On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:26, Digital Physics wrote:

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You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not randomstructures. They are aberrantconsistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agreethat white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of randomstructures.

`It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.`

`White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)`

`programs. They are relatively costly. But technically this is not`

`enough for eliminating them from the first person appearance, unless`

`we use the self-referential logics.`

But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...Chaitin-incompressible".

`In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in`

`case of you in the UD's work.`

This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradictingdaily experience.

`Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles`

`prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see`

`the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons`

`by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, and this`

`is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint`

`for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the`

`substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the`

`quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).`

Then you say "but computer science and mathematical logic shows thatit is not easy either to prove that comp and first personindeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]". I don't understand - it hasbeen shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it'snot easy to prove that?

`That is actually rather obvious, if you know just a bit of computer`

`science. To get all the computational histories, you need Church`

`thesis and the enumeration of all partial computable function. By the`

`padding theorem, this is a highly redundant and fractal (and complex)`

`structure, and by the theorem of Rice, the set of codes corresponding`

`to any non trivial functions is not recursive (making our substitution`

`level) unknowable. So it is rather highly complex to derive the`

`possibility of white rabbits from that. In this list we discuss`

`alternate manner to approach that measure problem.`

And you say: "There is no reason for making all relative historiesequally likely." But then what's the alternative?

`To study the math of the universal dovetailing, and of what machine`

`can say about themselves and about they consistent extension`

`relatively to it.`

`Accepting the comp theory, together with the classical theory of`

`knowledge, although we don't have the measure, we can extract the`

`logic obeyed by the particular case of the "measure one". I have`

`succeeded in showing that it obeys already a quantum-like logic. This`

`needs a bit of advanced computer science/mathematical logic. See my`

`paper for details and references.`

`I have to say that I am a bit astonished that some people seems to`

`have difficulties to grasp that once we assume comp, theoretical`

`computer science becomes *the* key tool to progress on the fundamental`

`question. The beam example above suggests empirically that we are`

`physically duplicated in the iterative way. But obviously we are not`

`just duplicated iteratively, we are also obeying computational laws,`

`and arithmetical laws, etc. If that was not the case, comp would imply`

`white noise and would fall immediately in Russell's Occam catastrophe.`

`But, thanks to God, universal numbers does not put only mess in`

`Platonia, they generate also a lot of order.`

-- Bruno Marchal

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if mosthistories are equally likely, and most of them are random andunpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles flyby, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weirdhistories will happen?From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100 You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories (like: "WMMMWWMWMMMMWWWMMWMMWWWWWM ..." (length 64) are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self-duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only tounderstand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simplecontext (the context of pure iterated self-duplication).Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which isa non trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in therelative 1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computablehistories and oracles (which can be handled mathematically with thelogics of self-reference). There is no reason for making allrelative histories equally likely. It is not easy to prevent whiterabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and mathematicallogic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and firstperson indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp impliesthem, then observation and induction makes comp false or very nonplausible."Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, whiterabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They areaberrant consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams."Bruno(*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the firstperson or the third person respectively, as defined for example inthe sane04 paper:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.htmlhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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