On 08 Mar 2011, at 09:23, Digital Physics wrote:
As you suggested, I tried to check the archive to make sense of your
replies, but I utterly failed. The archive seems to be full of
unexplained terminology as well. In your opinion, which previous
messages provide justifications of your claims on finite random
strings and white rabbit hallucinations?
Which claims?
Do you agree that the one bit string "1" can be considered as random,
in the first person view (like when you measure a (up+down) electron
in a {up, down} apparatus? I am not saying much more than that, except
that I situate such first person randomness in the classical situation
of self-duplication. And I did answer about the rabbit hallucination.
Its depth comes from the human processing of the hallucination, not
from just a video-game rabbit description.
Have you consult the sane04(*) paper? It is probably simpler than
finding what I said in this list. You were supposed to read a lot, I
realize. I cannot take exerts out of context . So it is far simpler, I
think, to start from sane04. The older 'escribe' archive were easier
to search in, but I have problem myself with the Google group archive.
You have intervened in a already long conversation, and you are
certainly welcome, but your question was out of the context of the
discussion, and it is not clear for me what you already understand or
not. Please read sane04, so I can figure out what is your precise
point if you are not satisfied with my explanation above. It is the
base of the list discussion since many years. Indeed the whole
discussion, is mostly based on my work which has developed intuitions
similar to Tegmark and Schmidhuber (but published much earlier) and
which shows both their defects and the (theological) price of their
amelioration with respect of the mind-body question.
The sane paper is a not too bad complete version of my contribution. I
give a precise version of a very weak form of computationalism, from
which I show that the mind-body problem is reduced to a problem of
justifying the appearance of the physical laws in the relative
number's or machine's mind.
The point is theological. It means that if we take seriously into
account the computationalist hypothesis, then Plato's theology is
correct, and Aristotle's theology (used by atheists and christians,
among others) is not correct. In that frame, physical reality does no
more describe the fundamental ontology, but appears to be the border
(or projection, shadow, ...) of (arithmetical) truth as seen from an
internal number-theoretically definable perspective. My contribution
is divided into a not too involved technical part (UDA), and much more
technical part (AUDA, or the Löbian machine's interview). The
technical AUDA makes the comp hypothesis, together with the classical
theory of knowledge, testable. I use the term 'theology' in the
original greek sense of 'theory of everything', or 'theory of truth'.
I can explain this only if I we are able to share some context.
In case you know the french you can consult, on my web page, the
original thesis, and a long detailed version. Tegmark and Schmidhuber
does not really address the mind-body problem. They assumed implicitly
some 'identity thesis' which just cannot work when assuming the
computationalist hypothesis. You might also consult Russell Standish's
book 'theory of nothing" which introduces well the kind of debate we
have on the everything-list.
If you have question we can proceed steps by steps in short mail.
I have no idea of your background, and the comp mind-body problem is
highly interdisciplinary, and different people have different
problems, and need sometimes different explanations. You might, but
are not obliged, to present yourself, mister or miss digital physics.
Bruno Marchal
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 18:19:33 +0100
On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of
random structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is
irrelevant here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must
consider the probability of the program that computes this concrete
individual history, and nothing else. The description of the entire
set is much shorter than the description of most of its individual
elements. But it is useless as it has no predictive power.
Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html
The entire set of random string is useful to illustrate the first
person indeterminacy, and that was its role in my reply to Andrew
and 1Z. So your remark is unfounded.
We have discussed this a lot with Juergen on this list. To keep its
position he was obliged to assume that finite strings can never be
said random, even form a first person point of view. You might take
a look in the archive. To sum up, Schmidhuber missed the first
person indeterminacy.
You have to understand that the point here consists not in solving
the mind-body problem, but in formulating it in the computationalist
theory of the mind.
White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)
programs.
No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are
both short and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in
Bennett's sense.
But a sustaining white rabbit human hallucination is another matter.
And this is what we have to take into account in the "measure
problem" when we are confronted with the universal dovetailing.
But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible".
In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.
This seems very unclear. What's the difference?
It is the difference between a counting algorithm, and a universal
algorithm. You might identify numbers and programs, and in that case
the difference is the difference between a list of programs, and a
list of the executions of the programs. If you have read enough in
the archive or in my paper to understand the first person
indeterminacy notion, you might understand that, from the first
person points of view, such a distinction does matter.
This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.
Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible,
sure, this still makes sense
and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This
gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).
Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of
substance.
I meant "computable histories *above* the substitution level", and
"randomness below". More precisely the randomness pertains on the
set of all computations going through my current relative states.
This is a consequence of the UD Argument. I refer you to my sane04
paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the
remainder of this message.
I suggest you read the paper sane04(*). If you have a (real precise,
not philosophical) problem, just ask a precise question. We were
discussing the seventh step of the UD Argument. It would already be
easier if you can acknowledge the understanding of the first six
steps. Note that the skipped message was alluding to the more
technical part of the work, where the measure one is given by a
variant of Gödel-Löb self-reference logics, which I name
"arithmetical hypostases", because I have used them to provide an
arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology, including his
notion of matter. The whole result is that comp, with the classical
theory of knowledge, is an empirically testable theory.
Bruno Marchal
(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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