Re: James Higgo and "Four Reasons Why You Don't Exist"
Hi Dan, Those are nice questions I would be interested in some answer too. May be I could try to recover from some hard disk the mailing address of James' mother, I will try. James introduced the idea of immortality in the list, and this has been what decided me to susbscribe. I met James in Brussels one month before his accident. James was a very nice guy dedicated to deep fundamental questions, and he was open to both science and eastern religion. he was also very interested in Leibniz. The list certainly miss him. If you get info, please tell us. Perhaps Wei Dai knows better. I'm afraid his book was far from completed. Perhaps you could find who manages his post-mortem web pages? Welcome to the list Dan, Bruno Le 19-déc.-07, à 22:16, freqflyer07281972 a écrit : > > Hi everyone, > > This is my first post to this group. I find so many of the posts so > fascinating, but I am still immersing myself in the discussion, so > forgive the somewhat trivial direction of the present post. > > I found a website memorializing James Higgo's thoughts on quantum > physics, quantum immortality, etc. From what I understand, he was a > prolific contributor to this group right up until is tragic and > untimely death (in this universe, at least) in 2001. The page > http://www.higgo.com/ quantum/fourreasons.htm offers an intriguing > 'synopsis' of a book called "Four Reasons Why You Don't Exist," > including word counts for each chapter. > > My question is: What is the status of this book? How much of it did > Higgo complete? Has it been published? A few searches in some obvious > and unobvious places did not uncover to me the existence of this > book. Was it a work in progress, and who was handling the details? > > Any information that anyone might have about this would be greatly > appreciated. > > Cheers > > Dan > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
> > -Original Message- > > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > I've explained that in other posts, but as you see, the idea is indeed > > mathematically incoherent - unless you just mean the conditional effective > > probability which a measure distribution defines by definition. And _that_ > > one, of course, leads to a finite expectation value for ones's observed age > > (that is, no immortality). I've just realised that according to the Bayesian argument, the chances of someone with an infinite world-line being ANY specific age are infinitesimal. (It also makes the chances of me being the age I am pretty infinitesimal too, come to think of it). That would seem to indicate that the Bayesian argument *assumes* that infinite world-lines (and possibly infinite anythings) are impossible. Sorry I took so long to spot that objection to the SSA argument, which I will call (4). Charles
FW: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > I've explained that in other posts, but as you see, the idea is indeed > mathematically incoherent - unless you just mean the conditional effective > probability which a measure distribution defines by definition. And _that_ > one, of course, leads to a finite expectation value for ones's observed age > (that is, no immortality). Although I have other objections to the quantum theory of immortality, I still don't see how the sampling argument refutes it. Because (as I've said elsewhere) you don't know what a typical observer is. If the QTI is correct then a typical observer moment may *well* be someone who is 10^32 years old wondering why all the other protons have decayed except the ones in his body. But you have no way to find that out *except* by reaching that age yourself, because it's very very very very (keep typing "very" for another couple of weeks) unlikely that you will meet up with a typical observer who isn't yourself. Charles
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
Jacques Mallah writes: > >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >You continue to characterize those who disagree with you on this issue > >as insane. Do you mean this literally? Or is it just a rhetorical > >technique, argument by intimidation and rudeness? > > No, it's not a rhetorical technique. Why would it be advantageous in an > argument to be rude? > I do mean it quite literally. As far as I can tell, there people > believe in illogical and dangerous things, for no apparent reason. It's no > different than if they believed they can fly. So you believe these people are insane, that they are mentally ill. You believe that they perhaps would benefit from consulting a doctor. Perhaps they are even a danger to themselves or others? What category of mental illness would you attribute to those who believe in quantum immortality? Looking at the list of disorders at http://www.mentalhealth.com/, the most likely possibility seems to be Delusional Disorder, http://www.mentalhealth.com/dis1/p21-ps02.html, or perhaps Schizophrenia. These are the ones which mention delusions, which is apparently what you consider this belief to entail. Tell me again that you are serious. You actually believe that people who disagree with you on this matter suffer from mental illness and delusions? Do you believe that a mental health professional who gained an understanding of the multiverse concept and had explained the alternative interpretation would diagnose these people as mentally ill? Despite the difficulty of the concepts, the slipperiness of the reasoning, the many alternative interpretations, you are so convinced of your own correctness that you think someone must be insane to disagree with you? Not just wrong or mistaken, but insane? Hal
RE: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > >self-sampling assumption--what does it mean to say that "I" should reason > >as if I had an equal probability of being any one of all possible observer-moments? > > It means - and I admit it does take a little thought here - _I want to > follow a guessing procedure that, in general, maximizes the fraction of > those people (who use that procedure) who get the right guess_. (Why would > I want a more error-prone method?) So I use Bayesian reasoning with the > best prior available, the uniform one on observer-moments, which maximizes > the fraction of observer-moments who guess right. No soul-hopping in that > reasoning, I assure you. I'm sorry, I still don't see how that applies to me. If I know which observer moments I'm in (e.g. I know how old I am) why should I reason as though I don't? Charles
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
>From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >I don't understand your objection. It seems to me that it is perfectly >coherent to imagine a TOE which includes both a universal "objective" >measure on the set of all observer-moments and also a relative conditional >probability which tells me what the probability is I'll have experience B >in the future if I'm having experience A right now. "You" is just a matter of definition. As for the conditional effective probability of an observation with characteristics A given that it includes characteristics B, p(A|B), that is automatically defined as p(A|B) = M(A and B) / M(B). There is no room to have a rival "relative conditional probability". (E.g. A = "I think I'm in the USA at 12:00 today", B="I think I'm Bob".) >In statistics we have both absolute and conditional probability, so what's >wrong with having the same thing in a TOE? In fact there is no choice but to have conditional probability - as long as it's the one that the absolute measure distribution automatically defines. >I suppose one objection might be that once we have an objective measure, we >understand everything we need to know about why I find myself having the >types of experiences I do Indeed so. >and that defining an additional conditional probability measure on the set >of all observer-moments would be purely "epiphenomenal" and inelegant. Is >that what your problem with the idea is? It's not just inelegant. It's impossible, if by "additional" you mean one that's not the automatic one. >self-sampling assumption--what does it mean to say that "I" should reason >as if I had an equal probability of being any one of all possible >observer-moments? It means - and I admit it does take a little thought here - _I want to follow a guessing procedure that, in general, maximizes the fraction of those people (who use that procedure) who get the right guess_. (Why would I want a more error-prone method?) So I use Bayesian reasoning with the best prior available, the uniform one on observer-moments, which maximizes the fraction of observer-moments who guess right. No soul-hopping in that reasoning, I assure you. >if I am about to step into a machine that will replicate one copy of me in >heaven and one copy in hell, then as I step into the imaging chamber I will >be in suspense about where I will find myself a moment from now, and if the >conditional probability of each possible future observer-moment is 50% >given my current observer-moment, then I will interpret that as a 50/50 >chance that I'm about to experience torture or bliss. That depends on the definition of "you". In any case, one copy will be happy (the one partying with the succubi in hell) and the other will be sad (the one stuck hanging out with Christians). So your utility function should be about even. I assume you'd care about both future copies at that point. >Surely you agree that there is nothing *mathematically* incoherent about >defining both absolute and conditional probability measures on the set of >all observer-moments. So what's your basis for calling the idea "crazy?" I've explained that in other posts, but as you see, the idea is indeed mathematically incoherent - unless you just mean the conditional effective probability which a measure distribution defines by definition. And _that_ one, of course, leads to a finite expectation value for ones's observed age (that is, no immortality). - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
>From: "Jacques Mallah" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>You continue to characterize those who disagree with you on this issue >>as insane. Do you mean this literally? Or is it just a rhetorical >>technique, argument by intimidation and rudeness? > >No, it's not a rhetorical technique. Why would it be advantageous in >an >argument to be rude? >I do mean it quite literally. As far as I can tell, there people >believe in illogical and dangerous things, for no apparent reason. It's no >different than if they believed they can fly. I don't understand your objection. It seems to me that it is perfectly coherent to imagine a TOE which includes both a universal "objective" measure on the set of all observer-moments and also a relative conditional probability which tells me what the probability is I'll have experience B in the future if I'm having experience A right now. In statistics we have both absolute and conditional probability, so what's wrong with having the same thing in a TOE? I suppose one objection might be that once we have an objective measure, we understand everything we need to know about why I find myself having the types of experiences I do, and that defining an additional conditional probability measure on the set of all observer-moments would be purely "epiphenomenal" and inelegant. Is that what your problem with the idea is? I have my own pet theory about why a TOE including both absolute and conditional probability measures could actually be quite elegant, with each type of probability measure defining the other (like solving a large set of simultaneous equations to find the only self-consistent way to assign values to each variable), but I'll save that for another post. Another possible objection to the notion of a conditional probability measure would be the one you mentioned earlier, that it would seem to imply some weird idea of a propertyless "soul" that leaps around between different observer-moments (each defined as a certain computation, perhaps). I would point out, though, that there is a nice symmetry between this difficulty and a similar difficulty in understanding the meaning of the self-sampling assumption--what does it mean to say that "I" should reason as if I had an equal probability of being any one of all possible observer-moments? How could I be any observer-moment but the one I actually am? Perhaps a skeptic would caricature the self-sampling assumption by imagining a bunch of propertyless souls that have to draw straws to decide which observer-moment they'll end up "becoming," but I don't think the difficulty visualizing what the SSA means really counts as a strong argument against it. Similarly, I don't think the difficulty with visualizing what "conditional probability" would mean is a strong objection to the idea, "leaping" nonwithstanding. >From a first-person perspective you can see pretty clearly what it would mean--if I am about to step into a machine that will replicate one copy of me in heaven and one copy in hell, then as I step into the imaging chamber I will be in suspense about where I will find myself a moment from now, and if the conditional probability of each possible future observer-moment is 50% given my current observer-moment, then I will interpret that as a 50/50 chance that I'm about to experience torture or bliss. Surely you agree that there is nothing *mathematically* incoherent about defining both absolute and conditional probability measures on the set of all observer-moments. So what's your basis for calling the idea "crazy?" _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >You continue to characterize those who disagree with you on this issue >as insane. Do you mean this literally? Or is it just a rhetorical >technique, argument by intimidation and rudeness? No, it's not a rhetorical technique. Why would it be advantageous in an argument to be rude? I do mean it quite literally. As far as I can tell, there people believe in illogical and dangerous things, for no apparent reason. It's no different than if they believed they can fly. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
>Jacques Mallah writes: > The problem comes when some people consider death in this context. >I'll try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself >insane I will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are. You continue to characterize those who disagree with you on this issue as insane. Do you mean this literally? Or is it just a rhetorical technique, argument by intimidation and rudeness? It's not unusual to have serious and even bitter philosophical and technical disagreements in the sciences. But I don't recall seeing any where the disputants stooped so low as to characterize their opponents as insane. It's especially bizarre when we are dealing with such difficult and ambiguous questions. Even the definitions we use are slippery and may mean different things to different people. Disagreement in such an area is inevitable. Perfectly rational people may come to different conclusions, as in any challenging intellectual area. We lack consensus on nearly every fundamental question in the multiverse model. What is measure, what is an implementation, what constitutes a mind, what is the reference set for all observers, how does time fit in, what characterizes the set of all universes? It is arrogance of the highest order to claim that your particular guesses at answers and interpretations of these questions are the only right ones. It goes far beyond that to claim that those who find other answers are insane. I suggest that you abandon this rhetorical technique and open your mind slightly. The path to truth is difficult and no one person has a monopoly. Calling those who disagree insane can only hurt the exchange of information and slow progress for everyone. Hal Finney
Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Jacques Mallah writes: > > The problem comes when some people consider death in this context. >I'll try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself >insane I will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are. > >I have mixed feelings about this line of reasoning, but I can offer >some arguments in favor of it. I guess you mean in favor of FIN. How about against it too, since you have mixed feelings? > > The insane view however holds that the mind of the "killed" twin >somehow leaps into the surviving twin at the moment he would have been >killed. Thus, except for the effect on other people who might have known >the twins, the apparent death is of no consequence. > >It's not that the mind "leaps". That would imply that minds have >location, wouldn't it? And spatial limits? But that notion doesn't >work well. > >Mind is not something that is localized in the universe in the way >that physical objects are. You can't pin down the location of a mind. >Where in our brains is mind located? In the glial cells? In the neurons? >The whole neuron, or just the synapse? It doesn't make sense to imagine >that you can assign a numerical value to each point in the brain which >represents its degree of mind-ness. Location is not a property of mind. A computationalist would say that the mind is due to the functioning of the brain, and thus is "located" where the parts that function are. But this is totally irrelevant. Suffice it to say that a mind is associated with that brain, while a different mind would be associated with a different brain. >Hence we cannot speak of minds "leaping". I remind you that _I_ never said they leap, could leap, or that such a thing is logically possible at all. I said only that the insane hold such a view, which many posters on this list do. Whatever they may mean by what they say, the effect is best described as saying they think minds leap. >It makes more sense to think of mind as a relational phenomenon, like >"greater than" or "next to", but enormously more complicated. In that >sense, if there are two identical brains, then they both exhibit the >same relational properties. That means that the mind is the same in >both brains. It's not that there are two minds each located in a brain, >but rather that all copies of that brain implement the mind. Nope. That make no (0) sense at all. Sure, you could _define_ a mind to be some computation, as you seem to want, rather than being a specific implementation of that computation. But that's a rather silly definition, since it's a specific implementation that would be associated with conscious thinking of a particular brain, and thus with measure. Of course, even a twin who dies could never have the same computation as one that lived, since "HALT" is obviously a significant difference in the computation. >Further support for this model can be found by considering things from >the point of view of that mind. Let it consider the question, which >brain am I in at this time? Which location in the universe do I occupy? >There is no way for the mind to give a meaningful, unique response to >this question. There's no way to know for sure, you mean. OK, I agree with that. You can still guess with high confidence. In any case, there's still a fact of the matter, regardless of whether you know that fact. >Any answer will be both wrong and right. That makes no sense. The answer will be either wrong XOR right, for a particular mind; but you can't know for sure which of those minds is you. Hence you use indexical Bayesian reasoning or "SSA". >In this model, if the number of brains increases or decreases, the mind >will not notice, it will not feel a change. Surviving minds won't notice a change. Dead minds won't feel a thing, which is the reason death sucks. >No introspection will reveal the number of implementations of itself that >exist in a universe or a multiverse. True, although with the SSA you can make some reasonable guesses. >This is only dangerous if the belief is wrong, of course. The contrary >belief could be said to be dangerous in its way, if it were wrong as well. >(For example, it might lead to an urgent desire to build copies.) Even supposing the logical belief to be wrong - what's so dangerous about building copies? In any case, that would require a lot more tech than we have. > >I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were >true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the >apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find >yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is >the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs. > >This is a different argument and has nothing to do with the idea of >"leaping", which is mostly what I want t
Re: Quantum Suicide Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
Hal finney wrote:
>It makes more sense to think of mind as a relational phenomenon, like
>"greater than" or "next to", but enormously more complicated. In that
>sense, if there are two identical brains, then they both exhibit the
>same relational properties. That means that the mind is the same in
>both brains. It's not that there are two minds each located in a brain,
>but rather that all copies of that brain implement the mind.
>
>Further support for this model can be found by considering things from
>the point of view of that mind.
>Let it consider the question, which
>brain am I in at this time? Which location in the universe do I occupy?
>There is no way for the mind to give a meaningful, unique response to
>this question. It does not occupy just one brain or just one location.
>Any answer will be both wrong and right.
>
>In this model, if the number of brains increases or decreases, the mind
>will not notice, it will not feel a change. In fact, it has no way
>of telling. No introspection will reveal the number of implementations
>of itself that exist in a universe or a multiverse. (Possibly it can
>tell that there are more than zero implementations, but even that will
>be questioned by some.)
I do supporte a similar view of course.
I argued, through comp, for zero *physical*
implementations and a continua (uncountable) of "normal" slightly
differentiating experiences of consistent extensions.
We can attach a mind to a relatively apparent consistent machine,
(perhaps even just by sort of turing-politeness), but we cannot attach
*a* (one) machine, nor any singular description to "a" mind.
The mind body problem is not *that* easy. Indeed.
Jacques Mallah wrote:
>The problem comes when some people consider death in this context. I'll
>try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself insane I
>will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are.
First theorem in machine psychology: any machine knowing its own
consistency
(non insanity ?) is inconsistent.([]<>t & <>t) -> []f
This is not only true (theorem of G*), but any consistent machine can
know that ("arithmeticaly true" theorem of G).
Bruno
Quantum Suicide Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
Jacques Mallah writes: > The problem comes when some people consider death in this context. I'll > try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself insane I > will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are. I have mixed feelings about this line of reasoning, but I can offer some arguments in favor of it. > OK. Now, suppose there are two exactly identical twins who lead exactly > identical lives up until a moment when suddenly, one of them is killed. > (This serves as a model of the case with people in parrallel universes > acting as 'twins'.) > Obviously, if you care about these twins, the death was a bad thing to > happen. There is now less of these people. True, one twin survived, but > supposing he is still happy, there is still only half as much happiness in > the world due to the twins as there would be if one had not died. I > formalize this by saying that the measure of such conscious observations has > been reduced by a factor of 2. > The insane view however holds that the mind of the "killed" twin somehow > leaps into the surviving twin at the moment he would have been killed. > Thus, except for the effect on other people who might have known the twins, > the apparent death is of no consequence. It's not that the mind "leaps". That would imply that minds have location, wouldn't it? And spatial limits? But that notion doesn't work well. Mind is not something that is localized in the universe in the way that physical objects are. You can't pin down the location of a mind. Where in our brains is mind located? In the glial cells? In the neurons? The whole neuron, or just the synapse? It doesn't make sense to imagine that you can assign a numerical value to each point in the brain which represents its degree of mind-ness. Location is not a property of mind. Hence we cannot speak of minds "leaping". It makes more sense to think of mind as a relational phenomenon, like "greater than" or "next to", but enormously more complicated. In that sense, if there are two identical brains, then they both exhibit the same relational properties. That means that the mind is the same in both brains. It's not that there are two minds each located in a brain, but rather that all copies of that brain implement the mind. Further support for this model can be found by considering things from the point of view of that mind. Let it consider the question, which brain am I in at this time? Which location in the universe do I occupy? There is no way for the mind to give a meaningful, unique response to this question. It does not occupy just one brain or just one location. Any answer will be both wrong and right. In this model, if the number of brains increases or decreases, the mind will not notice, it will not feel a change. In fact, it has no way of telling. No introspection will reveal the number of implementations of itself that exist in a universe or a multiverse. (Possibly it can tell that there are more than zero implementations, but even that will be questioned by some.) > This they call the "quantum theory of immortality" (QTI) because, due to > quantum mechanics, there would always be some parrallel universe in which > any given person would have copies that live past any given age, and they > figure the minds would always leap into those copies. I will from now on > call it the "fallacious immortality nonsense" (FIN). Those beliefs are > dangerous by the way, since they can encourage suicide or worse. This is only dangerous if the belief is wrong, of course. The contrary belief could be said to be dangerous in its way, if it were wrong as well. (For example, it might lead to an urgent desire to build copies.) >I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were > true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the > apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find > yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is > the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs. This is a different argument and has nothing to do with the idea of "leaping", which is mostly what I want to take issue with. All this argument shows is that measure or probability decreases with time. The implications of this for how minds should regard changes in their numbers of implementation are complex and IMO unresolved. (For example, is adding a new implementation to be desired as much as the destruction of one implementation is to be avoided? What about size, are big implementations better than small ones? How about speed, does it matter if the implementations get out of phase, how much does it affect probability and measure?) Hal Finney
Re: James Higgo
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >What is "a sane view of mortality"? >Jenny Higgo > >[Jacques Mallah wrote:] > > Like the rest of the group, I'm shocked and saddenned by this news. >I don't have much time to write now, as I'll be leaving for my new job in >North Dakota tomorrow. > > Although I disagreed with him more often than not, James' input will >be missed, and not just because he was one of the few members of the group >who eventually came around to a sane view of mortality. To explain that, I'll have to explain some of what's been going on in this mailing list. As you know, (most of) the people on this list, me included, believe in the existance of what could be called "parallel universes" in which (among other things) other people similar to ourselves exist. (I will not bother to make a distinction here between the reasons to believe this based on quantum mechanics, vs. those based on general philosophy.) In many ways it is no different from believing in a spacially infinite universe, since in that case if you look at enough planets you would eventually find nearly exact duplicates of the Earth. The problem comes when some people consider death in this context. I'll try to explain the insane view on this, but since I am not myself insane I will probably not do so to the satisfaction of those that are. OK. Now, suppose there are two exactly identical twins who lead exactly identical lives up until a moment when suddenly, one of them is killed. (This serves as a model of the case with people in parrallel universes acting as 'twins'.) Obviously, if you care about these twins, the death was a bad thing to happen. There is now less of these people. True, one twin survived, but supposing he is still happy, there is still only half as much happiness in the world due to the twins as there would be if one had not died. I formalize this by saying that the measure of such conscious observations has been reduced by a factor of 2. The insane view however holds that the mind of the "killed" twin somehow leaps into the surviving twin at the moment he would have been killed. Thus, except for the effect on other people who might have known the twins, the apparent death is of no consequence. This they call the "quantum theory of immortality" (QTI) because, due to quantum mechanics, there would always be some parrallel universe in which any given person would have copies that live past any given age, and they figure the minds would always leap into those copies. I will from now on call it the "fallacious immortality nonsense" (FIN). Those beliefs are dangerous by the way, since they can encourage suicide or worse. I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that were true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than the apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not find yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it is the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs. With one notatable exception that is. James Higgo believed in the FIN when I joined this list. However, he came to understand that different people's moments of conscious observation are independent and each valuable in their own right, so he rejected the FIN and came to a sane view on mortality, while continuing to believe in other universes. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: James Higgo
This might be little consolation for those who see this place as the only existence. >From my perspective, James has gone home. He's checked out of school for the summer and left his books and his school uniform behind. I seriously doubt he'll miss being here. For what it's worth. Robert W. Marchal wrote: > Fred Chen wrote: > > >[...] The multiverse concept is of little comfort on > >occasions like these. > > Any "concept" is of little confort on those occasions, for those > who remain. > > Only ritual and presence of other close person can perhaps be a > little comfort. > > Now remember James proposed a sort of buddhist view about the > multithings, it would have been nice to have his opinion on that > question. > > Bruno > > PS I did not intend to answer to James' mother *on-line*. Sorry. > > > _ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
Re: James Higgo
Fred Chen wrote: >[...] The multiverse concept is of little comfort on >occasions like these. Any "concept" is of little confort on those occasions, for those who remain. Only ritual and presence of other close person can perhaps be a little comfort. Now remember James proposed a sort of buddhist view about the multithings, it would have been nice to have his opinion on that question. Bruno PS I did not intend to answer to James' mother *on-line*. Sorry.
Re: James Higgo
I was shocked to hear of James Higgo's passing. I still have his replies to some of my postings. The multiverse concept is of little comfort on occasions like these. Fred
Re: James Higgo
Jacques Mallah wrote >>From: George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>It is at times like this that I hope that all our theories about >>multiuniverses are in fact correct. > >It doesn't matter, of course. First, the measure of James-like beings >(summing over time) is now known to be smaller than we thought it would be; >that's true no matter what. Sometimes you speak like if you *have* solved your "implementation problem". How could you know now? With the comp hyp., or just the QM hyp., (and this in a completely provable way taking just Everett memory machines in the non relativistic setting), you should not sum up on "time", but you must sum up on *all* consistent neighborhoods. (Time and space emerges on that eventually through comp). You really speak like a quantum Bohmian, discarding quasi-magically all computational histories but one. Decoherence explains only why those "worlds" get rather quickly inaccessible for most of *each* of us, (= "Is" with George Levy first person plural plenal, or noush?). Why do you put "many world" in your signature? The James Higgos of the "other worlds" are zombie or what? I'm not sure it is consolating or reassuring, but that's another point. How do you distinguish yourself from numerically indentical counterparts? >Secondly, the 'classical' universe is surely >large enough that there still exist similar beings, or at least, beings that >we would place equal utility on the existance of. >So, with or without the >MWI, the effect of this news on our utility functions should be about the >same. Sorry we were talking about James *own* utility functions and expectations, from James own first person "average" consistent point of view. The first person. The one you mention in your signature (btw): The one who knows no one else knows ... Bruno
Re: James Higgo
Sad to hear that James is no more. Saibal
Re: James Higgo
Like the rest of the group, I'm shocked and saddenned by this news. I don't have much time to write now, as I'll be leaving for my new job in North Dakota tomorrow. Although I disagreed with him more often than not, James' input will be missed, and not just because he was one of the few members of the group who eventually came around to a sane view of mortality. >From: George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >It is at times like this that I hope that all our theories about >multiuniverses are in fact correct. It doesn't matter, of course. First, the measure of James-like beings (summing over time) is now known to be smaller than we thought it would be; that's true no matter what. Secondly, the 'classical' universe is surely large enough that there still exist similar beings, or at least, beings that we would place equal utility on the existance of. So, with or without the MWI, the effect of this news on our utility functions should be about the same. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
