Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 08 Mar 2011, at 09:23, Digital Physics wrote:

As you suggested, I tried to check the archive to make sense of your  
replies, but I utterly failed. The archive seems to be full of  
unexplained terminology as well. In your opinion, which previous  
messages provide justifications of your claims on finite random  
strings and white rabbit hallucinations?



Which claims?

Do you agree that the one bit string "1" can be considered as random,  
in the first person view (like when you measure a (up+down) electron  
in a {up, down} apparatus? I am not saying much more than that, except  
that I situate such first person randomness in the classical situation  
of self-duplication. And I did answer about the rabbit hallucination.  
Its depth comes from the human processing of the hallucination, not  
from just a video-game rabbit description.


Have you consult the sane04(*) paper? It is probably simpler than  
finding what I said in this list. You were supposed to read a lot, I  
realize. I cannot take exerts out of context . So it is far simpler, I  
think, to start from sane04. The older 'escribe' archive were easier  
to search in, but I have problem myself with the Google group archive.


You have intervened in a already long conversation, and you are  
certainly welcome, but your question was out of the context of the  
discussion, and it is not clear for me what you already understand or  
not. Please read sane04, so I can figure out what is your precise  
point if you are not satisfied with my explanation above. It is the  
base of the list discussion since many years. Indeed the whole  
discussion,  is mostly based on my work which has developed intuitions  
similar to Tegmark and Schmidhuber (but published much earlier) and  
which shows both their defects and the (theological) price of their  
amelioration with respect of the mind-body question.
The sane paper is a not too bad complete version of my contribution. I  
give a precise version of a very weak form of computationalism, from  
which I show that the mind-body problem is reduced to a problem of  
justifying the appearance of the physical laws in the relative  
number's or machine's mind.
The point is theological. It means that if we take seriously into  
account the computationalist hypothesis, then Plato's theology is  
correct, and Aristotle's theology (used by atheists and christians,  
among others) is not correct. In that frame, physical reality does no  
more describe the fundamental ontology, but appears to be the border  
(or projection, shadow, ...) of (arithmetical) truth as seen from an  
internal number-theoretically definable perspective. My contribution  
is divided into a not too involved technical part (UDA), and much more  
technical part (AUDA, or the Löbian machine's interview). The  
technical AUDA makes the comp hypothesis, together with the classical  
theory of knowledge, testable. I use the term 'theology' in the  
original greek sense of 'theory of everything', or 'theory of truth'.

I can explain this only if I we are able to share some context.
In case you know the french you can consult, on my web page, the  
original thesis, and a long detailed version. Tegmark and Schmidhuber  
does not really address the mind-body problem. They assumed implicitly  
some 'identity thesis' which just cannot work when assuming the  
computationalist hypothesis. You might also consult Russell Standish's  
book 'theory of nothing" which introduces well the kind of debate we  
have on the everything-list.

If you have question we can proceed steps by steps in short mail.
I have no idea of your background, and the comp mind-body problem is  
highly interdisciplinary, and different people have different  
problems, and need sometimes different explanations. You might, but  
are not obliged, to present yourself, mister or miss digital physics.


Bruno Marchal

(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal



From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 18:19:33 +0100


On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:



I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of  
random structures.

It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.

You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is  
irrelevant here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must  
consider the probability of the program that computes this concrete  
individual history, and nothing else. The description of the entire  
set is much shorter than the description of most of its individual  
elements. But it is useless as it has no predictive power.  
Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:

http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html

Th

RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-08 Thread Digital Physics

As you suggested, I tried to check the archive to make sense of your replies, 
but I utterly failed. The archive seems to be full of unexplained terminology 
as well. In your opinion, which previous messages provide justifications of 
your claims on finite random strings and white rabbit hallucinations?

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 18:19:33 +0100


On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:

I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random 
structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.

You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant 
here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must consider the 
probability of the program that computes this concrete individual history, and 
nothing else. The description of the entire set is much shorter than the 
description of most of its individual elements. But it is useless as it has no 
predictive power. Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this: 
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html

The entire set of random string is useful to illustrate the first person 
indeterminacy, and that was its role in my reply to Andrew and 1Z. So your 
remark is unfounded.We have discussed this a lot with Juergen on this list. To 
keep its position he was obliged to assume that finite strings can never be 
said random, even form a first person point of view. You might take a look in 
the archive.  To sum up, Schmidhuber missed the first person indeterminacy.You 
have to understand that the point here consists not in solving the mind-body 
problem, but in formulating it in the computationalist theory of the mind. 



White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense) programs. 

No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are both short 
and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in Bennett's sense.

But a sustaining white rabbit human hallucination is another matter. And this 
is what we have to take into account in the "measure problem" when we are 
confronted with the universal dovetailing.



But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible".

In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.

This seems very unclear. What's the difference?

It is the difference between a counting algorithm, and a universal algorithm. 
You might identify numbers and programs, and in that case the difference is the 
difference between a list of programs, and a list of the executions of the 
programs. If you have read enough in the archive or in my paper to understand 
the first person indeterminacy notion, you might understand that, from the 
first person points of view, such a distinction does matter. 



This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.

Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, 

sure, this still makes sense

and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).

Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of substance. 
 I meant "computable histories *above* the substitution level", and "randomness 
below". More precisely the randomness pertains on the set of all computations 
going through my current relative states. This is a consequence of the UD 
Argument. I refer you to my sane04 
paper:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html



Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the remainder of this 
message.

I suggest you read the paper sane04(*). If you have a (real precise, not 
philosophical) problem, just ask a precise question. We were discussing the 
seventh step of the UD Argument. It would already be easier if you can 
acknowledge the understanding of the first six steps.  Note that the skipped 
message was alluding to the more technical part of the work, where the measure 
one is given by a variant of Gödel-Löb self-reference logics, which I name 
"arithmetical hypostases", because I have used them to provide an arithmetical 
interpretation of Plotinus theology, including his notion of matter. The whole 
result is that comp, with the classical theory of knowledge, is an empirically 
testable theory.
Bruno Marchal

(*)http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

 http:

Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:




I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those  
of random structures.

It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.


You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is  
irrelevant here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must  
consider the probability of the program that computes this concrete  
individual history, and nothing else. The description of the entire  
set is much shorter than the description of most of its individual  
elements. But it is useless as it has no predictive power.  
Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:

http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html


The entire set of random string is useful to illustrate the first  
person indeterminacy, and that was its role in my reply to Andrew and  
1Z. So your remark is unfounded.
We have discussed this a lot with Juergen on this list. To keep its  
position he was obliged to assume that finite strings can never be  
said random, even form a first person point of view. You might take a  
look in the archive.  To sum up, Schmidhuber missed the first person  
indeterminacy.
You have to understand that the point here consists not in solving the  
mind-body problem, but in formulating it in the computationalist  
theory of the mind.






White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)  
programs.


No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are  
both short and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in  
Bennett's sense.


But a sustaining white rabbit human hallucination is another matter.  
And this is what we have to take into account in the "measure problem"  
when we are confronted with the universal dovetailing.







But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible".


In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.


This seems very unclear. What's the difference?


It is the difference between a counting algorithm, and a universal  
algorithm. You might identify numbers and programs, and in that case  
the difference is the difference between a list of programs, and a  
list of the executions of the programs. If you have read enough in the  
archive or in my paper to understand the first person indeterminacy  
notion, you might understand that, from the first person points of  
view, such a distinction does matter.







This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.


Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible,


sure, this still makes sense

and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This  
gives an hint

for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).


Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of  
substance.


 I meant "computable histories *above* the substitution level", and  
"randomness below". More precisely the randomness pertains on the set  
of all computations going through my current relative states. This is  
a consequence of the UD Argument. I refer you to my sane04 paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the  
remainder of this message.


I suggest you read the paper sane04(*). If you have a (real precise,  
not philosophical) problem, just ask a precise question. We were  
discussing the seventh step of the UD Argument. It would already be  
easier if you can acknowledge the understanding of the first six  
steps.  Note that the skipped message was alluding to the more  
technical part of the work, where the measure one is given by a  
variant of Gödel-Löb self-reference logics, which I name "arithmetical  
hypostases", because I have used them to provide an arithmetical  
interpretation of Plotinus theology, including his notion of matter.  
The whole result is that comp, with the classical theory of knowledge,  
is an empirically testable theory.


Bruno Marchal

(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Digital Physics


> > I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random 
> > structures.
> It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.

You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant 
here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must consider the 
probability of the program that computes this concrete individual history, and 
nothing else. The description of the entire set is much shorter than the 
description of most of its individual elements. But it is useless as it has no 
predictive power. Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this: 
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html

> White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense) programs. 

No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are both short 
and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in Bennett's sense.

> > But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
> > Chaitin-incompressible".
>
> In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
> case of you in the UD's work.

This seems very unclear. What's the difference?

> > This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
> > daily experience.
>
> Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
> prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
> the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
> by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, 

sure, this still makes sense

> and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
> for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
> substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
> quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).

Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of substance. 
Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the remainder of this 
message.


  

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Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:26, Digital Physics wrote:



You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random  
structures. They are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agree  
that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random  
structures.


It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.  
White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)  
programs. They are relatively costly. But technically this is not  
enough for eliminating them from the first person appearance, unless  
we use the self-referential logics.





But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...  
Chaitin-incompressible".


In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in  
case of you in the UD's work.




This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting  
daily experience.


Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles  
prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see  
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons  
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, and this  
is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint  
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the  
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the  
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).





Then you say "but computer science and mathematical logic shows that  
it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person  
indeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]". I don't understand - it has  
been shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it's  
not easy to prove that?


That is actually rather obvious, if you know just a bit of computer  
science. To get all the computational histories, you need Church  
thesis and the enumeration of all partial computable function. By the  
padding theorem, this is a highly redundant and fractal (and complex)  
structure, and by the theorem of Rice, the set of codes corresponding  
to any non trivial functions is not recursive (making our substitution  
level) unknowable. So it is rather highly complex to derive the  
possibility of white rabbits from that. In this list we discuss  
alternate manner to approach that measure problem.






  And you say: "There is no reason for making all relative histories  
equally likely." But then what's the alternative?


To study the math of the universal dovetailing, and of what machine  
can say about themselves and about they consistent extension  
relatively to it.
Accepting the comp theory, together with the classical theory of  
knowledge, although we don't have the measure, we can extract the  
logic obeyed by the particular case of the "measure one". I have  
succeeded in showing that it obeys already a quantum-like logic. This  
needs a bit of advanced computer science/mathematical logic. See my  
paper for details and references.


I have to say that I am a bit astonished that some people seems to  
have difficulties to grasp that once we assume comp, theoretical  
computer science becomes *the* key tool to progress on the fundamental  
question. The beam example above suggests empirically that we are  
physically duplicated in the iterative way. But obviously we are not  
just duplicated iteratively, we are also obeying computational laws,  
and arithmetical laws, etc. If that was not the case, comp would imply  
white noise and would fall immediately in Russell's Occam catastrophe.  
But, thanks to God, universal numbers does not put only mess in  
Platonia, they generate also a lot of order.


-- Bruno Marchal






From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100


On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if most  
histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and  
unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly  
by, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weird  
histories will happen?



From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you
iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person
indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will
agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next
outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories
(like:
"WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ..." (length 64)
are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.



Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self- 
duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to  
u

RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Digital Physics

You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They 
are aberrant 
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agree that white 
rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures. But you 
also claim that "most will consider their histories ... 
Chaitin-incompressible". This means long programs and no predictability at all, 
contradicting daily experience. Then you say "but computer science and 
mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and 
first person indeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]". I don't understand - it 
has been shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it's not easy 
to prove that?  And you say: "There is no reason for making all relative 
histories equally likely." But then what's the alternative?


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100


On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if most histories are 
equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the 
sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather reliably 
that none of those weird histories will happen?

> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
> Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
> You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you 
> iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person 
> indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will 
> agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next 
> outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories 
> (like:
> "WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ..." (length 64)
> are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.


Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self-duplication. 
The iterated self-duplication is used here only to understand what is the first 
person indeterminacy in a very simple context (the context of pure iterated 
self-duplication).
Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a non 
trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the relative 
1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable histories and oracles 
(which can be handled mathematically with the logics of self-reference). There 
is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. It is not easy 
to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and 
mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and 
first person indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp implies them, 
then observation and induction makes comp false or very non plausible.
"Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits (flying 
crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, 
a bit like in our nocturnal dreams."
Bruno
(*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first person or 
the third person respectively, as defined for example in the sane04 
paper:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

  

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Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:

But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are  
random and unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can  
we predict rather

reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?

> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
> Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
> You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you
> iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person
> indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will
> agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next
> outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories
> (like:
> "WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ..." (length 64)
> are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.



Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self- 
duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to  
understand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simple  
context (the context of pure iterated self-duplication).


Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a  
non trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the  
relative 1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable  
histories and oracles (which can be handled mathematically with the  
logics of self-reference).
There is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely.  
It is not easy to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but  
computer science and mathematical logic shows that it is not easy  
either to prove that comp and first person indeterminacy implies them.  
And if we prove comp implies them, then observation and induction  
makes comp false or very non plausible.


Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits  
(flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant  
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams.


Bruno

(*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first  
person or the third person respectively, as defined for example in the  
sane04 paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

2011-03-07 Thread Digital Physics

But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and 
unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict 
rather 
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?

> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
> Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
> You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you  
> iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person  
> indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will  
> agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next  
> outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories  
> (like:
> "WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ..." (length 64)
> are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.

  

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