On 14 Apr, 17:34, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> You are right. UDA only shows that matter, whatever conception we can
> have about it as far as it is primary, is void of any explanation power
> given that we HAVE TO justify material appearances from the number
> relation (by comp,
Le 14-avr.-07, à 15:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>
> On 11 Apr, 16:01, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Matter, as we
>> see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable
>> computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is
>> what the UDA is all about.
>
> Matter
On 11 Apr, 16:01, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Matter, as we
> see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable
> computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is
> what the UDA is all about.
Matter can be even if your argument is correct, since your
Bruno,
addendum to my post before. You wrote:
BM:
But ok, you are just arguing for the non-comp assumption.
[JM]:
No, I just speak about 'another type' comp, a non-digital contraption that
handles meaning, function, without the crutches of the (hypothetical? at least
unidentified) numbers - thos
Dear Bruno, allow me to interleave below as [JM]: remarks.
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2007 9:13 AM
Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Le 09-avr.-07, à 16:40, John
Le 09-avr.-07, à 17:06, John M a écrit :
> Thanks, Quentin.
> It seems AoC is not contrary to the line I represented.
> *
> To your other post: I did not feel any pejorating in Peter's
> "Brunoism". Bruno is appreciated with his "23rd c". views. (He joked
> about it, calling the list as 100 ye
Le 09-avr.-07, à 16:40, John M a écrit :
> Stathis,
> I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic
> binaryly digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech. immagination
> wander and think about analog computers dealing in meanings and
> functions rather than bits 0 o
On 8 Apr, 23:01, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > From: 1Z
>
> > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
> > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
> > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
> > Brunoism does
x27;physical' figment of our explanatory sequence in
learning about the world).
My ramblings conclude into: it all may be right (in conditional). My criticism
aims at triggering (teasing?) better arguments. So are my questions.
Best regards
John M
- Original Message -
F
M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2007 10:48 PM
Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: 1Z
>
>
On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: 1Z
> >
> > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
> > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
> > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
> > Brunoism does not fol
> From: 1Z
>
> Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
> Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
> Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
> Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism,
> it is in oppos
formula. Hard to beat,
> especially since so far there is NO successfully applicable (not even a
> dreamed-up) alternative developed sufficiently into a hopeful replacement
> for the many millennia evolved 'physical view' of our reductionist
> conventional science. Even
start from there if not in veritable sci-fi.
Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from
7;physical view' of our reductionist conventional
science.
Even the new ways start from there if not in veritable sci-fi.
John M
- Original Message -
From: 1Z
To: Everything List
Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2007 12:57 PM
Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism&
On 3 Apr, 20:08, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic?
It's widely agreed on. Otherwise there would e problems about the
existence of those platonic objects which can only be
defined with certain, disp
Le 03-avr.-07, à 21:08, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Hi Tim
>>
>> Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part):
>>
>>>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
>>> idea
>>> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that h
On Apr 3, 5:03 am, Tim Boykett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hello Everythingers,
>
>I was introduced to this list by Jurgen Schmidhuber, who spoke at a
> meeting that we had here in Linz in 2005. A very interesting meeting
> with Ed Fredkin, Tom Toffoli, Karl Svozil and a few others to make
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Tim
>
> Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part):
>
>>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
>> idea
>> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have
>> a certain
>> mathematical structure. One of the "ev
Hi Tim
Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part):
>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
> idea
> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have
> a certain
> mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is
>
Hello Everythingers,
I was introduced to this list by Jurgen Schmidhuber, who spoke at a
meeting that we had here in Linz in 2005. A very interesting meeting
with Ed Fredkin, Tom Toffoli, Karl Svozil and a few others to make it
a very full couple of days.
One of the recurring ideas here
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