is. You (and most everyone else too) probably think of a magnet generating a 'magnetic field' in space which picks up a piece of iron and moves it around, but I think of a magnet as just a piece of metal which is able to inspire similar pieces of metal to pick themselves up - or more accurately, to flip it's motive orientation from the mass and density of the Earth to the atomic affinity of the similar metal. This affinity is a kind of sense experience - a feeling of physical coherence which is amplified in an orderly, wavelike pattern the closer the two objects are drawn together. There is no actual field. The iron feels the magnet and moves toward it. It sounds insane, I know, but I'm pretty sure that it's true. The contagious nature of the magnetic effect - the fact that the piece of iron is now a magnet, is just the same principle behind how a cane can be like a kind of eye for a blind person, and how rod and cone cells can influence neurons in the VC, and how the psyche can specifically influence the brain activity. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 17, 8:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > > On Oct 17, 7:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > >> wrote: > >> >> As an engineering problem as well as for the purpose of the thought > >> >> experiment, we replace a part at a time and, as with the mechanic and > >> >> the car, see whether it works the same. If the subject says they have > >> >> gone blind or feel weird or something then the replacement part is not > >> >> working properly. If they say they feel normal and they seem to you to > >> >> behave normally then the replacement part is working properly. > > >> > I agree that would be a decent way of finding out. I'm saying that > >> > they will not feel normal though, and they will most likely not behave > >> > normally over time. > > >> But they have to say they feel normal since the speech centres of > >> their brain receives the same electrical input and the neurons there > >> fire in the same sequence as they normally would. Only if the neurons > >> are affected by non-physical inputs (which would by assumption be > >> missing if the artificial neurons are installed) would the subject be > >> able to say that something was awry. > > > They wouldn't have to say that they feel normal, because the 'speech > > centers' are not controlled by the artificial neurons. The speech > > centers are used by the conscious areas of the brain so they can > > vocalize anything that the subject cares to vocalize. If you were > > colorblind and you replaced part of a computer monitor with an area of > > pixels which looked like a perfect physical match to you, the user > > would still be able to see the difference if they were the wrong > > colors or monochrome. > > The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive > information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any > statement about what he sees. What makes you think that's the case? That's a blatant fallacy, isn't it? "The windshield wipers must, through a relay of mechanical parts, receive music from the from the radio station" Visual centers don't talk, and speech centers don't see. People see and talk. > If the visual centres are artificial, > but producing the same neural outputs to the rest of the brain, They probably won't though. They can't because they don't feel the appropriate qualia to repspond to events in the same way over time. It depends how close they are to natural neurons, maybe even the neurons which are genetically specific to that individual. > then > the rest of the brain will respond as if vision is normal: If there is some part of the natural visual centers there, they may very well be able to use the artificial ones as a substitute - like a cane, but you can't use a cane as a substitute for your whole arm. > the subject > will say everything looks normal, he will grasp things normally with > his hands, he will paint or write poetry about what he sees normally. > His motor cortex cannot be aware that the visual cortex has changed, > since the only awareness of the outside world the motor cortex can > have must come through the surrounding tissue. I understand how you are thinking about it, but I think that would make sense if there were a such thing as functional equivalence of qualia, but qualia has no function. There is no way to know if you can make something that feels just like a neuron unless it is in fact a natural neuron. > > > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in > > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a > > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > > futuristic artificial device? > > We assume that the artificial device reproduces the pattern of neural > firing and nothing else. Do you think that is *impossible*? Why? Sure, it might be impossible. Because the pattern is context dependent. If you have a bunch of separate heart cells, they will all beat regularly but not synchronized. So you make an artificial heart cell that beats regularly at the same interval as any of the other heart cells. When you put all of the separate heart cells in a dish together, they all will synchronize - except the artificial ones. If you were to put enough artificial heart cells in a living heart, you would cause an arrhythmia and kill the person who is using that heart to live. Neurons are orders of magnitude more interconnected than that. The idea that there is a fixed 'pattern of neural firing' which can be derived from a single neuron in isolation that can be extrapolated out to the brain as a whole is just fac
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On 10/17/2011 5:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 17, 7:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: As an engineering problem as well as for the purpose of the thought experiment, we replace a part at a time and, as with the mechanic and the car, see whether it works the same. If the subject says they have gone blind or feel weird or something then the replacement part is not working properly. If they say they feel normal and they seem to you to behave normally then the replacement part is working properly. I agree that would be a decent way of finding out. I'm saying that they will not feel normal though, and they will most likely not behave normally over time. But they have to say they feel normal since the speech centres of their brain receives the same electrical input and the neurons there fire in the same sequence as they normally would. Only if the neurons are affected by non-physical inputs (which would by assumption be missing if the artificial neurons are installed) would the subject be able to say that something was awry. They wouldn't have to say that they feel normal, because the 'speech centers' are not controlled by the artificial neurons. The speech centers are used by the conscious areas of the brain so they can vocalize anything that the subject cares to vocalize. If you were colorblind and you replaced part of a computer monitor with an area of pixels which looked like a perfect physical match to you, the user would still be able to see the difference if they were the wrong colors or monochrome. Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be observed directly in the tissue of the brain, We don't know that. We only know that we don't have the resolution and instruments to observe them directly...yet. there is no sense in imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive But it is quiet insensitive in some respects, e.g. to touch, to light, to EM fields,... than a kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably futuristic artificial device? Because the brain is sensitive to afferent nerve impulses and it is relatively plastic. That's why people can learn to see via signals from nerves on their back and blind people "envision" their surroundings by ear. Read this all the way through: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.09/vision.html In any case it is (for now) merely a thought experiment. Brent Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 11:31 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 17, 7:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> >> As an engineering problem as well as for the purpose of the thought >> >> experiment, we replace a part at a time and, as with the mechanic and >> >> the car, see whether it works the same. If the subject says they have >> >> gone blind or feel weird or something then the replacement part is not >> >> working properly. If they say they feel normal and they seem to you to >> >> behave normally then the replacement part is working properly. >> >> > I agree that would be a decent way of finding out. I'm saying that >> > they will not feel normal though, and they will most likely not behave >> > normally over time. >> >> But they have to say they feel normal since the speech centres of >> their brain receives the same electrical input and the neurons there >> fire in the same sequence as they normally would. Only if the neurons >> are affected by non-physical inputs (which would by assumption be >> missing if the artificial neurons are installed) would the subject be >> able to say that something was awry. > > They wouldn't have to say that they feel normal, because the 'speech > centers' are not controlled by the artificial neurons. The speech > centers are used by the conscious areas of the brain so they can > vocalize anything that the subject cares to vocalize. If you were > colorblind and you replaced part of a computer monitor with an area of > pixels which looked like a perfect physical match to you, the user > would still be able to see the difference if they were the wrong > colors or monochrome. The speech centres must, through a relay of neurons, receive information from the visual centres if the subject is to make any statement about what he sees. If the visual centres are artificial, but producing the same neural outputs to the rest of the brain, then the rest of the brain will respond as if vision is normal: the subject will say everything looks normal, he will grasp things normally with his hands, he will paint or write poetry about what he sees normally. His motor cortex cannot be aware that the visual cortex has changed, since the only awareness of the outside world the motor cortex can have must come through the surrounding tissue. > Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be > observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in > imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be > missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing > simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why > would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a > kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably > futuristic artificial device? We assume that the artificial device reproduces the pattern of neural firing and nothing else. Do you think that is *impossible*? Why? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 17, 7:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > >> As an engineering problem as well as for the purpose of the thought > >> experiment, we replace a part at a time and, as with the mechanic and > >> the car, see whether it works the same. If the subject says they have > >> gone blind or feel weird or something then the replacement part is not > >> working properly. If they say they feel normal and they seem to you to > >> behave normally then the replacement part is working properly. > > > I agree that would be a decent way of finding out. I'm saying that > > they will not feel normal though, and they will most likely not behave > > normally over time. > > But they have to say they feel normal since the speech centres of > their brain receives the same electrical input and the neurons there > fire in the same sequence as they normally would. Only if the neurons > are affected by non-physical inputs (which would by assumption be > missing if the artificial neurons are installed) would the subject be > able to say that something was awry. They wouldn't have to say that they feel normal, because the 'speech centers' are not controlled by the artificial neurons. The speech centers are used by the conscious areas of the brain so they can vocalize anything that the subject cares to vocalize. If you were colorblind and you replaced part of a computer monitor with an area of pixels which looked like a perfect physical match to you, the user would still be able to see the difference if they were the wrong colors or monochrome. Since we know absolutely that we have experiences which cannot be observed directly in the tissue of the brain, there is no sense in imagining that replicating what we observe in the brain will not be missing crucial capacities which we can't anticipate. Even replacing simpler organs with actual human organs have a risk of rejection. Why would the brain, which is presumably infinitely more sensitive than a kidney, have no problem with a completely theoretical and unrealizably futuristic artificial device? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> As an engineering problem as well as for the purpose of the thought >> experiment, we replace a part at a time and, as with the mechanic and >> the car, see whether it works the same. If the subject says they have >> gone blind or feel weird or something then the replacement part is not >> working properly. If they say they feel normal and they seem to you to >> behave normally then the replacement part is working properly. > > I agree that would be a decent way of finding out. I'm saying that > they will not feel normal though, and they will most likely not behave > normally over time. But they have to say they feel normal since the speech centres of their brain receives the same electrical input and the neurons there fire in the same sequence as they normally would. Only if the neurons are affected by non-physical inputs (which would by assumption be missing if the artificial neurons are installed) would the subject be able to say that something was awry. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 15, 10:48 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 4:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> Functionalism assumes that the qualia will be reproduced if the > >> observable function of the brain is reproduced. The thought experiment > >> assumes that this is *not* the case. You have therefore missed one of > >> the most basic points. > > > You are ignoring my point. Function is in the eye of the observer. Do > > you understand that this is true or do you insist that there is an > > absolute reality that is beyond any particular observation? > > When we talk about functional replacement it is specific to the > purpose we are considering. The artificial neurons need to reproduce > the electrical activity of the biological neurons they are replacing > in order to stimulate the neighbouring neurons in the same way. The > structure and substance of the artificial neurons is unimportant as > long as this is achieved. It may be that if the structure and > substance is not reproduced the qualia will not be reproduced either, > even though the electrical activity is reproduced. We assume that this > is so and see where it leads. I agree that is one way of looking at it, but I think that in fact the qualia will not be reproduced because our lack of understanding of what electrical activity actually is. The model you are operating from sees electricity as a pseudosubstance which is independent from matter, so that reproducing a pattern of 'firingness' in anything which results in the same pattern of firing in neighboring neurons would succeed in substitution. Think about how this would work if you had a group of a thousand hamsters all living together. If you create an artificial hamster as a stuffed animal with mechanical parts so that it can move, a heater so it will be the correct temperature, spray it with the proper pheromones so that it will smell right to the other hamsters, you might be able to introduce this into the community in place of one of the existing hamsters. This may satisfy a superficial behavior reproduction - a baby hamster will choose the a-hamster instead of a wire monkey, etc. If you upgrade the a-hamster to be a really top notch zoological replica with audio-animatronic features and soft pliable skin, let's say that you can really fool the entire hamster community. This is where your artificial neuron is at. You are saying that all that is required is that the other hamsters can't tell the difference. All I'm saying is that if you replace all of the hamsters with a- hamsters, then you don't have any real hamsters left to be fooled and the thing which arises out of the whole is lost the more the ratio of real to mechanical drops. Yes, you are correct that the patterns of what neurons are doing is very important, and that any substance or condition which causes that to change is functionally equivalent to neurons in general, but I think that you are incorrect to assume that the actual thing that changes (neuron, hamster) can be replaced by such substances or conditions. You would indeed lose the qualia at the cellular level and at the top level, and since the qualia is influential to the long term behavior of the organism, it's choices and habits, we cannot expect to be able to reproduce even the electrical activity of the brain as a whole. > > >> The third person observable behaviour of a Chinese character is the > >> way it reflects the light. > > > Not true. It could be carved in wood or cast in bronze so that it can > > be read by touching it. There is no difference in the way something > > reflects the light unless there is something that can tell the > > difference. > > But if we are just considering the appearance of a Chinese character > the only relevant thing is the way it reflects the light. To a blind person, the way it feels is the appearance. Light is not necessary. > Who is > interpreting it does not matter: it need only perform the function of > a written Chinese character in the same way as the original Chinese > character. Tell me how a the function of a written Chinese character can be performed if all human beings on Earth die off? If who is interpreting it does not matter then a starfish should be able to read Chinese as long as the light is reflected in the same way. Since that is absurd, my conclusion is that who is interpreting it does matter. Not to be condescending, but this is basic semiotics. It's not really controversial. > > >> It is not how the character is interpreted. > >> The third person observable behaviour of a neuron is the timing and > >> voltage of the action potential, the type and amount of > >> neurotransmitter released at the synapse, and so on. > > > Those characteristics are only observable using specific insruments to > > extend the body into the microcosm. When we use different instruments, > > we get different observations. Our subjective experience is just a set > > of observations using different instruments. > > The
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 4:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> Functionalism assumes that the qualia will be reproduced if the >> observable function of the brain is reproduced. The thought experiment >> assumes that this is *not* the case. You have therefore missed one of >> the most basic points. > > You are ignoring my point. Function is in the eye of the observer. Do > you understand that this is true or do you insist that there is an > absolute reality that is beyond any particular observation? When we talk about functional replacement it is specific to the purpose we are considering. The artificial neurons need to reproduce the electrical activity of the biological neurons they are replacing in order to stimulate the neighbouring neurons in the same way. The structure and substance of the artificial neurons is unimportant as long as this is achieved. It may be that if the structure and substance is not reproduced the qualia will not be reproduced either, even though the electrical activity is reproduced. We assume that this is so and see where it leads. >> The third person observable behaviour of a Chinese character is the >> way it reflects the light. > > Not true. It could be carved in wood or cast in bronze so that it can > be read by touching it. There is no difference in the way something > reflects the light unless there is something that can tell the > difference. But if we are just considering the appearance of a Chinese character the only relevant thing is the way it reflects the light. Who is interpreting it does not matter: it need only perform the function of a written Chinese character in the same way as the original Chinese character. >> It is not how the character is interpreted. >> The third person observable behaviour of a neuron is the timing and >> voltage of the action potential, the type and amount of >> neurotransmitter released at the synapse, and so on. > > Those characteristics are only observable using specific insruments to > extend the body into the microcosm. When we use different instruments, > we get different observations. Our subjective experience is just a set > of observations using different instruments. The relevant function is what the other neurons see. >> It is not what >> qualia are associated with these activities. Are you now clear on what >> third person person observable behaviour (which usually is just called >> "behaviour") means? > > I am clear that you don't understand what I am talking about. Replicating the function of an object is not that difficult to understand. If you have a problem with your car and the mechanic suggests a replacement with a part that looks different from the original you ask him if the car will run the same with the new part as it did before. That's all I mean. >> > I understand that you think I'm not getting the point that you have to >> > agree to the thought experiment conditions that include comp, but I do >> > understand that. You don't understand that I see the problem with this >> > thought experiment to bother with it. Yes, if functionalism could be >> > true, then function would be all that is required to do anything, and >> > if function is all that is required to do anything then anything that >> > has the same function would have to do everything exactly the same. >> > It's circular. You could say the same thing with anything. If instead >> > of comp, we decide to do a thought experiment where we decide that >> > anything that that casts the same shadow must be the same thing, then >> > if we make something with the exact same shadow then it must be the >> > same thing that we have made. It's a fallacy. I can make a volleyball >> > and call it a soccer ball when it isn't. >> >> No, as I have repeatedly said the initial assumption is that comp is >> wrong, functionalism is wrong. > > It's intended to show that assuming that is a problem though. Yes, the assumption is made that functionalism is wrong and problems arise that need an explanation. You haven't provided one; my explanation is that functionalism is right. >> >> I've repeated this argument several times and you have responded thus: >> >> - It would be really difficult to make a functionally equivalent brain >> >> (yes, I agree, but this is a philosophical argument, not an >> >> engineering project) >> >> > Not just difficult, but but potentially impossible, depending on your >> > definition of equivalent. >> >> The artificial brain part is functionally equivalent if the rest of >> the brain carries on in the usual (third person observable) manner. > > It depends entirely on who or what the third person is. You haven't > figured out yet thateach observer is capable of observing differently > so that there is no such thing as a quality that is just observable in > general. The particular third person observable behaviour of interest is that the neurons which interface with the artificial replacement are stimulated in the same way as before. The physica
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 14, 11:08 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 1:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> If you could make a functionally equivalent artificial brain that > >> lacks qualia (and that applies even if the brain is not computerised) > >> then you would be able to create a partial zombie. A partial zombie > >> *behaves* normally and *believes* he has normal qualia. That means you > >> could be a partial zombie right now, since you behave as if you can > >> see and believe that you can see. If you think that is absurd (and you > >> have said you do) then partial zombies thus defined are impossible, > >> which means a brain that was functionally equivalent in its third > >> person observable behaviour must also be equivalent in its qualia. > > > The notion of a functionally equivalent artificial brain is what is > > absurd, so that all of the bogus hypothetical ideas that follow from > > it are also garbage. I understand the thought experiment, but it > > doesn't hold water because it assumes functionalism a priori, then > > uses it's erroneous conclusion to justify functionalism through > > circular reasoning. > > Functionalism assumes that the qualia will be reproduced if the > observable function of the brain is reproduced. The thought experiment > assumes that this is *not* the case. You have therefore missed one of > the most basic points. You are ignoring my point. Function is in the eye of the observer. Do you understand that this is true or do you insist that there is an absolute reality that is beyond any particular observation? > > > The whole idea of third person observable behavior is also a non- > > sequitur. What is the third person observable behavior of a Chinese > > character? Does the reproduction of a Chinese character produce > > equivalent qualia in a person who can read Chinese versus one who > > cannot? A brain is the same way. Without a human consciousness using > > the brain, it's just a mass of meaningless tissue, or a colony of > > microorganisms, or a matrix of sampled electromagnetic coordinates, > > etc. It has no meaningful observable behaviors. They only become > > meaningful to us when we relate them to our subjective experiences > > which we already find meaningful. Without those as a starting point, > > there is nothing about the brain which is worth simulating. > > The third person observable behaviour of a Chinese character is the > way it reflects the light. Not true. It could be carved in wood or cast in bronze so that it can be read by touching it. There is no difference in the way something reflects the light unless there is something that can tell the difference. > It is not how the character is interpreted. > The third person observable behaviour of a neuron is the timing and > voltage of the action potential, the type and amount of > neurotransmitter released at the synapse, and so on. Those characteristics are only observable using specific insruments to extend the body into the microcosm. When we use different instruments, we get different observations. Our subjective experience is just a set of observations using different instruments. > It is not what > qualia are associated with these activities. Are you now clear on what > third person person observable behaviour (which usually is just called > "behaviour") means? I am clear that you don't understand what I am talking about. > > I understand that you think I'm not getting the point that you have to > > agree to the thought experiment conditions that include comp, but I do > > understand that. You don't understand that I see the problem with this > > thought experiment to bother with it. Yes, if functionalism could be > > true, then function would be all that is required to do anything, and > > if function is all that is required to do anything then anything that > > has the same function would have to do everything exactly the same. > > It's circular. You could say the same thing with anything. If instead > > of comp, we decide to do a thought experiment where we decide that > > anything that that casts the same shadow must be the same thing, then > > if we make something with the exact same shadow then it must be the > > same thing that we have made. It's a fallacy. I can make a volleyball > > and call it a soccer ball when it isn't. > > No, as I have repeatedly said the initial assumption is that comp is > wrong, functionalism is wrong. It's intended to show that assuming that is a problem though. > > >> I've repeated this argument several times and you have responded thus: > >> - It would be really difficult to make a functionally equivalent brain > >> (yes, I agree, but this is a philosophical argument, not an > >> engineering project) > > > Not just difficult, but but potentially impossible, depending on your > > definition of equivalent. > > The artificial brain part is functionally equivalent if the rest of > the brain carries on in the usual (third person observable) manne
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 1:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> If you could make a functionally equivalent artificial brain that >> lacks qualia (and that applies even if the brain is not computerised) >> then you would be able to create a partial zombie. A partial zombie >> *behaves* normally and *believes* he has normal qualia. That means you >> could be a partial zombie right now, since you behave as if you can >> see and believe that you can see. If you think that is absurd (and you >> have said you do) then partial zombies thus defined are impossible, >> which means a brain that was functionally equivalent in its third >> person observable behaviour must also be equivalent in its qualia. > > The notion of a functionally equivalent artificial brain is what is > absurd, so that all of the bogus hypothetical ideas that follow from > it are also garbage. I understand the thought experiment, but it > doesn't hold water because it assumes functionalism a priori, then > uses it's erroneous conclusion to justify functionalism through > circular reasoning. Functionalism assumes that the qualia will be reproduced if the observable function of the brain is reproduced. The thought experiment assumes that this is *not* the case. You have therefore missed one of the most basic points. > The whole idea of third person observable behavior is also a non- > sequitur. What is the third person observable behavior of a Chinese > character? Does the reproduction of a Chinese character produce > equivalent qualia in a person who can read Chinese versus one who > cannot? A brain is the same way. Without a human consciousness using > the brain, it's just a mass of meaningless tissue, or a colony of > microorganisms, or a matrix of sampled electromagnetic coordinates, > etc. It has no meaningful observable behaviors. They only become > meaningful to us when we relate them to our subjective experiences > which we already find meaningful. Without those as a starting point, > there is nothing about the brain which is worth simulating. The third person observable behaviour of a Chinese character is the way it reflects the light. It is not how the character is interpreted. The third person observable behaviour of a neuron is the timing and voltage of the action potential, the type and amount of neurotransmitter released at the synapse, and so on. It is not what qualia are associated with these activities. Are you now clear on what third person person observable behaviour (which usually is just called "behaviour") means? > I understand that you think I'm not getting the point that you have to > agree to the thought experiment conditions that include comp, but I do > understand that. You don't understand that I see the problem with this > thought experiment to bother with it. Yes, if functionalism could be > true, then function would be all that is required to do anything, and > if function is all that is required to do anything then anything that > has the same function would have to do everything exactly the same. > It's circular. You could say the same thing with anything. If instead > of comp, we decide to do a thought experiment where we decide that > anything that that casts the same shadow must be the same thing, then > if we make something with the exact same shadow then it must be the > same thing that we have made. It's a fallacy. I can make a volleyball > and call it a soccer ball when it isn't. No, as I have repeatedly said the initial assumption is that comp is wrong, functionalism is wrong. >> I've repeated this argument several times and you have responded thus: >> - It would be really difficult to make a functionally equivalent brain >> (yes, I agree, but this is a philosophical argument, not an >> engineering project) > > Not just difficult, but but potentially impossible, depending on your > definition of equivalent. The artificial brain part is functionally equivalent if the rest of the brain carries on in the usual (third person observable) manner. >> - A brain can't be functionally equivalent without the qualia (yes, >> this is assumed at the beginning because we are only discussing the >> third person observable behaviour) >> - Qualia are not computable (yes, we assume you are right about this >> at the beginning - otherwise it would be begging the question) >> - Partial zombies as redefined by you can exist (maybe, but you don't >> win debates by redefining terms) >> - A simulation of a thing is not the thing (yes, but the assumption is >> that the simulation just controls the firing of the neurons with which >> it interfaces, not that it is the same as the neurons or has qualia) > > The simulation is supposed to replace the neurons. That's what it's > simulating. The simulation interfaces with the other neurons so that their pattern of firing is the same as it would have been before. The simulation by assumption does not reproduce the qualia. It also need not reproduce other aspects of the neurons, such
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 7:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 1:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> A person who has the visual cortex of his brain replaced with a > >> functionally equivalent computer will behave as if he can see > >> normally, claim that he can see normally and believe that he can see > >> normally. It is therefore not like blindsight, where the patient has > >> deficient vision and claims that he cannot see at all. It is also not > >> like Anton's syndrome, the opposite of blindsight, where the patient > >> is blind due to a cortical lesion but has the delusional belief that > >> he can see and walks around stumbling into things. > > > It is also not like blindsight or Anton's syndrome in that those > > things exist, while the idea of a 'functionally equivalent' computer > > replacement for the visual cortex may well be an unrealizable dream > > based upon a misguided approach which is almost right but ends up > > being exactly wrong. My idea of Multisense Realism suggests this idea > > is a dead end, and that has always been my point. I have no opinion > > about whether or not a functionally equivalent computer does this or > > would not do that, my opinion is only that the qualia of vision is not > > an objective function (although it informs on objective conditions in > > a way that has functional benefits), it is a subjective sense. > > I think a functionally equivalent computerised brain would be very > difficult to make but that is not the point of the philosophical > argument. The point is that it should be physically possible provided > that the third person observable behaviour of the brain is computable. The physical behavior of the brain is not the same thing as the biological and neurological behavior. Each level not only becomes more complex and thus more difficult to compute, but introduces more and more factors which are truly uncomputable. Subjectivity plays a greater and greater role as the more complex units become more empowered decision makers with more options and more time to consider their own preferences. Physical level phenomena has less bandwidth, shallower subjectivity so that decisions are automatic reflexes passing from input to output and back with no time to interpret them. > For it to be computable the brain must conform to physical laws and > those laws must be computable. You have agreed that the brain will > conform to physical laws - it won't do anything magical. As soon as a cell becomes alive, we cannot meaningfully describe it's existence in purely physical or chemical terms. It can only be reduced to the biological level and still be understood as a cell. From the point of view of physics, chemistry is magic. From chemistry, biology is magic. >It remains > possible that some of the physics the brain uses is non-computable, as > Roger Penrose thinks; however, there isn't really any evidence for > this. What would such evidence look like? Is there any evidence to support the idea that human feeling is computable? > > If you could make a functionally equivalent artificial brain that > lacks qualia (and that applies even if the brain is not computerised) > then you would be able to create a partial zombie. A partial zombie > *behaves* normally and *believes* he has normal qualia. That means you > could be a partial zombie right now, since you behave as if you can > see and believe that you can see. If you think that is absurd (and you > have said you do) then partial zombies thus defined are impossible, > which means a brain that was functionally equivalent in its third > person observable behaviour must also be equivalent in its qualia. The notion of a functionally equivalent artificial brain is what is absurd, so that all of the bogus hypothetical ideas that follow from it are also garbage. I understand the thought experiment, but it doesn't hold water because it assumes functionalism a priori, then uses it's erroneous conclusion to justify functionalism through circular reasoning. The whole idea of third person observable behavior is also a non- sequitur. What is the third person observable behavior of a Chinese character? Does the reproduction of a Chinese character produce equivalent qualia in a person who can read Chinese versus one who cannot? A brain is the same way. Without a human consciousness using the brain, it's just a mass of meaningless tissue, or a colony of microorganisms, or a matrix of sampled electromagnetic coordinates, etc. It has no meaningful observable behaviors. They only become meaningful to us when we relate them to our subjective experiences which we already find meaningful. Without those as a starting point, there is nothing about the brain which is worth simulating. I understand that you think I'm not getting the point that you have to agree to the thought experiment conditions that include comp, but I do understand that. You don't understand that I see the problem with this thought experiment to bo
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 4:49 pm, Jason Resch wrote: > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 1:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > I think it's too simplistic to talk about a verbal center acting on > > it's own. There is no suggestion that a sightblind patient has been > > reduced to a talking parrot by their condition. We have no reason to > > doubt the authenticity of the condition that they describe. > > There is a condition, the part of the brain that is involved in the > interview does not have the same level of access to the visual information > it formally had. The part of the brain that is involved in the interview does have access to to some optical detection though. That's how it can reach out and find an object when it is asked to. This proves that visual qualia is not necessary for optical function. That was my only point to make, and blindsight proves beyond a doubt that is the case, thus invalidating all arguments based on a presumed automatic conjuring of subjective qualia as a consequence of function or mechanism. > > > If there > > were no such condition, that would tend to support functionalism, so > > even the existence of reports of sightblindness are somewhat > > contrafactual for functionalism. > > If the blind-sighted person can still catch a frisbee, then some part(s) of > their brain are still able to see. No. They could use echolocation, electric-field sensation, ESP, who knows. That's not my point though. Even allowing that human beings can only detect what is in front of them at a distance by using the optical sensors in the front of their skull, there is absolutely no reason to believe that any visual 'seeing' is going on as far as having a subjective experience comparable to a human visual one, with colors, shapes, images, etc. Like a computer without a monitor, the hand eye coordination can keep right on doing what it's doing, just like the stomach does, without any particular qualia. I happen to think that there is some qualia on the meta-cellular level, but without the visual cortex involved, there is no light, no color, no sight at all. Otherwise we wouldn't need a visual cortex, we could just have drill a hole in our skull and put a lens on the outside of it and expect to see through it. > > > > > > of the brain. > > > Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no > > processes > > > in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. > > > There is no question that parts of the brain are making sense of > > optical experiences through the eyes but there is no reason to assume > > that it is processed as visual qualia. > > True, the qualia are likely experienced differently by the other parts of > the brain. Yet, I'm not sure we can deny the absence of visual qualia of > any kind throughout the brain. This is true for the same reason you cannot > deny that your immune system may be experiencing something. I agree, and I think that there is a proto-visual qualia likely for every human cell since it's based on the same eukaryotic stem cell which we know has light sensitivity at least in some of it's forms. I would think that this sensitivity is developed much more in the rod and cone cells than say bone marrow cells, but that visual cortex neurons have an exquisite sensitivity to the rod and cone cells which they use as a stem-qualia, if you will, to develop, amplify, and augment into this big spectacular experience on the macro psychological level. Blindsight shows that the rest of the brain can do a decent job without that big expensive production, which shows that it's not a given that visual qualia arises out of any kind of inevitable determinism or evolutionary biology. > > > > > For > > > instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown > > > ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual > > > information. > > > There is no such thing as information. It is only the subjective > > capacity to be informed. > > This leads to a solipsistic definition of information, but it is still > information nonetheless, is it not? Is it not something that informs? No, it's not a something at all. If I look at a Chinese character without knowing how to read Chinese, I get no semantic information, just optical patterns. If I learn Chinese there is no change in the character. I have not added something to it, nor is there a new thing which has come into being. All that has changed is my ability to make sense of what was always there - molecules of ink on paper which is publicly available through optics. Those do not inform, they just fade over time. > > > To talk about visual information without a > > subjective experience is like saying that your video card could be > > watching a movie. > > I don't think so. Your optic nerve may not experience anything, but it is a > carrier for information which is ultimately interpreted to form your visual > experience. Just because what the optic nerve is doing can be interpreted in a
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 2:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2011/10/13 Craig Weinberg > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 13, 11:04 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg > >wrote: > > > > > On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > > > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast > > between > > > > > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > > > > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People > > suffering > > > > > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > > > > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not > > stimuli > > > > > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > > > > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > > > > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > > > > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > > > > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > > > > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able > > to > > > > > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > > > > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > > > > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > > > > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > > > > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > > > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > > > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > > > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer > > brain > > > > > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when > > it > > > > > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at > > what > > > > > > it is seeing? > > > > > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > > > > > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > > > > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to > > a > > > > > normally sighted person. > > > > > It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point > > > > is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the > > > > qulaia of visual perception. > > > > I don't think you have established this. See below. > > > > > This is the big deal about absent qualia, > > > > that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet > > > > this is evidence of just that. > > > > All we learn when we interview someone is what level of access their > > verbal > > > center of the brain has to other perceptual functions > > > I think it's too simplistic to talk about a verbal center acting on > > it's own. There is no suggestion that a sightblind patient has been > > reduced to a talking parrot by their condition. We have no reason to > > doubt the authenticity of the condition that they describe. If there > > were no such condition, that would tend to support functionalism, so > > even the existence of reports of sightblindness are somewhat > > contrafactual for functionalism. > > > > of the brain. > > > Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no > > processes > > > in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. > > > There is no question that parts of the brain are making sense of > > optical experiences through the eyes but there is no reason to assume > > that it is processed as visual qualia. > > > For > > > instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown > > > ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual > > > information. > > > There is no such thing as information. It is only the subjective > > capacity to be informed. To talk about visual information without a > > subjective experience is like saying that your video card could be > > watching a movie. > > > Likewise, someone with Anton's syndrome may have the opposite > > > defect in wiring, where the verbal center of the brain does receive > > visual > > > information, but the parts of the brain that integrates it to control > > motion > > > and reflexes do not. > > > > > It is not necessary for any of the > > > > qualia of vision to be present to achieve some of the functional > > > > benefit of sight. > > > > This is somewhat of a leap. > > > Why? If we believe the reports of blindsight, what other conclusion > > can we make? > > > > > Qualia may or may not assist us functionally at all. > > > > Replace qualia with "awareness of information", and you can see how > > > necessary it is for certain processes to be aware of some piece of > > > information in order to function properly. > > > Qualia is not awareness of in
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 1:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> A person who has the visual cortex of his brain replaced with a >> functionally equivalent computer will behave as if he can see >> normally, claim that he can see normally and believe that he can see >> normally. It is therefore not like blindsight, where the patient has >> deficient vision and claims that he cannot see at all. It is also not >> like Anton's syndrome, the opposite of blindsight, where the patient >> is blind due to a cortical lesion but has the delusional belief that >> he can see and walks around stumbling into things. > > It is also not like blindsight or Anton's syndrome in that those > things exist, while the idea of a 'functionally equivalent' computer > replacement for the visual cortex may well be an unrealizable dream > based upon a misguided approach which is almost right but ends up > being exactly wrong. My idea of Multisense Realism suggests this idea > is a dead end, and that has always been my point. I have no opinion > about whether or not a functionally equivalent computer does this or > would not do that, my opinion is only that the qualia of vision is not > an objective function (although it informs on objective conditions in > a way that has functional benefits), it is a subjective sense. I think a functionally equivalent computerised brain would be very difficult to make but that is not the point of the philosophical argument. The point is that it should be physically possible provided that the third person observable behaviour of the brain is computable. For it to be computable the brain must conform to physical laws and those laws must be computable. You have agreed that the brain will conform to physical laws - it won't do anything magical. It remains possible that some of the physics the brain uses is non-computable, as Roger Penrose thinks; however, there isn't really any evidence for this. If you could make a functionally equivalent artificial brain that lacks qualia (and that applies even if the brain is not computerised) then you would be able to create a partial zombie. A partial zombie *behaves* normally and *believes* he has normal qualia. That means you could be a partial zombie right now, since you behave as if you can see and believe that you can see. If you think that is absurd (and you have said you do) then partial zombies thus defined are impossible, which means a brain that was functionally equivalent in its third person observable behaviour must also be equivalent in its qualia. I've repeated this argument several times and you have responded thus: - It would be really difficult to make a functionally equivalent brain (yes, I agree, but this is a philosophical argument, not an engineering project) - A brain can't be functionally equivalent without the qualia (yes, this is assumed at the beginning because we are only discussing the third person observable behaviour) - Qualia are not computable (yes, we assume you are right about this at the beginning - otherwise it would be begging the question) - Partial zombies as redefined by you can exist (maybe, but you don't win debates by redefining terms) - A simulation of a thing is not the thing (yes, but the assumption is that the simulation just controls the firing of the neurons with which it interfaces, not that it is the same as the neurons or has qualia) - Determinism would leave no room for feeling and decision-making (I disagree but let's assume that you are right about this too and see where it leads) - Computers are cold, heartless things (not said by you in those exact words but we also assume this at the beginning) >> We can imagine a >> condition of perfect blindsight in combination with Anton's syndrome: >> the patient lacks visual qualia while responding normally to visual >> cues and has a delusional belief that he has normal vision. The >> problem with that is, there is no way to diagnose it: we could all be >> suffering from it and we wouldn't know, so it is just as good as >> normal vision. > > So if you have a stroke and find yourself trapped in a body that is > going around killing people (sort of an Angel Heart scenario), since > there is no way to know the difference between your behavior and you > from, then you say it's just as good as you. We would have to treat > that behavior as if it were criminally intentional, but I don't think > that has to have anything at all to do with subjectivity. We have > involuntary behaviors that are different from voluntary behaviors. > Just because we can't tell which is which from the outside doesn't > mean that the subjective distinction on the inside isn't critically > important - much more important than outside appearances. As I keep repeating, I would have to *behave* normally and *believe* that I was normal. Since I don't normally go around killing people, if I had a brain lesion that made me do that I would not be behaving normally, even if I were deluded in thinking that I w
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 1:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 13, 11:04 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > > > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast > between > > > > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > > > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People > suffering > > > > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > > > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not > stimuli > > > > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > > > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > > > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > > > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > > > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > > > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able > to > > > > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > > > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > > > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > > > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > > > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > > > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > > > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > > > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer > brain > > > > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when > it > > > > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at > what > > > > > it is seeing? > > > > > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > > > > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > > > > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to > a > > > > normally sighted person. > > > > > It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point > > > is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the > > > qulaia of visual perception. > > > > I don't think you have established this. See below. > > > > > This is the big deal about absent qualia, > > > that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet > > > this is evidence of just that. > > > > All we learn when we interview someone is what level of access their > verbal > > center of the brain has to other perceptual functions > > I think it's too simplistic to talk about a verbal center acting on > it's own. There is no suggestion that a sightblind patient has been > reduced to a talking parrot by their condition. We have no reason to > doubt the authenticity of the condition that they describe. There is a condition, the part of the brain that is involved in the interview does not have the same level of access to the visual information it formally had. > If there > were no such condition, that would tend to support functionalism, so > even the existence of reports of sightblindness are somewhat > contrafactual for functionalism. > If the blind-sighted person can still catch a frisbee, then some part(s) of their brain are still able to see. > > > of the brain. > > Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no > processes > > in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. > > There is no question that parts of the brain are making sense of > optical experiences through the eyes but there is no reason to assume > that it is processed as visual qualia. > True, the qualia are likely experienced differently by the other parts of the brain. Yet, I'm not sure we can deny the absence of visual qualia of any kind throughout the brain. This is true for the same reason you cannot deny that your immune system may be experiencing something. > > For > > instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown > > ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual > > information. > > There is no such thing as information. It is only the subjective > capacity to be informed. This leads to a solipsistic definition of information, but it is still information nonetheless, is it not? Is it not something that informs? > To talk about visual information without a > subjective experience is like saying that your video card could be > watching a movie. > I don't think so. Your optic nerve may not experience anything, but it is a carrier for information which is ultimately interpreted to form your visual experience. > > Likewise, someone with Anton's syndrome may have the opposite > > defect in wiring
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
2011/10/13 Craig Weinberg > On Oct 13, 11:04 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > > > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast > between > > > > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > > > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People > suffering > > > > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > > > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not > stimuli > > > > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > > > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > > > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > > > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > > > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > > > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able > to > > > > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > > > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > > > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > > > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > > > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > > > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > > > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > > > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer > brain > > > > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when > it > > > > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at > what > > > > > it is seeing? > > > > > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > > > > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > > > > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to > a > > > > normally sighted person. > > > > > It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point > > > is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the > > > qulaia of visual perception. > > > > I don't think you have established this. See below. > > > > > This is the big deal about absent qualia, > > > that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet > > > this is evidence of just that. > > > > All we learn when we interview someone is what level of access their > verbal > > center of the brain has to other perceptual functions > > I think it's too simplistic to talk about a verbal center acting on > it's own. There is no suggestion that a sightblind patient has been > reduced to a talking parrot by their condition. We have no reason to > doubt the authenticity of the condition that they describe. If there > were no such condition, that would tend to support functionalism, so > even the existence of reports of sightblindness are somewhat > contrafactual for functionalism. > > > of the brain. > > Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no > processes > > in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. > > There is no question that parts of the brain are making sense of > optical experiences through the eyes but there is no reason to assume > that it is processed as visual qualia. > > For > > instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown > > ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual > > information. > > There is no such thing as information. It is only the subjective > capacity to be informed. To talk about visual information without a > subjective experience is like saying that your video card could be > watching a movie. > > Likewise, someone with Anton's syndrome may have the opposite > > defect in wiring, where the verbal center of the brain does receive > visual > > information, but the parts of the brain that integrates it to control > motion > > and reflexes do not. > > > > > It is not necessary for any of the > > > qualia of vision to be present to achieve some of the functional > > > benefit of sight. > > > > This is somewhat of a leap. > > Why? If we believe the reports of blindsight, what other conclusion > can we make? > > > > > > Qualia may or may not assist us functionally at all. > > > > Replace qualia with "awareness of information", and you can see how > > necessary it is for certain processes to be aware of some piece of > > information in order to function properly. > > Qualia is not awareness of information. We are informed by qualia, but > we can be informed more effectively through unconscious processes. > Replace information with experiences instead. > > > > > > Blindsight shows the p
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 11:04 am, Jason Resch wrote: > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > > > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > > > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > > > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > > > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > > > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > > > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > > > > it is seeing? > > > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > > > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to a > > > normally sighted person. > > > It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point > > is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the > > qulaia of visual perception. > > I don't think you have established this. See below. > > > This is the big deal about absent qualia, > > that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet > > this is evidence of just that. > > All we learn when we interview someone is what level of access their verbal > center of the brain has to other perceptual functions I think it's too simplistic to talk about a verbal center acting on it's own. There is no suggestion that a sightblind patient has been reduced to a talking parrot by their condition. We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the condition that they describe. If there were no such condition, that would tend to support functionalism, so even the existence of reports of sightblindness are somewhat contrafactual for functionalism. > of the brain. > Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no processes > in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. There is no question that parts of the brain are making sense of optical experiences through the eyes but there is no reason to assume that it is processed as visual qualia. For > instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown > ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual > information. There is no such thing as information. It is only the subjective capacity to be informed. To talk about visual information without a subjective experience is like saying that your video card could be watching a movie. Likewise, someone with Anton's syndrome may have the opposite > defect in wiring, where the verbal center of the brain does receive visual > information, but the parts of the brain that integrates it to control motion > and reflexes do not. > > > It is not necessary for any of the > > qualia of vision to be present to achieve some of the functional > > benefit of sight. > > This is somewhat of a leap. Why? If we believe the reports of blindsight, what other conclusion can we make? > > > Qualia may or may not assist us functionally at all. > > Replace qualia with "awareness of information", and you can see how > necessary it is for certain processes to be aware of some piece of > information in order to function properly. Qualia is not awareness of information. We are informed by qualia, but we can be informed more effectively through unconscious processes. Replace information with experiences instead. > > > Blindsight shows the potential from an unconscious form of vision to > > develop in the same way that our digestion or immune system operates > > within a complex, survival intensive environment without conjuring up > > a world of top-level qualia with voluntary control. > > I think yo
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > > > it is seeing? > > > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to a > > normally sighted person. > > It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point > is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the > qulaia of visual perception. I don't think you have established this. See below. > This is the big deal about absent qualia, > that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet > this is evidence of just that. All we learn when we interview someone is what level of access their verbal center of the brain has to other perceptual functions of the brain. Therefore we cannot use the claim of blindness to assert that no processes in the person's brain are receiving processed visual information. For instance, a person with blind sight might still be able to catch a thrown ball, because the motor section of the brain is receiving visual information. Likewise, someone with Anton's syndrome may have the opposite defect in wiring, where the verbal center of the brain does receive visual information, but the parts of the brain that integrates it to control motion and reflexes do not. > It is not necessary for any of the > qualia of vision to be present to achieve some of the functional > benefit of sight. This is somewhat of a leap. > Qualia may or may not assist us functionally at all. > Replace qualia with "awareness of information", and you can see how necessary it is for certain processes to be aware of some piece of information in order to function properly. > Blindsight shows the potential from an unconscious form of vision to > develop in the same way that our digestion or immune system operates > within a complex, survival intensive environment without conjuring up > a world of top-level qualia with voluntary control. > I think your conclusion from the phenomenon of blindsight is premature. Imagine a coinjoined twin who just had one very big head and two brains. One brain controlled walking and received input from the eyes, the other brain received input from the ears and controlled talking. What could you conclude from this twin's insistence that it was unable to see? > > > > > If a robot does things that only something that can see can do, then > > there must be something within it that sees. > > Not at all. I can make a ventriloquist dummy respond to things that > only something can see can do but there is nothing within it that > sees. > > You are not considering the whole system, which includes both the ventriloquist dummy and the ventriloquist. Obviously there is something in that system which sees (the ventriloquist). Take the ventrioliquist away and the dummy can no longer behave as if it sees. This example only confirms my original statement. > > > > That some person maintains they cannot see is not proof that nothing > > in their head is seeing. > > I agree. That's why my idea is that all cells potentially 'see' to > some extent, it's just our top level brain-scale sight which sees in a > human visual experience which i
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 1:51 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > > it is seeing? > > A person who has the visual cortex of his brain replaced with a > functionally equivalent computer will behave as if he can see > normally, claim that he can see normally and believe that he can see > normally. It is therefore not like blindsight, where the patient has > deficient vision and claims that he cannot see at all. It is also not > like Anton's syndrome, the opposite of blindsight, where the patient > is blind due to a cortical lesion but has the delusional belief that > he can see and walks around stumbling into things. It is also not like blindsight or Anton's syndrome in that those things exist, while the idea of a 'functionally equivalent' computer replacement for the visual cortex may well be an unrealizable dream based upon a misguided approach which is almost right but ends up being exactly wrong. My idea of Multisense Realism suggests this idea is a dead end, and that has always been my point. I have no opinion about whether or not a functionally equivalent computer does this or would not do that, my opinion is only that the qualia of vision is not an objective function (although it informs on objective conditions in a way that has functional benefits), it is a subjective sense. > We can imagine a > condition of perfect blindsight in combination with Anton's syndrome: > the patient lacks visual qualia while responding normally to visual > cues and has a delusional belief that he has normal vision. The > problem with that is, there is no way to diagnose it: we could all be > suffering from it and we wouldn't know, so it is just as good as > normal vision. So if you have a stroke and find yourself trapped in a body that is going around killing people (sort of an Angel Heart scenario), since there is no way to know the difference between your behavior and you from, then you say it's just as good as you. We would have to treat that behavior as if it were criminally intentional, but I don't think that has to have anything at all to do with subjectivity. We have involuntary behaviors that are different from voluntary behaviors. Just because we can't tell which is which from the outside doesn't mean that the subjective distinction on the inside isn't critically important - much more important than outside appearances. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 13, 12:52 am, Jason Resch wrote: > On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > >http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > > it is seeing? > > It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual > information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. > > In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to a > normally sighted person. It doesn't matter whether they are functionally equivalent. The point is that the function of sight is in some ways independent from the qulaia of visual perception. This is the big deal about absent qualia, that it would be too crazy if we could somehow see without seeing, yet this is evidence of just that. It is not necessary for any of the qualia of vision to be present to achieve some of the functional benefit of sight. Qualia may or may not assist us functionally at all. Blindsight shows the potential from an unconscious form of vision to develop in the same way that our digestion or immune system operates within a complex, survival intensive environment without conjuring up a world of top-level qualia with voluntary control. > > If a robot does things that only something that can see can do, then > there must be something within it that sees. Not at all. I can make a ventriloquist dummy respond to things that only something can see can do but there is nothing within it that sees. > > That some person maintains they cannot see is not proof that nothing > in their head is seeing. I agree. That's why my idea is that all cells potentially 'see' to some extent, it's just our top level brain-scale sight which sees in a human visual experience which is relevant to the world in which our body functions as a single entity. >Consider split brain patients, when you hold > a conversation with a split brain patient, which hemisphere are you > talking to? What might the other hemisphere be aware of that the other > is not? Sure, there are probably many interior subjects and proto subjects within the psyche. That's who we experience in our dreams. If the top dog gets whacked on the head, then next dream they have may feature their former self as a supporting character while the primary identity is promoted from the undamaged ranks. It may not be discretely modular, the overall personality can just shift, and this happens naturally as we mature. We pay attention to different voices and it shapes our identity and expression more. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 12, 11:06 pm, meekerdb wrote: > Or is it telling the truth if it says it can see? Then it wouldn't have blindsight? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 > > "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between > a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of > correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering > from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to > reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli > are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, > they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when > asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with > subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to > guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do > with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to > discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way > appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show > color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual > capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in > light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " > > Sounds like absent qualia to me. > > "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" > > So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain > doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it > says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what > it is seeing? A person who has the visual cortex of his brain replaced with a functionally equivalent computer will behave as if he can see normally, claim that he can see normally and believe that he can see normally. It is therefore not like blindsight, where the patient has deficient vision and claims that he cannot see at all. It is also not like Anton's syndrome, the opposite of blindsight, where the patient is blind due to a cortical lesion but has the delusional belief that he can see and walks around stumbling into things. We can imagine a condition of perfect blindsight in combination with Anton's syndrome: the patient lacks visual qualia while responding normally to visual cues and has a delusional belief that he has normal vision. The problem with that is, there is no way to diagnose it: we could all be suffering from it and we wouldn't know, so it is just as good as normal vision. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 12, 2011, at 9:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " Sounds like absent qualia to me. "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what it is seeing? It seems blindsight is the result of some modules receiving visual information but not all the modules which would normally receive it. In any event, one with blind sight is not functionally equivalent to a normally sighted person. If a robot does things that only something that can see can do, then there must be something within it that sees. That some person maintains they cannot see is not proof that nothing in their head is seeing. Consider split brain patients, when you hold a conversation with a split brain patient, which hemisphere are you talking to? What might the other hemisphere be aware of that the other is not? Jason Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On 10/12/2011 7:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1676 "As stated above, blindsight is seen clinically as a contrast between a lack of declarative knowledge about a stimulus and a high rate of correct answers to questions about the stimulus (1). People suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing, and are therefore unable to reach spontaneously for stimuli, cannot decide whether or not stimuli are present, and do not know what objects look like. In this sense, they are blind. However, they are able to give correct answers when asked to decide between given alternatives (1). Studies done with subjects that exhibit blindsight have shown that they are able to guess reliably only about certain features of stimuli having to do with motion, location and direction of stimuli. They are also able to discriminate simple forms, and can shape their hands in a way appropriate to grasping the object when asked to try. Some may show color discrimination as well (2). Subjects also show visual capacities, including reflexes (e.g. the pupil reacts to changes in light), implicit reactions and voluntary responses (3). " Sounds like absent qualia to me. "people suffering from blindsight claim to see nothing" So Stathis, Jason, Bruno... how do you know that your computer brain doesn't have blindsight if it's eyes seem to work? Is it lying when it says it can't see, or is it seeing without being able to look at what it is seeing? Craig Or is it telling the truth if it says it can see? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
