Re: UDA Step 7
On Apr 3, 3:12 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Günther, > > Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > > > > Dear Bruno, > > >> Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic > >> corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation > >> rule. > >> The significance of this remains to be seen of course. > > > Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one > > reading) > > I am aware. Sorry. I will perhaps explain a bit more the > "methodological problem" is an answer to a post by Tom. > Soon or later. > Bruno, I think you might be referring to me. In either case, I apologize for not participating in a while. I have been busy with other priorities, even other pass times. I have a two-fold interest in your UDA, and in the Everything List in general. One is the math, having a M.S. in math and doing it everyday on my job. The other interest is in philosophy and theology. So I am especially interested in the intersection of the two. It has been a while since I've picked up Cutland's introductory book on Recursion Theory. I have to be honest and say that my motivation in studying your UDA is (I'll probably word this wrong in my haste) either to reconfirm in another instance that trying to figure out everything in a reductionistic sense based on math and logic (the most accurate tools of reductionism) leads to futility (no conclusion), or it shows that there must be a transcendent basis for everything, or both. Another point connected to this that I have argued is that the inescability of the mind-body problem points to the transcendent basis having a personal (mind) aspect at the core. Just an administrative note: To see my oldest posts, from 2006, you have to search for [EMAIL PROTECTED] because I changed email addresses and re-registered as [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Caylor) after that. By the way, near the end of one of our discussions on Plonitus' hypostases, you said that what I was saying was the same thing as Augustine. I just wanted to let you know that I didn't get it from Augustine, I somehow thought it up myself. Smells a little like truth, it seems to be able to be seen independently from different perspectives (invariance). There's something mystical going on here. ;) Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Dear Günther, Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > Dear Bruno, > >> Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic >> corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation >> rule. >> The significance of this remains to be seen of course. > > Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one > reading) I am aware. Sorry. I will perhaps explain a bit more the "methodological problem" is an answer to a post by Tom. Soon or later. > >> In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the >> translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine. >> Why? >> Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the >> fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing >> Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p >> sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she >> is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p >> Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the >> self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The >> Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 >> sentences >> together with their many proofs. >> This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some >> amount of knowledge of recursion theory. > > Ah OK; I am going to do some recursion theory this semester. (the > Rogers > book :-) It is the best. > Could you recommend something on modal logic? I would recommend the following one: Chellas, 1980 Chellas, B. F. (1980). Modal Logic, an introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. > > >> Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are >> too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with >> too >> much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying >> "too >> late, too late ..."? > > Yes that is what I meant. > >>> but I think >>> they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the >>> Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which >>> just >>> oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum". >> >> >> I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or >> assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some >> identity >> thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's >> Olympia: we have discuss this). > > Now I don't understand; I am aware of Maudlin's Olympia, though not of > your movie graph argument. > > How do you mean the first person is forgotten? A bit like the way of the so called Eliminative Materialist" (cf the Churchland). The (hard) problem of consciousness and/or the mind problem is(are) so difficult that somme people hide it into a pure language problem or a problem referring to things which would not be existing, like if consciousness would be an illusion. I think that in this list people generally agree that consciousness or mind exists. Epiphenomenalism, the idea that consciousness exists but has no role or no function, is also a manner to make the person, and its will, disappear. Of course I do think that once we assume seriously the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive sciences, we have to "eliminate" the substantial primary matter idea, but this goes against many years (centuries) of naive aristotelianism, itself a product of millions years of "Darwinian Evolution": the cat is better not doubting the reality of the mouse if he want to survive ... Do you agree that consciousness cannot be an illusion unlike everything else? To be illusional, you have to be conscious of something. But everything else can be doubted: body, matter, universe(s), etc. Have a good day, Bruno PS thanks to the reference to Bostrom's paper. I have put it on my USB key, and I will read it at home tonight. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Dear Bruno, > Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic > corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation > rule. > The significance of this remains to be seen of course. Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one reading) > In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the > translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine. > Why? > Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the > fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing > Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p > sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she > is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p > Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the > self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The > Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences > together with their many proofs. > This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some > amount of knowledge of recursion theory. Ah OK; I am going to do some recursion theory this semester. (the Rogers book :-) Could you recommend something on modal logic? > Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are > too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too > much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying "too > late, too late ..."? Yes that is what I meant. >> but I think >> they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the >> Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which >> just >> oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum". > > > I don't understand. (In general the first person is forgotten or > assimilated to third person constructs like brain through some identity > thesis, this cannot work by the Movie Graph argument or by Maudlin's > Olympia: we have discuss this). Now I don't understand; I am aware of Maudlin's Olympia, though not of your movie graph argument. How do you mean the first person is forgotten? Best, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Gear Günther, Le 31-mars-08, à 19:01, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > Dear Bruno, > >>> The things I am unclear about are: >>> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state >>> -> >>> what are these? >> We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can >> be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state >> is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through >> an >> infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational >> history >> is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word >> "history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current >> state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity >> equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity >> classes I proceed in interviewing such machines. > > Ah OK, I understand. The equivalence class found in the interview - do > you have results already? Yes. The comp "intelligible matter" hypostases give the modal logic corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation rule. The significance of this remains to be seen of course. > >>> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you >>> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no >>> contradiction; or differently?)- >> Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so >> the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I >> identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of >> (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the >> white >> rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false >> at >> the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's >> second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when >> asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine). >> I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing >> Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to >> acknowledge >> that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they >> are universal. > > Ok, this is also clearer now. What my problem is that these > restrictions > seem somewhat arbitrary to me (only sigma_1 sentences etc) OK. This is part of what I intended to explain to David, Barry, Mirek and some others. In a nutshell, the restriction to the sigma_1 sentences *is* the translation of the comp hyp in the language of a Lobian machine. Why? Because you can characterize a Turing Universal Prover Machine by the fact that she can prove all true Sigma_1 sentences. So Turing Universality can be defined by the modal formula p -> []p, for p sigma_1. A lobian machine is not only universal, but "knows" that she is universal, i.e. she can prove all the formula p -> []p for p Sigma_1. Adding the axiom p -> []p to the logic G, gives the self-reference logic of the computationalist lobian machine. The Universal Dovetailer is equivalent to the set of true sigma_1 sentences together with their many proofs. This is explained at the end of most of my papers, but needs some amount of knowledge of recursion theory. > > It seems very much like picking out some well-behaved classes of > mathematical "objects" so that one get's nice resultes, compatible with > observable universe. Not at all. Everything comes from the mathematical description of what is a Universal dovetailer (and motivated by UDA which is itself based on the first person indeterminacy, and its invariance for some transformation). > > But why should the Plenitude restrict itself to such theories? Necessity follows from the informal UDA, and then the precise math is given by the formal (arithmetical) UDA. Remember that we postulate comp at the start. (After, the results go trough with very strong weakening of the comp hyp). > Or is > your view just that the others do not give rise to observers? The others give rise to observer, but use principle which I think should be justified. > >> Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I >> have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to >> be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take >> time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The >> reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I >> think. > > The 3rd person white rabbit would be the many universes; Hmmm... I would say that 3rd person white rabbit appear when there are too much universes with aberrant histories. Too much universes with too much talking white rabbits having clocks in their hands and saying "too late, too late ..."? > but I think > they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the > Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which > just > oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum". I don't understand.
Re: UDA Step 7
Dear Bruno, >> The things I am unclear about are: >> 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> >> what are these? > We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can > be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state > is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through an > infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational history > is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word > "history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current > state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity > equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity > classes I proceed in interviewing such machines. Ah OK, I understand. The equivalence class found in the interview - do you have results already? >> 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you >> define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no >> contradiction; or differently?)- > Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so > the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I > identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of > (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the white > rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false at > the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's > second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when > asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine). > I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing > Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to acknowledge > that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they > are universal. Ok, this is also clearer now. What my problem is that these restrictions seem somewhat arbitrary to me (only sigma_1 sentences etc) It seems very much like picking out some well-behaved classes of mathematical "objects" so that one get's nice resultes, compatible with observable universe. But why should the Plenitude restrict itself to such theories? Or is your view just that the others do not give rise to observers? > Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I > have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to > be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take > time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The > reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I > think. The 3rd person white rabbit would be the many universes; but I think they are also aware of first person white rabbit, as they discuss the Boltzmann brain quite literally as a "brain" in some papers - which just oozes away after some time or immediately after "cogito ergo sum". The central problem in all approaches seems (as the many discussions on this topic on the everything list also show) the _measure_ on the universes/OMs whatever. Maybe on should adopt some a priori "rational" principles to constrict possible universes (in line of symmetry, invariance, closure etc) (Of course, closure is one of these principles in your adopting Church Thesis as a vantage point for selecting from all math. objects; which contradicts my objection above ;-)) Cheers, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
On Mar 28, 11:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Marc, > > Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > > > Hi guys, > > > Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to > > COMP. > > OK. > > > > > I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless, > > the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different > > domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and > > *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other. > > Sure. I would add psychology, theology, sociology, etc. Well, perform a top-level decomposition of knowledge domains from the most to the least general, and you can actuallly catch math in the act of dividing into different knowledge domains. It's true that any such classification of reality is a mental construct, but this does not mean that all classification schemes are equal...some are far more useful than others and a careful decomposition of knowledge domains results in a single unified scheme 'dropping out' mathematical categories start to *decompose*, or *crystallize* into the reality we experience. Here's the beginning of my proposed decomposition (most abstract first, moving down through the list you move down through the knowledge hierarchy - so for example, Category Theory is most general, it 'eats' Algebra, which in turn 'eats' Discrete Math and so on down the list) PLATONIC (MULTIVERSE LEVEL) Category Theory - Calculus, Analysis, Number Theory, Peano Axioms, ZF- Set Theory Algebra- Field, Group, Ring Discrete Math - Algorithm, Cellular automation, Church-Turing, Combinatoraics, Computability, Godel, Lob, Graph Theory, Iteration, Recurison Aesthetics - Beauty, Sublimity Morality - Ethics, Social Contract, Utilarianism, Consequentalism Virtue - Archetype, Virtue Ethics Field Physics - Geometry, Standard Model, Trigonometry, Relativity Mechanics - Classical Mechanics, Hamiltonian Models, Lagrangian Mechanics Digital Physics - Computational Complexity, P=NP, Kolmogorov Complexity COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL (REALITY AS SEEN BY AN OBSERVER) Reflective Reasoning - Analogy formation, Prototyping, Consciousness Probability Theory - Bayes, Inductive Reasoning, Bayesian Networks Symbolic Logic - Boolean Algebra, First-Order Logic, Predicate Logic, Modal Logic Communication - Emotion, Linguistics, Semantics, Semiotics Decision Theory - Economics, Pareto Efficientcy, Game Theory, Utility Psychology - Developmental, Evolutionary, Social Data Communications - Information Theory, Information Integration, Global WorkSpace Thermodynamics - Memory-Prediction Model, Memory, Neural Network, 0th-3rd Laws Chemistry - Chemical Kinematics OBJECT LEVEL (ARTIFACTS - BY PRODUCTS OF COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL) Data Modeling / High Level - Ontology, Relational Databases, Semantic Web, Lisp, Ruby Software Architectures/ Mid Level - Design Pattern, Object Oriented, Java Operating Systems/Low Level - Linux, Windows, DOS, C Programming Language Sociology - Group, Role Politics - Democracy, Humanism, Socialism, Libertarianism Narrative Art - Fantasy, Science Fiction, Computer Games Virtual Reality - HTML, XML, World Wide Web, Human-Computer Interaction, GUI Mechanical Engineering - Computer Engineering, Internet, Telecommunications, Robotics Solid State Physics - Chemical Engineering, Nanotechnology, Electrical Engineering, Circuits -- Do you see how the original mathematical categories decompose and how there's a neat knowledge hierarcy emerging? All of these fields have in some sense *emerged* purely from *mathematical categories*, and each fits neatly in its rightful place. As of 2008, only the people on the everything-list start to see all ;) "Here we are.born to be kings. Were the princes of the universe. Here we belong.fighting to survive. In a world with the darkest powers. And here we are.were the princes of the universe. Here we belong.fighting for survival. Weve come to be the rulers of your world. I am immortal.i have inside me blood of kings. I have no rival.no man can be my equal. Take me to the future of your world. Born to be kings.princes of the universe. Fighting and free.got your world in my hand. Im here for your love and Ill make my stand. We were born to be princes of the universe. No man could understand.my power is in my own hand. Ooh.ooh.ooh.ooh.people talk about you. People say youve had your day. Im a man that will go far. Fly the moon and reach for the stars. With my sword and head held high. Got to pass the test first time - yeah. I know that people talk about me I hear it every day. But I can prove you wrong cos Im right first time. Yeah.yeah.alright.watch this man fly. Bring on the girls. Here we are.born to be kings.were the princes of The universe.here we belong.born to be kings. Princes of the universe.fighting and free. Got the world in my hands.Im here for your love. And Ill make my stand. We were born to be princes of the universe." - Queen, "
Re: UDA Step 7
Hi Marc, Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > Hi guys, > > Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to > COMP. OK. > > I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless, > the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different > domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and > *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other. Sure. I would add psychology, theology, sociology, etc. > My > misunderstanding was based on the fact that I couldn't (and still > don't fully) see how they could be the same. They are not. When I want to be very short about the consequence of comp (through UDA, say), I say that the "physical reality" is the border of the mathematical reality, as seen from inside mathematics. But it is more the border of the "lobian ineluctable ignorance". The difference with Tegmark, here, is that, although the physical reality can still be a mathematical (but a priori non computable) object, such object has to be derived from Turing machine's psychology/theology. (and then the interview of the lobian machine gives, thanks to the nuances brought by the incompleteness phenomenon, all the needed nuances (the arithmetical hypostases). > But yes, I'm now > convinced of COMP. Be careful. Comp needs some act of faith ... (even an infinitely reiterated act of faith, coffee can help in the morning, tea too ...). > > The relationship is subtle, but I'm now think that the *Mathematical* > domain is primary (most general), the *Teleological* domain is less > general, and the *Physical* domain is least general. I agree. > > So Math is the bedrock, which supercedes Teleology, which in turn > supercedes Physics. > > --- > > As regards the Consciousness discussion, there are three things you > need to remember about it; > > (1) It's not a thing, it's a process Hmmm... I am not sure it can even be a process. I would say it is a mind state, but this not saying much. I would say it is the mind state of someone believing in a reality, like a cat believing in an invisible (because hidden) mouse. > (2) It's not just a *physical* process, it's also a *mathematical* > process > (3) It's not just what the process *does* (it's function), it's what > the process *signifies* Sure. > > I think if you just bear in mind these 3 simple points about > consciousness, you won't go far wrong. > > After about 6 years of ganashing my teeth and nearly going insane > thinking about these issues, I have now reached my own tentative (in > principle) answers on most of the big questions, to my own > satisfaction. > > --- > > I don't think *any* of the current scientific or philosophical > persepctives on consciousness are quite right. > > Consciousness *is* physical, but it's not *just* physical, it also > extends into the mathematical domain. It is highly ambiguous to say that consciousness is physical, imo. > So I think that none of the > materialist or dualist positions are correct. OK. > I was fooled by > *functionalism* for a while, but I don't think that's quite right > either. See point (3) above - it's true that consciousness is a > process, just as the functionalists say. but it's not what the process > *does* (functionalism) that is identical to consciousness, but what > the process *signifies* - consciousness is a *logical representation* > of the meaning of a concept - it is a *language* for representing > concepts - this is NOT the same thing as functionalism. OK. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Hi Jason, Le 28-mars-08, à 01:07, Jason a écrit : > To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states > with mind states as COMP assumes, This could be a misleading way to present the thing, especially in front of a physicalist which most of the time tends to equate a computational state with a physical state. With comp, by subjective indeterminacy, we can *associate* a mind state to some computational state, but the reverse is not correct, the relation is not one-one, we have to associate an infinity of computational states to a mind state. For example your current mind state does not depend on the exact position of some electron in your brain, and more generally your mind state is associated with all possible relative incarnation/history of your computational state. > and if this universe is computable, Hmmm... I try to insist that, well ... in a nutshell, that IF I am a machine, THEN the universe is NOT computable. Neither the physical universe, nor the mathematical universe. The reason is that IF I am a machine, THEN what I can observe emerges from an infinity of computations going through my current state of mind. You are perhaps confusing Schmidhuberian constructive physics with what I take as being the consequence of indexical comp (there is a level such that *I* survive a substitution done at that level, and this whatever my first person (subjective) "I" believe to have as local incarnated third person "I" (body)). > would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular > mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by > experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is > experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication > and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link > between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not > the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we > grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could > share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via > communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting, > the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe, > or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If > this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a > maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be > perceived. I (or just comp if I am correct) agree(s) more with Plotinus ineffable ONE that with a personalized big whole like in some Christian reinterpretation of Plotinus neoplatonism. But Plotinus is not always clearcut on that question, and if you make the substitution level somehow infinitily low, then there could be a sense we are all the same person and we are ourselves the big whole. I personally doubt this, but who knows ... It is too early to draw a definitive conclusion from comp on this point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Hi guys, Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to COMP. I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless, the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and *abstract math*, which *look* very different to each other. My misunderstanding was based on the fact that I couldn't (and still don't fully) see how they could be the same. But yes, I'm now convinced of COMP. The relationship is subtle, but I'm now think that the *Mathematical* domain is primary (most general), the *Teleological* domain is less general, and the *Physical* domain is least general. So Math is the bedrock, which supercedes Teleology, which in turn supercedes Physics. --- As regards the Consciousness discussion, there are three things you need to remember about it; (1) It's not a thing, it's a process (2) It's not just a *physical* process, it's also a *mathematical* process (3) It's not just what the process *does* (it's function), it's what the process *signifies* I think if you just bear in mind these 3 simple points about consciousness, you won't go far wrong. After about 6 years of ganashing my teeth and nearly going insane thinking about these issues, I have now reached my own tentative (in principle) answers on most of the big questions, to my own satisfaction. --- I don't think *any* of the current scientific or philosophical persepctives on consciousness are quite right. Consciousness *is* physical, but it's not *just* physical, it also extends into the mathematical domain. So I think that none of the materialist or dualist positions are correct. I was fooled by *functionalism* for a while, but I don't think that's quite right either. See point (3) above - it's true that consciousness is a process, just as the functionalists say. but it's not what the process *does* (functionalism) that is identical to consciousness, but what the process *signifies* - consciousness is a *logical representation* of the meaning of a concept - it is a *language* for representing concepts - this is NOT the same thing as functionalism. Cheers all --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 12:56:48AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that > consciousness is a physical property. I'm with you on this one. Searle's suggestion sound bizarre to me, without further evidence to back it up. Where you and I might > diverge in opinion is that I think something still burns in a > simulated reality even if there are no observers within that reality > to sense it. It's the basic "If a tree falls in the woods.." idea. I > would say the simulation of the tree falling doesn't make a sound > without an observer in the simulation to hear it, but I would say a > tree still falls, in that simulation even without there being an > interpreter at that level of simulation. I am interested to know your > opinion on this and how if at all it differs from mine. > Whilst I probably do differ from you on this, I also think it is a question without merit, similar to debating the number of angels on the head of pin. > Regards, > > Jason > > -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process > as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of > the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain > process as self, so that (assuming comp) we can objectively say that > some processes are conscious, because they recognise themselves as > computations. Otherwise computation is just in the eye of the > beholder, and so would consciousness be, which is absurd. > > I think it unlikely that the entire universe is conscious. > I think we agree in some sense with the self-interpretation. Let me explain what I believe for the given thought experiment proposed by John Serle. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle#Artificial_intelligence "Since then, Searle has come up with another argument against strong AI. Strong AI proponents claim that anything that carries out the same informational processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious, because it was running the same information processes. Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how good a simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well you simulate fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative: observers pick out certain patterns in the world and consider them information processes, but information processes are not things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all implementing the same program." I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that consciousness is a physical property. I further disagree with his assertion that a computer based on pipes and water or ping pong balls could not be conscious. I think you would agree, saying that observers within those computed realities can interpret the computations that create their realities. When something is burned in a simulation, the heat of the fire and smell of the smoke can be felt by observers within that simulated reality. Where you and I might diverge in opinion is that I think something still burns in a simulated reality even if there are no observers within that reality to sense it. It's the basic "If a tree falls in the woods.." idea. I would say the simulation of the tree falling doesn't make a sound without an observer in the simulation to hear it, but I would say a tree still falls, in that simulation even without there being an interpreter at that level of simulation. I am interested to know your opinion on this and how if at all it differs from mine. Regards, Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is > pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience. > This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting > (two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If > we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness > beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space > seems more reasonable. > > I think in a certain sense two people holding hands and talking could be considered one mind. The differentiation between minds is certainly not black and white. Let's call the talking pair A and B. The activity of A's neurons affect the conscious experience of A, do you agree? If we stimulate a certain neuron in A's brain we might cause A to recall a memory, or see a hallucination. Neuron stimulation can directly effect the mind of A. Does not B through touch, speech, and visual cues effect the neural activity of A's brain? Consider that if a certain neuron in B's brain fires, it could cause a signal to be sent down the nerve sells to the muscles that control B's hand, causing B to squeeze A's hand. This results in the continued propagation of the nerve signal up A's arm into A's brain. I think what we typically consider to be independent minds are actually _mostly_ closed loops of neural activity with a very high degree of internal data transfer. Our minds are only partially isolated, however. There are lower throughput channels of information transfer that can link the state of two minds. My brain, by sending nerve inputs through my fingers and typing messages into my computer is injecting thoughts into your brain as you read this. Internal communication with in a brain may be many Terabits per second, but the computations that implement a brain in a universe like this cannot be considered in isolation. An analogy might be a grid computing system where powerful computers are connected via slow 14.4 Kbps modems. One computer can send a computational task to another, data transfer is slow and difficult, and to predict the future state of the system, all computers must be considered part of a larger computational process. Our brains themselves are much like this model, data is processed in one area, and the result is sent to other parts, yet we consider a brain to be a single mind. As Bruno often states, a mind is a computational history, but if we follow that history backwards in time it inevitably passes through and includes computations done by other minds. My point is that boundaries of where one mind might end and another begins is fuzzy, and perhaps the only consistent way to define a computational history of a mind is to consider all the computations until we reach some point isolation. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 05:07:30PM -0700, Jason wrote: > > To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states > with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable, > would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular > mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by > experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is > experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication > and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link > between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not > the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we > grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could > share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via > communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting, > the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe, > or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If > this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a > maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be > perceived. > > Jason The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain process as self, so that (assuming comp) we can objectively say that some processes are conscious, because they recognise themselves as computations. Otherwise computation is just in the eye of the beholder, and so would consciousness be, which is absurd. I think it unlikely that the entire universe is conscious. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience. This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting (two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space seems more reasonable. On 28/03/2008, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states > with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable, > would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular > mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by > experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is > experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication > and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link > between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not > the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we > grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could > share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via > communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting, > the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe, > or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If > this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a > maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be > perceived. > > Jason > > On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > > Dear Bruno, > > > > I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004 > > paper, and I have a question regarding step 7. > > > > (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment > > until I understand step 7 ;-) > > > > The things I am unclear about are: > > 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> > > what are these? > > > > 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you > > define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no > > contradiction; or differently?)- > > > > 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in > > modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational > histories? > > > > Cheers, > > Günther > > > > -- > > Günther Greindl > > Department of Philosophy of Science > > University of Vienna > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > .athttp://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ > > > > > Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ > > Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org > > > -- "They couldn't hit an elephant at this dist-" Last words of Gen. John Sedgwick, spoken as he looked out over the parapet at enemy lines during the Battle of Spotsylvania in 1864. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable, would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting, the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe, or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be perceived. Jason On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Bruno, > > I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004 > paper, and I have a question regarding step 7. > > (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment > until I understand step 7 ;-) > > The things I am unclear about are: > 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> > what are these? > > 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you > define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no > contradiction; or differently?)- > > 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in > modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational histories? > > Cheers, > Günther > > -- > Günther Greindl > Department of Philosophy of Science > University of Vienna > [EMAIL PROTECTED]://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ > > Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ > Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: UDA Step 7
Hi Günther, Le 25-mars-08, à 13:35, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > Dear Bruno, > > I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004 > paper, and I have a question regarding step 7. > > (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment > until I understand step 7 ;-) Nice. Step eight is the more difficult, but for some people---those who have never start to believe in a *primary* physical universal--- it can be considered as redundant. > > The things I am unclear about are: > 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> > what are these? We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state is accessed an infinity of times by the Universal Dovetailer through an infinity of infinite computations. OK? A complete computational history is just such an infinite computation. Sometimes I use the word "history" to refer to the internal view of some machine whose current state has been accessed by the UD. In that case some similarity equivalence class is in play. To get the math of those similarity classes I proceed in interviewing such machines. > > 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you > define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no > contradiction; or differently?)- Just "no contradiction". Now a computation is not per se a theory, so the notion of contradiction is not directly applicable. That is why I identify a computation with a proof of a Sigma_1 sentence of (elementary, Robinsonian) arithmetic. Of course this leads to the white rabbit issue, a lot of statement are relatively consistent and false at the same time, like the "self-inconsistency statement" (by Godel's second theorem the proposition "I am inconsistent" is consistent (when asserted by a Robinsonian machine or a Lobian machine). I recall that a Robinsonian machine is a machine having Turing Universal abilities, but without the introspective power to acknowledge that. On the contrary Lobian machine are universal and know that they are universal. > > 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in > modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational > histories? Thanks for the references out of line. I will read those papers once I have the time. At first sight it looks like the cosmologists begin to be aware of a (third person) white rabbit problem. It will still take time before they realize the first person white rabbit problem. The reason is that they have no formation on the "mind-body" problem I think. I hope this can help you a bit. I take the liberty to put online the references you gave me because I think it is of general interest: http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0611043 (Andrei Linde) or http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0610079 (Don Page) The New York Times had a piece about this stuff in January: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/science/15brain.html? _r=1&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
UDA Step 7
Dear Bruno, I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004 paper, and I have a question regarding step 7. (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment until I understand step 7 ;-) The things I am unclear about are: 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -> what are these? 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no contradiction; or differently?)- 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational histories? Cheers, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
